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British Army tank regiment soldiers train with drones in Estonia to boost battlefield awareness
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British soldiers from the Royal Tank Regiment have finished a small drone operators course in Estonia, training alongside NATO partners in Baltic winter conditions. The course signals a major shift as one of the UK’s oldest armored units adapts to modern reconnaissance needs using tactical sUAS platforms.
British soldiers from Dreadnaught Squadron of the British Army Royal Tank Regiment completed a small Unmanned Aircraft System operators course in Estonia, according to information posted by the Royal Armoured Corps on its official X account on November 30, 2025. The training, conducted alongside allied instructors and tested in winter conditions, reflects a growing push to equip armored crews with lightweight reconnaissance drones that can scout ahead of heavy vehicles and improve battlefield awareness.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkBritish soldiers from Dreadnaught Squadron, Royal Tank Regiment, operate a small tactical drone during sUAS training in Estonia, enhancing battlefield reconnaissance capabilities in coordination with NATO forces. (Picture source: Royal Armoured Corps X account)
The training was deliberately set against Estonia’s unpredictable late-autumn weather, with high winds, persistent rain, and limited daylight, testing the operational limits of small drone systems. British troops progressed from theoretical classroom modules to hands-on flying, executing live drone operations during both daylight and nighttime conditions. The goal was clear: to equip armored units with organic aerial reconnaissance capabilities to enable faster, more informed decision-making on the modern battlefield.
Historically, the British Army's Dreadnaught Squadron has relied on the Challenger 2 main battle tank for its combat effectiveness. While these heavily armored platforms remain critical to ground dominance, they have long lacked immediate situational awareness beyond line of sight. That gap is now being filled by drones. Small uncrewed systems allow tank crews to scout terrain, detect enemy positions, and map movement corridors before exposing their vehicles to potential ambush or long-range anti-tank threats.
Incorporating drone operations into armored doctrine represents a fundamental shift in how British forces prepare for conflict. As one senior officer involved in the training explained, “This isn't just a side skill. It’s a core enabler that lets tanks act with precision rather than brute force. It’s how we win before contact.” By launching a drone ahead of an armored column, commanders can identify kill zones, spot dismounted threats, or even mark enemy armor for indirect fires. This new layer of awareness transforms how the Royal Tank Regiment maneuvers in contested environments.
In addition to enhancing their own capabilities, Dreadnaught Squadron troops trained alongside partner forces from NATO's enhanced Forward Presence. This joint context ensured full interoperability and built on shared tactics that reflect the changing nature of war in Eastern Europe. With Russian aggression still looming across the region, integrated drone use is no longer experimental. It is a frontline necessity.
The training also has strategic implications. By embedding sUAS operators within tank formations, the British Army is signaling that its heavy forces will no longer operate in isolation or ignorance of their surroundings. Instead, these units are being configured to operate as part of a larger sensor-to-shooter network, where real-time intelligence drives maneuver and fires. Analysts from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) have noted that such capabilities will be essential in any future peer conflict, particularly in densely contested areas such as the Suwałki Gap or in urban environments where tanks are vulnerable to asymmetric threats.
Although the British Ministry of Defence has not yet formalized a regiment-wide doctrine for integrating drones into all armored units, sources suggest a broader rollout is likely. Troops from this training cycle are expected to return to the UK and serve as instructors, bringing sUAS integration into the wider force structure of the Royal Armoured Corps.
Crucially, this shift is not about replacing tanks. It is about enhancing their relevance in a digitized battlefield where information dominance often determines victory. As a junior NCO from Dreadnaught Squadron put it during the course, “We’re still tankers. We’re just tankers who can see further and strike smarter.”
For the British Army Royal Tank Regiment, the move toward drone-supported operations is not just a tactical upgrade. It is part of a generational evolution that fuses historical battlefield muscle with the intelligence and adaptability demanded by 21st-century conflict.
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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U.S. Prepares for Possible Military Action in Venezuela, Nigeria and Iraq After President’s Announcement
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U.S. President Donald Trump has ordered preparations and publicly floated military options in three theaters, Venezuela/Caribbean, Nigeria/West Africa and Iraq/ West Asia, while the U.S. has increased naval and air assets in the southern Caribbean. The moves concentrate on coercive, precision options near maritime approaches and standoff strike packages in each theater, with distance, partner access and legal constraints shaping feasible courses of action.
According to articles and statements since his reelection in 2024, U.S. President Donald Trump has pursued a double-edged foreign policy. On one side, he pledges to end America’s “forever wars” and restore global economic stability; on the other, he has reignited commercial rivalries by imposing new tariffs even on traditional allies. In recent weeks, Trump has gone further, openly mentioning potential U.S. military interventions across three continents. In South America, tensions with Venezuela have surged as the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, recently redeployed from the Mediterranean, arrived in Caribbean waters. In Africa, the president has spoken of “taking action” in Nigeria, a country marked by religious conflict and immense oil wealth. And in Western Asia, he has warned Iraq’s leadership of possible “operations” if American interests are threatened. Behind the rhetoric lies a consistent pattern: each of these nations maintains strained relations with Washington while controlling key energy resources. Should economic or diplomatic levers fail, the administration appears ready to rely on nearby military assets tailored to each theatre, at sea, in the air, or on land.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkA carrier strike group operating as part of the U.S. Fleet, soon to be deployed near Venezuela (Picture source: U.S. Navy).
The geography and posture are not symmetrical: in the southern Caribbean, U.S. naval and air assets surged in late summer and early autumn, giving Washington proximate tools for precision maritime interdiction, coastal strikes and limited special operations. Multiple reports have documented strikes on suspected drug craft near Venezuela in September and October, alongside the arrival of warships, a fast-attack submarine and F-35s forward in Puerto Rico. These deployments provide credible means to act quickly at sea and against select coastal targets without a ground invasion. The same is not true in West Africa, where the United States dismantled its Sahel basing network after the 2024 withdrawal from Niger, creating a logistics problem that would slow any Nigeria operation and drive the Pentagon toward air-centric or special operations options that rely on partner access.
Venezuela is the theater where the United States can most rapidly scale effects. The posture today includes surface combatants armed with Tomahawk land-attack missiles and SM-6 multi-mission rounds, maritime patrol P-8A aircraft for targeting and battle damage assessment, and forward fifth-generation fighters staged in Puerto Rico. Tomahawk’s in-flight retargeting and loiter capability make it suitable for dynamic targeting, while SM-6 adds over-the-horizon anti-air and limited strike options that expand a destroyer’s magazine utility. The P-8A brings the AN/APY-10 radar and multi-INT payloads suited to find go-fast boats, coastal assembly areas and emissions associated with Venezuelan radars along the littoral. The strategy Washington has sketched is coercive and iterative: strike at sea against smuggling craft and staging nodes, threaten infrastructure that supports illicit trafficking cycles, and pair maritime interdiction with limited land-attack options if coastal defenses actively challenge U.S. ships or aircraft. A carrier air wing, if tasked, would add persistent ISR and suppression of enemy air defenses.
Target sets in this scenario are maritime and coastal. They include semi-submersibles and fast boats outbound from Venezuelan waters, fuel and logistics clusters that support trafficking along the Paria and Orinoco deltas, and coastal surveillance radars that cue patrol craft. The Tomahawk Block V family gives surface action groups a standoff option with modernized navigation and communications, while a B-1B or B-52H launching JASSM-ER from the continental United States or Puerto Rico would offer complementary land-attack standoff if required. JASSM-ER’s reach exceeds 500 nautical miles, and the B-1 has demonstrated internal carriage of twenty-four JASSM-class weapons. Those combinations create a ladder of escalation from naval gunfire and helicopter-borne visit, board, search and seizure, up through precision cruise missile strikes on coastal command nodes if Venezuelan forces escalate first.
The Trump administration has identified targets in Venezuela that include military facilities used to smuggle drugs, according to U.S. officials, if Trump decides to move forward with airstrikes https://t.co/CBWbPqIf9Q
— The Wall Street Journal (@WSJ) October 31, 2025Venezuela’s integrated air defense is not negligible. Caracas is widely reported to operate S-300VM batteries and legacy Pechora-2M systems, with public imagery of transporter-erector-launchers at sites near Caracas and Maracay, and periodic analyses that track their dispersal patterns. Those point defenses, paired with mobile coastal radars and legacy fighters, complicate low-altitude routes and make a suppression package prudent before any land-attack sortie over the littoral. The U.S. Navy’s AARGM-ER, now advancing through operational testing, is being integrated on the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G and is designed to reach farther from maritime launch points than legacy HARM. That matters for an opening salvo that first degrades emitters, then authorizes follow-on strikes with Tomahawk or JASSM-ER. The emphasis would be maritime control and coastal denial effects, not regime change.
Venezuelan Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile system deployed west of Caracas, Venezuela. Image captured from local media footage showing the movement of launcher vehicles and radar units on October 25, 2025, indicating full combat readiness. (Picture source: Venezuela TV)
The logistics underpin the strategy: San Juan to Caracas is roughly 478 nautical miles, a fighter-sized hop that can be comfortably bracketed by KC-135 and KC-46 refueling or avoided by standoff weapons from ships. Cooperative Security Locations on Curaçao and Aruba, long used for counter-drug aviation, further reduce transit times for ISR aircraft. Put simply, the Caribbean theater offers enough basing depth and naval mobility to sustain a days-to-weeks coercive campaign without large land footprints. That proximity is precisely why the administration’s Caribbean moves occurred first.
Nigeria is a very different math problem. The closest enduring U.S. base in Africa is on the opposite side of the continent, and the retirement of the Niger hub forced AFRICOM to rely on long legs, partner access or expeditionary staging. Djibouti to Abuja is approximately 2,068 nautical miles. MQ-9s can loiter for more than twenty-seven hours for ISR and precision attack, but establishing a persistent strike pattern over Nigeria would still require forward operating locations, diplomatic permissions, and tankers to support manned aircraft if called in. The most credible near-term tools are ISR and limited air-to-ground fires where Abuja consents, coupled with special operations advisory teams or hostage-recovery elements on a short leash. Anything resembling an amphibious or armored incursion is not plausible on short notice without host-nation basing in West Africa and weeks of staging. U.S. still hold bases near Nigeria, even if they cannot be considered as enduring bases, they still can host military assets to conduct preventive strikes or operations while waiting for other forces and armaments to be deployed.
U.S. Bases in Africa (Mail and Guardian - John McCann).
Because the U.S. President tied possible action in Nigeria to the protection of civilians, targeting logic would emphasize rapid ISR cueing of mass-atrocity incidents, interdiction of armed convoys threatening population centers, and strike support to Nigerian units if requested. MQ-9s with Hellfire, GBU-12 and GBU-38 give discriminate effects against mobile targets, while aerial refueling opens options for a small package of F-15E or F-35 aircraft to deliver JASSM-class standoff weapons from regional airspace if access is granted. Tanker math matters here. The KC-46 carries up to 212,000 pounds of fuel. KC-135 fleet upgrades improved offload capacity and reliability. Without regional clearances, however, tankers must orbit far from the target area, creating long drag chains that quickly erode sortie efficiency. The operational takeaway is that Nigeria's options remain bounded by permissions and distance, a point echoed by experts analyzing the planning guidance.
Nigeria’s adversaries present a fragmented and elusive target set. Boko Haram and Islamic State–West Africa Province (ISWAP) operate from dispersed rural sanctuaries across Borno, Yobe and Lake Chad, using light vehicles, small arms, and mobile camps rather than fixed infrastructure. The Nigerian Air Force fields a mix of older Chinese and Russian aircraft with limited radar coverage, leaving wide airspace gaps over the north. Urban density in cities like Lagos and Abuja further complicates air operations, creating a risk of collateral damage and restricting kinetic options to remote areas where target identification can be verified through persistent ISR.
Iraq sits between these poles. The United States retains a lean but real footprint at bases such as Ain al-Asad and within the Kurdistan region, along with theater ISR and strike assets on call. The declared policy is a phased drawdown and consolidation by end-2026, which means any new kinetic activity would be framed as force protection and counter-ISIS or as select strikes on Iran-aligned militia infrastructure after attacks on U.S. personnel. CENTCOM’s public record over the last two years describes repeated militia drone and rocket attacks and U.S. retaliatory strikes on weapons depots and command nodes in Iraq and Syria. That pattern suggests a continued advisory mission with episodic precision strikes rather than ground maneuver, constrained by Baghdad’s sovereignty concerns and by the announced timeline to reduce forces.
U.S. Bases in Middle East, near Iraq (Picture source: Al Jazeera).
If hostilities escalated in Iraq, the opening U.S. targets would again be enablers: one-way attack drone stockpiles, rockets and launch sites, militia C2, and air defense systems that threaten U.S. aircraft. Standoff munitions like JASSM-ER allow strikes from outside Iraqi airspace if required by diplomacy, while armed MQ-9s provide overwatch for advisers and convoys. The political reality is that Baghdad’s tolerance has limits, and Washington’s current posture is designed to apply pressure with precision while avoiding actions that force the Iraqi government to curtail the partnership outright.
In Iraq, the principal threat environment is defined by Iran-aligned militias equipped with short-range rockets, improvised loitering munitions, and armed drones that target coalition installations and logistics convoys. These groups maintain small, concealed firing sites near populated zones, making counter-battery and counter-UAS operations complex and politically sensitive. Their decentralized structure allows rapid relocation and plausible deniability, forcing U.S. forces to rely on high-precision strikes and persistent surveillance rather than large-scale maneuvers. The Iraqi security forces’ uneven control across provinces further complicates target coordination and deconfliction.
The Ain al-Asad Airbase, the remaining U.S. base in Iraq (Picture source: U.S. DoW).
Across all three theaters, the escalation ladder should be explicit. At sea near Venezuela, it begins with surveillance and interdiction, moves to disabling fire and armed helo actions, then to coastal SEAD with AARGM-ER if Venezuelan emitters illuminate U.S. aircraft, followed by Tomahawk or JASSM-ER against fixed nodes only if lethal threats persist. In Nigeria, it begins with ISR and information support to Abuja, then time-sensitive strikes with MQ-9s on armed perpetrators of mass violence under Nigerian request, and only then, if partners grant access, limited manned airpower presence. In Iraq, the rung below major escalation is already routine: retaliatory precision strikes on militia infrastructure after a credible attack on U.S. forces, followed by diplomatic de-escalation. That clarity helps manage risk to aircrews and to civilians.
Risks are material and legal. Any land-attack options in Venezuela would raise sovereignty issues and risk miscalculation with air defenses around population centers. In Nigeria, civilian protection operations would demand positive identification, host-nation authorization and careful rules of engagement. In Iraq, any expansion of strikes inside federal territory without Baghdad’s buy-in could fracture the coalition and accelerate the drawdown timeline. Those constraints are one reason Pentagon officials have kept options short of invasion in public discourse.
Tomahawk Block V provides long-range, subsonic precision with in-flight retargeting and battle damage imagery. SM-6 adds flexible defense and limited strike from Aegis ships. JASSM-ER offers low observable penetration beyond 500 nautical miles, with proven employment and heavy bomber carriage that allows mass. P-8A’s APY-10 radar, EO/IR and acoustic suite strengthen maritime kill chains and post-strike assessment. MQ-9 endurance allows broad-area surveillance and discriminate engagement with Hellfire and laser-guided bombs. Tankers enable all of this, but they also telegraph operational feasibility. The distance from San Juan to Caracas is under 500 nautical miles, which simplifies tanker plans. Djibouti to Abuja is over 2,000 nautical miles, which does not. Erbil to Al Qaim is roughly 180 nautical miles, a short reach for persistent overwatch. These numbers define the difference among the three options on the table.
If Washington chooses to apply limited force, the most executable play is in the Caribbean, where naval and fifth-generation air assets already sit close enough to deliver controlled, reversible pressure. Nigeria remains a planning problem where intelligence and special operations can move quickly but sustained airpower cannot without permissions and staging. Iraq is accessible but politically bounded, suited to the current pattern of retaliatory precision and partner enablement.
Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.
Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.
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Northrop Grumman’s F-35 Fighter output highlights industrial power behind US air dominance
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On July 2, 2025, Northrop Grumman announced from Palmdale, California, that it had reached a new milestone in military aircraft manufacturing with the ability to deliver a center fuselage for the F-35 Lightning II every thirty hours. This announcement, taken from an official company release, reflects the significant transformation of defense manufacturing methods, where production speed is now combined with strict standards of precision and reliability. For the United States and its international partners, this achievement provides additional assurance of the availability and modernization of the fifth-generation fleet.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkA U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II (Picture source: US DoD)
The F-35 Lightning II, developed by Lockheed Martin with contributions from Northrop Grumman, BAE Systems, and Pratt & Whitney, is a fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter designed for air superiority, ground attack, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare. It is produced in three versions: the F-35A, intended for air forces and equipped with conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL); the F-35B, which combines stealth with short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) capability, enabling operations from smaller ships or austere bases; and the F-35C, adapted for carrier operations with a larger wing and reinforced structure. Sharing a common technological foundation, the variants provide operators with a coherent and flexible tool suited to different operational environments.
Powered by a Pratt & Whitney F135 turbofan producing up to 43,000 pounds of thrust with afterburner, the F-35 reaches a maximum speed of Mach 1.6 (1,930 km/h) and a range of 2,220 km with internal fuel. Its maximum takeoff weight is 31,800 kg, allowing it to carry a wide range of armaments. The internal 20 mm cannon (GAU-22A or M61A2, depending on the version) is complemented by AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9X Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, as well as ground-attack weapons such as the GBU-31 JDAM, the GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb, and the AGM-88 HARM, designed to neutralize air defense systems. The internal weapons bay preserves stealth, while six external hardpoints allow a payload of more than 15,000 pounds when discretion is not required. The aircraft is equipped with advanced sensors, including the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, the Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS), the Distributed Aperture System (DAS), and the Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS), providing comprehensive battlefield coverage and extended situational awareness.
At the core of this architecture, the center fuselage plays a critical role. It houses the air intakes, part of the fuel tanks, the internal weapons bay, and the flight-operable doors and mechanisms. The accuracy of its assembly, particularly edge alignment and application of coatings, directly determines the aircraft’s stealth performance and reliability in missions. Northrop Grumman has already delivered more than 1,400 such fuselages, confirming its central role in the Lightning II program and its expertise in producing complex aerospace structures.
This production pace is made possible by the Integrated Assembly Line (IAL), inaugurated in 2011, which remains one of the most advanced facilities worldwide for fighter aircraft manufacturing. Designed to assemble all three versions of the F-35 on a single line, it incorporates advanced processes such as automated guided vehicles, robotic drilling, and on-site molding. These operations are reinforced by real-time production data analysis, improving quality control while optimizing the use of human resources. The IAL thus represents the convergence of automation, robotics, and precision engineering.
The scale of the facility illustrates the magnitude of the project. Covering an area equivalent to a football field, it includes more than 115 assembly stations and processes around ten million parts annually. With this capacity, completing one center fuselage every thirty hours has become feasible, symbolizing a shift in the standards of defense aerospace manufacturing.
Beyond fuselage production, Northrop Grumman is also responsible for several other F-35 subsystems, including radars, communications equipment, and logistics support. This vertical integration, bringing together design, production, and sustainment, aims to secure supply chains and ensure technical consistency across the program. It reflects an industrial strategy designed for long-term requirements and the continuous adaptation of client armed forces.
The consequences of this acceleration extend well beyond the Palmdale plant. In a context of technological competition and regional tensions, the ability to deliver fifth-generation aircraft rapidly is a decisive factor. For U.S. forces, it ensures increased fleet availability, while international partners rely on these production rates to meet delivery schedules and strengthen their air capabilities.
Since entering service in 2015, the F-35 has become the most widely distributed fighter program globally. In the United States, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps each operate their respective variants. Among historical partners, the United Kingdom employs F-35Bs for both the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy, Italy has acquired both F-35As and F-35Bs, and the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark are already fielding F-35As.
Additional customers have joined this initial group. Israel, the first to use the aircraft in combat, operates customized F-35As. Japan, already equipped with F-35As, began deploying its first F-35Bs in the south of the country in August 2025. Australia, South Korea, and Belgium have also received their first aircraft, while Finland, Poland, Switzerland, Canada, Romania, Greece, Germany, and the Czech Republic have signed firm contracts but are still awaiting deliveries.
This diversity of buyers, combined with production having already passed 1,200 aircraft delivered by mid-2025, highlights the pressure on the global supply chain and the need for Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin to further increase throughput. Forces already equipped are working to integrate the F-35 into their operational doctrines, while those still waiting for deliveries depend on the reliability of industrial schedules. In this context, the declared pace of one center fuselage every thirty hours is critical, as it underpins both the credibility of the program and the fulfillment of commitments to allied nations.
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Report: V-MAX2 marks a new phase in France’s hypersonic weapons strategy
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On June 26, 2023, France reached a decisive milestone in the field of hypersonics with the successful launch of the V-MAX hypersonic glider from Biscarrosse. This first flight, the result of cooperation between the French defence procurement agency (DGA), ArianeGroup, and Onera, validated key technological choices and marked a European first. By succeeding in stabilising and manoeuvring a vehicle at speeds above Mach 5, France demonstrated its ability to develop capabilities in a sector where only the United States, Russia and China had been active until then. Yet this test was only a first step. France’s ambition is now to move further with VMAX2, followed by the SyLex programme and finally ASN4G, to fully integrate these technologies into a national defence strategy.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkConcept rendering of France’s VMAX2 hypersonic glider flying at extreme speed above the Earth’s atmosphere. (Picture source: Editing content from Army Recognition Group)
Hypersonic glider weapon systems are designed to strike targets by penetrating enemy air and missile defences. Propelled into the upper atmosphere by carrier systems, these gliders reach speeds from Mach 5 to Mach 20. Their trajectories, made unpredictable by extreme manoeuvrability, render them very difficult to intercept. This combination of speed and agility provides a rapid intervention capability at both medium and long ranges. To overcome air and missile defence networks, a hypersonic glider must maintain very high velocity throughout its flight while being able to perform complex manoeuvres in the terminal phase, precisely when it is most exposed to interceptors. This requires a high lift-to-drag ratio, heat-resistant materials and a control system able to respond to extreme conditions.
Aware of these challenges, the Ministry of the Armed Forces appointed ArianeGroup as prime contractor for the V-MAX programme. The company possesses unique expertise in Europe in ballistic launchers, space vehicles and atmospheric re-entry. The first phase of work focused on aerothermodynamic modelling, high-temperature materials and thermal protection, inertial navigation and guidance systems, as well as sensors and antennas. The demonstrator launched in 2023 was designed to test manoeuvrability during re-entry, under severe mechanical and thermal constraints. The flight confirmed structural integrity and the performance of on-board systems, marking a technological success recognised as a first for France and Europe.
The next stage is embodied by VMAX2. This programme, part of the incremental roadmap defined by the DGA, is intended to demonstrate France’s ability to design and control a hypersonic glider equipped with an advanced command system. The vehicle, whose shape and thermomechanical strength are based on several technological breakthroughs, comes very close to an operational system. It will be used to experiment with critical subsystems under representative conditions while anticipating advances in adversary interception technologies. The aim is to achieve a precise understanding of hypersonic flight dynamics to guide future military capabilities.
In continuity with this programme, the SyLex project, presented at the Paris Air Show in 2025, represents an ambition to reach a new threshold. This demonstrator is expected to achieve speeds of up to Mach 16, or around 20,000 km/h. To reach such a leap, France will need to build a sovereign test infrastructure able to reproduce and analyse these extreme conditions. Initial flight experiments are scheduled for 2027, with potential operational integration around 2030. SyLex reflects a clear determination: to provide France with autonomous hypersonic capability, avoiding dependence on foreign infrastructures or technologies.
In parallel, France is preparing the replacement of the ASMP-A airborne nuclear missile with the ASN4G programme. Scheduled for around 2035, this system will be powered by a ramjet engine, combining hypersonic velocity with a strategic payload, thereby ensuring the credibility of French deterrence in the face of advancing missile defence systems. Led by MBDA and Onera under the MIHYSYS contract awarded in 2024, this project is directly embedded in France’s nuclear deterrence doctrine and will be a central element of future strategic posture.
These developments are taking shape in the context of international competition. Russia already fields the Avangard and Kinzhal systems, while China is multiplying tests of the DF-ZF glider. The United States continues several programmes but struggles to convert prototypes into operational capabilities. In this environment, France, despite more limited resources, is seeking to maintain credible status by relying on technological innovation and a reinforced deterrence doctrine.
Ultimately, the evolution of France’s hypersonic sector, from VMAX to VMAX2, then SyLex and ASN4G, reflects a progressive but ambitious strategy. Each demonstrator provides vital knowledge, each test is a milestone towards capabilities that could reshape military balances. The coming years will reveal whether France can translate these technological advances into a lasting strategic advantage. One thing is certain: in the global race for hypersonic missiles, Paris has chosen not to remain on the sidelines but to assert its place among the powers shaping the warfare of tomorrow.
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Analysis: How Greenland makes Denmark indispensable to NATO’s Arctic strategy
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The contract signed by Denmark’s Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization (FMI) with the Swedish company T-KARTOR to deliver new flight charts for the ice-free areas of Greenland might appear minor at first glance. Yet this technical decision reflects a much deeper strategic reality. Greenland, an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, is increasingly at the heart of global geopolitical rivalries. The island is becoming a focal point of the struggle for influence in the Arctic, where sovereignty enforcement, military posturing, and resource competition converge.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkThe new flight charts now cover all ice-free regions of Greenland.
(Picture source: Danish MoD)
For Copenhagen, securing accurate and updated aeronautical charts is not just about aviation safety. It is part of a broader effort to guarantee sovereignty over a vast and remote region that defines Denmark’s role as an Arctic power. With the Royal Danish Air Force relying on these maps to conduct patrols, surveillance, and search-and-rescue missions, the ability to fly at lower altitudes and operate more effectively strengthens the country’s presence in a territory that is central to NATO’s northern flank.
Greenland’s importance extends well beyond Danish defense. The island sits at the crossroads of global strategic interests. As Arctic sea ice continues to retreat, new maritime routes are gradually opening. These potential shipping corridors could shorten transit between Asia, Europe, and North America, bypassing traditional chokepoints like the Suez and Panama canals. Even though these routes remain hazardous and commercially uncertain, the prospect alone has drawn the attention of major powers, making Greenland a natural point of interest in future Arctic shipping governance.
The United States views Greenland as indispensable to its defense posture. Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) remains a critical hub for missile warning systems and space surveillance. During his presidency, Donald Trump famously floated the idea of buying Greenland, a move that was met with rejection in both Nuuk and Copenhagen but underscored Washington’s enduring perception of the island’s value. Meanwhile, Russia has stepped up its Arctic military presence, reinforcing bases along its northern coast and conducting naval operations. China has expressed interest as well, focusing on Greenland’s mineral wealth and potential role in future trade routes, even if its projects have often faced political resistance or economic setbacks.
The island’s mineral resources, especially rare earth elements, place it at the center of global competition for critical raw materials. These resources are vital for the green energy transition and modern defense technologies. Western states see Greenland as an opportunity to diversify supply chains and reduce dependence on China. At the same time, Greenland’s own government has placed strict limits on uranium mining and oil exploration, balancing environmental concerns with economic aspirations. For many Greenlanders, resource exploitation is not merely an economic question but a step toward greater autonomy, or even independence, from Denmark.
Since gaining self-rule in 2009, Greenland has expanded its authority over domestic affairs and has openly articulated its long-term ambition for independence. The government’s 2024-2033 Foreign, Defense, and Security Strategy makes clear its intent to engage internationally on its terms. Local leaders insist that decisions about the island’s resources and future will be made by Greenlanders themselves, rejecting external attempts to impose geopolitical agendas.
In this context, Denmark’s investment in flight charts acquires symbolic significance. It reflects a commitment to safeguard sovereignty in the Arctic, strengthen NATO’s northern defenses, and ensure that operations over Greenland remain safe and effective. At the same time, it underscores how even small technical steps are inseparable from the broader geopolitical currents shaping the Arctic.
As climate change accelerates and great power rivalry intensifies, Greenland’s role will only grow. What may seem like a routine defense procurement is, in fact, a reminder that the Arctic is no longer a peripheral theater but a central arena of global competition. For Denmark, ensuring control and operational capacity in Greenland is not only about today’s security needs but also about maintaining influence in a region where the balance of power is rapidly shifting.
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Analysis: China’s Strategy to Undermine the US Undersea Surveillance Network
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According to an article published on August 13, 2025, by Defense News, citing an essay by Ryan Martinson for the Center for International Maritime Security, some officers of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) recommend a strategy aimed directly at the United States undersea surveillance network, which is considered a major threat to China’s submarine fleet. Martinson, a professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, reports that Chinese experts view this system as vulnerable due to the vast maritime area to be monitored in the Western Pacific. According to these experts, disabling enough sensors could paralyze the entire system and significantly reduce its effectiveness.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkChina already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)
To understand this concern, it is necessary to outline the structure of the U.S. undersea surveillance network, and the technical means China already possesses or seeks to develop, whether coercive or non-coercive but dual-use, that is, applicable for military purposes.
The U.S. system is built on an integrated architecture combining fixed sensors, mobile systems, and airborne platforms. At its core is the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), a successor to the Cold War-era SOSUS network, consisting of arrays of seabed acoustic sensors connected to shore by undersea cables. This fixed network continuously monitors strategic areas, particularly maritime choke points and likely submarine transit routes. Complementing it are towed-array systems such as the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS), deployed on specialized ships such as the Victorious and Impeccable classes. These are capable of using passive or low-frequency active sonar to detect submarines over long distances, even in complex acoustic environments. U.S. destroyers, frigates, and attack submarines add capability with hull-mounted sonars and towed arrays, while airborne assets, the P-8A Poseidon and MH-60R Seahawk, deploy sonobuoys, dipping sonars, and torpedoes. The network is further supported by satellites, unmanned undersea vehicles, and oceanographic research ships, which gather environmental data critical to optimizing detection.
This American view contrasts sharply with China’s perception. Washington and its allies are concerned about the rapid expansion of China’s submarine fleet, expected to reach 65 units in 2025 and 80 by 2035, including nuclear-powered ballistic missile and attack submarines, as well as advanced conventional types such as the Yuan class. Beijing, for its part, believes the increasing sophistication of U.S. anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts threatens the stealth of its submarines, a key factor in their operational effectiveness. The article in Military Art describes U.S. cables and sensor networks as “fragile and easily severed” and identifies the command and control systems as the network’s “Achilles’ heel,” potentially vulnerable to kinetic or cyberattacks. The authors call for the development of acoustic, magnetic, optical, and electronic detection technologies, supported by artificial intelligence, as well as autonomous undersea vehicles capable of destroying these infrastructures.
Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former U.S. Navy submarine officer, considers this assessment credible. He notes that the IUSS and SURTASS vessels have been effective for decades but acknowledges that targeted attacks on specific network nodes are possible. However, he emphasizes the difficulty of locating small devices at sea or on the seabed and the operational cost of such a campaign, which would require substantial resources and restrict the use of Chinese submarine forces within the first island chain, when they might be more effective beyond it. Clark also outlines another potential approach, saturating the U.S. network by deploying a large number of submarines before a conflict, making it more difficult for U.S. forces to track and engage them all simultaneously.
China already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions, and the Sea Wing (Haiyi) oceanographic drone, used in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea to gather environmental data suitable for military exploitation. These platforms can be launched from military or civilian vessels, including China’s large fishing fleet, which could be tasked with support missions. Conventional naval forces, such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines, could also directly target SURTASS ships or other U.S. surveillance vessels. In addition, China’s cyber capabilities provide another means to disrupt command and control.
In parallel, Beijing is investing in advanced detection and localization systems such as the Qianlong series (Qianlong-1, Qianlong-2, Qianlong-3) and the Haishen-6000, designed for deep-sea exploration but adaptable for military purposes. Equipped with multiple sensors and coupled with artificial intelligence, they could locate hidden or buried installations and prepare them for neutralization.
On the offensive side, China is considering militarizing research submersibles such as the Jiaolong and Shenhai Yongshi, which can dive to great depths, to place charges, cut cables, or disable sensors. This could be combined with a saturation strategy involving the simultaneous deployment of a large number of submarines, forcing the United States to disperse its surveillance resources and creating opportunities to penetrate areas normally well covered by U.S. ASW.
If China were to conduct a systematic campaign against the U.S. network of undersea sensors, the consequences would be wide-ranging. The U.S. Navy’s ability to monitor and track Chinese submarines in the Western Pacific would be reduced, complicating the implementation of sea-denial and sea-control plans. This might lead Washington to invest heavily in redundant, more discreet, and resilient systems, including increased use of autonomous undersea vehicles to patrol sensitive areas. Strategically, the partial or temporary loss of undersea information dominance would increase operational uncertainty for U.S. and allied forces, potentially creating windows of opportunity for Chinese operations within the first and second island chains. Such a development would also heighten the role of regional allied ASW capabilities, particularly those of Japan and Australia, in a more decentralized surveillance architecture that would remain exposed to adversary countermeasures.
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Analysis: The Wing Loong II Drone and China’s rise in the global armed UAV market
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From Africa to the Middle East and South Asia, China’s Wing Loong-2 (WL-2) unmanned aerial vehicle has become a consistent presence across multiple operational theatres. Developed by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, a subsidiary of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China, it is operated both by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and a range of foreign customers. It has been widely deployed by Nigeria against Boko Haram, by Saudi Arabia against Houthi positions, by Pakistan in cross-border operations, and in Libya’s civil war, reflecting the growing export of Chinese armed drone technology. In its domestic configuration, designated GJ-2, it has been in PLA service since 2018, participating in live-fire exercises around Taiwan and patrols over the South China Sea.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkThe WL-2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle designed for both reconnaissance and strike operations.
(Picture source: Wikimedia Commons)
First unveiled at the Zhuhai Airshow in 2016 and making its maiden flight the following year, the WL-2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone intended for reconnaissance and strike missions. Measuring 11 meters in length with a wingspan of 20.5 meters, its aerodynamic design is similar to the US MQ-9 Reaper. However, its performance is lower in several respects. With a maximum take-off weight of 4,200 kg, around 500 kg less than the Reaper, it carries only 480 kg of external payload compared to the Reaper’s 1,400 kg. Its top speed is 370 km/h, service ceiling 9,000 meters, and range 1,500 km, compared to 480 km/h, 15,000 meters, and 1,900 km for the Reaper. These differences are partly due to its WJ-9 turboprop engine, rated at 500 to 600 shaft horsepower, less powerful than the Reaper’s Honeywell TPE331-10, delivering up to 900 shaft horsepower.
In endurance, the WL-2 can operate for 20 hours with a full weapons load and up to 32 hours with a reduced load, compared to the Reaper’s 27 hours. It also features certain technological characteristics, such as the use of China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, providing redundancy in the event of GPS signal denial in contested environments. A truck-mounted ground station can control several aircraft with a range of 200 to 300 km in beyond line-of-sight mode, and up to 3,000 km via satellite link, although this configuration is not always offered to foreign buyers.
In terms of sensors, the WL-2 is fitted with a stabilized electro-optical/infrared turret, a synthetic aperture radar, and a datalink capable of transmitting real-time imagery and intelligence to deployed units. It has six underwing hardpoints for a variety of guided munitions, including the YJ-9E anti-ship missile, LS-6 glide bomb, TL-2 and AG-300M air-to-ground missiles, and FT-series satellite-guided bombs. In maximum configuration, it can carry up to 12 munitions, or 18 TL-2 missiles of 16 kg each using triple-ejector racks. The BA-7 missile, modeled on the US AGM-114 Hellfire, is also part of its inventory.
Outside PLA service, the WL-2 has been exported to and operated by several countries, including Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Libya, where it has been employed in various combat environments ranging from counter-insurgency operations to conventional strike missions. These export cases demonstrate its adaptability to different operational contexts and its appeal to a diverse set of armed forces.Beyond reconnaissance and strike roles, the WL-2 can be fitted with an electronic warfare module, identifiable by its disc-shaped antenna, for jamming and countermeasures missions. Its modular design also supports civilian applications such as meteorological observation and emergency communications, with the WL-2H version deployed in typhoon and earthquake zones to assess damage and restore communications. The system can take off and land autonomously, execute simplified maneuvers, and be operated by a single person using a point-and-click control interface.
Artificial intelligence algorithms allow the aircraft to monitor its systems, identify threats, and return autonomously if damaged, using trajectory optimization and glide control technologies. These features reduce the need for advanced operator training, making it viable for countries without a full UAV pilot training program.
Commercially, its main advantage lies in its cost. While an MQ-9 system for US forces starts at about USD 30 million and export contracts can reach into the billions, the WL-2 is estimated at USD 4–6 million per unit, including munitions, ground control stations, and after-sales support. Pakistan ordered 48 units in 2018 with an option for local co-production. China also offers more flexible payment terms and fewer political restrictions, making it accessible to buyers excluded from Western systems.
Although more advanced Chinese drones such as the stealth GJ-11 and CH-7 are emerging, the WL-2 and its PLA variant, the GJ-2, remain key assets and competitive internationally. While it does not match the highest Western performance standards, it provides an operational and financial balance suited to low- and medium-intensity conflicts, reinforcing China’s position in the armed drone sector.
Compared to similar-class systems, the WL-2 is a lower-cost alternative to the US MQ-9 Reaper, the Chinese CH-5, Türkiye’s Bayraktar Akıncı, and Israel’s Hermes 900. The Reaper leads in payload capacity and altitude but is costlier and subject to stricter export controls. The CH-5 emphasizes long endurance at low cost, while the Akıncı offers a heavy, multi-role platform with a wide range of domestically produced weapons. The Hermes 900, more compact, is oriented toward endurance ISR missions with a broad civilian and military user base.
In export markets, the WL-2 benefits from competitive pricing, compatible munitions, and permissive political conditions, with Beijing also less hesitant than Western suppliers to sell to non-democratic states or governments with mixed human rights or civilian protection records. Other systems occupy distinct niches: the MQ-9B serves NATO and Indo-Pacific allies seeking interoperability and maritime capability, the Akıncı appeals to non-NATO countries requiring heavy strike capability, the CH-5 targets budget-limited buyers, and the Hermes 900 is selected for dual-use and certifiable missions. This segmentation shows that, despite its limitations, the WL-2 retains a strong position in markets where cost-effectiveness and minimal political restrictions are priorities.
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How the Compact Mako Hypersonic Missile Could Transform U.S. Air Power
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Physical compatibility tests have confirmed that the Mako can be carried internally by the F-22 and F-35A/C, as well as externally on aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and P-8A Poseidon (Picture source: Lockheed Martin)
Development of the Mako began in 2017 under the U.S. Air Force’s Stand In Attack Weapon (SiAW) program, with approximately $35 million in funding. The aim was to provide the Air Force with a weapon capable of quickly and precisely neutralizing strategic targets within anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, particularly in response to Chinese threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Measuring between 3.6 and 4 meters in length depending on the variant, with a diameter of 33 centimeters and a weight of approximately 590 kilograms, the missile can carry interchangeable 60-kilogram warheads and integrate various guidance systems. Its open digital architecture allows for rapid upgrades and reduces reliance on proprietary processes, offering advantages for future updates and cost control.
Physical compatibility tests have confirmed that the Mako can be carried internally by the F-22 and F-35A/C, as well as externally on aircraft such as the F-15E, F-16C, F/A-18 Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler, and P-8A Poseidon. Virtual tests have validated internal carriage on the B-1B, B-52H, and B-21Raider bombers. Equipped with standard 30-inch lugs, it can be integrated with nearly the entire U.S. aerial arsenal and, with an additional booster, could also be launched from the vertical launch tubes of U.S. Navy ships, similar to the AGM-158C LRASM missile.
This level of compatibility enables new operational concepts. Lockheed Martin has, for example, considered a combined deployment in which fifth-generation stealth fighters act as forward scouts to detect and designate targets, passing the data to fourth-generation aircraft equipped with Sniper targeting pods and armed with Mako missiles to execute the strike. This division of roles would maximize available firepower while leveraging the specific strengths of each platform, especially in highly contested environments.
The Mako is powered by a solid-fuel rocket motor capable of reaching Mach 5 at high altitude while retaining maneuverability, significantly reducing the reaction time available to enemy defenses. Its modular design, combined with additive manufacturing for components such as the seeker fairing and control surfaces, helps shorten production timelines and improve industrial responsiveness. The use of advanced digital engineering makes it possible to simulate and validate variants directly in a virtual environment before manufacturing, optimizing development and facilitating series production.
The strategic context further underscores the relevance of this program. China is actively developing the YJ-21 hypersonic missile, already tested in both naval and air-launched versions. The Mako could enable the United States to close the gap in the hypersonic arms race and maintain strategic balance against such threats. In parallel, the May 2025 development of the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) by Northrop Grumman and Raytheon Technologies illustrates the complementary nature of offensive and defensive programs in this domain.
Internationally, Lockheed Martin has expressed interest in initial production in the United Kingdom before transferring industrial activity to the United States, as part of potential cooperation under the AUKUS agreement. The UK Ministry of Defence, aiming to achieve a sovereign hypersonic missile capability by 2030, is considering the Mako as a viable option. Collaboration with British and Australian industrial partners could facilitate technology sharing, cost distribution, and capacity building among the participating nations.
At present, the Mako has not yet received production funding from the U.S. Department of Defense. However, its inclusion by the U.S. Navy in the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) category would allow for accelerated funding should a favorable decision be made. If approved, the Mako could become a key element of the U.S. military inventory, combining speed, flexibility, and multi-platform compatibility, and could serve as an important asset in both aerial and naval operations in the coming decades.
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How US Army Is Rebuilding Its Missile Defense Around Mass and Preemptive Action
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As ballistic and aerial threats proliferate and diversify, the US Army is preparing to release, by October 2025, a complete overhaul of its air and missile defense strategy, with a planning horizon extending to 2040. This new doctrinal framework, announced by Lieutenant General Sean A. Gainey during the Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, comes at a time of growing saturation, increasing sophistication of offensive vectors, and major shifts in command and control architectures. Far from being a mere update, this strategy signals a clear break from the post-2018 legacy by reaffirming the centrality of mass in air defense and embedding preemptive action as a core operational principle.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkMIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems for a readiness exercise in Germany (Picture source: US DoD)
Since the last version was published in 2018, the global strategic landscape has shifted dramatically. Drone campaigns in the Middle East, precision strikes in Ukraine, and saturation maneuvers by both state and non-state actors have exposed the limitations of sequential interception models. Adversaries are no longer attempting to breach a shield; they seek to overwhelm it. Within this context, General Gainey calls for a return to fundamentals, explicitly naming mass as a critical factor in tactical resilience. Warfare is once again a matter of volume, in munitions, sensors, and command nodes. As more coordinated salvos of theater-level weapons emerge, the ability to absorb the initial blow becomes as decisive as the ability to respond.
However, mass alone is no longer sufficient. The US Army now aims to go further by adopting a proactive posture centered on the neutralization of threats before they are launched. This approach, referred to as smart missile defeat, goes beyond linear defense logic and fits within a broader framework of informational and multi-domain attrition warfare. It entails integrating non-kinetic capabilities such as cyber disruption, electronic warfare, and AI-driven ISR strikes to delay, degrade, or disrupt adversary supply chains, launch platforms, and command systems.
In this light, artificial intelligence is no longer viewed as a tactical aid but as a core doctrinal enabler. The Army is investing in hybrid decision-making architectures, where machines help absorb operators’ cognitive workload and offer near-real-time distributed targeting decisions. According to General Gainey, this shift implies a redefinition of the human role, from operator to supervisor. This transition underpins the development of the Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS), designed to connect all available sensors and effectors, regardless of origin, within a modular command and distributed fires framework.
The broad deployment of IBCS, combined with the fielding of new sensors such as LTAMDS and short-range interceptors like M-SHORAD, is intended to produce a more agile, distributed, and lethal force. Alongside this, the US Army is also asserting a stronger role in homeland defense, working with NORAD and the Missile Defense Agency to support the development of the Golden Dome, a layered missile defense shield intended to address both theater-level and strategic threats. Though still in early stages, this effort reflects the growing ambition of the Space and Missile Defense Command to operate not just beyond the perimeter but within the national defense architecture itself.
The forthcoming 2040 strategy is thus a structural response to a dual challenge: absorbing saturation while regaining the initiative. It aligns with broader doctrinal shifts outlined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which calls for more adaptable, distributed forces capable of operating in contested, high-intensity environments. The return to mass is not a conservative fallback. It is a capacity expansion backed by command tools and technologies designed to strike before adversaries can act. In other words, the goal is not merely to survive the initial blow but to prevent it from occurring at all.
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Report: Reimagining Mesh-Based Radar Detection Against Hypersonic and Saturation Threats
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In the face of increasingly complex, saturating, and hypersonic strikes carried out by adversarial powers, traditional air defense systems are reaching their physical and economic limits. In a forward-looking report publishedin July 2025 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), analysts Masao Dahlgren, Patrycja Bazylczyk, and Tom Karako propose a fundamental shift: replacing architectures built around a few powerful radars with a dense mesh of passive, proliferated sensors forming a "distributed sensory skin" capable of detecting, tracking, and identifying threats while surviving in highly contested environments.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkHensoldt's TRML-4D radar, though an active sensor, is used within the IRIS-T SLM network and could serve as a nodal element in a more discreet and distributed mesh architecture (Picture source: Hensoldt)
This approach, referred to as mesh sensing, breaks away from the traditional detection-identification-engagement triad by distributing each function across specialized nodes within a network. The proposed sensors include acoustic detectors (such as Zvook or Sky Fortress deployed in Ukraine), infrared sensors (MWIR, LWIR), electro-optical cameras (TV/CCD), passive RF listening devices (e.g., Silent Sentinel), miniature Doppler radars mounted on lightweight drones, as well as hyperspectral sensors and transient event detectors. With unit costs now often below $10,000, these systems can be widely deployed in fixed, semi-mobile, or airborne configurations, using micro-UAVs such as the Black Hornet, RQ-28A, or Anavia HT-100. They can be layered operationally, acoustic systems positioned forward, infrared and optical sensors placed in-depth, and data fusion nodes secured in covered terrain.
The operational value lies in the ability of these networks to detect increasingly stealthy threats, such as subsonic cruise missiles like the Kh-101 or modified Shahed-136 drones, even in environments affected by electronic countermeasures, spectral camouflage, or active jamming. In a scenario modeled by CSIS, a ground-based air defense system in eastern Poland saw its performance improve by 26% against a ballistic missile salvo when supported by a passive EO/IR network of 14 sensors. The benefit was not only quantitative: early warning was improved by 3 to 4 minutes, allowing sufficient time for repositioning a Patriot PAC-3 MSE battery or activating a SkyCeptor interceptor within the IBCS framework.
The network infrastructure proposed by CSIS is based on a high-redundancy mesh architecture coupled with local data processing via edge computing. Sensor data does not require full centralization but can be partially processed at the source using dimensionality reduction, neural network classification (such as YOLOv7 or ResNet), or contextual interpretation (embedded LLMs in micro-instances). This localized processing improves resilience against jamming, reduces latency, and minimizes dependence on SATCOM or LTE relays vulnerable to electronic warfare. In this context, systems like the KORNET Passive Surveillance Sensor (KORNET-PSS) from Thales, the Silent Watch by Leonardo, or SAAB’s SHORAD Enhanced EO Mesh could be integrated as specialized nodes within a federated architecture.
This distributed network is not intended to replace active radars like the AN/MPQ-65A (Patriot) or the GM200 MM/C used by Dutch forces, but rather to complement them. It could also be used to multiply false targets against enemy anti-radiation missiles by deploying active decoys or intermittent emitters. The system may also support dynamic camouflage strategies, with regular shifts between emission sources, similar to the approach implemented in the Israeli Scorpius-T system.
Growing interest in distributed sensor architectures can be observed among armed forces. In 2024, the Bundeswehr approved a test of the ABF-Passiv (Aufgeklärte Bedrohung Früherkennung) program, based on deployable tripod-mounted LWIR sensors. The Italian Army is currently testing EO/IR sensor networks developed by Elettronica, in conjunction with its Kronos Grand Mobile radars. The US Army, for its part, has included in the FY2026 budget a program titled Passive Integrated Ground Sensors (PIGS), aimed at equipping Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs) with EO/IR acoustic sensor meshes to detect small drone movements at squad level.
Ultimately, mesh sensing could be integrated into a cloud-based command and control system capable of fusing sensor tracks in real time, prioritizing them, and automatically cueing intercept platforms. This direction, referred to as autopoietic sensor fusion, would represent a doctrinal shift comparable to the introduction of C-RAM systems or hit-to-kill interceptors in the 1990s. It reflects a step toward the emergence of a territorial immune system based not on kinetic mass, but on informational omnipresence.
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Analysis: How Ukraine’s Agile Warfare Model Shapes NATO Military Modernization
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At the inaugural LANDEURO event organizedby the Army Sustainment University on July 17, 2025, in Wiesbaden, Germany, a key session titled “Ukrainian Innovation at the Speed of Relevance” provided an in-depth perspective on the technological transformation underway within the Ukrainian armed forces. The discussion brought together defense industry experts, military representatives, and technology innovators to examine how Ukraine is accelerating the development of military solutions in direct response to battlefield demands. The objective was not simply to assess the current state of innovation but to demonstrate how the Ukrainian approach could redefine operational standards for NATO forces.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkAt the core of the discussions, participants emphasized the remarkable adaptability of Ukrainian industry and military units working closely together to meet frontline requirements (Picture source: Ukrainian MoD)
At the core of the discussions, participants emphasized the remarkable adaptability of Ukrainian industry and military units working closely together to meet frontline requirements. A significant focus was placed on the integration of artificial intelligence and autonomous systems in military operations. Speakers highlighted Ukraine’s ability to rapidly design and deploy FPV drones (First Person View), loitering munitions, and autonomous systems built from 3D-printed components, open-source mapping tools, and embedded AI modules. These systems are designed to identify, track, and engage targets even in environments heavily contested by electronic warfare.
Sebastian Kuhl, Director of Land Sales at Helsing, noted that faced with the high costs of complex sensors such as gimbals, Ukrainian engineers favor embedding AI algorithms directly onboard drones. This approach enables image stabilization and automatic target recognition without relying on costly and fragile mechanical devices. This "software-first" strategy supports better scalability of capabilities at lower costs, which is critical for a military operating under resource constraints.
Another topic addressed during the session was digital finance and disintermediation mechanisms used to support the war effort. Speakers explained how Ukraine has circumvented traditional financial and procurement systems through the use of cryptocurrency and crowdfunding. These methods help bypass administrative delays, allowing for the rapid funding and delivery of equipment directly to the frontlines. This alternative procurement strategy was presented as a model of financial agility under wartime conditions that may hold relevance for Western forces.
Yaroslav Azhnyuk, CEO of TheFourthLaw, stressed the advantages of software over hardware, explaining that the scalability of software solutions enables rapid deployment of updates and new capabilities in the field without requiring the replacement of physical platforms. Ukrainian-developed software modules are designed to be adaptable across various platforms, from FPV drones to autonomous ground vehicles. Azhnyuk described massively scalable autonomy as the most decisive defense technology of this decade while reaffirming that final engagement decisions remain under human control.
In the context of Ukraine's industrial efforts, drone production has undergone significant development. In 2024, nearly 2 million drones were manufactured domestically, including over 1.5 million FPV drones, many equipped with autonomy kits such as the ZIR module. This module enables low-cost drones to automatically recognize targets, such as armored vehicles or artillery, over distances exceeding 1 kilometer and to pursue moving targets at speeds of up to 60 km/h. This type of equipment reflects Ukraine's capability to combine affordable hardware with advanced software functionalities.
The session also shared insights on the Ukrainian military's innovative doctrine, which now favors modular systems and incremental approaches rather than complex, lengthy, and expensive developments. This doctrine translates into the progressive integration of autonomous features on existing platforms, such as last-phase autonomous navigation that enables drones to continue toward their targets even under communication jamming, as well as automated reconnaissance and fire correction functions.
The session concluded with a shared observation: Ukraine's approach presents a practical model of adaptability and pragmatism for NATO forces. Instead of pursuing perfect or technologically ambitious solutions that may prove unrealistic in wartime, Ukraine favors rapid experimentation, continuous field feedback, and iterative development. This innovation culture, driven by immediate operational needs, constitutes a unique operational laboratory for Western alliances that may soon face environments characterized by electronic warfare, drone swarms, and pervasive artificial intelligence.
Discussions at LANDEURO demonstrated that military innovation lies not solely in the sophistication of equipment but in the capacity to industrialize adaptable solutions rapidly, supported by innovative financial models and an agile ecosystem. Ukraine's case, shaped by the conditions of a war of attrition, may well define the path for modern armed forces facing future threats.
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SIPRI 2025 Warns of Rising Proliferation of Nuclear Multiple-Warhead and Dual-Use Systems
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The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published its annual Yearbook on 16 June 2025, which confirms the end of an era: the gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals that began after the Cold War is now over. In contrast, all nuclear-armed states pursued in 2024 a strategy of modernization, expansion, or innovation in their nuclear capabilities. This return to nuclear competition coincides with the weakening of arms control frameworks, with no immediate prospects for replacement.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkIn Russia, despite delays and another RS-28 Sarmat failure in 2024, plans to reload silos and increase warheads per missile remain unchanged. (Picture source: WikiCommons)
The report records an estimated total of 12,241 nuclear warheads as of 1 January 2025, of which 9,614 are in military stockpiles and 3,912 are deployed on operational delivery systems. Around 2,100 warheads are maintained at high operational alert, mainly by the United States and Russia. SIPRI also notes that China may now keep some warheads mounted on missiles during peacetime.
Modernization covers all components of the nuclear triads. In the United States, programs to replace the Minuteman IIIICBMs, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, and air-launched cruise missiles are underway, despite budget-related delays. Washington is also developing new non-strategic nuclear warheads, raising concerns about the program’s long-term sustainability. In Russia, while strategic forces remain a priority, the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile experienced another failure in 2024, and several other systems are delayed. Still, plans to reload silos and increase warhead counts per missile remain intact.
China is undergoing the fastest expansion. Its arsenal increased from 500 to around 600 warheads within a year, and it has completed or nearly completed construction of more than 300 new ICBM silos across desert and mountainous regions. At this pace, China could possess 1,500 warheads by 2035. The country is actively developing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities and continues to enhance its dual-capable naval and airborne systems.
The United Kingdom did not expand its stockpile in 2024 but remains on a growth trajectory laid out in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh. London is moving forward with the construction of four new SSBNs. France continues to develop its third-generation SSBN and a new air-launched cruise missile, while upgrading the payload of its M51 ballistic missile.
India has continued the development of MIRV-capable canisterized missiles, which can be transported with mated warheads and may remain on alert. Pakistan is expanding fissile material production and delivery systems, suggesting continued growth. North Korea now holds an estimated 50 assembled warheads and the fissile material for 40 more. It is advancing its doctrine of tactical deterrence and preparing to introduce theater nuclear weapons, according to South Korean sources.
Israel, while maintaining its policy of deliberate ambiguity, tested a propulsion system in 2024 that may be related to the Jericho missile series. Upgrades were also reported at the Dimona plutonium production site.
SIPRI highlights a concerning doctrinal shift. In November 2024, Russia revised its nuclear posture to broaden the scenarios in which it might use nuclear weapons. The United States replaced its forward-deployed B61 bombs in Europe with modernized versions. The report also notes that MIRV-capable systems, once limited to the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, are now being developed or deployed by China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
Emerging technologies are introducing new uncertainties. Warhead miniaturization, developments in artificial intelligence, automated command and control, cyber defense, and space warfare are reshaping deterrence architectures. Several states are investing in long-range maneuverable missiles, antisatellite weapons, and hypersonic glide vehicles. These advancements may shorten decision-making timelines and increase the risk of miscalculation or accidental use.
The SIPRI Yearbook 2025 concludes that the global nuclear order is entering a phase of increased strategic instability. The anticipated expiration of the New START treaty in 2026, with no replacement in sight, could trigger an unregulated cycle of warhead deployments, including rapid silo reactivation and submarine reloads. For armed forces and defense industries, these developments imply renewed attention to second-strike capabilities, the resilience of command-and-control systems, and the flexibility permitted under evolving nuclear doctrines.
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Missile Defense: US Highlights Key Role of SM3 Interceptors After First Combat Use in Middle East
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The U.S. Department of Defense has officially announced a major modification to a contract awarded to Raytheon, now a subsidiary of RTX Corporation, concerning the sustainment of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors. This contract modification, valued at $2.134 billion, raises the total ceiling from $1.198 billion to $3.332 billion. The announcement comes in a strategically significant context, as the SM-3 was recently used for the first time in an operational combat scenario by the U.S. Navy during the interception of Iranian missiles targeting Israel.
The Standard Missile-3 is an exo-atmospheric interceptor designed to neutralize short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats through direct kinetic impact, without the use of an explosive warhead (Picture source: Raytheon)
The contract covers ongoing engineering and logistical support services for the various SM-3 variants, including the Block IA, Block IB, and Block IIA versions. It encompasses complex technical services such as configuration management, obsolescence mitigation, cybersecurity measures, service life evaluation, support for flight testing, industrial base assessments, and the provision of spare parts. It also includes specific activities related to the defense of Guam and support under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. Work will be carried out at Raytheon facilities in Tucson, Arizona, and Huntsville, Alabama, under the supervision of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), also based in Huntsville. The performance period remains unchanged and extends through October 29, 2029.
The Standard Missile-3 is an exo-atmospheric interceptor designed to neutralize short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats through direct kinetic impact, without the use of an explosive warhead. Developed by Raytheon on behalf of the MDA, the system employs a "hit-to-kill" approach, which relies on direct collision to destroy targets. It is deployed from both sea-based Aegis-equipped ships and land-based Aegis Ashore sites in Europe. The SM-3 plays a central role in the ballistic missile defense architecture of the United States and its allies, particularly within NATO's Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). With over 30 successful space intercepts and more than 400 missiles delivered to the U.S. and Japanese navies, the system has established a credible operational track record.
Among the operational variants, the SM-3 Block IB features a dual-color infrared seeker and a Throttleable Divert and Attitude Control System (TDACS), enhancing terminal guidance accuracy. The Block IIA variant, developed in cooperation with Japan, represents a significant evolution. It incorporates a wider 21-inch diameter, more powerful rocket motors, a larger kinetic warhead, and an improved seeker coupled with a High Divert DACS. These enhancements provide extended range and speed, allowing the missile to defend larger areas against advanced ballistic threats. This version forms the core of EPAA Phase III, with deployment already underway in Romania and planned for Poland. It has demonstrated its effectiveness in NATO multinational exercises and in a successful live interception of a ballistic missile target in 2017.
The SM-3 Block IA, the earliest version deployed since 2004, features a 13.5-inch propulsion system, a monochrome seeker, and a Solid Divert and Attitude Control System (SDACS). It serves as the technological foundation of the program. The Block IB, operational since 2011, introduced important improvements while maintaining compatibility with the original design. The Block IIA represents a capability leap, not only in terms of range but also in strategic flexibility, as it can be launched from both naval and land-based platforms, enabling a wider range of operational scenarios.
The recent combat use of the SM-3 in intercepting ballistic threats launched from Iran has further reinforced its strategic relevance among U.S. allies. This event demonstrated the interceptor's technical maturity and its ability to counter high-altitude missile attacks in a complex environment. It also highlights the missile’s growing role in protecting strategic sites, deployed naval forces, and allied territories across Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region.
By enabling Raytheon to continue and expand its technical support to U.S. and allied forces, this contract modification underscores the increasingly central position of the SM-3 in U.S. missile defense doctrine. In a global context marked by the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and intensifying strategic rivalries, the SM-3 program remains a key tool for deterrence, international cooperation, and collective protection. This contract confirms Raytheon's pivotal role in sustaining Western exo-atmospheric interception capabilities.
EvolutionoftheStandardMissile-3 (SM-3)interceptorsundertheAegisBallisticMissileDefense (BMD)program (Picture source: MDA)
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US Speeds Up Nuclear Triad Overhaul Amid Growing Global Nuclear Competition
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According to a report updated on May 1, 2025, by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), the United States is undertaking a vast effort to modernize its strategic nuclear forces, involving both the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). This program aims to ensure the credibility, flexibility, and resilience of the U.S. deterrent posture in a context shaped by the rise of nuclear-armed competitors, notably Russia and China. Estimated at $946 billion over ten years by the Congressional Budget Office, this investment includes the renewal of the three components of the nuclear triad, warhead modernization, and the upgrade of nuclear command and control systems. The DoD’s FY2025 budget request allocates $49.2 billion to support these efforts, highlighting the strategic priority given to long-term nuclear deterrence.
The Minuteman III will soon be replaced by the Sentinel ICBM (formerly GBSD), a new-generation missile integrating digital systems, advanced countermeasures, and a modular design, offering intercontinental range, improved precision, and increased resilience to a first strike (Picture source: US DoD)
The land-based leg of the triad is centered on Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed from three U.S. Air Force bases in Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. Each missile, with a range exceeding 13,000 kilometers, is powered by three solid-fueled stages and guided by an inertial navigation system. Originally capable of carrying up to three thermonuclear warheads, the missiles now carry only a single W78 or W87 warhead in compliance with New START treaty limits. Of the 450 existing silos, 400 are operationally deployed, with the remaining 50 retained as reserve or dispersal infrastructure. The current fleet has undergone life extension programs to enhance reliability and accuracy. The Minuteman III will soon be replaced by the Sentinel ICBM (formerly GBSD), a new-generation missile integrating digital systems, advanced countermeasures, and a modular design, offering intercontinental range, improved precision, and increased resilience to a first strike. The program plans to acquire 659 missiles to support the deployment of 400 operational units and testing. The Sentinel will carry the new W87-1 warhead, currently under development by NNSA. This warhead will incorporate modernized safety features, enhanced accident resistance, and fully redesigned components.
The sea-based leg of the triad is composed of 14 Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each capable of carrying up to 20 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). These three-stage missiles, guided by GPS and inertial navigation, have a range of over 12,000 kilometers and are designed to deliver multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), including the W76-1 (100 kilotons), W76-2 (low-yield variant, 6–8 kilotons), and W88 (475 kilotons). Each submarine can carry up to 96 warheads, though the actual number varies depending on operational needs and treaty limits. Two submarines are generally in maintenance, while twelve are operationally deployed across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with homeports at Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. The Ohio-class will be replaced by the Columbia-class, which features 16 launch tubes per boat (down from 24), low-maintenance propulsion, digital systems, and acoustic reduction technologies. These submarines are expected to remain in service until 2080. The D5LE and D5LE2 programs are extending the operational life and capabilities of the Trident missiles to match the deployment timeline of the Columbia-class. Simultaneously, NNSA is developing the W93 warhead, incorporating enhanced safety features and intended to be paired with the future Mark 7 reentry vehicle.
The air-based leg is currently composed of two types of bombers: 20 B-2 Spirit stealth bombers, based at Whiteman AFB in Missouri, and 74 B-52H Stratofortress aircraft stationed at Barksdale AFB in Louisiana and Minot AFB in North Dakota. The B-2is a subsonic flying wing designed for penetrating enemy defenses and delivering B61-7, B61-11, or B83 gravity nuclear bombs. The B-52, which lacks stealth capabilities, carries AGM-86B air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) equipped with W80-1 warheads (approximately 150 kilotons), capable of low-altitude flight over a distance exceeding 2,400 kilometers. Both platforms can also carry conventional weapons. The future of the air leg is embodied in the B-21 Raider, a new stealth bomber under development for both nuclear and conventional missions, designed to operate in contested environments. Initial units are undergoing testing and limited production, with a minimum of 100 aircraft planned. The B-21 will also be equipped with the new Long Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, designed to evade modern air defenses with a range exceeding 2,500 kilometers, and armed with the upgraded W80-4 warhead.
Gravity bombs are also undergoing modernization. NNSA has consolidated several B61 variants into a single B61-12 version, GPS-guided, featuring modern safety systems, and compatible with platforms such as the F-35, B-2, and future B-21. The B83 bomb, with a yield of 1.2 megatons, was slated for retirement in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. However, in 2023, the Pentagon announced the development of the B61-13, a new high-yield gravity bomb intended for hardened or deeply buried targets, set to replace the B83 gradually.
The sea-based leg of the triad is composed of 14 Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each capable of carrying up to 20 Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) (Picture source: US DoD)
In parallel, the United States is investing heavily in the modernization of its NC3 (Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications) infrastructure, which comprises satellites, radar systems, cable networks, command centers, and secure communications platforms to ensure decision-making continuity and launch authority in all scenarios. The FY2025 budget includes $11 billion for the ongoing overhaul of this architecture, with an emphasis on improving resilience to cyber threats and space-based disruptions.
Nuclear force employment planning remains the responsibility of the U.S. President, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). In 2024, a new presidential directive expanded U.S. deterrence objectives to address the simultaneous threat posed by Russia, China, and North Korea. The directive outlines the potential need to adapt the size, posture, or composition of the force. In March 2025, STRATCOM Commander General Anthony Cotton publicly raised the possibility of increasing the number of B-21 bombers ordered, suggesting that the current modernization plan may be insufficient to meet the challenges of a two-peer nuclear environment. This perspective aligns with the 2023 findings of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, which concluded that the existing modernization program is "necessary but not sufficient."
In summary, the United States is implementing a comprehensive overhaul of its strategic nuclear architecture, combining the replacement of delivery platforms, warhead modernization, and the digital transformation of its command systems. This long-term effort aims to preserve a flexible, survivable, and credible deterrent posture in a global context increasingly defined by the nuclear competition between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. By integrating technological investments, doctrinal adjustments, and sustained industrial efforts, U.S. nuclear modernization reaffirms its central role in the country’s national security strategy.
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Pakistan Leverages Its Alliance With China to Counter India’s Air Power
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As military tensions between India and Pakistan have escalated in recent days, Islamabad continues to strengthen its defensive posture by relying on a range of air defense systems supplied by China. The confrontation, which began with an attack in India and was then fueled by artillery exchanges in Kashmir, armed drone overflights, and several mutual airspace violations, revives the specter of a conventional conflict between the two nuclear-armed powers. In this context, the modernization of Pakistan’s air defense has become a strategic priority. Pakistan now relies on a layered network composed of the HQ-9P, HQ-9BE, FD-2000, HQ-16FE, as well as older systems such as the LY-80 and FM-90, to build an aerial shield against Indian air superiority.
The HQ-9 air defense missile systems are attached to a surface-to-air missile brigade of the air force under the PLA Central Theater Command (Picture source: Chinese MoD)
The HQ-9P system today constitutes one of the pillars of Pakistan’s air defense. Introduced by the army in 2021, it is a derivative of the Russian S-300 system, developed by the Chinese company CPMIEC with Moscow's agreement. Equipped with an HT-233 3D phased-array radar, it can track up to 100 targets and simultaneously engage between 8 and 10. Its estimated range is 125 kilometers against aircraft and about 25 kilometers against cruise missiles. This system uses a Track-Via-Missile (TVM) guidance method, combining inertial navigation, mid-course corrections, and active radar homing in the terminal phase. Deployed around sensitive sites such as Rawalpindi and Karachi, the HQ-9P provides credible deterrence capabilities but remains limited in range compared to Russian standards.
Additionally, the Pakistan Air Force deploys the HQ-9BE, a more recent and enhanced variant, with a maximum range of up to 260 kilometers against combat aircraft and 25 kilometers against tactical ballistic missiles. Capable of intercepting targets at speeds up to Mach 14, the HQ-9BE represents a significant upgrade, featuring the JSG-400 target designation radar and the JPG-600 surveillance radar, supported by advanced electronic counter-countermeasures. Its limited anti-ballistic capability, however, places it behind India's S-400 system in overall effectiveness.
The FD-2000, an export version of the HQ-9A, is also operational within the Pakistan Air Force. Designed to engage multiple aerial targets and low-flying cruise missiles simultaneously, it relies on the HT-233 radar and has a range of 125 kilometers against aircraft. Compared to the American Patriot PAC-3, the FD-2000 offers broader coverage at a lower cost, although its proximity-fused warhead reduces its effectiveness against certain ballistic threats.
To reinforce its medium-range defense, Pakistan has integrated the HQ-16FE, an improved version of the HQ-16 (or LY-80), developed based on the Russian Buk missile system. This system offers a range of 160 kilometers and an interception altitude of 27 kilometers. It uses a 2D active electronically scanned array radar with a surveillance range of 250 kilometers, capable of tracking twelve targets and engaging eight simultaneously. With its combined semi-active and active radar homing guidance, the HQ-16FE effectively complements the HQ-9BE, ensuring seamless coverage between defense layers.
These various systems are integrated into Pakistan’s CLIAD (Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence) architecture, developed by the army to coordinate surveillance, command, and control across multiple radar and missile layers (Picture source: @Defence_IDA X Channel )
Older but still in service within certain units, the LY-80 (or HQ-16A) provides coverage between 40 and 70 kilometers and can intercept targets flying at speeds of up to Mach 2.5. Paired with IBS-150 radars, it remains effective against subsonic threats. At shorter range, the FM-90, derived from the Chinese HQ-7 and inspired by the French Crotale system, continues to be used with a 15-kilometer engagement range. It employs command-to-line-of-sight radar guidance, sufficient against drones or helicopters but vulnerable to modern missiles like the Meteor or BrahMos.
These various systems are integrated into Pakistan’s CLIAD (Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence) architecture, developed by the army to coordinate surveillance, command, and control across multiple radar and missile layers. Regular exercises, such as Al-Bayza, are held to test this integration. Additionally, efforts are underway to develop indigenous capabilities, notably through the LoMADS and FAAZ-SL programs, although these remain at an early stage.
In comparison, India fields a far more advanced air defense system, centered around the Russian S-400 Triumf, complemented by multiple national and Israeli-origin layers. Delivered starting in December 2021, the S-400 offers a detection range of 600 kilometers and an engagement range of up to 400 kilometers, employing four types of missiles: the 40N6 for very long-range targets, the 48N6E3 for medium-range aerial and missile threats, and the 9M96E/9M96E2 for highly maneuverable targets. Capable of tracking 100 targets and simultaneously engaging 36, the S-400 provides India with formidable in-depth air defense.
The S-400 units, now renamed "Sudarshan," have been deployed on both the Chinese and Pakistani fronts. In July 2024, a military exercise demonstrated their effectiveness, achieving an 80% success rate against simulated targets. This capability is reinforced by complementary systems such as Akash(30–70 km range), Barak-8 (70–100 km range), QRSAM (25–30 km range), SPYDER (15–35 km range), and SR-SAM, offering comprehensive national airspace coverage. Additionally, most Indian radars are based on AESA technology, providing significant advantages in detection, resilience against electronic countermeasures, and simultaneous multi-target tracking.
In comparison, India fields a far more advanced air defense system, centered around the Russian S-400 Triumf, complemented by multiple national and Israeli-origin layers (Picture source: Vitaly V.Kuzmin)
This layered architecture enables India to manage a two-front challenge against China and Pakistan while ensuring credible conventional deterrence. Furthermore, the “Make in India” program has allowed the local development of Akash and QRSAM missiles, reducing dependence on imports and securing logistical continuity during prolonged conflicts.
Despite Chinese support, Pakistan remains disadvantaged on several fronts: detection range, number of simultaneous engagements, radar coverage, and operational experience. While the HQ-9BE and HQ-16FE offer significant capabilities, their effectiveness against saturation attacks or stealth strikes remains uncertain. Moreover, although China and Turkey themselves operate the S-400 and could share sensitive insights into its weaknesses, this would not be sufficient to offset the broader technological gap.
As the Indo-Pakistani conflict enters an uncertain and potentially escalating phase, air defense is becoming a central component of bilateral deterrence. While Pakistan has made notable progress in surface-to-air defense through its partnership with Beijing, India retains a clear technological and doctrinal advantage. This gap could prove decisive in the event of a direct aerial confrontation over South Asia.
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Can Russia Challenge NATO’s Dominance in the Baltic Sea Despite an Unfavorable Balance of Power
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While the Baltic Sea now appears as a strategic stronghold firmly held by NATO, Russian military capabilities in the region remain significant and could offer Moscow unexpected room for maneuver in the event of a crisis. In an article published by Challenges on April 25, 2025, Vincent Lamigeon relies on satellite images provided by Maxar and analyzed by Safran AI to present a detailed overview of Russian naval, aerial, and hybrid forces in the Baltic, with a particular focus on the Kaliningrad enclave.
The naval base at Baltiysk, home to the Baltic Fleet, hosts a diverse and significant naval force. (Picture source: @VincentLamigeon on X for Challenges /Maxar/Safran AI)
With Finland’s accession to NATO in 2023 and Sweden’s in 2024, the Baltic Sea has increasingly become a NATO-dominated maritime area. Access to this semi-enclosed sea passes through Denmark’s Øresund, Great Belt, and Little Belt straits, strategic chokepoints that Copenhagen and Stockholm could theoretically seal off in the event of conflict. Russia’s access to the Baltic is now limited to two vulnerable points: the military enclave of Kaliningrad and the city of Saint Petersburg. The Gulf of Finland, which leads to Saint Petersburg, could be blocked through mining operations or submarine interdiction conducted by Finland and Estonia. Despite this strategic isolation, Russia maintains considerable military capabilities in the region.
The naval base at Baltiysk, home to the Baltic Fleet, hosts a diverse and significant naval force. Satellite imagery analysis identifies around fifteen warships docked there. Among them is a Buyan-M class missile corvette, equipped with Kalibr cruise missiles with a range exceeding 1,500 kilometers, capable of striking deep strategic targets. A Kilo-class conventional attack submarine, specialized in coastal submarine warfare, is also present. The force includes two destroyers: a Sovremenny-class vessel for anti-ship warfare and a Udaloy-class vessel for anti-submarine warfare, each equipped with heavy missiles and advanced detection systems. Two multi-role Steregushchiy-class corvettes are moored alongside several Krivak-class frigates, intended to protect convoys and coastal installations. Additionally, three Dyugon-class landing ships, two Kashtan-class support vessels, and an Ivan Papanin-class icebreaking patrol vessel are based at the port.
The Baltiysk facilities are protected by reinforced defensive measures, including two camouflaged air defense systems, likely Pantsir-S1s, and a floating barrier designed to counter surface drones at the port entrance. These measures aim to prevent drone attacks, a threat demonstrated on April 7, 2024, when the missile corvette Serpukhov was severely damaged by a Ukrainian GUR operation.
Beyond the ships visible at the docks, other Russian naval units operate in the Baltic but are not visible on satellite images. These include Karakurt-class corvettes armed with Kalibr and Oniks missiles, as well as Ropucha-class landing ships. According to the Military Balance 2025 by the IISS, the Baltic Fleet comprises a total of 69 vessels. However, many of these are older, smaller patrol ships more suited to coastal operations than high-intensity conflict.
Russian aerial capabilities in the region remain active. In Kaliningrad, Chkalovsk Air Base hosts about twenty Su-27 multirole fighters, capable of performing air superiority and long-range interception missions. The base also occasionally hosts Il-78M tanker aircraft, which extend the operational range of Russian fighters and bombers. In 2022, Chkalovsk also temporarily hosted MiG-31K aircraft armed with hypersonic Kinjal missiles, capable of striking targets over 2,000 kilometers away. The Chernyakhovsk Air Base, less active, nonetheless hosts several S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missile batteries, providing dense aerial coverage for the enclave.
A Kilo-class conventional attack submarine, specialized in coastal submarine warfare at Baltiysk (Picture source: Wikimedia Commons)
Beyond Kaliningrad, Russia relies on its northern installations on the Kola Peninsula to maintain strategic reach over the Baltic. Radar imagery of Olenya Air Base reveals a notable concentration of Tu-95 strategic bombers. These aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear or conventional cruise missiles, regularly conduct demonstration flights over the Baltic. Having been relocated from Engels Air Base following repeated Ukrainian attacks, their deployment reflects Moscow’s operational adaptation. Nearby, at Olenya Guba naval base, the intelligence-gathering ship Yantar is stationed, suspected of conducting underwater espionage operations targeting Western communication infrastructures.
In light of these capabilities, Baltic coastal states are concerned that Russia’s ongoing hybrid warfare efforts—GPS jamming, undersea infrastructure sabotage, and radar targeting of NATO aircraft—could escalate into open conflict. The overall balance of power remains unfavorable to Russia, which fields only one or two submarines in the Baltic compared to about ten NATO submarines, and a few dozen fighter aircraft against nearly 400 operated by NATO members. However, according to Danish military intelligence, if hostilities in Ukraine were to cease, Russia could refocus its military assets westward within just six months, posing a potential threat to a Baltic state or seeking to alter the regional balance by force.
Several possible scenarios are under consideration. One involves seizing the Suwalki Corridor, a strategic strip connecting Kaliningrad to Belarus and cutting off the Baltic states from the rest of NATO. Another scenario envisions Russia launching a naval operation to seize three strategic islands: Gotland (Sweden), Bornholm (Denmark), and the Åland archipelago (Finland). Control of these islands would enable the deployment of anti-ship and anti-air missile systems, establishing a denial zone that would impede NATO reinforcements.
Aware of these threats, regional states have taken action. Sweden re-militarized Gotland in 2017; Bornholm has hosted numerous NATO exercises, and in 2024, the US Navy deployed a Typhon missile system there, capable of striking Kaliningrad from 1,500 kilometers away. The Åland archipelago, however, remains demilitarized, representing a vulnerability in NATO’s defensive posture.
Despite its structural weaknesses, Russia retains a significant destabilization capacity in the Baltic Sea. Its naval, aerial, and hybrid means enable it to contemplate rapid and targeted actions that could catch NATO forces off guard should tensions in Eastern Europe suddenly escalate. Vigilance among coastal states and the strengthening of NATO’s presence in the region thus remain essential to prevent any strategic surprise.
