INTEL: Russia May Deploy North Korean Hwasal-1 RA-3 Cruise Missile in Ukraine War.

Russia may soon employ a variant of North Korea’s Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile in strikes against Ukraine, according to OSINTWarfare reporting on December 25, 2025. If confirmed, the move would underscore a deepening Russia–North Korea defense partnership and introduce a serious new proliferation risk into the conflict.

Russia is reportedly preparing to deploy a variant of North Korea’s Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile in combat operations against Ukraine, according to information shared by the OSINTWarfare account on X on December 25, 2025. The claims, attributed to multiple Russian sources, suggest the missile variant could be equipped with a one-ton high-explosive warhead and have an estimated operational range of 130 to 250 km, marking a potentially significant shift in Moscow’s strike capabilities.
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The Hwasal-1 Ra-3 (also referenced as Hwasal-1D-3) is seen during a test launch from what appears to be a paved runway, likely at Onchon Airbase on North Korea’s western coast. The missile, equipped with a modified large-diameter warhead, was unveiled during a strategic cruise missile test on April 20, 2024. (Picture source: North Korea Press Agency)

The Hwasal‑1 Ra‑3 variant first appeared publicly in April 2024, when North Korean state media showcased the missile on a TEL (transporter erector launcher) during a test conducted by the DPRK Missile Administration. The system, visibly enlarged to accommodate a “super-large” warhead, was presented as an evolution of the standard Hwasal‑1, a subsonic land-attack cruise missile with terrain-following capability. The shift to a larger warhead configuration, analysts assess, sacrifices fuel capacity for payload, reducing its range but significantly increasing strike lethality against fortified targets or logistics hubs.

More critically, this development does not occur in isolation. Since the early stages of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow and Pyongyang have deepened their military cooperation, quietly forging one of the most consequential arms corridors in the post-Cold War era. By late 2023, U.S. intelligence began tracking high-volume transfers of North Korean munitions to Russia, with estimates suggesting that millions of 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, as well as 122mm Grad rockets, had already entered Russian stockpiles. These shipments were likely intended to offset critical shortages faced by Russian frontline units across Donetsk, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia.

The collaboration escalated further in early 2024 when U.S. and South Korean intelligence officials publicly accused North Korea of supplying short-range ballistic missiles to Russia. Satellite imagery and intercepted launch telemetry linked multiple Russian missile strikes in eastern Ukraine to North Korean-produced KN-23 and KN-25 systems, tactical ballistic platforms modeled on the Russian Iskander-M but adapted for the DPRK’s own industrial base. The KN-23, in particular, is capable of evading missile defenses with a quasi-ballistic flight path and terminal maneuverability, making it especially threatening in the Ukrainian context.

Now, with reports of the Hwasal‑1 Ra‑3 variant entering the Russian arsenal, military analysts warn that Ukraine could face a new threat vector: low-flying, GPS-guided cruise missiles capable of bypassing radar and air defense systems primarily calibrated for high-altitude or ballistic threats. Unlike ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can approach targets from unexpected directions, skimming the terrain and exploiting gaps in sensor coverage, particularly in areas where Western-supplied air defense systems like NASAMS or IRIS-T are not densely deployed.

Equally significant is the strategic message this sends. Moscow’s willingness to integrate foreign-designed missile systems, especially from a country like North Korea, itself under a strict international arms embargo, illustrates both Russia’s increasing reliance on pariah states and Pyongyang’s growing assertiveness in projecting its weapons technology into active combat theaters. In essence, North Korea is now field-testing its weapons in a live European war zone through a proxy partner, a development that should deeply concern not only Ukraine and NATO, but also the broader Indo-Pacific security community.

While no official statement has confirmed the operational deployment of the Hwasal-1 Ra-3 by Russian forces, the continued accumulation of evidence from satellite imagery, social media posts, and strike pattern analysis could soon provide conclusive indicators. If confirmed, this would be the first known use of a North Korean cruise missile in a major conventional war, effectively internationalizing the Korean Peninsula’s weapons ecosystem and offering Moscow a new class of standoff precision weapon at a time when its indigenous cruise missile stockpiles, particularly Kalibr and Kh-101 types, have been heavily depleted.

This development underscores the urgent need for NATO and Ukraine’s partners to reassess the threat spectrum and consider how unconventional actors are enabling Russia’s continued military campaign. Beyond battlefield implications, the growing Moscow–Pyongyang defense axis signals a troubling erosion of international nonproliferation norms.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.