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Denmark Weighs Expanding Its Fleet of US F-35 Fighters Despite Tensions over Greenland.
As diplomatic tensions intensify between Denmark and the United States regarding the future of Greenland, an autonomous territory under Danish sovereignty, Copenhagen is paradoxically considering strengthening its military cooperation with Washington. On March 26, 2025, Danish Defence Minister Troels Lund Poulsen confirmed in an interview with the daily Børsen that Denmark is contemplating the acquisition of additional F-35A fighter jets manufactured in the United States. This announcement comes amid a politically sensitive environment, marked by renewed assertions from U.S. President Donald Trump concerning Greenland, as well as growing concerns over Denmark’s strategic dependency on the United States for military equipment.
Denmark plans to expand its initial order of 27 F-35As—11 soon operational at Skrydstrup—by acquiring 8 to 10 more amid rising security concerns in Europe and the Arctic (Picture source: US DoD)
For the Danish Minister, acquiring additional F-35s is “entirely logical” to reinforce the country's air combat capabilities. According to him, Denmark cannot afford to operate multiple types of fighter aircraft due to its limited size and resources, which justifies the choice of a standardized fleet based solely on the F-35A.
The F-35A Lightning II is a fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter developed by Lockheed Martin for the U.S. Air Force. Designed for conventional takeoff and landing, it combines low observability with advanced sensors and operational versatility. Equipped with the AN/APG-81 AESA radar, the Distributed Aperture System (DAS), and the Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS), the aircraft provides 360-degree situational awareness and effective detection of both airborne and ground threats. Powered by a Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engine, it can reach a top speed of Mach 1.6 and has a combat range exceeding 2,200 kilometers. Its integrated architecture includes electronic warfare systems, secure data links, and capabilities for suppressing enemy air defences.
In terms of armament, the F-35A features an internal 20mm M61A2 cannon and can carry a wide array of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions: AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles, GBU-31 JDAM and GBU-39 SDB guided bombs, and AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles. Its main weapons are housed internally to maintain stealth, but the aircraft can also be configured to carry external payloads at the expense of its radar signature. Designed for air superiority, precision strike, reconnaissance, and close air support missions, the F-35A is already in service with multiple allied air forces and is regarded as a key asset in operations conducted within contested environments.
Denmark’s pragmatic approach, however, faces a challenging diplomatic backdrop. Since returning to the White House, President Trump has reiterated his desire to acquire Greenland, citing national security interests, and has, according to some observers, considered exerting military and economic pressure on Copenhagen to pursue this objective.
In response to these statements, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen condemned what she described as “unacceptable” political pressure, reiterating that “Greenland is not for sale.” Greenland’s political leadership has likewise reaffirmed the island’s sovereignty while indicating a continued openness to economic partnerships. Despite this strong opposition, the Danish government remains unwilling to sever its longstanding defence ties with the United States—an alliance spanning over 75 years. For Troels Lund Poulsen, breaking this cooperation would be “a fundamental mistake,” even amid growing unease over certain positions expressed by the current U.S. administration.
The situation is further complicated by internal criticism. Rasmus Jarlov, chairman of the Danish Parliament’s Defence Committee, has expressed regret over the decision to purchase the F-35. Writing on the social platform X, he warned of a potential scenario in which Washington might remotely deactivate U.S.-supplied weapons systems in the event of a political disagreement, thereby leaving Denmark exposed to external threats. He now advocates for reassessing Denmark’s strategic dependency on the United States and calls on European allies to consider doing the same.
The first F-35As ordered by Denmark in 2016 are currently being delivered. Eleven aircraft have been assigned to Skrydstrup Air Base and are scheduled to be declared operational as of April 1. In total, Denmark is set to receive 27 units. However, the Royal Danish Air Force (Flyvevåbnet) is aiming to acquire an additional eight to ten aircraft, a move aligned with broader increases in defence spending in response to shifting security dynamics in Europe and the Arctic region.
In parallel with its intent to expand its fleet of stealth fighters, Denmark is also considering strengthening its air projection capabilities. General Michael Hyldgaard, acting Chief of Defence, has advocated for Denmark to join the Multinational Multi Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF), a NATO-managed program involving six European countries that jointly operate a fleet of A330 MRTT refuelling aircraft. Denmark may initially purchase flight hours, with plans to eventually acquire two aircraft at an estimated cost of nearly one billion euros. According to Troels Lund Poulsen, this capability is critical for conducting long-range operations, especially in the Arctic and North Atlantic, and would significantly bolster Denmark’s air power.
Meanwhile, U.S. interest in Greenland is not limited to political considerations. As early as 2019, Danish military intelligence had raised alarms about China’s strategic ambitions in the region, particularly efforts by Beijing to gain control over critical infrastructure and exploit mineral resources, notably rare earth elements. These concerns have only heightened Greenland’s strategic value within the transatlantic security framework and continue influencing Washington’s stance.
Despite ongoing political disagreements, the F-35 program remains a model of industrial interdependence between the United States and its allies. Both the Danish Defence Minister and General Hyldgaard have emphasized that many of the aircraft’s components are sourced from European firms, making the program a shared venture among partner nations. This interconnectivity is, in their view, a stabilizing factor that reinforces cohesion within the transatlantic alliance, even in the face of diplomatic strain.
In conclusion, Denmark appears determined to expand its fleet of F-35As despite the open political dispute with the United States over Greenland. Caught between American political pressure, technological reliance, evolving geopolitical realities, and the need for military modernization, Copenhagen is navigating a complex strategic dilemma. While mistrust toward the current U.S. administration is increasing, Denmark’s operational needs continue to justify sustained—and even deepened—cooperation with Washington in the field of defence.