Ukrainian Navy confirms that the intelligence ship Simferopol was hit in Russia’s first-ever naval drone strike.

On August 29, 2025, Ukrainian Navy spokesman Dmytro Pletenchuk confirmed that the intelligence ship Simferopol was struck in the Danube Delta by a Russian high-speed unmanned surface vessel (USV). The attack resulted in the death of two sailors, several injuries, and searches for missing crew members, while most of the crew were brought to safety. The Russian Ministry of Defence and Russian media outlets reported that the vessel had sunk following the strike, but Pletenchuk stated he "could not confirm this information" at the moment. The conflicting accounts left the exact status of the ship unclear in the immediate aftermath, even as video material corroborated the strike, showing the drone’s approach before detonation.
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The Simferopol (A505) is equipped with the Melchior passive radio intelligence system, which could detect emissions at ranges up to 450 kilometers and simultaneously track as many as 200 maritime, aerial, or coastal targets. (Picture source: Ukrainian and Russian MoDs)

The attack occurred only meters from Romanian waters, emphasizing the geographic sensitivity of naval operations in the river approaches. Analysts described the platform as a slow auxiliary vessel particularly exposed to such threats in confined waters. Pletenchuk confirmed that search operations were continuing for missing personnel even after the strike had been acknowledged, highlighting the incomplete nature of casualty reporting in the early aftermath. The incident prompted regional monitoring, with U.S. Navy P-8A maritime patrol aircraft recorded over the western Black Sea the day before the attack, reflecting heightened surveillance in response to increasing activity of unmanned naval craft. These elements combined to situate the strike not only as a tactical loss but also as a signal of the growing risks in contested maritime zones bordering NATO territory.

The Simferopol (A505), officially designated as a medium reconnaissance ship, was constructed as part of the Laguna program and built on the unfinished hull of a Project 502EM fishing trawler at the Kuznia na Rybalskomu shipyard in Kyiv. It was launched on April 23, 2019, later transported to Odesa by inland waterways, and began trials in 2020 before being formally named in December of that year. The ship entered service in 2021, representing a relatively new addition to Ukraine’s auxiliary fleet. Its naming honored a predecessor command vessel that served until 2012, maintaining continuity within the Navy. The conversion of an incomplete commercial trawler hull into a reconnaissance platform reflected Ukraine’s adaptation of available resources to field intelligence-gathering capacity at sea.

The vessel’s mission centered on radio, radiotechnical, radar, and electro-optical reconnaissance, with the Melchior passive radio intelligence system as its principal asset. This station could detect emissions at ranges up to 450 kilometers and simultaneously track as many as 200 maritime, aerial, or coastal targets. Supporting equipment included the Delta-M navigation radar and imported wideband digital direction finders acquired in 2019. In July 2023, the ship was armed with a single AK-306 30 mm artillery system for close-range defense, and it was also associated with man-portable air defense launchers. This limited armament underlined the platform’s specialized intelligence role rather than a combat orientation. Its technical characteristics included a length of 54.8 meters, a beam of 9.8 meters, a draught of slightly more than four meters, a standard displacement of 1,220 tons, a top speed of 11.6 knots, an endurance of 28 days, a maximum range of 7,200 nautical miles, and a crew complement of 29.

The Simferopol carried out sea trials between 2020 and 2021 that included maneuvers designed to test evasive tactics and the use of passive countermeasures in the optical, infrared, and radar bands. On October 13, 2021, the vessel participated in the rescue of the degaussing ship Balta near Zmiinyi Island, underscoring its auxiliary value beyond reconnaissance duties. Analysts noted that with the onset of full-scale war, conditions limited the practical deployment of such vessels and suggested that some reconnaissance equipment might have been removed from ships of this type to be integrated into ground-based systems. These operational realities placed constraints on how the vessel was employed in the years leading up to its destruction, even as its intelligence role remained important for maritime situational awareness.

The Russian strike represented the first confirmed operational use of a naval drone against a Ukrainian vessel, marking a new phase in Moscow’s adoption of uncrewed systems. Russia had previously announced organizational steps to incorporate naval drones, including dedicated units and cadet training, and showcased prototypes in July 2025. Open sources noted that some Russian unmanned craft had limited control ranges, prompting experiments with relay networks to expand reach. The successful attack against Simferopol demonstrated that such systems had matured to operational use. On the same day, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency reported damaging a Russian Buyan-M missile ship in Temryuk Bay with aerial drones and assault craft, illustrating that both sides now integrate unmanned systems into offensive maritime operations.

The confirmed strike, which could have led to the sinking of the Simferopol, significantly reduces Ukraine’s already limited fleet of dedicated reconnaissance vessels. The Ukrainian Navy does not operate multiple ships of this type, meaning that the loss removes one of the country’s few purpose-built electronic intelligence platforms capable of extending surveillance beyond coastal radar and fixed land-based posts. Spy ships like the Simferopol provide mobile collection capacity closer to contested zones than satellites or static installations, making them critical for monitoring enemy fleet movements, tracking emissions, and gathering signatures of Russian systems in the Black Sea region. Without this vessel, Ukraine faces a reduction in its ability to collect and analyze electronic signals at sea, forcing greater reliance on drones, ground stations, and allied intelligence support. The ship’s destruction therefore, not only depletes the fleet numerically but also weakens a specialized intelligence role that cannot be easily substituted in the short term.