China’s J-10 Fighter Seen With Possible YJ-21E Hypersonic Anti-Ship Missile in New Images.

New imagery released by Chinese military appears to show a PLA Air Force J-10 fighter carrying a large, conical weapon consistent with the YJ-21E hypersonic anti-ship missile family. If confirmed, the pairing would mark a significant shift in how China could threaten U.S. and allied naval forces across the Western Pacific.

Photos published on December 26, 2025, by China Military Online show a PLA Air Force J-10 fighter lifting off for what is described as a routine training sortie, but analysts quickly focused on the jet’s centerline payload. The weapon’s size, shape, and mounting geometry closely resemble open-source depictions of the YJ-21E export hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile, prompting renewed debate among regional defense observers about whether China has succeeded in adapting a weapon once limited to heavy bombers for use on a frontline multirole fighter.
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YJ-21E hypersonic air-launched anti-ship ballistic missile, assessed up to 1,500 km range with Mach 6-plus flight and a Mach 10-class terminal dive, built to hit major warships with minimal warning and stress shipboard defenses (Picture source: China Military/Weibo).

If the identification is correct, the technical leap is less about inventing a new missile than about shrinking a weapon class that China has so far associated with heavy launch platforms. The YJ-21 is assessed in open defense reporting as a hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile with an operational range of roughly 1,500 km, cruising around Mach 6 and reaching approximately Mach 10 in the terminal phase. This speed profile is intended to compress warning timelines and complicate interception by layered naval air defense systems. The YJ-21E designation has been linked to export display models shown at major Chinese airshows, indicating a form factor adapted for broader carriage options, potentially with reduced range to comply with export limitations.

The fighter itself is central to the significance of this development. The J-10C is a modern canard-delta, single-engine multirole aircraft broadly comparable to late-model F-16s, but optimized for the PLA’s networked approach to warfare. It integrates advanced sensors, datalinks, and electronic warfare systems that allow it to operate as part of a wider kill chain rather than as an isolated shooter. Pairing such an aircraft with a large ballistic-style anti-ship weapon suggests a doctrinal shift, accepting penalties in drag, fuel load, and air-to-air armament in exchange for a high-impact maritime strike capability. In practical terms, a J-10C configured this way would likely operate with escorts, offboard targeting support, and standoff jamming assets, functioning as a delivery node rather than a self-contained strike platform.

Operationally, fighter-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles alter the geometry of sea denial. China has already demonstrated air-launched ballistic missile concepts from H-6K bombers, but moving a related capability onto a lighter, more numerous fighter dramatically increases sortie flexibility and survivability. Fighters can disperse across multiple airfields, reposition launch points by hundreds of kilometers, and attack from unpredictable vectors, forcing opposing naval forces to defend against a far wider threat envelope than coastal or bomber-based systems alone would impose.

In comparison with Western anti-ship missiles, the concept sits in a distinct category. Most NATO navies and air forces rely on subsonic or low-supersonic sea-skimming cruise missiles such as Naval Strike Missile, LRASM, Harpoon, or Exocet. These weapons emphasize stealth, autonomous targeting, and terminal maneuvering, typically at ranges of a few hundred kilometers. While effective, they do not deliver the same kinetic energy or reaction-time compression as a hypersonic ballistic profile. Western hypersonic anti-ship efforts remain largely developmental, with operational fielding still several years away and focused initially on limited numbers.

For China, the strategic implications are clear. Integrating a YJ-21E-class missile onto a frontline fighter strengthens deterrence by raising the perceived cost of naval intervention near China’s periphery. In the context of a Taiwan contingency, such a capability directly threatens carrier strike groups, amphibious forces, and high-value logistics ships attempting to enter the theater. Even if used sparingly, the mere presence of fast, long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles launched from fighters could push opposing navies farther east, stretch defensive resources, and slow the buildup of combat power.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of this concept depends on the kill chain, including space-based sensors, maritime surveillance assets, secure datalinks, and the ability to update targeting information in contested electromagnetic environments. A credible, difficult-to-counter threat that forces adversaries to alter plans and timelines already serves Beijing’s broader anti-access and area-denial strategy, and the apparent pairing of the J-10C with a YJ-21E-class missile suggests that China is intent on expanding that pressure across more platforms and more axes of attack.