Analysis: Will North Korea’s M-1978 Koksan Artillery Compensate for Russia’s 2S7 Pion Losses in Ukraine?.

With a shortage of 2S7 "Pion" howitzers and 203mm shells on the Russian side, and given the recent influx of North Korean weaponry into Russia, the possibility arises of seeing North Korea’s M-1978/1989 "Koksan" 170mm self-propelled artillery (SPA) deployed alongside Russian forces. These "Koksan" guns, although using a smaller caliber than the 2S7 "Pion," have a comparable maximum range (35-40 km), which makes them a feasible substitute for the depleted Russian long-range artillery units.
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The North Korean M-1978 "Koksan" 170mm self-propelled artillery displayed during a military parade in Pyongyang, showcasing its long-range strike capability and distinctive open-mounted gun at the rear of a modified Type 59 tank chassis. (Picture source: Social Network)

According to *The Military Balance 2024*, the Russian Army currently possesses 50 modernized 2S7M "Malka" and approximately 75 2S7 "Pion" howitzers, of which 31 have reportedly been destroyed or significantly damaged in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

The M-1978/1989 "Koksan" artillery systems, developed in North Korea, have proven valuable for long-range bombardment and targeting fixed positions, which aligns with Russia’s current artillery-based strategies. With its effective range of 40 kilometers using standard rounds and up to 60 kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles, the "Koksan" offers Russia comparable reach to the 2S7 "Pion." While it does not match the 203mm caliber of the "Pion" or the "Malka," its 170mm shells could still deliver significant destructive power, particularly in continuous bombardment operations—a staple of Russian tactics in the conflict.

Technically, the Koksan artillery system is built on a modified chassis of the Type 59 main battle tank, a design originally developed by China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO). In this configuration, the standard Type 59 turret has been removed and replaced with an armored plate, creating a platform at the rear of the vehicle where the 170mm gun is mounted in an open setup. This unconventional arrangement positions the gun at the very rear of the chassis, which assists in absorbing recoil and stabilizing the artillery system during firing. The driver’s compartment, located at the front left of the hull, is under complete armor protection, a design element retained from the original Type 59 chassis. The chassis itself provides a similar level of protection to that of the Type 59 MBT, offering some defense against small arms fire and shell fragments but limited resistance to direct hits.

The Russian military has faced significant challenges with the attrition of its 2S7 "Pion" fleet, which has weakened its capacity for long-range, high-impact strikes. Additionally, the scarcity of 203mm shells compounds this problem, restricting Russia’s ability to maximize the potential of its remaining "Pion" units. The introduction of North Korean M-1978/1989 "Koksan" guns could provide much-needed relief by filling the role of long-range artillery in critical sectors, albeit at a reduced caliber.

However, deploying "Koksan" artillery in Russia’s arsenal introduces logistical and operational complications. The 170mm caliber used by the "Koksan" is uncommon in Russia’s ammunition supply chain, which is mainly equipped for 152mm and 203mm rounds. Consequently, integrating this North Korean artillery would require either direct ammunition support from North Korea or establishing dedicated supply lines, which could be vulnerable to interception or disruption. Furthermore, Russian personnel would need training to operate these foreign systems, as North Korean artillery designs are generally less automated and user-friendly than Russian models. This could impact the rate of fire and overall operational efficiency, particularly in high-intensity combat environments.

Foreign artillery systems also present tactical risks in a conflict where Ukrainian forces possess NATO-supplied counter-battery radars, drones, and precision-guided munitions. Ukrainian troops have effectively targeted Russian artillery, including the 2S7 "Pion" units, using these advanced detection and targeting tools. The "Koksan" guns, if deployed, would likely face similar risks, making them vulnerable to counter-battery fire and precision strikes by Ukrainian forces. This vulnerability would necessitate strategic positioning and protective measures to avoid further losses.

This possible deployment also signals a significant shift in North Korea’s international posture and its relationship with Russia. For North Korea, supporting Russia represents a rare opportunity to bolster its standing with a significant global power, potentially in return for economic assistance or technological support, which could further develop its own military-industrial capabilities. However, such a transfer would likely be viewed as a violation of United Nations sanctions against North Korean arms exports, potentially attracting increased scrutiny and sanctions against both North Korea and the logistical networks supporting the cooperation.

The deployment of North Korea’s "Koksan" artillery in Ukraine would mark an unprecedented internationalization of the conflict, involving North Korean equipment in a high-stakes European battlefield. For Russia, these artillery systems could temporarily offset losses and sustain long-range artillery operations, essential to its strategy. It would highlight the importance of robust counter-battery capabilities and intelligence support for Ukraine and its allies to neutralize this new potential threat. As this scenario unfolds, the global defense community will be closely monitoring the operational impact of North Korean artillery on the battlefield, as well as the broader geopolitical implications of Russia’s increasingly public alignment with North Korea.