As
the violence worsens in Syria, the United States and international community
are in a dilemma. Even more serious than the recent veto by Russia and
China of a U.N. Security Council resolution criticizing the regime of
Bashar al-Assad, there are no great options for how to respond.
(By Michael O'Hanlon – Source Special to CNN) |
The
various Syrian factions and populations are far too interspersed for a
Libya-like operation to work. Al-Assad and his army are far too strong,
still, for a simple and small peacekeeping mission to succeed. It would
be opposed by the regime if it tried to enter the country. And if we invaded,
the specter of an Iraq-style imbroglio would loom given Syria’s
size and given the multitude of nefarious actors there.
That leaves three main types of possible military options. All are limited
in scale and scope; therefore, all promise only mediocre results. I do
not favor any just yet, and we should only consider them in the event
of strong Arab League and NATO support and participation. But if the situation
continues to worsen, we cannot look idly by, either.
1) A punitive naval or air operation to encourage a coup against
al-Assad.
The idea here would be to hope that al-Assad’s cronies could be
persuaded to depose him and then forge a power-sharing deal with the opposition
as a precondition for ending sanctions and the associated punitive military
campaign. The two most viable options would be a naval blockade to prevent
Syria from exporting oil or importing a number of goods, and a limited
air campaign to deprive the regime of assets that it values (like palaces).
2) A broader Balkans-like campaign.
Building on the above air war concept, and also on Fouad Ajami’s
February 10 Wall Street Journal oped about the “Kosovo model”
for Syria, air strikes could be broadened to include targeting the heavy
Syrian army weapons being used to shell cities. This could be combined
with the creation of a no-fly zone for Syrian military helicopters and
other aircraft. In addition to this, we could arm the Syrian opposition,
though this could be expected to increase rather than decrease violence
in the short term relative to what is occurring today.
3) Creation of a safe zone for Syrian civilians, using airpower
and some modest number of outside ground troops, perhaps in the north
near Turkey.
This would be modeled on the protection we afforded Kurds in Iraq throughout
the 1990s even with Saddam Hussein still in power. Alas, it would be harder
in Syria. There is no natural geographic or demographic logic to any particular
possible safe zone in Syria.
Populations are too interspersed, and the killing is happening largely
in central cities where it would be impractical to create such zones in
all likelihood. Creating it in the northeast would be more practical,
but less helpful for the threatened populations of the country. This kind
of mission would therefore have only a limited ability to protect innocents.
But depending on how the situation unfolded, it could perhaps be combined
with the above options to create the nucleus of a stronger resistance
that could ultimately challenge al-Assad’s rule using the safe area
as a staging base and sanctuary.
None of these ideas look decisive. All are risky. As such, they should
only be considered if and when things get worse. But it may not be too
early to raise the ideas in public - if for no other reason than to signal
to the murderous Syrian regime that we do have options besides just hoping
that al-Assad will fall of his own weight like a piece of rotten fruit.
While I hope for the latter scenario, we are collectively far too sanguine
about the likelihood that it will happen anytime soon on its own.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of Michael O'Hanlon
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