Ukrainian Drones Weaken Russia by Destroying Ka-27 Helicopter and Four Radars in Crimea.

Ukrainian Defence Intelligence reported that special units used kamikaze drones on 21 November to destroy a Russian Ka-27 naval helicopter and four major radar systems in occupied Crimea. The coordinated strike further erodes Russia's air surveillance network and supports a broader Ukrainian campaign to weaken the peninsula’s air defenses.

According to the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (GUR), on 21 November 2025, the Prymary or Ghosts special unit used kamikaze drones against Russian positions in occupied Crimea, destroying a Ka 27 naval helicopter and four air defense radar systems, including a Lira A10 airfield radar, 55Zh6U Nebo U, dome-housed Nebo SV, and a P 18 Terek. GUR released edited onboard footage that shows a Ukrainian drone evading a missile from a Pantsir S1 system before diving into a radar site, and Ukrinform confirmed the strike based on the same official material.
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Ukrainian Ghosts unit strikes a Ka-27 naval helicopter and multiple Russian radar systems in Crimea using low-flying kamikaze drones, dealing a significant blow to the peninsula's air surveillance network and exposing persistent vulnerabilities in Russia's air defenses (Picture source: U.S. Navy).

The Ka-27 Helix is the standard shipborne helicopter of the Russian Navy, designed primarily for anti-submarine warfare with a typical range of about 800 kilometers, a three-person crew, and the ability to deploy dipping sonar, sonobuoys, and lightweight torpedoes or depth charges against submarines and surface targets. In the Black Sea Fleet, it operates from frigates, coastal bases like Kacha airfield near Sevastopol, and patrol vessels to search for Ukrainian submarines, uncrewed surface vessels, and low-flying missile threats. Removing even a single fully equipped Ka 27 reduces Russia’s ability to screen convoys, cover the approaches to Sevastopol, and protect surviving combatants already pushed eastward by Ukrainian missile and drone attacks.

The radar targets tell an even more important story. The Lira A10 is a modern S-band terminal area radar used for airfield surveillance, providing 360-degree coverage out to roughly 160 to 200 kilometers and feeding both air traffic control and local air defense. The Nebo U and Nebo SV family are mobile VHF band surveillance radars, designed to detect low observable aircraft, cruise missiles, and high altitude targets at ranges above 300 kilometers, and to supply three-dimensional coordinates to higher-level command posts. The P-18 Terek, a widely exported 2D VHF early warning radar with a range of around 250 kilometers, is valued for its ability to see small or stealth optimised targets at long range and to cue more precise engagement radars. Together, these systems form the outer surveillance ring that feeds Russia’s S-300 and S-400 batteries in western Crimea, so destroying all four in a single night punches a measurable hole in the regional air picture.

GUR and multiple Ukrainian outlets stress that the operation was carried out entirely with strike drones. The video shows a first-person view style munition flying at treetop height, provoking a launch from a Pantsir S1 before jinking violently as the missile bursts behind it and then continuing into the radar dome. That sequence matches a pattern documented in other Ghosts and Primary raids in Crimea and Donbas, where long-range FPV or one-way fixed-wing drones are flown in low, using terrain masking and clutter to compress the reaction time of Russian crews. Analysts who study FPV combat footage note that systems such as Pantsir S1, optimised for fast-moving aircraft and cruise missiles, struggle against small, slow, low-flying drones that can hide in ground returns or approach from blind sectors close to the launcher.

Since mid-2024, Ukrainian forces have repeatedly hit S-300 and S-400 components, 92N6E engagement radars, and coastal surveillance sites in Crimea to degrade Russia’s integrated air defense and open corridors for deeper missile and drone attacks. The Ka-27 and radar losses of 21 November follow earlier Ghosts operations against aircraft, radars, and landing craft on the peninsula and reinforce a methodical pattern described by Western analysts as a process where Ukrainian forces blind Russian radar networks before striking high-value assets.

The operation also illustrates how the war in 2025 has tilted decisively toward massed unmanned systems. Ukrainian officials report that domestic firms produced more than 2 million drones of all types in 2024, with output forecast to exceed 4.5 million in 2025, over 2 million of them FPV strike platforms. Analysts estimate that drones now account for roughly two-thirds of Russian equipment losses, while Ukraine’s new Unmanned Systems Forces represent a rapidly expanding arm of the military responsible for a growing share of frontline strikes. Senior Ukrainian officers have warned NATO that its armies are not prepared for the scale and tempo of drone warfare now seen daily across the front.

For Russia, losing scarce high-end radars in Crimea is harder to absorb than replacing individual launchers or missiles. Sanctions and wartime demand have already forced Moscow to rely more heavily on legacy Soviet era systems and modest upgrades rather than genuinely new designs, with increasing pressure on the microelectronics supply chain. Reconstituting a Nebo or modernised P-18 battery demands trained crews, specialized vehicles, and complex electronics that cannot be surged to the front as quickly as cheap FPV drones can be assembled in Ukrainian workshops. In the near term, Russian commanders will likely disperse and move remaining radars more frequently, accept gaps in coverage, or strip other sectors to reinforce Crimea; each option erodes the coherence of their wider air defense network.

On the battlefield, the November raid is unlikely to decide the war, which remains a grinding contest along the eastern and southern fronts. But it is a clear case study of how a mid-tier power, faced with a larger opponent, is using an industrial-scale drone ecosystem to peel away critical enablers like surveillance radars and naval helicopters. For every radar dome destroyed on the Crimean coast, it becomes slightly easier for Ukrainian long-range drones, cruise missiles, and eventually modern combat aircraft to reach deeper into occupied territory while forcing Russia to adapt tactically and spend more of its limited high-end assets on static defense.