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Thai governor raises alarm after Cambodia reportedly deploys Chinese KS-1C air defense systems near border.


According to Nation Thailand on July 26, 2025, the Governor of Thailand's Surin province, Chamnan Chuenta, issued a public warning advising citizens to avoid areas located within 120 kilometers of the Thai-Cambodian border. The announcement cited increased security concerns tied to the possible deployment of long-range rocket and missile systems by the Cambodian armed forces. Specifically, Thai authorities indicated that Cambodia had deployed Chinese-made PHL‑03 multiple launch rocket systems and KS‑1C medium-range surface-to-air missile systems in Oddar Meanchey province. Cambodian authorities have not issued any official statement confirming or denying the presence of these systems.
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Developed by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), the KS‑1C is an export-oriented variant of China’s HQ‑12 (Red Flag‑12) medium-range air defense system. (Picture source: Weibo/疯子白杨)


The security warning follows violent clashes that occurred on July 24, 2025, in multiple contested regions along the border, including near the 11th-century Prasat Ta Muen Thom temple. The fighting began after a Thai soldier stepped on a land mine near Chong An Ma, an area previously involved in incidents. Thailand attributed the mine-laying to Cambodian forces, while Cambodia denied recent mine deployment and accused Thai soldiers of violating territorial boundaries. The conflict resulted in at least eleven deaths, primarily among Thai civilians, and dozens of injuries. In response, the Royal Thai Air Force deployed four F-16 fighter jets to conduct airstrikes against Cambodian army targets, reportedly including command centers of the 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions. Cambodian government officials did not release casualty figures, but confirmed artillery exchanges and armed engagements. The July violence represents an escalation of tensions that have been growing since May 28, when a Cambodian soldier was killed during a firefight near Chong Bok. The military standoff has triggered diplomatic retaliation, including the downgrading of bilateral ties and petitions to international bodies such as the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

The KS‑1C is an export variant of the HQ‑12 (Hongqi-12) medium-range surface-to-air missile system developed by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). It is based on the KS‑1A and features canister-launched missiles in place of the rail-based design used in previous iterations. Each KS‑1C missile measures approximately 5.6 meters in length, weighs between 886 and 900 kilograms, and carries a high-explosive warhead of 100 kilograms. According to the manufacturer, the system can simultaneously intercept six targets with eight missiles, with an engagement range between 5 kilometers and 70 kilometers, and an altitude engagement capability from 0.3 kilometers to 27 kilometers. The stated lethal radius of the warhead exceeds 50 meters, and the probability of a single-shot kill against a typical aircraft target is listed as greater than or equal to 0.89. KS‑1C deployments by Cambodia reportedly began in 2023 or 2024, following similar acquisitions by Thailand in 2016. Additional operators include Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Myanmar, and the People’s Liberation Army under the HQ‑12 designation.

According to a brochure from China National Precision Machinery Import & Export Corporation (CPMIEC), the KS-1C’s composition includes both combat and support components. The combat component includes 24 ready-to-use missiles, and a single guidance station that provides target designation and missile guidance. There are six missile-launching vehicles that deploy the launchers into position, supported by two power distribution vehicles for supplying and stabilizing onboard electronics. A frequency conversion and power distribution vehicle is included to regulate and manage power supply compatibility across different subsystems. A single passive phased-array radar (H-200) is responsible for target acquisition and tracking, playing a central role in detection and fire control processes. The support component includes six missile transport and loading vehicles and three missile transport vehicles for resupplying the launchers during extended operations. A spare parts and collimation mast vehicle ensures technical maintenance and calibration, while a tools vehicle provides basic repair and servicing capabilities. A dedicated missile test vehicle is included to verify missile readiness prior to launch. Additional infrastructure includes a 40kW power supply vehicle to supplement energy demands, a nitrogen supply vehicle for missile maintenance, two loading-training missiles for operational practice, and one testing-training missile for system trials.

Thailand acquired the KS‑1C in 2016, while Cambodia reportedly received four batteries in 2024. However, it seems that Cambodia's KS‑1C systems did not intercept any of the F-16s involved in the July 24 airstrikes, contrary to what some Cambodian media claim. Thai and Chinese-language media reported that the failure was not due to missile malfunction but to systemic shortcomings in Cambodia’s defense infrastructure. Cambodia's TH‑S311 air defense command system, intended to integrate the KS‑1C with other systems such as LY‑80 and HQ‑17AE, failed to respond during the attack. The entire Cambodian air defense array reportedly includes only 12 KS‑1C and 12 LY‑80 launchers, which were insufficient to cover the 800-kilometer border. Thai aircraft allegedly exploited the gaps between missile coverage zones and may have used terrain masking and electronic countermeasures to avoid radar detection. Cambodian officials have not confirmed these claims, and no evidence has been presented to contradict Thai statements that all deployed aircraft returned without damage. Analysts have noted that Thailand's possession of the same KS‑1C system since 2016 may have provided its pilots with specific knowledge about the system's weaknesses.

Cambodia’s inability to establish a functioning integrated air defense has drawn attention to broader issues in its military structure. Thailand's air force has a clear superiority over Cambodia’s minimal aerial assets. The Royal Thai Air Force fields over 50 fourth-generation fighter jets, including F-16s and Gripen C/Ds, many of which have undergone modernization. In contrast, Cambodia’s air force possesses only six FTC-2000G advanced trainer jets with limited combat capability, insufficient radar range, and minimal payload capacity. Cambodian pilots reportedly refrained from engaging Thai aircraft, fearing the consequences of confronting heavily armed fighters like the F-16, which are equipped with AIM-120C beyond-visual-range missiles. The Thai military further enhanced its operational advantage by deploying airborne early warning systems, electronic warfare pods, and precision-guided munitions. Cambodia, by contrast, lacked even a basic radar network or air surveillance integration, turning its ground-based defenses into isolated and ineffective systems. Analysts argue that these factors, rather than the hardware itself, explain the failure of Cambodia’s KS‑1C and other systems to engage targets effectively.

The border conflict has had political consequences in both countries. In Thailand, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was suspended by the Constitutional Court following a leaked phone call in which she blamed the military for mishandling the crisis. The conversation with former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen triggered political backlash and led to the collapse of her coalition's parliamentary majority. In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Manet submitted a petition to the United Nations requesting an emergency Security Council meeting to address Thai military actions. Both countries have exchanged diplomatic expulsions. Meanwhile, Cambodia has reportedly sought additional military support from China, including J‑10CE and JF‑17 fighter aircraft, HQ‑9 long-range surface-to-air missiles, and surveillance drones. Reports indicate that China may prefer indirect support methods, such as using Pakistan as a transfer intermediary, in order to avoid tensions with Thailand or the United States. No new transfers have been confirmed, and China has not publicly responded to the reported Cambodian request.

Furthermore, Thailand maintains 360,000 active-duty troops, along with 200,000 reservists and 45,000 paramilitary personnel. Cambodia’s total military strength stands at 124,000, including security and paramilitary forces. In terms of equipment, Thailand operates 49 Ukrainian T‑84 Oplot and 62 Chinese VT‑4 main battle tanks, while Cambodia continues to rely primarily on Soviet-era T‑54, T‑55, and Type 59 tanks. Both armies use Chinese-origin infantry weapons and artillery systems. Cambodian units reportedly field 81‑type 7.62 mm light machine guns, LG4 grenade launchers, 69‑1 anti-tank rockets, and PP‑87 mortars, while Thai forces deploy equipment such as the PW‑78 recoilless rifle. Multiple videos and images shared online confirm the presence of older Chinese systems on both sides, indicating a reliance on legacy platforms. Analysts describe the current conflict as a limited engagement aimed at controlling key border zones rather than initiating full-scale war, although the potential for escalation remains.


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