Analysis: China’s Strategy to Undermine the US Undersea Surveillance Network.

According to an article published on August 13, 2025, by Defense News, citing an essay by Ryan Martinson for the Center for International Maritime Security, some officers of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recommend a strategy aimed directly at the United States undersea surveillance network, which is considered a major threat to China’s submarine fleet. Martinson, a professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, reports that Chinese experts view this system as vulnerable due to the vast maritime area to be monitored in the Western Pacific. According to these experts, disabling enough sensors could paralyze the entire system and significantly reduce its effectiveness.
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China already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

To understand this concern, it is necessary to outline the structure of the U.S. undersea surveillance network, and the technical means China already possesses or seeks to develop, whether coercive or non-coercive but dual-use, that is, applicable for military purposes.

The U.S. system is built on an integrated architecture combining fixed sensors, mobile systems, and airborne platforms. At its core is the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), a successor to the Cold War-era SOSUS network, consisting of arrays of seabed acoustic sensors connected to shore by undersea cables. This fixed network continuously monitors strategic areas, particularly maritime choke points and likely submarine transit routes. Complementing it are towed-array systems such as the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS), deployed on specialized ships such as the Victorious and Impeccable classes. These are capable of using passive or low-frequency active sonar to detect submarines over long distances, even in complex acoustic environments. U.S. destroyers, frigates, and attack submarines add capability with hull-mounted sonars and towed arrays, while airborne assets, the P-8A Poseidon and MH-60R Seahawk, deploy sonobuoys, dipping sonars, and torpedoes. The network is further supported by satellites, unmanned undersea vehicles, and oceanographic research ships, which gather environmental data critical to optimizing detection.

This American view contrasts sharply with China’s perception. Washington and its allies are concerned about the rapid expansion of China’s submarine fleet, expected to reach 65 units in 2025 and 80 by 2035, including nuclear-powered ballistic missile and attack submarines, as well as advanced conventional types such as the Yuan class. Beijing, for its part, believes the increasing sophistication of U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts threatens the stealth of its submarines, a key factor in their operational effectiveness. The article in Military Art describes U.S. cables and sensor networks as “fragile and easily severed” and identifies the command and control systems as the network’s “Achilles’ heel,” potentially vulnerable to kinetic or cyberattacks. The authors call for the development of acoustic, magnetic, optical, and electronic detection technologies, supported by artificial intelligence, as well as autonomous undersea vehicles capable of destroying these infrastructures.

Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former U.S. Navy submarine officer, considers this assessment credible. He notes that the IUSS and SURTASS vessels have been effective for decades but acknowledges that targeted attacks on specific network nodes are possible. However, he emphasizes the difficulty of locating small devices at sea or on the seabed and the operational cost of such a campaign, which would require substantial resources and restrict the use of Chinese submarine forces within the first island chain, when they might be more effective beyond it. Clark also outlines another potential approach, saturating the U.S. network by deploying a large number of submarines before a conflict, making it more difficult for U.S. forces to track and engage them all simultaneously.

China already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions, and the Sea Wing (Haiyi) oceanographic drone, used in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea to gather environmental data suitable for military exploitation. These platforms can be launched from military or civilian vessels, including China’s large fishing fleet, which could be tasked with support missions. Conventional naval forces, such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines, could also directly target SURTASS ships or other U.S. surveillance vessels. In addition, China’s cyber capabilities provide another means to disrupt command and control.

In parallel, Beijing is investing in advanced detection and localization systems such as the Qianlong series (Qianlong-1, Qianlong-2, Qianlong-3) and the Haishen-6000, designed for deep-sea exploration but adaptable for military purposes. Equipped with multiple sensors and coupled with artificial intelligence, they could locate hidden or buried installations and prepare them for neutralization.

On the offensive side, China is considering militarizing research submersibles such as the Jiaolong and Shenhai Yongshi, which can dive to great depths, to place charges, cut cables, or disable sensors. This could be combined with a saturation strategy involving the simultaneous deployment of a large number of submarines, forcing the United States to disperse its surveillance resources and creating opportunities to penetrate areas normally well covered by U.S. ASW.

If China were to conduct a systematic campaign against the U.S. network of undersea sensors, the consequences would be wide-ranging. The U.S. Navy’s ability to monitor and track Chinese submarines in the Western Pacific would be reduced, complicating the implementation of sea-denial and sea-control plans. This might lead Washington to invest heavily in redundant, more discreet, and resilient systems, including increased use of autonomous undersea vehicles to patrol sensitive areas. Strategically, the partial or temporary loss of undersea information dominance would increase operational uncertainty for U.S. and allied forces, potentially creating windows of opportunity for Chinese operations within the first and second island chains. Such a development would also heighten the role of regional allied ASW capabilities, particularly those of Japan and Australia, in a more decentralized surveillance architecture that would remain exposed to adversary countermeasures.