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Japan FY2026 Defense Budget Positions SHIELD Drones as Core Pillar of Southwestern Island Defense
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Japan’s FY2026 defense budget formally elevates the SHIELD concept into a core operational pillar, marking its clearest embrace yet of massed unmanned warfare, according to the Ministry of Defense. The move signals a strategic judgment that future fighting in the southwestern islands will hinge on exhausting an adversary’s strike complex rather than preserving a small number of high-value platforms.

Japan has taken a decisive step toward reshaping its military doctrine, with the Ministry of Defense confirming on December 26, 2025, that the FY2026 defense budget formally positions the SHIELD concept as a core operational pillar. The shift reflects a growing consensus inside the ministry that deterrence and warfighting in the southwestern islands will depend less on the survivability of exquisite platforms and more on the ability to generate sustained pressure through large numbers of unmanned systems operating across air, sea, and land domains.
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Rather than a discrete drone program, SHIELD, forms a joint combat architecture networked across unmanned air, surface, and underwater assets of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.(Picture source: Japanese MoD)

SHIELD, an acronym for Synchronized, Hybrid, Integrated, and Enhanced Littoral Defense, is not a standalone drone program but a fully integrated combat architecture designed to network unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater systems across all three branches of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. The FY2026 budget allocates approximately JPY 312.8 billion to unmanned asset defense capability, including JPY 128.7 billion specifically dedicated to standing up SHIELD by FY2027. Japanese defense planners describe the system as a multilayered coastal denial framework intended to overwhelm enemy sensors, dilute missile salvos, and impose a punishing cost-exchange ratio on any attacking force.

At the tactical level, the Ground Self-Defense Force will field an entirely new family of expendable attack drones designed for mass production and rapid replacement. Three primary categories are planned. The Type I small attack UAV is optimized for short-range strikes against vehicles, dismounted forces, and exposed equipment, closely resembling FPV-style loitering munitions adapted for military use. The Type II variant extends range and payload, enabling attacks against fortified positions, logistics nodes, and amphibious landing craft operating near the coastline. The Type III UAV represents the most disruptive element, with an advertised engagement range of up to approximately 100 kilometers against ground and surface targets, effectively functioning as a low-cost, long-range precision strike asset intended to complement traditional missiles.

These attack drones are supported by modular reconnaissance UAVs and quadcopters for real-time target acquisition, battle damage assessment, and fire correction. Japan is also introducing specialized interceptor UAVs tasked with defending radar sites and air defense nodes, reflecting an understanding that fixed sensors will be prime targets in the opening phase of any high-intensity conflict. Rather than relying solely on surface-to-air missiles, SHIELD uses cheap aerial interceptors to counter enemy drones and loitering munitions at close range.

Maritime elements form the second pillar of the system. The Maritime Self-Defense Force plans to deploy ship-launched UAVs for over-the-horizon reconnaissance and strike missions against surface targets, extending the sensor and engagement reach of destroyers and patrol vessels without exposing manned aircraft. In parallel, SHIELD includes the acquisition of small multipurpose unmanned surface vehicles capable of operating in coordinated swarms. These USVs are designed for surveillance, target designation, electronic decoy roles, and direct attacks against enemy vessels, forcing adversaries to choose between expending expensive anti-ship missiles or allowing unmanned attackers to close the distance.

Below the surface, small multipurpose unmanned underwater vehicles provide persistent intelligence collection in chokepoints and littoral approaches. These UUVs are optimized for reconnaissance, seabed mapping, and monitoring of amphibious movements, providing data that feeds into the broader SHIELD command network. Their contribution is critical in maintaining continuous situational awareness in contested waters where traditional manned submarines and patrol aircraft may be constrained.

What binds these disparate systems together is SHIELD’s centralized yet resilient command-and-control architecture. The Ministry of Defense emphasizes the ability to simultaneously control heterogeneous unmanned assets across domains, creating a distributed sensor-to-shooter network where low-cost platforms generate targeting data for higher-end weapons such as stand-off missiles, coastal artillery, and naval strike systems. This architecture allows Japan to conserve scarce high-value munitions while maintaining pressure across the battlespace.

Operationally, SHIELD reflects direct lessons drawn from Ukraine, where inexpensive drones have repeatedly forced adversaries into unfavorable cost exchanges and exposed the vulnerability of concentrated forces. Japanese planners increasingly view attrition not as a failure but as a deliberate tool. By forcing an opponent to expend advanced interceptors and long-range missiles against expendable drones, SHIELD aims to erode offensive momentum before decisive engagements occur.

Strategically, the system represents a profound cultural shift for Japan’s defense posture. Long defined by quality, restraint, and defensive interception, Tokyo is now explicitly planning for saturation, redundancy, and acceptance of losses in unmanned assets to preserve human life and combat power. The FY2026 budget makes clear that Japan no longer assumes future wars will be short or containable. Instead, it is building the capacity to fight under sustained missile pressure across the first island chain.

For regional adversaries, the implication is stark. Any attempt to coerce or seize territory in Japan’s southwestern approaches would encounter not only layered missile defenses and long-range strike capabilities, but also a dense, adaptive cloud of unmanned systems designed to disrupt sensors, exhaust magazines, and degrade decision-making from the opening hours of a conflict. SHIELD transforms Japan’s defense budget from a conventional rearmament plan into a declaration of how it intends to fight and endure in a high-intensity Indo-Pacific war.
Exclusive Analysis: U.S. Trump-Class Warship Introduces Next-Generation Stealth and Combat Systems
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The U.S. Navy has announced plans to design a Trump-class guided missile battleship, beginning with USS Defiant (BBG-1), as part of a broader Golden Fleet expansion. The proposed ship emphasizes hypersonic strike capabilities, deep missile capacity, and fleet command survivability in high-end conflicts.

On December 22, 2025, the U.S. Department of War announced its intent to construct a new Trump-class guided missile battleship, starting with the future USS Defiant (BBG-1), as the centerpiece of a wider “Golden Fleet” buildup. The move revives the battleship label, but the hardware being proposed is closer to a missile-heavy large surface combatant built to fight inside a saturated anti-ship missile environment, while also acting as a fleet command node. The War Department’s Pentagon News account describes the ships as 30,000-to 40,000-ton combatants now in the design phase, with construction of the lead ship targeted for the early 2030s.
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Trump class battleship concept is a 35,000-ton missile-heavy flagship built for hypersonic strike, dense air defense, and layered self-protection with deep magazines and advanced sensors (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

For the U.S. Navy, the operational problem is keeping surface forces lethal after the first days of a peer fight, when carriers may need to operate at longer stand-off ranges and when destroyers can burn through their missile magazines quickly. The Golden Fleet portal frames the battleship as a platform that can strike an adversary at vastly longer range than the previous class and, crucially, can deploy with hypersonic and nuclear-capable missiles. Official reports describe the plan as beginning with two ships, with an eventual ambition for 20 to 25 hulls, positioning the class as a magazine and presence multiplier rather than a boutique capability.

The concept design places the Trump-class in the 30,000 to 40,000 ton displacement range, with USS Defiant shown as a roughly 35,000 ton combatant exceeding 840 feet in length and approaching 880 feet overall, with a beam between 105 and 115 feet and a draft estimated at 24 to 30 feet. Propulsion is described as a combined gas turbine and diesel configuration delivering more than 30 knots of top speed, while providing sufficient electrical margin to support energy intensive sensors and weapons. Crew size is projected between 650 and 850 personnel, reflecting both the ship’s scale and its role as a command flagship rather than a traditional escort.

The announced main battery is missile-centered. Navy messaging ties the class to Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic weapons and to the Surface Launch Cruise Missile Nuclear, commonly referred to as SLCM-N, indicating an intent to combine long-range conventional strike and a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile option on a surface combatant. The concept art and accompanying technical material circulating in coverage also describe a large Mk 41 Vertical Launching System fit on the order of 128 cells, plus a dedicated 12-cell battery for CPS. In practical terms, this would let a single ship carry a mixed load of Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles, SM-2 and SM-6for area air defense and surface strike, and potentially SM-3 for ballistic missile defense, alongside hypersonic rounds intended for time-sensitive or heavily defended targets. The Navy’s own press language emphasizes larger missile magazines and deep strike weapons as the central idea.

In addition to its missile armament, the Trump class design reintroduces advanced gun systems as part of a layered engagement strategy. The Golden Fleet concept promotes directed energy weapons for more favorable exchange ratios against incoming threats, and reporting on the technical package attributes to the ship a 32 megajoule railgun firing hypervelocity projectiles, plus two 5-inch guns paired with hypervelocity ammunition. If those elements mature, they would give Defiant a menu of lower-cost shots for close and medium range engagements, particularly against drones, fast attack craft, and potentially certain missile profiles. The same reporting describes an option of two 300-kilowatt or two 600-kilowatt class lasers, complementing kinetic close-in systems and providing sustained defensive fire limited mainly by power generation and thermal management. At the same time, both railguns and high-end shipboard lasers remain technically demanding, and outside observers have noted that the Navy previously reduced emphasis on railgun development after years of work, which is why early hulls would likely need a conservative path that does not hinge on any single revolutionary weapon to reach initial operational capability.

Defiant’s defensive concept is built around layered sensing, electronic warfare, and rapid engagement. The Navy press release explicitly assigns the ship an Integrated Air and Missile Defense role and describes it as capable of operating with a carrier strike group or commanding its own surface action group. The artwork associated with the announcement depicts an Aegis-type architecture, and the intent is clearly to make the battleship a high-value air defense node that can protect itself and others while also delivering long-range fires. For close in defense, the ship is shown equipped with two Mk 45 Rolling Airframe Missile launchers, multiple Mk 38 30 millimeter guns positioned fore and aft, and at least two 20 millimeter class close range systems to counter leakers that penetrate the outer defensive layers.

The Trump-class battleship also integrates two Counter Unmanned Systems modules, reinforcing its role in defending itself and nearby vessels against drone swarms in congested littoral or open ocean environments. The flight deck and hangar depicted for a large tiltrotor, such as the V-22, point to a ship that is designed to move people, parts, and sensors quickly, extend its scouting radius, and support maritime interdiction or special operations support missions without immediately leaning on the carrier air wing.

The tactical reason to build a ship in this size class is magazine depth married to survivability and command capacity. A larger hull can accept more redundancy in power distribution, more compartmentation, larger damage control margins, and greater space for cooling and electrical growth, all of which become decisive if directed energy and advanced sensors are to be fielded at scale. It also provides room for a robust command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence suite, which Navy messaging highlights by describing the battleship as a quarterback for wider fleet operations, including manned and unmanned platforms. In a distributed maritime operations construct, that combination matters because it allows the Navy to push decision-making and engagement authority forward while still retaining a heavily defended node that can coordinate a surface action group and keep firing after smaller escorts have expended their weapons.

On development and feasibility, official accounts state the Navy will lead design while partnering with the defense industrial base, and they add that the Trump class would replace the earlier DDG(X) destroyer plan, with intended DDG(X) capabilities folded into the new hull. That phrasing implies a program strategy built around adopting mature subsystems where possible, such as Mk 41 and established combat systems, while treating railguns and the highest power lasers as spiral upgrades. Broader reporting has emphasized the scale ambition and the administration’s message about expanding industrial output across the country, which, if pursued, would require long-term funding stability, workforce growth, and shipyard throughput improvements to avoid colliding with other major naval construction priorities.

Against Western competitors, the Trump class concept sits in a displacement and magazine category that NATO navies do not currently field. Britain’s Type 45 destroyers and the Franco-Italian Horizon class are optimized for air defense in the roughly 7,000 to 8,000 ton range, with far smaller missile capacities than the roughly 140 launch cells suggested for Defiant when Mk 41 and CPS cells are combined. Even Japan’s Maya class, among the most capable Aegis destroyers outside the U.S. Navy, carries 96 Mk 41 cells at around 10,000 tons full load. The closest Western analogue in ambition is the U.S. Navy’s own Zumwalt class, built around large electrical power margins and now being adapted for hypersonic weapons, but it remains far smaller in displacement than a 35,000-ton battleship concept.

If built as described, the new Trump-class battleship would shift U.S. Navy surface combat power by concentrating long-range strike and air defense into fewer, higher-capacity flagships that can carry the fight deeper and longer without immediate resupply. The neutral capability impact is straightforward: more missiles per hull, more growth margin for directed energy, and a platform designed to act as a forward command node, all aimed at sustaining sea control and power projection in the 2030s and beyond.

Read full technical review here: Trump-class battleship

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
U.S. Army unveils lean Mobile Brigade Combat Team built for modern warfare
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The U.S. Army is moving toward a new Mobile Brigade Combat Team that cuts brigade manning to about 1,900 troops while packing in more sensors, drones, and precision weapons, according to a new Congressional Research Service note based on Army data. The design is meant to help light infantry survive and win in drone-saturated, electronically contested battles similar to Ukraine, trading sheer numbers for speed, dispersion and precision fires.

The U.S. Army is preparing to replace traditional Infantry Brigade Combat Teams with a lighter, more technically dense Mobile Brigade Combat Team built around mobility vehicles, organic drones and long-range precision strike, according to a December 9 Congressional Research Service note drawing on official Army force design data. The future MBCT trims brigade strength to roughly 1,900 soldiers, less than half the manpower of a current IBCT, while adding layers of small UAS, loitering munitions, electronic warfare, and mobile command nodes designed to maneuver and survive under constant observation and long-range fire.
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Soldiers from the 2nd Mobile Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), start their Infantry Squad Vehicle after a UH-60 Black Hawk drop at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Johnson. (Picture source: US DoD)

The reduction in organizational size is the first major shift. The MBCT will consist of approximately 1,900 soldiers, compared with 4,500 in a traditional Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). The Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is the standard infantry brigade designed for sustained operations in low-intensity environments. The new format redistributes essential functions to prioritize mobility, autonomy and the ability to disperse, while retaining a core of fires, logistics, communications, medical support and information advantage. This reduction does not imply a loss of capability; instead, it reflects a technological densification intended to replace mass with speed and precision.

Enhanced tactical mobility relies on the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV), now fielded across every rifle squad. The Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) is a lightweight nine-seat platform able to transport a full squad and its equipment across complex terrain without dependence on established routes. Designed as an expendable platform, it enables rapid maneuver and improves survivability against drones, observers and indirect fires. The report reveals two additional variants in development: the ISV-Utility (ISV-U), which will integrate command modules, energy storage and distribution, electronic warfare, counter-UAS systems, precision-fires payloads and mortar options; and the ISV-Heavy (ISV-H), intended to serve as a brigade-level mobile command platform with a hybrid powertrain producing the electrical output needed for EW systems and tactical networks. This approach turns a light vehicle into a technical node supporting high-intensity operations.

The second pillar of the MBCT concept is the increased density of sensors and effectors across all echelons. Small UAS become organic from squad to battalion, supporting reconnaissance, target acquisition and maneuver. Loitering munitions provide the capability to strike beyond line of sight, enabling dispersed units to engage targets at several kilometers. The document confirms the gradual replacement of the TOW 2B missile by the Mobile Long-Range Precision Strike Missile system, developed to extend anti-armor reach for dispersed elements. This technical layer builds on weapons already present in the squads, including the Javelin missile, effective against armored platforms at extended ranges, and the Carl-Gustaf launcher, suited to fortified positions and tactical obstacles.

The creation of the Multi-Function Reconnaissance Company (MFRC) represents a major organizational innovation. It merges traditional reconnaissance with the Tactical UAS platoon, the EW platoon and an Effects platoon equipped with loitering munitions and anti-armor systems. Teams can be task-organized to support battalions during distributed operations. This integration of sensors, jamming and precision effects within a single company reflects a shift toward light units built around modular technical capabilities.

The report also details the Multi-Purpose Company (MPC), which will replace assault companies in Infantry Battalions. It centralizes mortars, reconnaissance and counter-UAS assets while controlling most of the battalion’s loitering munitions. This consolidation aims to reposition sensors, indirect fires and counter-drone systems quickly, increasing battalion responsiveness in battlefields dominated by aerial observation and precision strike.

The transformation timeline is tied to concrete capability milestones. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY2025 includes MBCTs already equipped with full ISV fleets, organic small UAS and initial quantities of loitering munitions integrated into tactical command structures. FY2026 budget lines allocate more than 300 million dollars for the ISV and 75 million for loitering munitions, reinforcing three technical pillars: mobility platforms, aerial sensor density and organic strike capabilities. As ISV-U and ISV-H variants are fielded, the brigade will gain dedicated vehicles for mobile command, onboard energy generation, EW systems and C2 functions, strengthening tactical networks.

The internal configuration of the MBCT establishes a continuous chain of technical effects from squad to brigade. Sections combine ISV mobility with the engagement capabilities of the Javelin, which can reach armored targets beyond two kilometers, and the Carl-Gustaf, suited for destroying structures or light armor. Small UAS provide observation and fire adjustment. The MFRC adds integrated layers of sensors, jamming and loitering munitions, while the MPC coordinates mortars, reconnaissance and counter-UAS assets. The result is a light but technologically dense brigade able to disperse forces without losing tactical coherence, supported by mobile platforms generating the power required for sensors, data links and precision-strike systems.
INTEL: North Korea’s Hwasong-20 ICBM Missile Emerges as New Strategic Threat to Indo-Pacific and U.S.
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North Korea’s new Hwasong 20 InterContinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) is drawing heightened scrutiny from defense analysts, who say the system’s design points to a more survivable and flexible nuclear threat than anything Pyongyang has fielded before. Early assessments suggest the missile could introduce a step change in range, mobility, and potential payload options, raising concerns about how the United States and its regional allies will need to adapt their deterrence posture.

The Hwasong 20, first publicly displayed during an October 2025 military parade in Pyongyang, now sits at the center of U.S. and South Korean intelligence reviews of its operational potential. The oversized transporter launcher and the apparent multi-stage configuration have prompted analysts to revisit long-standing assumptions about North Korea’s ability to disperse, conceal, and rapidly ready its strategic systems. Although no flight-test data have been released, the platform’s architecture suggests that Pyongyang is pursuing an ICBM designed for extended range and reduced vulnerability. This combination could complicate missile defense planning and early warning timelines.
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The Hwasong 20 intercontinental ballistic missile moves through central Pyongyang during North Korea’s October 2025 military parade, carried on an enlarged transporter launcher that analysts say underscores the regime’s push for greater range, mobility, and nuclear survivability. (Picture source: North Korea Press Agency)

A new-generation solid-fuel engine reportedly powers the missile, believed to deliver thrust in the range of 1,960 to 1,970 kilonewtons. This performance level surpasses that of the earlier Hwasong-18, North Korea’s first solid-fuel ICBM, by roughly 40 percent. Solid-fuel propulsion brings decisive advantages. Unlike liquid-fueled missiles, which require hours of pre-launch preparation, solid-fuel systems can be fired with minimal warning, significantly improving survivability and responsiveness.

Accompanying the missile is a newly developed 11-axle transporter-erector-launcher. The TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) design is a key element of this weapons system, offering road mobility and a quick-launch capability that makes preemptive targeting by enemy forces substantially more difficult. Unlike previous TELs that relied on side-mounted elevation systems, the Hwasong-20 launcher employs a central vertical erection mechanism. This configuration more closely mirrors the architecture of Russian and Chinese TELs, indicating growing sophistication in North Korea’s missile deployment platforms.

The missile is housed in a sealed canister on the launcher, further improving its combat readiness and resistance to environmental degradation. This canisterized configuration supports long-term storage, faster field deployment, and reduced visibility during pre-launch operations. The canister also likely protects the missile’s sensitive components and simplifies transport logistics, enhancing its credibility as a deployable deterrent rather than a symbolic display asset.

Strategic analysts have taken particular note of the missile’s widened payload shroud and enlarged airframe, which suggest the Hwasong-20 could be capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs. If true, this would enable a single missile to deliver several warheads to distinct targets, dramatically increasing its threat potential. Such a capability would also place significant strain on regional missile defense systems, including THAAD, Aegis Ashore, and Patriot PAC-3 batteries, which are optimized for single-warhead trajectories and may be overwhelmed in a saturation scenario.

The projected range of the Hwasong-20 is estimated at over 15,000 km, placing the entire continental United States within reach. This reach is particularly concerning for Indo-Pacific security planners, as it reinforces North Korea’s strategy of threatening the U.S. homeland in order to erode confidence in Washington’s extended deterrence commitments. If South Korea or Japan begins to doubt that the United States would risk nuclear retaliation to defend them, the foundation of alliance-based deterrence in the region could begin to crack.

In the context of regional dynamics, the Hwasong-20 arrives amid heightened military competition. China’s military assertiveness in the South China Sea, Russia’s growing defense relationship with Pyongyang, and renewed trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea have created a complex and volatile environment. The Hwasong-20’s introduction can be seen not just as a weapons milestone but as a strategic maneuver to exploit regional uncertainty and widen divisions among U.S. allies.

Satellite imagery and open-source intelligence have tracked increased activity at known North Korean test sites, including movement of TELs and construction work at static engine test stands. This activity coincides with Pyongyang’s public claims of successfully testing a high-performance carbon-fiber composite engine, purportedly the core propulsion system for the Hwasong-20. However, no live launch footage or telemetry data has been made public, leaving the missile’s actual performance in question.

Despite the lack of a verified flight test, defense officials across the United States and East Asia are treating the Hwasong-20 as a credible threat. The Pentagon has acknowledged intensified surveillance over North Korean missile facilities and reaffirmed its defense commitments to allies in the region. Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan have both accelerated their own missile defense upgrades and continue to deepen defense integration with U.S. forces.

Operationally, the Hwasong-20 presents several challenges. Its mobility makes it harder to track. Its solid-fuel nature means it can launch faster than traditional liquid-fueled missiles. And its suspected MIRV capability means it can potentially overwhelm current missile defenses with multiple warheads from a single launch. These factors combine to create a system that is not just more powerful but more unpredictable, reducing early warning time and increasing the complexity of response options.

Viewed through the lens of regional deterrence, the Hwasong-20 is a deliberate signal by Pyongyang. It is not merely a technological upgrade but a political message aimed at shaping the behavior of adversaries and allies alike. By introducing a missile that threatens both the regional and strategic reach of U.S. forces, North Korea is attempting to alter the risk calculus and strategic posture of the entire Indo-Pacific theater.

Until a successful flight test is confirmed, the full operational credibility of the Hwasong-20 remains uncertain. But its debut and the capabilities it claims cannot be ignored. It reflects North Korea’s continued prioritization of missile modernization, and its strategic doctrine is clearly evolving to include mobile, survivable, and multi-warhead nuclear platforms.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
British Army tank regiment soldiers train with drones in Estonia to boost battlefield awareness
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British soldiers from the Royal Tank Regiment have finished a small drone operators course in Estonia, training alongside NATO partners in Baltic winter conditions. The course signals a major shift as one of the UK’s oldest armored units adapts to modern reconnaissance needs using tactical sUAS platforms.

British soldiers from Dreadnaught Squadron of the British Army Royal Tank Regiment completed a small Unmanned Aircraft System operators course in Estonia, according to information posted by the Royal Armoured Corps on its official X account on November 30, 2025. The training, conducted alongside allied instructors and tested in winter conditions, reflects a growing push to equip armored crews with lightweight reconnaissance drones that can scout ahead of heavy vehicles and improve battlefield awareness.
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British soldiers from Dreadnaught Squadron, Royal Tank Regiment, operate a small tactical drone during sUAS training in Estonia, enhancing battlefield reconnaissance capabilities in coordination with NATO forces. (Picture source: Royal Armoured Corps X account)

The training was deliberately set against Estonia’s unpredictable late-autumn weather, with high winds, persistent rain, and limited daylight, testing the operational limits of small drone systems. British troops progressed from theoretical classroom modules to hands-on flying, executing live drone operations during both daylight and nighttime conditions. The goal was clear: to equip armored units with organic aerial reconnaissance capabilities to enable faster, more informed decision-making on the modern battlefield.

Historically, the British Army's Dreadnaught Squadron has relied on the Challenger 2 main battle tank for its combat effectiveness. While these heavily armored platforms remain critical to ground dominance, they have long lacked immediate situational awareness beyond line of sight. That gap is now being filled by drones. Small uncrewed systems allow tank crews to scout terrain, detect enemy positions, and map movement corridors before exposing their vehicles to potential ambush or long-range anti-tank threats.

Incorporating drone operations into armored doctrine represents a fundamental shift in how British forces prepare for conflict. As one senior officer involved in the training explained, “This isn't just a side skill. It’s a core enabler that lets tanks act with precision rather than brute force. It’s how we win before contact.” By launching a drone ahead of an armored column, commanders can identify kill zones, spot dismounted threats, or even mark enemy armor for indirect fires. This new layer of awareness transforms how the Royal Tank Regiment maneuvers in contested environments.

In addition to enhancing their own capabilities, Dreadnaught Squadron troops trained alongside partner forces from NATO's enhanced Forward Presence. This joint context ensured full interoperability and built on shared tactics that reflect the changing nature of war in Eastern Europe. With Russian aggression still looming across the region, integrated drone use is no longer experimental. It is a frontline necessity.

The training also has strategic implications. By embedding sUAS operators within tank formations, the British Army is signaling that its heavy forces will no longer operate in isolation or ignorance of their surroundings. Instead, these units are being configured to operate as part of a larger sensor-to-shooter network, where real-time intelligence drives maneuver and fires. Analysts from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) have noted that such capabilities will be essential in any future peer conflict, particularly in densely contested areas such as the Suwałki Gap or in urban environments where tanks are vulnerable to asymmetric threats.

Although the British Ministry of Defence has not yet formalized a regiment-wide doctrine for integrating drones into all armored units, sources suggest a broader rollout is likely. Troops from this training cycle are expected to return to the UK and serve as instructors, bringing sUAS integration into the wider force structure of the Royal Armoured Corps.

Crucially, this shift is not about replacing tanks. It is about enhancing their relevance in a digitized battlefield where information dominance often determines victory. As a junior NCO from Dreadnaught Squadron put it during the course, “We’re still tankers. We’re just tankers who can see further and strike smarter.”

For the British Army Royal Tank Regiment, the move toward drone-supported operations is not just a tactical upgrade. It is part of a generational evolution that fuses historical battlefield muscle with the intelligence and adaptability demanded by 21st-century conflict.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
U.S. Prepares for Possible Military Action in Venezuela, Nigeria and Iraq After President’s Announcement
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U.S. President Donald Trump has ordered preparations and publicly floated military options in three theaters, Venezuela/Caribbean, Nigeria/West Africa and Iraq/ West Asia, while the U.S. has increased naval and air assets in the southern Caribbean. The moves concentrate on coercive, precision options near maritime approaches and standoff strike packages in each theater, with distance, partner access and legal constraints shaping feasible courses of action.

According to articles and statements since his reelection in 2024, U.S. President Donald Trump has pursued a double-edged foreign policy. On one side, he pledges to end America’s “forever wars” and restore global economic stability; on the other, he has reignited commercial rivalries by imposing new tariffs even on traditional allies. In recent weeks, Trump has gone further, openly mentioning potential U.S. military interventions across three continents. In South America, tensions with Venezuela have surged as the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, recently redeployed from the Mediterranean, arrived in Caribbean waters. In Africa, the president has spoken of “taking action” in Nigeria, a country marked by religious conflict and immense oil wealth. And in Western Asia, he has warned Iraq’s leadership of possible “operations” if American interests are threatened. Behind the rhetoric lies a consistent pattern: each of these nations maintains strained relations with Washington while controlling key energy resources. Should economic or diplomatic levers fail, the administration appears ready to rely on nearby military assets tailored to each theatre, at sea, in the air, or on land.
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A carrier strike group operating as part of the U.S. Fleet, soon to be deployed near Venezuela (Picture source: U.S. Navy).

The geography and posture are not symmetrical: in the southern Caribbean, U.S. naval and air assets surged in late summer and early autumn, giving Washington proximate tools for precision maritime interdiction, coastal strikes and limited special operations. Multiple reports have documented strikes on suspected drug craft near Venezuela in September and October, alongside the arrival of warships, a fast-attack submarine and F-35s forward in Puerto Rico. These deployments provide credible means to act quickly at sea and against select coastal targets without a ground invasion. The same is not true in West Africa, where the United States dismantled its Sahel basing network after the 2024 withdrawal from Niger, creating a logistics problem that would slow any Nigeria operation and drive the Pentagon toward air-centric or special operations options that rely on partner access.

Venezuela is the theater where the United States can most rapidly scale effects. The posture today includes surface combatants armed with Tomahawk land-attack missiles and SM-6 multi-mission rounds, maritime patrol P-8A aircraft for targeting and battle damage assessment, and forward fifth-generation fighters staged in Puerto Rico. Tomahawk’s in-flight retargeting and loiter capability make it suitable for dynamic targeting, while SM-6 adds over-the-horizon anti-air and limited strike options that expand a destroyer’s magazine utility. The P-8A brings the AN/APY-10 radar and multi-INT payloads suited to find go-fast boats, coastal assembly areas and emissions associated with Venezuelan radars along the littoral. The strategy Washington has sketched is coercive and iterative: strike at sea against smuggling craft and staging nodes, threaten infrastructure that supports illicit trafficking cycles, and pair maritime interdiction with limited land-attack options if coastal defenses actively challenge U.S. ships or aircraft. A carrier air wing, if tasked, would add persistent ISR and suppression of enemy air defenses.

Target sets in this scenario are maritime and coastal. They include semi-submersibles and fast boats outbound from Venezuelan waters, fuel and logistics clusters that support trafficking along the Paria and Orinoco deltas, and coastal surveillance radars that cue patrol craft. The Tomahawk Block V family gives surface action groups a standoff option with modernized navigation and communications, while a B-1B or B-52H launching JASSM-ER from the continental United States or Puerto Rico would offer complementary land-attack standoff if required. JASSM-ER’s reach exceeds 500 nautical miles, and the B-1 has demonstrated internal carriage of twenty-four JASSM-class weapons. Those combinations create a ladder of escalation from naval gunfire and helicopter-borne visit, board, search and seizure, up through precision cruise missile strikes on coastal command nodes if Venezuelan forces escalate first.

The Trump administration has identified targets in Venezuela that include military facilities used to smuggle drugs, according to U.S. officials, if Trump decides to move forward with airstrikes https://t.co/CBWbPqIf9Q
— The Wall Street Journal (@WSJ) October 31, 2025

Venezuela’s integrated air defense is not negligible. Caracas is widely reported to operate S-300VM batteries and legacy Pechora-2M systems, with public imagery of transporter-erector-launchers at sites near Caracas and Maracay, and periodic analyses that track their dispersal patterns. Those point defenses, paired with mobile coastal radars and legacy fighters, complicate low-altitude routes and make a suppression package prudent before any land-attack sortie over the littoral. The U.S. Navy’s AARGM-ER, now advancing through operational testing, is being integrated on the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G and is designed to reach farther from maritime launch points than legacy HARM. That matters for an opening salvo that first degrades emitters, then authorizes follow-on strikes with Tomahawk or JASSM-ER. The emphasis would be maritime control and coastal denial effects, not regime change.

Venezuelan Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile system deployed west of Caracas, Venezuela. Image captured from local media footage showing the movement of launcher vehicles and radar units on October 25, 2025, indicating full combat readiness. (Picture source: Venezuela TV)

The logistics underpin the strategy: San Juan to Caracas is roughly 478 nautical miles, a fighter-sized hop that can be comfortably bracketed by KC-135 and KC-46 refueling or avoided by standoff weapons from ships. Cooperative Security Locations on Curaçao and Aruba, long used for counter-drug aviation, further reduce transit times for ISR aircraft. Put simply, the Caribbean theater offers enough basing depth and naval mobility to sustain a days-to-weeks coercive campaign without large land footprints. That proximity is precisely why the administration’s Caribbean moves occurred first.

Nigeria is a very different math problem. The closest enduring U.S. base in Africa is on the opposite side of the continent, and the retirement of the Niger hub forced AFRICOM to rely on long legs, partner access or expeditionary staging. Djibouti to Abuja is approximately 2,068 nautical miles. MQ-9s can loiter for more than twenty-seven hours for ISR and precision attack, but establishing a persistent strike pattern over Nigeria would still require forward operating locations, diplomatic permissions, and tankers to support manned aircraft if called in. The most credible near-term tools are ISR and limited air-to-ground fires where Abuja consents, coupled with special operations advisory teams or hostage-recovery elements on a short leash. Anything resembling an amphibious or armored incursion is not plausible on short notice without host-nation basing in West Africa and weeks of staging. U.S. still hold bases near Nigeria, even if they cannot be considered as enduring bases, they still can host military assets to conduct preventive strikes or operations while waiting for other forces and armaments to be deployed.

U.S. Bases in Africa (Mail and Guardian - John McCann).

Because the U.S. President tied possible action in Nigeria to the protection of civilians, targeting logic would emphasize rapid ISR cueing of mass-atrocity incidents, interdiction of armed convoys threatening population centers, and strike support to Nigerian units if requested. MQ-9s with Hellfire, GBU-12 and GBU-38 give discriminate effects against mobile targets, while aerial refueling opens options for a small package of F-15E or F-35 aircraft to deliver JASSM-class standoff weapons from regional airspace if access is granted. Tanker math matters here. The KC-46 carries up to 212,000 pounds of fuel. KC-135 fleet upgrades improved offload capacity and reliability. Without regional clearances, however, tankers must orbit far from the target area, creating long drag chains that quickly erode sortie efficiency. The operational takeaway is that Nigeria's options remain bounded by permissions and distance, a point echoed by experts analyzing the planning guidance.

Nigeria’s adversaries present a fragmented and elusive target set. Boko Haram and Islamic State–West Africa Province (ISWAP) operate from dispersed rural sanctuaries across Borno, Yobe and Lake Chad, using light vehicles, small arms, and mobile camps rather than fixed infrastructure. The Nigerian Air Force fields a mix of older Chinese and Russian aircraft with limited radar coverage, leaving wide airspace gaps over the north. Urban density in cities like Lagos and Abuja further complicates air operations, creating a risk of collateral damage and restricting kinetic options to remote areas where target identification can be verified through persistent ISR.

Iraq sits between these poles. The United States retains a lean but real footprint at bases such as Ain al-Asad and within the Kurdistan region, along with theater ISR and strike assets on call. The declared policy is a phased drawdown and consolidation by end-2026, which means any new kinetic activity would be framed as force protection and counter-ISIS or as select strikes on Iran-aligned militia infrastructure after attacks on U.S. personnel. CENTCOM’s public record over the last two years describes repeated militia drone and rocket attacks and U.S. retaliatory strikes on weapons depots and command nodes in Iraq and Syria. That pattern suggests a continued advisory mission with episodic precision strikes rather than ground maneuver, constrained by Baghdad’s sovereignty concerns and by the announced timeline to reduce forces.

U.S. Bases in Middle East, near Iraq (Picture source: Al Jazeera).

If hostilities escalated in Iraq, the opening U.S. targets would again be enablers: one-way attack drone stockpiles, rockets and launch sites, militia C2, and air defense systems that threaten U.S. aircraft. Standoff munitions like JASSM-ER allow strikes from outside Iraqi airspace if required by diplomacy, while armed MQ-9s provide overwatch for advisers and convoys. The political reality is that Baghdad’s tolerance has limits, and Washington’s current posture is designed to apply pressure with precision while avoiding actions that force the Iraqi government to curtail the partnership outright.

In Iraq, the principal threat environment is defined by Iran-aligned militias equipped with short-range rockets, improvised loitering munitions, and armed drones that target coalition installations and logistics convoys. These groups maintain small, concealed firing sites near populated zones, making counter-battery and counter-UAS operations complex and politically sensitive. Their decentralized structure allows rapid relocation and plausible deniability, forcing U.S. forces to rely on high-precision strikes and persistent surveillance rather than large-scale maneuvers. The Iraqi security forces’ uneven control across provinces further complicates target coordination and deconfliction.

The Ain al-Asad Airbase, the remaining U.S. base in Iraq (Picture source: U.S. DoW).

Across all three theaters, the escalation ladder should be explicit. At sea near Venezuela, it begins with surveillance and interdiction, moves to disabling fire and armed helo actions, then to coastal SEAD with AARGM-ER if Venezuelan emitters illuminate U.S. aircraft, followed by Tomahawk or JASSM-ER against fixed nodes only if lethal threats persist. In Nigeria, it begins with ISR and information support to Abuja, then time-sensitive strikes with MQ-9s on armed perpetrators of mass violence under Nigerian request, and only then, if partners grant access, limited manned airpower presence. In Iraq, the rung below major escalation is already routine: retaliatory precision strikes on militia infrastructure after a credible attack on U.S. forces, followed by diplomatic de-escalation. That clarity helps manage risk to aircrews and to civilians.

Risks are material and legal. Any land-attack options in Venezuela would raise sovereignty issues and risk miscalculation with air defenses around population centers. In Nigeria, civilian protection operations would demand positive identification, host-nation authorization and careful rules of engagement. In Iraq, any expansion of strikes inside federal territory without Baghdad’s buy-in could fracture the coalition and accelerate the drawdown timeline. Those constraints are one reason Pentagon officials have kept options short of invasion in public discourse.

Tomahawk Block V provides long-range, subsonic precision with in-flight retargeting and battle damage imagery. SM-6 adds flexible defense and limited strike from Aegis ships. JASSM-ER offers low observable penetration beyond 500 nautical miles, with proven employment and heavy bomber carriage that allows mass. P-8A’s APY-10 radar, EO/IR and acoustic suite strengthen maritime kill chains and post-strike assessment. MQ-9 endurance allows broad-area surveillance and discriminate engagement with Hellfire and laser-guided bombs. Tankers enable all of this, but they also telegraph operational feasibility. The distance from San Juan to Caracas is under 500 nautical miles, which simplifies tanker plans. Djibouti to Abuja is over 2,000 nautical miles, which does not. Erbil to Al Qaim is roughly 180 nautical miles, a short reach for persistent overwatch. These numbers define the difference among the three options on the table.

If Washington chooses to apply limited force, the most executable play is in the Caribbean, where naval and fifth-generation air assets already sit close enough to deliver controlled, reversible pressure. Nigeria remains a planning problem where intelligence and special operations can move quickly but sustained airpower cannot without permissions and staging. Iraq is accessible but politically bounded, suited to the current pattern of retaliatory precision and partner enablement.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
Northrop Grumman’s F-35 Fighter output highlights industrial power behind US air dominance
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On July 2, 2025, Northrop Grumman announced from Palmdale, California, that it had reached a new milestone in military aircraft manufacturing with the ability to deliver a center fuselage for the F-35 Lightning II every thirty hours. This announcement, taken from an official company release, reflects the significant transformation of defense manufacturing methods, where production speed is now combined with strict standards of precision and reliability. For the United States and its international partners, this achievement provides additional assurance of the availability and modernization of the fifth-generation fleet.
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A U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II (Picture source: US DoD)

The F-35 Lightning II, developed by Lockheed Martin with contributions from Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, and Pratt & Whitney, is a fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter designed for air superiority, ground attack, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. It is produced in three versions: the F-35A, intended for air forces and equipped with conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL); the F-35B, which combines stealth with short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) capability, enabling operations from smaller ships or austere bases; and the F-35C, adapted for carrier operations with a larger wing and reinforced structure. Sharing a common technological foundation, the variants provide operators with a coherent and flexible tool suited to different operational environments.

Powered by a Pratt & Whitney F135 turbofan producing up to 43,000 pounds of thrust with afterburner, the F-35 reaches a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 (1,930 km/h) and a range of 2,220 km with internal fuel. Its maximum takeoff weight is 31,800 kg, allowing it to carry a wide range of armaments. The internal 20 mm cannon (GAU-22A or M61A2, depending on the version) is complemented by AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, as well as ground-attack weapons such as the GBU-31 JDAM, the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, and the AGM-88 HARM, designed to neutralize air defense systems. The internal weapons bay preserves stealth, while six external hardpoints allow a payload of more than 15,000 pounds when discretion is not required. The aircraft is equipped with advanced sensors, including the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS), the Distributed Aperture System (DAS), and the Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS), providing comprehensive battlefield coverage and extended situational awareness.

At the core of this architecture, the center fuselage plays a critical role. It houses the air intakes, part of the fuel tanks, the internal weapons bay, and the flight-operable doors and mechanisms. The accuracy of its assembly, particularly edge alignment and application of coatings, directly determines the aircraft’s stealth performance and reliability in missions. Northrop Grumman has already delivered more than 1,400 such fuselages, confirming its central role in the Lightning II program and its expertise in producing complex aerospace structures.

This production pace is made possible by the Integrated Assembly Line (IAL), inaugurated in 2011, which remains one of the most advanced facilities worldwide for fighter aircraft manufacturing. Designed to assemble all three versions of the F-35 on a single line, it incorporates advanced processes such as automated guided vehicles, robotic drilling, and on-site molding. These operations are reinforced by real-time production data analysis, improving quality control while optimizing the use of human resources. The IAL thus represents the convergence of automation, robotics, and precision engineering.

The scale of the facility illustrates the magnitude of the project. Covering an area equivalent to a football field, it includes more than 115 assembly stations and processes around ten million parts annually. With this capacity, completing one center fuselage every thirty hours has become feasible, symbolizing a shift in the standards of defense aerospace manufacturing.

Beyond fuselage production, Northrop Grumman is also responsible for several other F-35 subsystems, including radars, communications equipment, and logistics support. This vertical integration, bringing together design, production, and sustainment, aims to secure supply chains and ensure technical consistency across the program. It reflects an industrial strategy designed for long-term requirements and the continuous adaptation of client armed forces.

The consequences of this acceleration extend well beyond the Palmdale plant. In a context of technological competition and regional tensions, the ability to deliver fifth-generation aircraft rapidly is a decisive factor. For U.S. forces, it ensures increased fleet availability, while international partners rely on these production rates to meet delivery schedules and strengthen their air capabilities.

Since entering service in 2015, the F-35 has become the most widely distributed fighter program globally. In the United States, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each operate their respective variants. Among historical partners, the United Kingdom employs F-35Bs for both the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, Italy has acquired both F-35As and F-35Bs, and the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark are already fielding F-35As.

Additional customers have joined this initial group. Israel, the first to use the aircraft in combat, operates customized F-35As. Japan, already equipped with F-35As, began deploying its first F-35Bs in the south of the country in August 2025. Australia, South Korea, and Belgium have also received their first aircraft, while Finland, Poland, Switzerland, Canada, Romania, Greece, Germany, and the Czech Republic have signed firm contracts but are still awaiting deliveries.

This diversity of buyers, combined with production having already passed 1,200 aircraft delivered by mid-2025, highlights the pressure on the global supply chain and the need for Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin to further increase throughput. Forces already equipped are working to integrate the F-35 into their operational doctrines, while those still waiting for deliveries depend on the reliability of industrial schedules. In this context, the declared pace of one center fuselage every thirty hours is critical, as it underpins both the credibility of the program and the fulfillment of commitments to allied nations.
Report: V-MAX2 marks a new phase in France’s hypersonic weapons strategy
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On June 26, 2023, France reached a decisive milestone in the field of hypersonics with the successful launch of the V-MAX hypersonic glider from Biscarrosse. This first flight, the result of cooperation between the French defence procurement agency (DGA), ArianeGroup, and Onera, validated key technological choices and marked a European first. By succeeding in stabilising and manoeuvring a vehicle at speeds above Mach 5, France demonstrated its ability to develop capabilities in a sector where only the United States, Russia and China had been active until then. Yet this test was only a first step. France’s ambition is now to move further with VMAX2, followed by the SyLex programme and finally ASN4G, to fully integrate these technologies into a national defence strategy.
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Concept rendering of France’s VMAX2 hypersonic glider flying at extreme speed above the Earth’s atmosphere. (Picture source: Editing content from Army Recognition Group)

Hypersonic glider weapon systems are designed to strike targets by penetrating enemy air and missile defences. Propelled into the upper atmosphere by carrier systems, these gliders reach speeds from Mach 5 to Mach 20. Their trajectories, made unpredictable by extreme manoeuvrability, render them very difficult to intercept. This combination of speed and agility provides a rapid intervention capability at both medium and long ranges. To overcome air and missile defence networks, a hypersonic glider must maintain very high velocity throughout its flight while being able to perform complex manoeuvres in the terminal phase, precisely when it is most exposed to interceptors. This requires a high lift-to-drag ratio, heat-resistant materials and a control system able to respond to extreme conditions.

Aware of these challenges, the Ministry of the Armed Forces appointed ArianeGroup as prime contractor for the V-MAX programme. The company possesses unique expertise in Europe in ballistic launchers, space vehicles and atmospheric re-entry. The first phase of work focused on aerothermodynamic modelling, high-temperature materials and thermal protection, inertial navigation and guidance systems, as well as sensors and antennas. The demonstrator launched in 2023 was designed to test manoeuvrability during re-entry, under severe mechanical and thermal constraints. The flight confirmed structural integrity and the performance of on-board systems, marking a technological success recognised as a first for France and Europe.

The next stage is embodied by VMAX2. This programme, part of the incremental roadmap defined by the DGA, is intended to demonstrate France’s ability to design and control a hypersonic glider equipped with an advanced command system. The vehicle, whose shape and thermomechanical strength are based on several technological breakthroughs, comes very close to an operational system. It will be used to experiment with critical subsystems under representative conditions while anticipating advances in adversary interception technologies. The aim is to achieve a precise understanding of hypersonic flight dynamics to guide future military capabilities.

In continuity with this programme, the SyLex project, presented at the Paris Air Show in 2025, represents an ambition to reach a new threshold. This demonstrator is expected to achieve speeds of up to Mach 16, or around 20,000 km/h. To reach such a leap, France will need to build a sovereign test infrastructure able to reproduce and analyse these extreme conditions. Initial flight experiments are scheduled for 2027, with potential operational integration around 2030. SyLex reflects a clear determination: to provide France with autonomous hypersonic capability, avoiding dependence on foreign infrastructures or technologies.

In parallel, France is preparing the replacement of the ASMP-A airborne nuclear missile with the ASN4G programme. Scheduled for around 2035, this system will be powered by a ramjet engine, combining hypersonic velocity with a strategic payload, thereby ensuring the credibility of French deterrence in the face of advancing missile defence systems. Led by MBDA and Onera under the MIHYSYS contract awarded in 2024, this project is directly embedded in France’s nuclear deterrence doctrine and will be a central element of future strategic posture.

These developments are taking shape in the context of international competition. Russia already fields the Avangard and Kinzhal systems, while China is multiplying tests of the DF-ZF glider. The United States continues several programmes but struggles to convert prototypes into operational capabilities. In this environment, France, despite more limited resources, is seeking to maintain credible status by relying on technological innovation and a reinforced deterrence doctrine.

Ultimately, the evolution of France’s hypersonic sector, from VMAX to VMAX2, then SyLex and ASN4G, reflects a progressive but ambitious strategy. Each demonstrator provides vital knowledge, each test is a milestone towards capabilities that could reshape military balances. The coming years will reveal whether France can translate these technological advances into a lasting strategic advantage. One thing is certain: in the global race for hypersonic missiles, Paris has chosen not to remain on the sidelines but to assert its place among the powers shaping the warfare of tomorrow.
Analysis: How Greenland makes Denmark indispensable to NATO’s Arctic strategy
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The contract signed by Denmark’s Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization (FMI) with the Swedish company T-KARTOR to deliver new flight charts for the ice-free areas of Greenland might appear minor at first glance. Yet this technical decision reflects a much deeper strategic reality. Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, is increasingly at the heart of global geopolitical rivalries. The island is becoming a focal point of the struggle for influence in the Arctic, where sovereignty enforcement, military posturing, and resource competition converge.
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The new flight charts now cover all ice-free regions of Greenland.
(Picture source: Danish MoD)

For Copenhagen, securing accurate and updated aeronautical charts is not just about aviation safety. It is part of a broader effort to guarantee sovereignty over a vast and remote region that defines Denmark’s role as an Arctic power. With the Royal Danish Air Force relying on these maps to conduct patrols, surveillance, and search-and-rescue missions, the ability to fly at lower altitudes and operate more effectively strengthens the country’s presence in a territory that is central to NATO’s northern flank.

Greenland’s importance extends well beyond Danish defense. The island sits at the crossroads of global strategic interests. As Arctic sea ice continues to retreat, new maritime routes are gradually opening. These potential shipping corridors could shorten transit between Asia, Europe, and North America, bypassing traditional chokepoints like the Suez and Panama canals. Even though these routes remain hazardous and commercially uncertain, the prospect alone has drawn the attention of major powers, making Greenland a natural point of interest in future Arctic shipping governance.

The United States views Greenland as indispensable to its defense posture. Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) remains a critical hub for missile warning systems and space surveillance. During his presidency, Donald Trump famously floated the idea of buying Greenland, a move that was met with rejection in both Nuuk and Copenhagen but underscored Washington’s enduring perception of the island’s value. Meanwhile, Russia has stepped up its Arctic military presence, reinforcing bases along its northern coast and conducting naval operations. China has expressed interest as well, focusing on Greenland’s mineral wealth and potential role in future trade routes, even if its projects have often faced political resistance or economic setbacks.

The island’s mineral resources, especially rare earth elements, place it at the center of global competition for critical raw materials. These resources are vital for the green energy transition and modern defense technologies. Western states see Greenland as an opportunity to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on China. At the same time, Greenland’s own government has placed strict limits on uranium mining and oil exploration, balancing environmental concerns with economic aspirations. For many Greenlanders, resource exploitation is not merely an economic question but a step toward greater autonomy, or even independence, from Denmark.

Since gaining self-rule in 2009, Greenland has expanded its authority over domestic affairs and has openly articulated its long-term ambition for independence. The government’s 2024-2033 Foreign, Defense, and Security Strategy makes clear its intent to engage internationally on its terms. Local leaders insist that decisions about the island’s resources and future will be made by Greenlanders themselves, rejecting external attempts to impose geopolitical agendas.

In this context, Denmark’s investment in flight charts acquires symbolic significance. It reflects a commitment to safeguard sovereignty in the Arctic, strengthen NATO’s northern defenses, and ensure that operations over Greenland remain safe and effective. At the same time, it underscores how even small technical steps are inseparable from the broader geopolitical currents shaping the Arctic.

As climate change accelerates and great power rivalry intensifies, Greenland’s role will only grow. What may seem like a routine defense procurement is, in fact, a reminder that the Arctic is no longer a peripheral theater but a central arena of global competition. For Denmark, ensuring control and operational capacity in Greenland is not only about today’s security needs but also about maintaining influence in a region where the balance of power is rapidly shifting.
Analysis: China’s Strategy to Undermine the US Undersea Surveillance Network
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According to an article published on August 13, 2025, by Defense News, citing an essay by Ryan Martinson for the Center for International Maritime Security, some officers of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recommend a strategy aimed directly at the United States undersea surveillance network, which is considered a major threat to China’s submarine fleet. Martinson, a professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, reports that Chinese experts view this system as vulnerable due to the vast maritime area to be monitored in the Western Pacific. According to these experts, disabling enough sensors could paralyze the entire system and significantly reduce its effectiveness.
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China already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

To understand this concern, it is necessary to outline the structure of the U.S. undersea surveillance network, and the technical means China already possesses or seeks to develop, whether coercive or non-coercive but dual-use, that is, applicable for military purposes.

The U.S. system is built on an integrated architecture combining fixed sensors, mobile systems, and airborne platforms. At its core is the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), a successor to the Cold War-era SOSUS network, consisting of arrays of seabed acoustic sensors connected to shore by undersea cables. This fixed network continuously monitors strategic areas, particularly maritime choke points and likely submarine transit routes. Complementing it are towed-array systems such as the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS), deployed on specialized ships such as the Victorious and Impeccable classes. These are capable of using passive or low-frequency active sonar to detect submarines over long distances, even in complex acoustic environments. U.S. destroyers, frigates, and attack submarines add capability with hull-mounted sonars and towed arrays, while airborne assets, the P-8A Poseidon and MH-60R Seahawk, deploy sonobuoys, dipping sonars, and torpedoes. The network is further supported by satellites, unmanned undersea vehicles, and oceanographic research ships, which gather environmental data critical to optimizing detection.

This American view contrasts sharply with China’s perception. Washington and its allies are concerned about the rapid expansion of China’s submarine fleet, expected to reach 65 units in 2025 and 80 by 2035, including nuclear-powered ballistic missile and attack submarines, as well as advanced conventional types such as the Yuan class. Beijing, for its part, believes the increasing sophistication of U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts threatens the stealth of its submarines, a key factor in their operational effectiveness. The article in Military Art describes U.S. cables and sensor networks as “fragile and easily severed” and identifies the command and control systems as the network’s “Achilles’ heel,” potentially vulnerable to kinetic or cyberattacks. The authors call for the development of acoustic, magnetic, optical, and electronic detection technologies, supported by artificial intelligence, as well as autonomous undersea vehicles capable of destroying these infrastructures.

Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former U.S. Navy submarine officer, considers this assessment credible. He notes that the IUSS and SURTASS vessels have been effective for decades but acknowledges that targeted attacks on specific network nodes are possible. However, he emphasizes the difficulty of locating small devices at sea or on the seabed and the operational cost of such a campaign, which would require substantial resources and restrict the use of Chinese submarine forces within the first island chain, when they might be more effective beyond it. Clark also outlines another potential approach, saturating the U.S. network by deploying a large number of submarines before a conflict, making it more difficult for U.S. forces to track and engage them all simultaneously.

China already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions, and the Sea Wing (Haiyi) oceanographic drone, used in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea to gather environmental data suitable for military exploitation. These platforms can be launched from military or civilian vessels, including China’s large fishing fleet, which could be tasked with support missions. Conventional naval forces, such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines, could also directly target SURTASS ships or other U.S. surveillance vessels. In addition, China’s cyber capabilities provide another means to disrupt command and control.

In parallel, Beijing is investing in advanced detection and localization systems such as the Qianlong series (Qianlong-1, Qianlong-2, Qianlong-3) and the Haishen-6000, designed for deep-sea exploration but adaptable for military purposes. Equipped with multiple sensors and coupled with artificial intelligence, they could locate hidden or buried installations and prepare them for neutralization.

On the offensive side, China is considering militarizing research submersibles such as the Jiaolong and Shenhai Yongshi, which can dive to great depths, to place charges, cut cables, or disable sensors. This could be combined with a saturation strategy involving the simultaneous deployment of a large number of submarines, forcing the United States to disperse its surveillance resources and creating opportunities to penetrate areas normally well covered by U.S. ASW.

If China were to conduct a systematic campaign against the U.S. network of undersea sensors, the consequences would be wide-ranging. The U.S. Navy’s ability to monitor and track Chinese submarines in the Western Pacific would be reduced, complicating the implementation of sea-denial and sea-control plans. This might lead Washington to invest heavily in redundant, more discreet, and resilient systems, including increased use of autonomous undersea vehicles to patrol sensitive areas. Strategically, the partial or temporary loss of undersea information dominance would increase operational uncertainty for U.S. and allied forces, potentially creating windows of opportunity for Chinese operations within the first and second island chains. Such a development would also heighten the role of regional allied ASW capabilities, particularly those of Japan and Australia, in a more decentralized surveillance architecture that would remain exposed to adversary countermeasures.
Analysis: The Wing Loong II Drone and China’s rise in the global armed UAV market
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From Africa to the Middle East and South Asia, China’s Wing Loong-2 (WL-2) unmanned aerial vehicle has become a consistent presence across multiple operational theatres. Developed by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, it is operated both by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a range of foreign customers. It has been widely deployed by Nigeria against Boko Haram, by Saudi Arabia against Houthi positions, by Pakistan in cross-border operations, and in Libya’s civil war, reflecting the growing export of Chinese armed drone technology. In its domestic configuration, designated GJ-2, it has been in PLA service since 2018, participating in live-fire exercises around Taiwan and patrols over the South China Sea.
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The WL-2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle designed for both reconnaissance and strike operations.
(Picture source: Wikimedia Commons)

First unveiled at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2016 and making its maiden flight the following year, the WL-2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone intended for reconnaissance and strike missions. Measuring 11 meters in length with a wingspan of 20.5 meters, its aerodynamic design is similar to the US MQ-9 Reaper. However, its performance is lower in several respects. With a maximum take-off weight of 4,200 kg, around 500 kg less than the Reaper, it carries only 480 kg of external payload compared to the Reaper’s 1,400 kg. Its top speed is 370 km/h, service ceiling 9,000 meters, and range 1,500 km, compared to 480 km/h, 15,000 meters, and 1,900 km for the Reaper. These differences are partly due to its WJ-9 turboprop engine, rated at 500 to 600 shaft horsepower, less powerful than the Reaper’s Honeywell TPE331-10, delivering up to 900 shaft horsepower.

In endurance, the WL-2 can operate for 20 hours with a full weapons load and up to 32 hours with a reduced load, compared to the Reaper’s 27 hours. It also features certain technological characteristics, such as the use of China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, providing redundancy in the event of GPS signal denial in contested environments. A truck-mounted ground station can control several aircraft with a range of 200 to 300 km in beyond line-of-sight mode, and up to 3,000 km via satellite link, although this configuration is not always offered to foreign buyers.

In terms of sensors, the WL-2 is fitted with a stabilized electro-optical/infrared turret, a synthetic aperture radar, and a datalink capable of transmitting real-time imagery and intelligence to deployed units. It has six underwing hardpoints for a variety of guided munitions, including the YJ-9E anti-ship missile, LS-6 glide bomb, TL-2 and AG-300M air-to-ground missiles, and FT-series satellite-guided bombs. In maximum configuration, it can carry up to 12 munitions, or 18 TL-2 missiles of 16 kg each using triple-ejector racks. The BA-7 missile, modeled on the US AGM-114 Hellfire, is also part of its inventory.

Outside PLA service, the WL-2 has been exported to and operated by several countries, including Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Libya, where it has been employed in various combat environments ranging from counter-insurgency operations to conventional strike missions. These export cases demonstrate its adaptability to different operational contexts and its appeal to a diverse set of armed forces.

Beyond reconnaissance and strike roles, the WL-2 can be fitted with an electronic warfare module, identifiable by its disc-shaped antenna, for jamming and countermeasures missions. Its modular design also supports civilian applications such as meteorological observation and emergency communications, with the WL-2H version deployed in typhoon and earthquake zones to assess damage and restore communications. The system can take off and land autonomously, execute simplified maneuvers, and be operated by a single person using a point-and-click control interface.

Artificial intelligence algorithms allow the aircraft to monitor its systems, identify threats, and return autonomously if damaged, using trajectory optimization and glide control technologies. These features reduce the need for advanced operator training, making it viable for countries without a full UAV pilot training program.

Commercially, its main advantage lies in its cost. While an MQ-9 system for US forces starts at about USD 30 million and export contracts can reach into the billions, the WL-2 is estimated at USD 4–6 million per unit, including munitions, ground control stations, and after-sales support. Pakistan ordered 48 units in 2018 with an option for local co-production. China also offers more flexible payment terms and fewer political restrictions, making it accessible to buyers excluded from Western systems.

Although more advanced Chinese drones such as the stealth GJ-11 and CH-7 are emerging, the WL-2 and its PLA variant, the GJ-2, remain key assets and competitive internationally. While it does not match the highest Western performance standards, it provides an operational and financial balance suited to low- and medium-intensity conflicts, reinforcing China’s position in the armed drone sector.

Compared to similar-class systems, the WL-2 is a lower-cost alternative to the US MQ-9 Reaper, the Chinese CH-5, Türkiye’s Bayraktar Akıncı, and Israel’s Hermes 900. The Reaper leads in payload capacity and altitude but is costlier and subject to stricter export controls. The CH-5 emphasizes long endurance at low cost, while the Akıncı offers a heavy, multi-role platform with a wide range of domestically produced weapons. The Hermes 900, more compact, is oriented toward endurance ISR missions with a broad civilian and military user base.

In export markets, the WL-2 benefits from competitive pricing, compatible munitions, and permissive political conditions, with Beijing also less hesitant than Western suppliers to sell to non-democratic states or governments with mixed human rights or civilian protection records. Other systems occupy distinct niches: the MQ-9B serves NATO and Indo-Pacific allies seeking interoperability and maritime capability, the Akıncı appeals to non-NATO countries requiring heavy strike capability, the CH-5 targets budget-limited buyers, and the Hermes 900 is selected for dual-use and certifiable missions. This segmentation shows that, despite its limitations, the WL-2 retains a strong position in markets where cost-effectiveness and minimal political restrictions are priorities.
How the Compact Mako Hypersonic Missile Could Transform U.S. Air Power
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First unveiled at the Sea Air Space 2024 exhibition, the Mako hypersonic missile was developed by Lockheed Martin to reach speeds of Mach 5 while being compatible with a wide range of aerial platforms. Its compact size, modularity, and ability to be carried in the internal weapons bays of the F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters represent a notable development in the design of hypersonic weapons, which have long been limited by their bulk. This characteristic could mark a turning point in the United States’ long-range strike capabilities at a time when mastery of hypersonic technology is becoming a decisive factor in operational superiority.
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Physical compatibility tests have confirmed that the Mako can be carried internally by the F-22 and F-35A/C, as well as externally on aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and P-8A Poseidon (Picture source: Lockheed Martin)

Development of the Mako began in 2017 under the U.S. Air Force’s Stand In Attack Weapon (SiAW) program, with approximately $35 million in funding. The aim was to provide the Air Force with a weapon capable of quickly and precisely neutralizing strategic targets within anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, particularly in response to Chinese threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Measuring between 3.6 and 4 meters in length depending on the variant, with a diameter of 33 centimeters and a weight of approximately 590 kilograms, the missile can carry interchangeable 60-kilogram warheads and integrate various guidance systems. Its open digital architecture allows for rapid upgrades and reduces reliance on proprietary processes, offering advantages for future updates and cost control.

Physical compatibility tests have confirmed that the Mako can be carried internally by the F-22 and F-35A/C, as well as externally on aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and P-8A Poseidon. Virtual tests have validated internal carriage on the B-1B, B-52H, and B-21Raider bombers. Equipped with standard 30-inch lugs, it can be integrated with nearly the entire U.S. aerial arsenal and, with an additional booster, could also be launched from the vertical launch tubes of U.S. Navy ships, similar to the AGM-158C LRASM missile.

This level of compatibility enables new operational concepts. Lockheed Martin has, for example, considered a combined deployment in which fifth-generation stealth fighters act as forward scouts to detect and designate targets, passing the data to fourth-generation aircraft equipped with Sniper targeting pods and armed with Mako missiles to execute the strike. This division of roles would maximize available firepower while leveraging the specific strengths of each platform, especially in highly contested environments.

The Mako is powered by a solid-fuel rocket motor capable of reaching Mach 5 at high altitude while retaining maneuverability, significantly reducing the reaction time available to enemy defenses. Its modular design, combined with additive manufacturing for components such as the seeker fairing and control surfaces, helps shorten production timelines and improve industrial responsiveness. The use of advanced digital engineering makes it possible to simulate and validate variants directly in a virtual environment before manufacturing, optimizing development and facilitating series production.

The strategic context further underscores the relevance of this program. China is actively developing the YJ-21 hypersonic missile, already tested in both naval and air-launched versions. The Mako could enable the United States to close the gap in the hypersonic arms race and maintain strategic balance against such threats. In parallel, the May 2025 development of the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon Technologies illustrates the complementary nature of offensive and defensive programs in this domain.

Internationally, Lockheed Martin has expressed interest in initial production in the United Kingdom before transferring industrial activity to the United States, as part of potential cooperation under the AUKUS agreement. The UK Ministry of Defence, aiming to achieve a sovereign hypersonic missile capability by 2030, is considering the Mako as a viable option. Collaboration with British and Australian industrial partners could facilitate technology sharing, cost distribution, and capacity building among the participating nations.

At present, the Mako has not yet received production funding from the U.S. Department of Defense. However, its inclusion by the U.S. Navy in the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) category would allow for accelerated funding should a favorable decision be made. If approved, the Mako could become a key element of the U.S. military inventory, combining speed, flexibility, and multi-platform compatibility, and could serve as an important asset in both aerial and naval operations in the coming decades.
How US Army Is Rebuilding Its Missile Defense Around Mass and Preemptive Action
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As ballistic and aerial threats proliferate and diversify, the US Army is preparing to release, by October 2025, a complete overhaul of its air and missile defense strategy, with a planning horizon extending to 2040. This new doctrinal framework, announced by Lieutenant General Sean A. Gainey during the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, comes at a time of growing saturation, increasing sophistication of offensive vectors, and major shifts in command and control architectures. Far from being a mere update, this strategy signals a clear break from the post-2018 legacy by reaffirming the centrality of mass in air defense and embedding preemptive action as a core operational principle.
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MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems for a readiness exercise in Germany (Picture source: US DoD)

Since the last version was published in 2018, the global strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. Drone campaigns in the Middle East, precision strikes in Ukraine, and saturation maneuvers by both state and non-state actors have exposed the limitations of sequential interception models. Adversaries are no longer attempting to breach a shield; they seek to overwhelm it. Within this context, General Gainey calls for a return to fundamentals, explicitly naming mass as a critical factor in tactical resilience. Warfare is once again a matter of volume, in munitions, sensors, and command nodes. As more coordinated salvos of theater-level weapons emerge, the ability to absorb the initial blow becomes as decisive as the ability to respond.

However, mass alone is no longer sufficient. The US Army now aims to go further by adopting a proactive posture centered on the neutralization of threats before they are launched. This approach, referred to as smart missile defeat, goes beyond linear defense logic and fits within a broader framework of informational and multi-domain attrition warfare. It entails integrating non-kinetic capabilities such as cyber disruption, electronic warfare, and AI-driven ISR strikes to delay, degrade, or disrupt adversary supply chains, launch platforms, and command systems.

In this light, artificial intelligence is no longer viewed as a tactical aid but as a core doctrinal enabler. The Army is investing in hybrid decision-making architectures, where machines help absorb operators’ cognitive workload and offer near-real-time distributed targeting decisions. According to General Gainey, this shift implies a redefinition of the human role, from operator to supervisor. This transition underpins the development of the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), designed to connect all available sensors and effectors, regardless of origin, within a modular command and distributed fires framework.

The broad deployment of IBCS, combined with the fielding of new sensors such as LTAMDS and short-range interceptors like M-SHORAD, is intended to produce a more agile, distributed, and lethal force. Alongside this, the US Army is also asserting a stronger role in homeland defense, working with NORAD and the Missile Defense Agency to support the development of the Golden Dome, a layered missile defense shield intended to address both theater-level and strategic threats. Though still in early stages, this effort reflects the growing ambition of the Space and Missile Defense Command to operate not just beyond the perimeter but within the national defense architecture itself.

The forthcoming 2040 strategy is thus a structural response to a dual challenge: absorbing saturation while regaining the initiative. It aligns with broader doctrinal shifts outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for more adaptable, distributed forces capable of operating in contested, high-intensity environments. The return to mass is not a conservative fallback. It is a capacity expansion backed by command tools and technologies designed to strike before adversaries can act. In other words, the goal is not merely to survive the initial blow but to prevent it from occurring at all.
Report: Reimagining Mesh-Based Radar Detection Against Hypersonic and Saturation Threats
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In the face of increasingly complex, saturating, and hypersonic strikes carried out by adversarial powers, traditional air defense systems are reaching their physical and economic limits. In a forward-looking report publishedin July 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analysts Masao Dahlgren, Patrycja Bazylczyk, and Tom Karako propose a fundamental shift: replacing architectures built around a few powerful radars with a dense mesh of passive, proliferated sensors forming a "distributed sensory skin" capable of detecting, tracking, and identifying threats while surviving in highly contested environments.
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Hensoldt's TRML-4D radar, though an active sensor, is used within the IRIS-T SLM network and could serve as a nodal element in a more discreet and distributed mesh architecture (Picture source: Hensoldt)

This approach, referred to as mesh sensing, breaks away from the traditional detection-identification-engagement triad by distributing each function across specialized nodes within a network. The proposed sensors include acoustic detectors (such as Zvook or Sky Fortress deployed in Ukraine), infrared sensors (MWIR, LWIR), electro-optical cameras (TV/CCD), passive RF listening devices (e.g., Silent Sentinel), miniature Doppler radars mounted on lightweight drones, as well as hyperspectral sensors and transient event detectors. With unit costs now often below $10,000, these systems can be widely deployed in fixed, semi-mobile, or airborne configurations, using micro-UAVs such as the Black Hornet, RQ-28A, or Anavia HT-100. They can be layered operationally, acoustic systems positioned forward, infrared and optical sensors placed in-depth, and data fusion nodes secured in covered terrain.

The operational value lies in the ability of these networks to detect increasingly stealthy threats, such as subsonic cruise missiles like the Kh-101 or modified Shahed-136 drones, even in environments affected by electronic countermeasures, spectral camouflage, or active jamming. In a scenario modeled by CSIS, a ground-based air defense system in eastern Poland saw its performance improve by 26% against a ballistic missile salvo when supported by a passive EO/IR network of 14 sensors. The benefit was not only quantitative: early warning was improved by 3 to 4 minutes, allowing sufficient time for repositioning a Patriot PAC-3 MSE battery or activating a SkyCeptor interceptor within the IBCS framework.

The network infrastructure proposed by CSIS is based on a high-redundancy mesh architecture coupled with local data processing via edge computing. Sensor data does not require full centralization but can be partially processed at the source using dimensionality reduction, neural network classification (such as YOLOv7 or ResNet), or contextual interpretation (embedded LLMs in micro-instances). This localized processing improves resilience against jamming, reduces latency, and minimizes dependence on SATCOM or LTE relays vulnerable to electronic warfare. In this context, systems like the KORNET Passive Surveillance Sensor (KORNET-PSS) from Thales, the Silent Watch by Leonardo, or SAAB’s SHORAD Enhanced EO Mesh could be integrated as specialized nodes within a federated architecture.

This distributed network is not intended to replace active radars like the AN/MPQ-65A (Patriot) or the GM200 MM/C used by Dutch forces, but rather to complement them. It could also be used to multiply false targets against enemy anti-radiation missiles by deploying active decoys or intermittent emitters. The system may also support dynamic camouflage strategies, with regular shifts between emission sources, similar to the approach implemented in the Israeli Scorpius-T system.

Growing interest in distributed sensor architectures can be observed among armed forces. In 2024, the Bundeswehr approved a test of the ABF-Passiv (Aufgeklärte Bedrohung Früherkennung) program, based on deployable tripod-mounted LWIR sensors. The Italian Army is currently testing EO/IR sensor networks developed by Elettronica, in conjunction with its Kronos Grand Mobile radars. The US Army, for its part, has included in the FY2026 budget a program titled Passive Integrated Ground Sensors (PIGS), aimed at equipping Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) with EO/IR acoustic sensor meshes to detect small drone movements at squad level.

Ultimately, mesh sensing could be integrated into a cloud-based command and control system capable of fusing sensor tracks in real time, prioritizing them, and automatically cueing intercept platforms. This direction, referred to as autopoietic sensor fusion, would represent a doctrinal shift comparable to the introduction of C-RAM systems or hit-to-kill interceptors in the 1990s. It reflects a step toward the emergence of a territorial immune system based not on kinetic mass, but on informational omnipresence.
Analysis: How Ukraine’s Agile Warfare Model Shapes NATO Military Modernization
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At the inaugural LANDEURO event organizedby the Army Sustainment University on July 17, 2025, in Wiesbaden, Germany, a key session titled “Ukrainian Innovation at the Speed of Relevance” provided an in-depth perspective on the technological transformation underway within the Ukrainian armed forces. The discussion brought together defense industry experts, military representatives, and technology innovators to examine how Ukraine is accelerating the development of military solutions in direct response to battlefield demands. The objective was not simply to assess the current state of innovation but to demonstrate how the Ukrainian approach could redefine operational standards for NATO forces.
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At the core of the discussions, participants emphasized the remarkable adaptability of Ukrainian industry and military units working closely together to meet frontline requirements (Picture source: Ukrainian MoD)

At the core of the discussions, participants emphasized the remarkable adaptability of Ukrainian industry and military units working closely together to meet frontline requirements. A significant focus was placed on the integration of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems in military operations. Speakers highlighted Ukraine’s ability to rapidly design and deploy FPV drones (First Person View), loitering munitions, and autonomous systems built from 3D-printed components, open-source mapping tools, and embedded AI modules. These systems are designed to identify, track, and engage targets even in environments heavily contested by electronic warfare.

Sebastian Kuhl, Director of Land Sales at Helsing, noted that faced with the high costs of complex sensors such as gimbals, Ukrainian engineers favor embedding AI algorithms directly onboard drones. This approach enables image stabilization and automatic target recognition without relying on costly and fragile mechanical devices. This "software-first" strategy supports better scalability of capabilities at lower costs, which is critical for a military operating under resource constraints.

Another topic addressed during the session was digital finance and disintermediation mechanisms used to support the war effort. Speakers explained how Ukraine has circumvented traditional financial and procurement systems through the use of cryptocurrency and crowdfunding. These methods help bypass administrative delays, allowing for the rapid funding and delivery of equipment directly to the frontlines. This alternative procurement strategy was presented as a model of financial agility under wartime conditions that may hold relevance for Western forces.

Yaroslav Azhnyuk, CEO of TheFourthLaw, stressed the advantages of software over hardware, explaining that the scalability of software solutions enables rapid deployment of updates and new capabilities in the field without requiring the replacement of physical platforms. Ukrainian-developed software modules are designed to be adaptable across various platforms, from FPV drones to autonomous ground vehicles. Azhnyuk described massively scalable autonomy as the most decisive defense technology of this decade while reaffirming that final engagement decisions remain under human control.

In the context of Ukraine's industrial efforts, drone production has undergone significant development. In 2024, nearly 2 million drones were manufactured domestically, including over 1.5 million FPV drones, many equipped with autonomy kits such as the ZIR module. This module enables low-cost drones to automatically recognize targets, such as armored vehicles or artillery, over distances exceeding 1 kilometer and to pursue moving targets at speeds of up to 60 km/h. This type of equipment reflects Ukraine's capability to combine affordable hardware with advanced software functionalities.

The session also shared insights on the Ukrainian military's innovative doctrine, which now favors modular systems and incremental approaches rather than complex, lengthy, and expensive developments. This doctrine translates into the progressive integration of autonomous features on existing platforms, such as last-phase autonomous navigation that enables drones to continue toward their targets even under communication jamming, as well as automated reconnaissance and fire correction functions.

The session concluded with a shared observation: Ukraine's approach presents a practical model of adaptability and pragmatism for NATO forces. Instead of pursuing perfect or technologically ambitious solutions that may prove unrealistic in wartime, Ukraine favors rapid experimentation, continuous field feedback, and iterative development. This innovation culture, driven by immediate operational needs, constitutes a unique operational laboratory for Western alliances that may soon face environments characterized by electronic warfare, drone swarms, and pervasive artificial intelligence.

Discussions at LANDEURO demonstrated that military innovation lies not solely in the sophistication of equipment but in the capacity to industrialize adaptable solutions rapidly, supported by innovative financial models and an agile ecosystem. Ukraine's case, shaped by the conditions of a war of attrition, may well define the path for modern armed forces facing future threats.
SIPRI 2025 Warns of Rising Proliferation of Nuclear Multiple-Warhead and Dual-Use Systems
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The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published its annual Yearbook on 16 June 2025, which confirms the end of an era: the gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals that began after the Cold War is now over. In contrast, all nuclear-armed states pursued in 2024 a strategy of modernization, expansion, or innovation in their nuclear capabilities. This return to nuclear competition coincides with the weakening of arms control frameworks, with no immediate prospects for replacement.
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In Russia, despite delays and another RS-28 Sarmat failure in 2024, plans to reload silos and increase warheads per missile remain unchanged. (Picture source: WikiCommons)

The report records an estimated total of 12,241 nuclear warheads as of 1 January 2025, of which 9,614 are in military stockpiles and 3,912 are deployed on operational delivery systems. Around 2,100 warheads are maintained at high operational alert, mainly by the United States and Russia. SIPRI also notes that China may now keep some warheads mounted on missiles during peacetime.

Modernization covers all components of the nuclear triads. In the United States, programs to replace the Minuteman IIIICBMs, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, and air-launched cruise missiles are underway, despite budget-related delays. Washington is also developing new non-strategic nuclear warheads, raising concerns about the program’s long-term sustainability. In Russia, while strategic forces remain a priority, the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile experienced another failure in 2024, and several other systems are delayed. Still, plans to reload silos and increase warhead counts per missile remain intact.

China is undergoing the fastest expansion. Its arsenal increased from 500 to around 600 warheads within a year, and it has completed or nearly completed construction of more than 300 new ICBM silos across desert and mountainous regions. At this pace, China could possess 1,500 warheads by 2035. The country is actively developing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities and continues to enhance its dual-capable naval and airborne systems.

The United Kingdom did not expand its stockpile in 2024 but remains on a growth trajectory laid out in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh. London is moving forward with the construction of four new SSBNs. France continues to develop its third-generation SSBN and a new air-launched cruise missile, while upgrading the payload of its M51 ballistic missile.

India has continued the development of MIRV-capable canisterized missiles, which can be transported with mated warheads and may remain on alert. Pakistan is expanding fissile material production and delivery systems, suggesting continued growth. North Korea now holds an estimated 50 assembled warheads and the fissile material for 40 more. It is advancing its doctrine of tactical deterrence and preparing to introduce theater nuclear weapons, according to South Korean sources.

Israel, while maintaining its policy of deliberate ambiguity, tested a propulsion system in 2024 that may be related to the Jericho missile series. Upgrades were also reported at the Dimona plutonium production site.

SIPRI highlights a concerning doctrinal shift. In November 2024, Russia revised its nuclear posture to broaden the scenarios in which it might use nuclear weapons. The United States replaced its forward-deployed B61 bombs in Europe with modernized versions. The report also notes that MIRV-capable systems, once limited to the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, are now being developed or deployed by China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

Emerging technologies are introducing new uncertainties. Warhead miniaturization, developments in artificial intelligence, automated command and control, cyber defense, and space warfare are reshaping deterrence architectures. Several states are investing in long-range maneuverable missiles, antisatellite weapons, and hypersonic glide vehicles. These advancements may shorten decision-making timelines and increase the risk of miscalculation or accidental use.

The SIPRI Yearbook 2025 concludes that the global nuclear order is entering a phase of increased strategic instability. The anticipated expiration of the New START treaty in 2026, with no replacement in sight, could trigger an unregulated cycle of warhead deployments, including rapid silo reactivation and submarine reloads. For armed forces and defense industries, these developments imply renewed attention to second-strike capabilities, the resilience of command-and-control systems, and the flexibility permitted under evolving nuclear doctrines.

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