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U.S. Clearance of JASSM-ER Cruise Missile Sale Gives Italy Deep Stand-Off Precision-Strike Reach.
The U.S. State Department has cleared a possible 301 million dollars Foreign Military Sale to Italy for 100 AGM-158B/B-2 Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missiles Extended Range, along with support equipment and services, according to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
On December 5, 2025, the United States formally notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Italy, valued at up to 301 million dollars, for 100 AGM-158B/B-2 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles - Extended Range (JASSM-ER), as reported by the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Far from being a routine line in the arms-sales register, the case signals Italy’s entry into the limited circle of European air forces equipped for deep, conventional precision strikes at stand-off distances approaching a thousand kilometers. In a strategic environment reshaped by the war in Ukraine and pressure on NATO’s flanks, the proposed JASSM-ER package effectively recasts Italy’s F-35 fleet as a long-range conventional deterrent rather than a purely tactical strike asset.
Italy’s JASSM-ER request is therefore more than a technical upgrade; it marks a step change in how NATO’s southern anchor positions itself within the alliance’s emerging deep-strike architecture (Picture Source: Lockheed Martin / U.S. Air Force)
The core of the package is a stock of one hundred AGM-158B/B-2 JASSM-ER missiles, but the DSCA notice makes clear that Italy is effectively buying a complete capability rather than simply a batch of munitions. Beyond the missiles themselves, the proposed sale includes JASSM-specific classified test equipment and containers, KGV-135A encryption devices, spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, as well as repair-and-return support, transportation support and site surveys. It also covers weapon-system support, classified and unclassified software, publications and technical documentation, together with U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics assistance and other related elements of long-term program support.
DSCA underlines that the 301 million dollar figure corresponds to the highest estimated quantity and cost based on initial requirements, and that the final contracted amount is expected to be lower once Italy’s configuration, budget authority and the eventual sales agreement are defined. For Italian planners, this means they are locking in access to a mature U.S. deep-strike ecosystem with a predictable ceiling but some flexibility in the final scope.
In its public justification, DSCA uses a familiar formula that is nonetheless revealing for Italian force structure. The agency specifies that JASSM-ER is intended “for employment on Italian fighter aircraft, including but not limited to F-35 aircraft” and notes that “Italy will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.” Read against the current order of battle, this amounts to an endorsement of a roadmap in which F-35A and F-35B become the primary deep-strike carriers, while leaving political and technical space for eventual integration on Eurofighter Typhoon and other Italian combat aircraft if Rome judges the cost and operational payoff worthwhile. It also signals Washington’s confidence in Italian training, security and maintenance regimes, which are already tuned to handle complex, networked U.S.-origin systems and can therefore take on a low-observable stand-off weapon without a disruptive expansion of personnel or infrastructure.
From an operational standpoint, the shift is more significant than the headline numbers alone suggest. JASSM-ER is a low-observable, air-launched cruise missile designed to penetrate modern integrated air defense systems and deliver a heavy penetrating warhead against hardened, high-value targets, while allowing the launching aircraft to remain far outside most surface-to-air engagement zones. For nearly two decades, Italy’s long-range land-attack option has largely rested on Storm Shadow missiles carried by Tornado strike aircraft, a combination now being phased out as the Aeronautica Militare completes its transition to F-35A and F-35B fleets.
By pairing JASSM-ER with fifth-generation fighters and potentially other platforms, Italy moves from a legacy, niche deep-strike capability to a more survivable and networked system able to operate in heavily contested airspace, cooperate with allied ISR and C2 architectures, and threaten strategic infrastructure, air-defense nodes and command centers far beyond NATO’s immediate borders. DSCA notes that Italy is expected to integrate and sustain these articles and services without major difficulty, reflecting the level of modernization and interoperability already achieved within Italian air forces.
Geopolitically, the acquisition contributes to a new geometry of deterrence on NATO’s southern and eastern arcs, even though Washington officially stresses that the package does not, in its view, fundamentally shift the regional balance of power. From bases on Italian territory and, if required, from aircraft deployed forward, JASSM-equipped F-35s would give political leaders in Rome and Brussels options that sit below the nuclear threshold but well above traditional tactical aviation. In a crisis in the Mediterranean, North Africa or the wider Middle East, Italy would be able to hold at risk command bunkers, logistics hubs or anti-access systems without exposing crews to dense, layered air defenses.
In any contingency involving Russia or other high-end adversaries, Italian aircraft could contribute to allied deep-strike campaigns in coordination with northern European partners that are also turning to JASSM-ER, creating a de facto European “deep-strike tier” that complements missile-defense architectures such as those now being deployed in central and northern Europe. The overall effect is to make the alliance’s southern flank less predictable and more resilient in the eyes of any actor contemplating coercive escalation.
There is also a political-industrial dimension that goes beyond the straightforward statement that Lockheed Martin in Orlando, Florida, will act as principal contractor and that no offset arrangements have yet been identified, with any potential offsets to be negotiated later between the company and the Italian customer. By entrusting one of its most sensitive offensive capabilities to a U.S. missile family, Italy deepens its dependence on American munitions, software and sustainment chains at precisely the moment when Europe is debating “strategic autonomy” and indigenous deep-strike solutions. At the same time, Rome gains access to a system that is continuously improved for U.S. forces and key allies, with planned enhancements in areas such as connectivity, targeting and survivability, and whose export is overseen by the State Department’s arms control and political-military structures.
The DSCA notification stresses that implementation of the proposed sale would not require additional U.S. Government or contractor personnel to be stationed in Italy and would not degrade U.S. defense readiness, framing the case domestically as a low-footprint, low-risk reinforcement of an ally rather than a diversion of critical resources. This balance between tighter U.S.-Italian integration and a limited visible U.S. presence on Italian soil is likely to be politically important in both capitals.
Italy’s JASSM-ER request is therefore more than a technical upgrade; it marks a step change in how NATO’s southern anchor positions itself within the alliance’s emerging deep-strike architecture. With a relatively modest stock of 100 missiles, Rome buys not just hardware but strategic options: a greater role in allied strike planning, a stronger voice in debates on the eastern and southern flanks, and a credible ability to answer coercion with long-range precision rather than symbolic gestures.
The case also illustrates a broader European trend revealed by recent conflicts: medium powers are seeking both robust air and missile defense and the means to reach deep into an aggressor’s rear, and many still turn first to U.S. solutions when time and risk tolerance are limited. How Italy chooses to integrate, exercise and potentially expand this capability over the next decade will be a key indicator of the evolving balance between European defense ambition and continued transatlantic dependence in the deep-strike domain.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.