SIPRI 2025 Warns of Rising Proliferation of Nuclear Multiple-Warhead and Dual-Use Systems.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published its annual Yearbook on 16 June 2025, which confirms the end of an era: the gradual reduction of nuclear arsenals that began after the Cold War is now over. In contrast, all nuclear-armed states pursued in 2024 a strategy of modernization, expansion, or innovation in their nuclear capabilities. This return to nuclear competition coincides with the weakening of arms control frameworks, with no immediate prospects for replacement.
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In Russia, despite delays and another RS-28 Sarmat failure in 2024, plans to reload silos and increase warheads per missile remain unchanged. (Picture source: WikiCommons)

The report records an estimated total of 12,241 nuclear warheads as of 1 January 2025, of which 9,614 are in military stockpiles and 3,912 are deployed on operational delivery systems. Around 2,100 warheads are maintained at high operational alert, mainly by the United States and Russia. SIPRI also notes that China may now keep some warheads mounted on missiles during peacetime.

Modernization covers all components of the nuclear triads. In the United States, programs to replace the Minuteman III ICBMs, Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines, and air-launched cruise missiles are underway, despite budget-related delays. Washington is also developing new non-strategic nuclear warheads, raising concerns about the program’s long-term sustainability. In Russia, while strategic forces remain a priority, the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile experienced another failure in 2024, and several other systems are delayed. Still, plans to reload silos and increase warhead counts per missile remain intact.

China is undergoing the fastest expansion. Its arsenal increased from 500 to around 600 warheads within a year, and it has completed or nearly completed construction of more than 300 new ICBM silos across desert and mountainous regions. At this pace, China could possess 1,500 warheads by 2035. The country is actively developing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities and continues to enhance its dual-capable naval and airborne systems.

The United Kingdom did not expand its stockpile in 2024 but remains on a growth trajectory laid out in the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh. London is moving forward with the construction of four new SSBNs. France continues to develop its third-generation SSBN and a new air-launched cruise missile, while upgrading the payload of its M51 ballistic missile.

India has continued the development of MIRV-capable canisterized missiles, which can be transported with mated warheads and may remain on alert. Pakistan is expanding fissile material production and delivery systems, suggesting continued growth. North Korea now holds an estimated 50 assembled warheads and the fissile material for 40 more. It is advancing its doctrine of tactical deterrence and preparing to introduce theater nuclear weapons, according to South Korean sources.

Israel, while maintaining its policy of deliberate ambiguity, tested a propulsion system in 2024 that may be related to the Jericho missile series. Upgrades were also reported at the Dimona plutonium production site.

SIPRI highlights a concerning doctrinal shift. In November 2024, Russia revised its nuclear posture to broaden the scenarios in which it might use nuclear weapons. The United States replaced its forward-deployed B61 bombs in Europe with modernized versions. The report also notes that MIRV-capable systems, once limited to the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapon states, are now being developed or deployed by China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.

Emerging technologies are introducing new uncertainties. Warhead miniaturization, developments in artificial intelligence, automated command and control, cyber defense, and space warfare are reshaping deterrence architectures. Several states are investing in long-range maneuverable missiles, antisatellite weapons, and hypersonic glide vehicles. These advancements may shorten decision-making timelines and increase the risk of miscalculation or accidental use.

The SIPRI Yearbook 2025 concludes that the global nuclear order is entering a phase of increased strategic instability. The anticipated expiration of the New START treaty in 2026, with no replacement in sight, could trigger an unregulated cycle of warhead deployments, including rapid silo reactivation and submarine reloads. For armed forces and defense industries, these developments imply renewed attention to second-strike capabilities, the resilience of command-and-control systems, and the flexibility permitted under evolving nuclear doctrines.