Analysis: The Russian State Armament Programme 2018 – 2027
Even if the report used for the following analysis is more than one year old, its content makes it a remarkable instrument to understand the Russian defense evolution in terms of technical feasibility and financial affordability. Since then, Army Recognition published a lot of information enabling to validate this precious analysis that was carried on by Julian Cooper, Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, University of Birmingham/Associate Senior Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Extracts of his report addressing Army Recognition’s concerns have been selected hereunder.
2S35 Koalitsiya-SV 152mm self-propelled howitzer (Picture source: Army Recognition)
The Russian authorities have recently acknowledged that, after some delay and even some confusion about whether it had finally been signed off, President Putin has signed the new Russian State Armament Programme (SAP). As Deputy Prime Minister Dmitrii Rogozin noted, the new SAP was due in 2016, but given the events of 2014, particularly the fall in the price of oil, it was delayed.
This is an important step – the adoption of SAP-2027 indicates that Russia is set to begin a new phase of development of the Russian armed forces. Though the document itself is classified, and so cannot be reviewed directly, there is much evidence in the public domain which allows a detailed analysis of it. This review first briefly sketches out the role of the SAP in Russian planning and the shift in the planning horizon to a decade. It then turns to explore the scale of the funding of SAP and the priorities of the new SAP by service branch, before reflecting on the role of science in SAP, the defense industry and, finally, assessing the affordability of the SAP.
The SAP, is a ten-year document, updated every five years, approved by the President, setting out plans for the acquisition of new weapons, the modernization and repair of existing military equipment, and research and development (R&D) for the creation of new systems. The programme does not have the force of law but provides the basis for drawing up the annual state defense order (SDO) which brings together all the contracts between defense industry lead contractors and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) for the procurement of weapons and R&D to be implemented during the following year. This is approved by government decree and the funding of its implementation forms part of the federal budget chapter ‘national defense,’ which covers all the military activities of the MOD.
The SAP is a multi-volume document subject to very strict classification, summarizing the desired acquisitions of not only the MoD, but also other agencies with armed forces, in particular the Federal Security Service, the Ministry of the Interior, the troops of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardiya), the Ministry of Emergencies and the Federal Guard Service. The funding of the programme is based on a long-term budget forecast prepared by the Ministry of Finance (MoF), drawing on an economic forecast of the Ministry of Economic Development (MED). Funding is presented in terms of current, not constant, prices. The SAP is effectively a five-year document as acquisition intentions are set out in detail only for the first five years, the second presenting only general priorities. The principal performance indicator is the share of modern armaments and other military equipment in the total stock, by service and type of weapon, although the definition of ‘modern’ gives plenty of scope for subjective judgment.
Since SAP-2027 entered into force, significant development has been Putin’s state of the nation speech of 1st March 2018 in which he presented publically for the first time a number of advanced new weapons at various stages of development. They included the ‘Sarmat’ ICBM, an ‘Avangard’ hypersonic missile warhead, the ‘Kinzhal’ hypersonic air-launched missile, a mobile laser weapon of unspecified purpose, a long-range nuclear powered underwater drone able to carry a nuclear device, and a very long-range nuclear-powered cruise missile. According to Siluanov, funding for these development projects has been provided in SAP-2027 and it appears that the first four named systems are planned to enter service before the end of the period.
The priorities of SAP 2027 for the ground forces
There has been speculation that the ground forces will have a larger share of funding than in SAP-2020, but this may not be so as that programme was clearly amended in the course of implementation. When SAP 2020 first appeared, it was the development of a new generation of armored vehicles that attracted most attention. The target of delivering 2,300 new T-14 ‘Armata’ main battle tanks by 2020 was clearly challenging, and, while no equivalent targets for the ‘Kurganets-25’ and K-17 ‘Bumerang’ armored platforms were made public, it is likely that they were similarly ambitious.
To compensate for the delays, there was a quite large volume procurement of modernized equipment: according to Shoigu, in the five years 2012-17, the ground forces acquired 3,237 new and modernized tanks and armored vehicles. According to informed official reports, the ‘Armata’ will first be acquired in a trial batch of one hundred to be delivered by 2020 and serial procurement of the tracked ‘Kurganets-25’ will begin in 2021, but the year when the wheeled ‘Bumerang’ will enter service has not been revealed. According to Borisov, the volumes of serial production of the new armored systems will be decided after 2020.
This suggests that SAP-2027 may have less firm delivery targets for new weapons than did the over-optimistic SAP-2020. All the new systems will go first to the elite Taman division for trial use. Meanwhile, the acquisition of modernized tanks, a major feature of SAP-2020, will continue. Thus ‘Uralvagonzavod’ has a contract for the delivery of 30 T-90M tanks in 2018-19, including ten that will be newly built and twenty that will be modernized existing machines, plus in the same period 62 modernized T-80B to the level of T-80BVM. It is likely that more modernized T-72B3Ms will be purchased. According to Borisov, the MoD will acquire approximately 200 tanks a year. One new system, the BMPT 'Terminator‘ tank support combat vehicle, will be procured from 2018 when 12 will be purchased. The 2S35 ‘Koalitsiya-SV’ 152mm self-propelled howitzer will also soon be supplied in quantity.
Between 2011 and 2017, the ground forces acquired new multiple rocket launchers, in particular the ‘Tornado-G’ and ‘Tornado-S’ systems and, in late 2017, it was made known that development had started on a new generation successor under the name ‘Proryv’, presumably a priority under SAP-2027. There is clearly scope for the acquisition of more modern systems. According to Shoigu, from 2012 to 2017 the share of modern armaments in the ground forces as a whole increased from 15% to 44.7%, but this is a relatively small share compared to most other services. For some special troops, however, the share is much higher: electronic warfare forces, for instance, had a 67% modern share by the end of 2017, and are likely to remain a high priority in SAP-2027.
In terms of the implementation of SAP-2020, probably the most successful aspect has been the acquisition of the ‘Iskander-M’ operational missile system. Ten division sets were to enter service by 2020 according to the programme but, by the end of 2017, the target had already been met and in early 2018 another division was being introduced in Kaliningrad oblast. Deployment is likely to continue in SAP-2027, perhaps of an upgraded version, but the number of divisions has not been revealed.
The acquisition of the ‘Ratnik’ personal defense system for servicemen will continue with the transition to an upgraded version, ‘Ratnik-3.’ As part of these systems in January 2018 it was made public that the MoD had finally approved the adoption of new infantry weapons, the Kalashnikov AK-12 as the standard army machine gun and the AEK-971 as the machine gun for special divisions. The airborne troops will receive more airborne armored vehicles, in particular the BMD-4M ‘Sadovnitsa’ infantry fighting vehicle and the BTR-MDM ‘Rakushka’ armored personnel carrier officially adopted for armament in April 2016. A contract for a total of 250 of them is now being implemented.
UAVs and robots
It is clear that a high priority of SAP-2027 will be the acquisition of a widening range of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and various types of military robotic systems. At the start of SAP-2020, Russia was relatively backward in both technologies but has since made considerable progress with a growing research effort.
Russia now has a range of reconnaissance UAVs, notably the ‘Orlan-10’ and the ‘Forpost’, an Israeli ‘Searcher’ drone built under license, and both have seen combat use in Syria. The stock of UAVs is now more than 1,800 units. It has been announced that thirty more ‘Forpost’ are to be acquired by MoD, which is now committed to an import substitution programme at the Ekaterinburg Urals factory of civil aviation assembling them from imported components, the aim being to conclude a new contract from 2019 with full localization of supply. Work is also underway in Russia to develop unmanned underwater vehicles.
But there is still no strike UAV and filling this gap this is now a top priority. As the outcome of a tender of the MoD early in SAP-2020, there are three projects for their development. The smallest is a reconnaissance and strike UAV, the ‘Orion’ (R&D code name ‘Inokhodets’). This is a product of ‘Kronshtadt’ company, with some input from the Kazan Simonov design organization. It is an aircraft-type drone of about 1.2 tonnes able to carry small high-precision missiles. The second is the 5-tonne drone ‘Al’tair’ of Kazan Simonov. This has undergone flight tests but not entered serial production. The prototype that has flown has an engine built in Germany by the Russian-owned ‘Red Wing’ company.
In June 2017, Borisov stated that if state testing is completed in 2018 it will then be acquired. The third is a heavy (c. 20 tonnes), jet-powered, strike UAV, the ‘Okhotnik’, the ‘Okhotnik’, being developed by the Sukhoi design bureau. It was reported in 2014 that its first flight was expected in 2018. In December 2017, the Simonov design bureau received a contract from the MoD to develop a new heavy, high-speed UAV of the aircraft type with a turbojet engine. It is also known that the MoD started work on the development of a new long-range, supersonic, strike UAV able to fly at low altitudes. The basic problem for Russia in developing strike UAVs, if propeller-driven, is the lack of a suitable domestically produced power unit following the ending of deliveries from Ukraine. The ‘Salyut’ gas-turbine building center in Moscow has started to develop a new engine, the SM-100, for light aircraft and UAVs, with testing planned in 2019.
In recent years, there has been a rapid expansion of research into military robotics with the development of several new robot systems and this will remain a priority under SAP-2027. The Main Scientific Research and Testing Centre for Robot Technology of the MoD was established in Moscow in 2014. The MoD has adopted a ‘Concept for the application of robot systems of military purpose’, and is now realizing a programme ‘the creation of advanced military robots to 2025.’ The latter covers UAVs of all kinds and robotic systems for use on land and in water. There is considerable emphasis on the modularity of such systems, their autonomous action and the development of group applications of military robots. Some initial results have appeared, including the ‘Uran-6’ for clearing minefields, the ‘Uran-9’ for reconnaissance and fire support, the ‘Uran-14’ for fighting fires, the ‘Soratnik’ tracked and armored system for battlefield use, and the tracked ‘Nerekhta’ for reconnaissance, fire control and transport. It is clear that work on robotic systems will be stepped up during the next few years and that they will find increasing application in the armed forces.
The defense industry has its own programme
In examining future prospects for defense spending, it is necessary to consider a new dimension that appeared in 2016, namely the approval by the government of a new state programme for the development of the defense-industrial complex. Most of the funding of this programme, approved by a government decree of 16 May 2016, is classified. Only its first sub-programme, ‘Stimulating the development of the defense-industrial complex’ had open funding to a total of 35 billion rubles for the five years 2016-20. Rogozin later revealed that total budget funding of the programme would be 1,067 billion rubles, meaning that the open part is a mere 3%. Given that the programme is scheduled for only five years, this amounts to over 200 billion rubles a year.
Since the programme was adopted, further details have emerged. It has a number of sub-programmes in addition to the above, including the federal targeted programme, ‘development of the OPK’, which was originally intended to run from 2011 to 2020, a programme devoted to import substitution of technological equipment and components, one devoted to strategic materials, and another to ‘investigatory scientific research in the interests of the development of industrial technologies for the production of armaments, military and special equipment.’109 According to prime-minister Dmitrii Medvedev, work has now started on a new programme of development of the defense-industrial complex to 2025, presumably an updated extension of the existing state programme to bring it into line with GPV-2027.
Defense industry diversification
The adoption of SAP-2027 poses a challenge to the defense industry. Putin has been warning since December 2013 that the industry has to prepare for the time after 2020 when the growth of military orders will begin to moderate and even decline. As he underlined in April 2016, the response had to be diversification, with the development of the production of high-technology civilian and dual-use goods finding demand on both domestic and foreign markets. This would ensure the full use of defense industry capacities and employment but had to be prepared for in advance. This was the theme of meetings led by Putin in Tula and Izhevsk later the same year and has often been discussed since by Rogozin, Borisov and others, with frequent emphasis on the high-technology nature of the diversification, clearly to distinguish it from the ‘conversion’ of the Gorbachev years, a bitter memory in defense industry circles.
More recently, Putin spoke at a meeting on diversification at the Ufa aero-engine works in late January 2018. He noted that deliveries to the armed forces under the SDO would peak in 2020 and reiterated the basic targets: a civilian share of the output of the defense industry of 30% by 2025 by and at least 50% by 2030 compared with 17% in 2017. A month later, he issued a set of instructions (porucheniya) to the government on measures to facilitate diversification and monitor its implementation.
Can Russia Afford SAP-2027?
In 2018, Russia planned to spend 1,500 billion rubles on the MOD’s state defense order (SDO) accounting for almost 55% of planned spending on ‘national defense’, the budget chapter that accounts for most military spending, which is set to be just over 2.8% of GDP. From the three-year budget for 2018-20, it can be calculated that the SDO in 2019 is approximately 1,600 billion rubles, and ‘national defense’ 2.7% of GDP and for 2020 the equivalent figures are 1,700 and 2.6, with the SDO accounting for 60% of total spending on defense.
As noted above, the SDO is set to decline after 2020, apparently at first in nominal terms, i.e. to less than 1,700 billion rubles. Starting with these data and recalling that the funding of the SAP is in current prices, a simple simulation exercise reveals that the programme is probably affordable, definitely if a reasonable rate of growth is sustained. If an annual rate of economic growth of 2.5% is forecast for 2021-27, with a GDP deflator of 4%, and it is assumed that the defense share of GDP is held at 2.6% and the SDO share of ‘national defense’ at 55%, as in 2018, then it can be estimated that a modest decline in the volume of the SDO in nominal terms is possible in 2021 and that total spending on the SDO for the years 2018 to 2022, the first five years of the SAP, will be almost 8,300 billion rubles or almost 44% of the total funding allocation for the MOD under SAP-2027. For 2023 to 2027, total spending on the SDO turns out to be less than about 10,800 billion rubles, giving a total for the ten years of just over 19,000 billion rubles.
On the other hand, if growth after 2020 averages only 1.5%, the SAP could be implemented if spending on ‘national defense’ was held at 3% of GDP and the share of defense spending going to the SDO was 60%, as in the forecast for 2020. Such a gloomy growth scenario would clearly create more difficulties. Overall, SAP-2027 must be judged as feasible from an economic point of view, especially if economic growth is maintained at 2% a year or more.
Conclusion
SAP-2027 initiates a new phase of development of the Russian armed forces, a transition from an intensive process of renewal of its weaponry after almost two decades of being starved of new equipment to a more normal process of annual renewal. Clearly, the country’s civil and military leadership considers that by 2020, when the share of modern equipment should exceed 70%, that an adequate level of modernization will have been achieved making such a transition possible. As with SAP-2020, a large role will be played by modernized hardware, as opposed to completely new systems, although some developed during the last few years will finally be acquired in volume by the armed forces. Provided that the economy develops on a reasonably stable basis with an average rate of growth of GDP of at least two percent, the new programme should be feasible. For the defense industry, a new challenge will be posed: transition to the manufacture of more high-technology, competitive, civilian goods while continuing the development and production of genuinely modern armaments. But regardless of the new challenges that lie ahead, it cannot be denied that as a result of the implementation of SAP-2020 Russia is back as a credible military power.
Source: RUSSIAN STUDIES, NATO Defense College | 01/18 – May 2018
