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Meteor Air-to-Air Missile Successfully Integrated on U.S. F-35A Stealth Fighter Jet
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MBDA, Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office have completed major ground integration tests to validate safe carriage and release of the Meteor missile from the F-35A’s internal bay. The step positions the program for flight trials and marks a significant shift in NATO air combat reach and readiness.
On 4 December 2025, as reported by MBDA, the integration of the European Meteor air-to-air missile onto the US-built F-35A stealth fighter reached a decisive new stage. MBDA, Lockheed Martin and the F-35 Joint Program Office have completed a major series of ground integration tests, confirming that the missile can be safely carried and deployed from the aircraft’s internal weapons bay. This milestone, achieved at Edwards Air Force Base in California, places the programme on the threshold of flight testing and paves the way for full operational pairing of Europe’s flagship beyond-visual-range missile with the West’s most widely procured 5th-generation combat aircraft. Beyond the technical success, the announcement signals an important evolution in NATO and European air combat capabilities, with direct implications for deterrence and air superiority in contested theatres.
With one final ground test remaining before flight trials, the Meteor–F-35 programme has now crossed a key threshold from design to practical integration (Picture Source: MBDA / U.S. Air Force)
The recent campaign of ground vibration trials and fit checks was designed to verify how the F-35A and Meteor interact as a complete weapon system. Engineers instrumented both aircraft and missile to measure structural responses as the missile was subjected to a range of vibration frequencies, while also confirming clearances inside the internal bay and around adjacent stores. These tests, carried out with the missile mounted in the F-35A’s bay, are essential steps to ensure that carriage and release do not compromise the aircraft’s stealth shaping or generate unsafe loads. According to MBDA, only one further ground test is required before the programme can transition to airborne firings, bringing the Meteor–F-35A combination “one step closer” to operational status. The work builds on earlier flight trials of Meteor on the F-35B conducted by the Royal Air Force, with the UK leading integration on the STOVL variant while Italy sponsors the F-35A effort, illustrating the multinational character of the programme.
At the heart of this development lies Meteor itself, conceived as a collaborative programme between six European nations, the UK, Italy, France, Germany, Spain and Sweden, to counter evolving air threats at long range. Meteor is a network-enabled beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile that departs from traditional solid-rocket designs. Instead of a single boost phase followed by an unpowered glide, it employs a throttleable solid-fuel ramjet, often described as a variable-flow ducted rocket, allowing the missile to sustain and modulate thrust throughout its flight. This propulsion concept underpins Meteor’s significantly enlarged “no-escape zone”, meaning hostile aircraft that have been engaged have far fewer options to outrun or out-maneuver the missile compared with earlier BVR weapons. An active radar seeker provides terminal guidance, while inertial navigation and a two-way data link enable mid-course updates, retargeting and dynamic optimisation of the intercept. Coupled with a blast-fragmentation warhead and dual impact/proximity fuzing, the design aims to maximise the probability of kill against manoeuvring and high-value targets. Already in frontline service on Saab Gripen, Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale, and now being trialled on South Korea’s KF-21 Boramae, Meteor’s extension to the F-35 family is a logical next step in its evolution.
For F-35A operators, integrating Meteor is not just a matter of adding another weapon to the loadout; it reshapes how the aircraft can be employed in the air-to-air role. The F-35’s sensor suite, combining an AESA radar, electro-optical systems and passive electronic support measures, is designed to detect, classify and track threats at long range while the aircraft remains difficult to detect. Pairing these sensors with a ramjet-powered BVR missile able to sustain energy deep into the engagement allows the F-35A to prosecute targets at distances where adversary fighters may struggle to respond effectively. Because Meteor can receive guidance updates over a data link, the F-35A can engage threats cooperatively, either using its own sensors or exploiting information from other platforms in a networked battlespace. Internal carriage of Meteor preserves the aircraft’s low-observable configuration, allowing it to maintain stealth while armed with a missile optimised for long-range intercepts rather than being forced to rely on external pylons that would compromise signature. In practical terms, this gives aircrews greater flexibility in choosing when and how to reveal themselves, complicating the calculus for any opponent.
The geostrategic implications of this pairing are significant. For European and NATO air forces operating F-35As and F-35Bs, Meteor offers a European-developed air-to-air missile that matches the stealth fighter’s own emphasis on survivability, connectivity and reach, reinforcing both transatlantic industrial cooperation and European strategic autonomy. Italy’s sponsorship of the F-35A integration, alongside the UK’s leadership on F-35B, underscores how partner nations are using the F-35 programme to embed their own high-end weapon systems into a common combat aircraft fleet. As Meteor becomes available across more F-35 user communities, it is likely to influence air-policing concepts in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, air defence of carrier strike groups, and quick reaction alert postures over Europe’s northern and southern flanks. The message to potential adversaries is clear: any attempt to contest NATO airspace will face a combination of low-observable platforms and long-range, high-energy missiles designed specifically to deny escape. At the same time, the integration effort illustrates a broader trend in 21st-century air combat, in which the decisive advantage comes from the interplay between platform, sensors, weapons and networks rather than from any single system in isolation.
With one final ground test remaining before flight trials, the Meteor–F-35A programme has now crossed a key threshold from design to practical integration. If subsequent airborne firings confirm the results seen on the ground, European F-35 fleets will gain a long-range air-to-air capability aligned with the aircraft’s 5th-generation design philosophy and already proven on other European fighters. For MBDA, Lockheed Martin and the nations backing Meteor, this step represents more than just a successful test sequence: it is a concrete move toward a future air combat environment in which stealth aircraft and ramjet-powered missiles operate as a single, tightly integrated system, giving allied air forces a decisive edge in deterring and, if necessary, countering modern air threats.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Germany considers joining Edgewing's GCAP fighter jet program as FCAS tensions grow
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Germany is assessing potential entry options into the Edgewing Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), according to Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, as the FCAS program continues to contend with disputes over leadership and access to sensitive technology.
As reported by Reuters on December 4, 2025, Germany may consider joining Edgewing's Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) in the coming years, Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto told lawmakers during a parliamentary hearing. His remarks, which also cited inquiries from Australia, Saudi Arabia, and Canada, suggest that the trilateral fighter jet program led by Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan is drawing wider international attention at a moment when Germany’s own FCAS partnership continues to face political and industrial strain.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkThe Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) unites Italy, the UK, and Japan in the joint development of a sixth-generation stealth fighter to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon in Italian and British service and the Mitsubishi F-2 in Japan by 2035. (Picture source: Edgewing)
Crosetto explained that Germany could probably join the Global Combat Air Program, now called Edgewing, at a later stage and stressed that work is ongoing to ensure that any state wishing to participate has a clearly defined route for accession. He identified Australia as another potential partner and confirmed that Saudi Arabia and Canada have formally expressed interest, which indicates that multiple governments are seeking information on timelines, industrial frameworks, and expected obligations about a project intended to deliver a next-generation fighter jet by 2035. He stated that the founding nations have agreed to operate on equal terms and that their fighter is planned to function alongside drones in a combined system intended to broaden operational options. He added that expanding the number of participants increases investment potential, enlarges the technological workforce, improves economic return, and can reduce costs for existing partners. He also pointed out that Germany is currently engaged in the Future Combat Air System project but may evaluate alternatives as industrial and political dynamics evolve, which places both programs within the same strategic horizon.
The Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) unites Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan in the joint development of a sixth-generation stealth fighter to replace the Eurofighter Typhoon in Italian and British service and the Mitsubishi F-2 in Japan. The program emerged from the convergence of the United Kingdom’s Tempest effort and Japan’s F-X initiative, which shared similar objectives regarding industrial continuity and next-generation capability. The Edgewing project is based on an equal partnership model in which Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, BAE Systems, and Leonardo serve as the principal industrial leaders for airframe work, while Rolls-Royce, Avio Aero, and IHI cooperate in the power and propulsion domain. Approximately 9,000 personnel across the partner nations support the program and are connected to over 1,000 suppliers, of which around 600 are based in the United Kingdom and roughly 400 in Italy and Japan. A trilateral treaty signed in December 2023 established a formal governance body known as the GCAP International Government Organisation (GIGO), located in the United Kingdom, which coordinates requirements and program oversight. Development is planned to begin in 2025, with a demonstrator aircraft expected before the end of the decade and an in-service date targeted for 2035.
A principal feature of the GCAP is its integration of the fighter with uncrewed adjunct platforms and wider networks, forming a connected architecture intended to function across multiple domains. Conceptual models presented by the partners feature a large delta wing, expanded fuel volume, and an internal weapons bay designed to preserve low observability while supporting significant payload capacity. Officials have discussed expectations for increased range, potentially allowing transatlantic crossing on internal fuel, and the ability to carry internal weapon loads greater than those of current fifth-generation aircraft. The program’s approach to mission systems centers on data processing capacity needed to coordinate several uncrewed systems and sustain operations deep inside contested areas where communication with support aircraft may be restricted. Technology maturation is already occurring through platforms such as the Excalibur flight test aircraft and the Tempest Combat Air Demonstrator, which will assess sensor integration, aerodynamic shaping, weapons bay operation, and the Pyramid open mission system architecture intended to simplify upgrades across the aircraft’s life cycle. Together, these efforts form a technological foundation designed to reduce risk ahead of full-scale development.
Industrial consolidation inside GCAP/Edgewing took a significant step with the creation of the Edgewing joint venture, formally named in June 2025, which assigns BAE Systems, Japan Aircraft Industrial Enhancement Co Ltd, and Leonardo equal shares of 33.3 percent. Edgewing will manage design, development, and delivery of the aircraft and associated systems while operating in coordination with the governmental oversight provided by GIGO. The joint venture will include multiple development hubs in the partner nations, such as the headquarters in the United Kingdom and the main Italian facility at Torino Caselle, already home to Eurofighter assembly activities, as well as Japanese sites for airframe, propulsion, and electronics integration. Italy has allocated €8.8 billion to the program, and Leonardo has awarded around €100 million in GCAP-related research and development contracts to national suppliers. Japan has also restructured its defence export regulations to permit transfers of the jointly developed fighter to countries meeting specific conditions, including the absence of active conflict and the presence of a defence cooperation agreement. The formation of the Electronics Evolution consortium by Mitsubishi Electric, ELT Group, Leonardo, and Leonardo UK has established a coordinated industrial structure to produce the ISANKE and ICS sensor and communication suite. These mechanisms define how participation must be organized, which would frame any potential German entry.
On the other hand, the FCAS (Future Combat Air System) is a separate European initiative involving France, Germany, and Spain, with Belgium first acting as an observer and then joining as a partner. The program is built around a Next Generation Weapon System that includes a sixth-generation crewed fighter, remote carriers, and a combat cloud intended to integrate manned and unmanned systems across air and space domains. Originally, the FCAS project was planned to deliver a prototype around 2028 or 2029 and aims for an entry into service around 2040 to replace Rafale in France and Eurofighter in Germany and Spain. Industrial responsibility is shared among Dassault Aviation, Airbus, and Indra, while Safran and MTU Aero Engines cooperate on engine development within the EUMET structure. FCAS traces its origins to earlier Franco-British and European studies and has grown into a large European program expected to cost tens of billions of euros, with some national estimates reaching €100 billion when considering the full system. Despite this scale, the program continued to move through its phased development approach, including concept definition, technology maturation, and planned demonstrator activities.
However, the FCAS has been affected by recurring disagreements concerning leadership, workshare distribution, and the protection of sensitive industrial knowledge, which have created friction between the partners and slowed any progress. France's Dassault Aviation has insisted on acting as prime contractor and architect for the New Generation Fighter and has expressed concern that sharing too much responsibility with Airbus would dilute its ability to manage the design and protect sensitive intellectual property. Airbus, for its part, has argued that the scale and complexity of the programme require a more distributed approach and has warned against a governance model that would leave large parts of German industry in a subordinate position. Debates over intellectual property rights, proprietary know-how, and which technologies developed by Dassault could be accessed or reused by German and Spanish firms have been particularly contentious, raising questions about the degree of access each industry will have during development. These tensions have periodically led to delays in moving from the initial concept phases into more advanced stages, such as Phase 1B and the planned Phase 2, which is meant to cover demonstrator assembly and flight testing. Industry leaders have at times spoken publicly about the risk of failure if compromises cannot be reached, which has contributed to ongoing uncertainty surrounding the FCAS program.
During 2025, the program’s internal tensions became more visible as political leaders in France and Germany commented on industrial capacities and workshare expectations. Reports indicated that Dassault's reported push for an 80% workshare on the New Generation Fighter produced concerns in Germany about the balance of industrial benefits and access to key technologies. French Defence Minister Catherine Vautrin stated that Germany did not currently have the capacity to build a fighter aircraft on its own and that such expertise could not be acquired quickly, a remark that was interpreted by some in Berlin as a sign of French reluctance to accept a more equal role for German industry. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius publicly mentioned the possibility of ending FCAS if unresolved challenges persisted and said he would address the issue with his French and Spanish counterparts once the new French government settled. At the same time, discussions emerged in Germany about potential alternatives, including continuing FCAS without France, exploring closer cooperation with Sweden or the United Kingdom, or examining participation in GCAP, which some officials viewed as more advanced and more structured. Belgium’s progression from observer to partner and its subsequent review of its position, which led to the purchase of more U.S.-made F-35s, also illustrates how all these factors have shaped an environment in which Germany may feel compelled to reassess its participation in the FCAS program.
And finally, what about Vautrin's remarks about the German capacities? Let's have a look: Germany currently retains a comprehensive industrial base for fighter aircraft that covers final assembly, airframe production, propulsion systems, subsystem integration and full life cycle support, centered on Airbus Defence and Space in Manching where new Eurofighter Typhoons are assembled, tested, upgraded and maintained, including the recently contracted Tranche 5 aircraft that will keep the production line active into the 2030s. Structural manufacturing capacity is anchored by Premium AEROTEC’s sites in Augsburg and Varel, which produce major fuselage sections, composite assemblies, machined metal structures, air intake components, and other load-bearing parts used in fighter airframes, ensuring that Germany contributes to several core structural elements of the Eurofighter. Propulsion capability is maintained through EuroJet Turbo GmbH in Hallbergmoos and MTU Aero Engines in Munich, which together deliver EJ200 turbofan components, digital engine control units, compressors, maintenance functions, and long-term support needed for the Eurofighter fleet, preserving national competence in military jet engine manufacturing.
Germany also contributes to fighter production beyond domestic programs, by manufacturing center fuselage components and other structures for the F-35A supply chain, while remaining fully embedded in Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH for program coordination, system integration, upgrade planning, and technology evolution. Within this ecosystem, the German aerospace industry also supports integration of new AESA radar systems, electronic warfare equipment, and long-term modernization packages, reflecting a combined military-industrial approach to sustaining and upgrading a fighter fleet. Germany’s production capabilities are supplemented by a distributed network of subsystem suppliers providing avionics, flight control equipment, landing gear, weapons integration and maintenance services, giving the country a complete set of competencies required to sustain modern fighter operations. At the same time, long-term industrial planning could now be influenced by uncertainty surrounding the FCAS, since these tensions create a strategic dependency on either stabilizing FCAS, adjusting its scope, or identifying alternative cooperation frameworks, since the continuation or collapse of that programme will directly shape Germany’s ability to maintain a sovereign fighter jet industrial capability beyond the Eurofighter era.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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U.S. Greenlights $2.68B Air-Strike Weapons Package Aimed at Reinforcing Canada’s Deterrence
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The United States has approved a possible 2.68 billion dollar Foreign Military Sale of advanced air strike weapons and support equipment to Canada. The package is poised to strengthen Canadian air combat readiness at a time of rising demands in NATO and NORAD.
On December 4, 2025, the United States signaled a further deepening of North American defense integration by clearing a possible 2.68 billion dollar Foreign Military Sale of air strike weapons and support to Canada, as reported by the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the Pentagon and covered by Reuters. This FMS notification comes as Ottawa modernizes its air combat capabilities and prepares to introduce new fighter aircraft while facing growing demands in NATO and NORAD. At a time of heightened concern over long-range strike and missile threats, a large package of precision munitions is intended to strengthen Canada’s ability to conduct calibrated air operations at home and alongside allies. The notification to Congress is therefore both a key acquisition step and a political signal about the future shape of Canadian and North American airpower.
A Royal Canadian Air Force CF-18 releases a GBU-12 over Eglin Air Force Base during a US-run Weapons System Evaluation Program, which tests live precision-guided munitions in realistic conditions. This type of training underpins Canada’s move to expand its precision strike capabilities through the newly approved 2.68 billion dollar US air strike weapons package (Picture Source: U.S. Air Force)
At the core of the proposed package is a wide inventory of precision-guided and general-purpose munitions intended to equip Canada’s combat aircraft with a full spectrum of strike options. Ottawa has requested up to 3,108 GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb Increment I (SDB-I) glide bombs and up to 2,004 GBU-53 Small Diameter Bomb Increment II (SDB-II), complemented by 100 GBU-53 SDB-II guided test vehicles. The order also covers up to 5,352 KMU-572, 396 KMU-556 and 140 KMU-557 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) guidance kits, allowing conventional free-fall bombs to be converted into satellite-guided weapons. In addition, Canada seeks up to 3,414 BLU-111 500-lb general-purpose bombs, 220 BLU-117 2,000-lb bombs, 146 I-2000 penetrator warheads for hardened targets, 100 MK-82 inert bombs, 750 inert GBU-39 practice bombs with fuzes, and 100 GBU-39 guided test vehicles. The non-MDE segment of the case is also substantial, including fuze systems such as the FMU-139 and FMU-167 Hard Target Void Sensing Fuzes, DSU-38 laser target detectors, practice munitions, tools, training aids, classified and unclassified software, technical documentation, spare parts, and logistics and engineering support. The 2.68 billion dollar figure represents the maximum estimated value if all options are exercised, with the final value expected to be lower depending on detailed requirements, budget authority and the eventual signed contracts.
Operationally, the package is designed to give the Royal Canadian Air Force a flexible, scalable strike portfolio aligned with contemporary NATO concepts of operations. Small Diameter Bombs enable aircraft to carry more precision munitions per sortie and engage targets with reduced collateral effects, while JDAM guidance kits allow existing bomb bodies to be turned into all-weather precision weapons guided by GPS and inertial navigation. Penetrator warheads and 2,000-lb general-purpose bombs provide options against hardened or deeply buried infrastructure, whereas 500-lb general-purpose bombs maintain a more traditional load-out for a wide range of tactical targets. Although the DSCA notice does not specify platforms, the munitions are consistent with the capabilities of Canada’s current and planned fighter fleet, including the F-35A aircraft Ottawa is in the process of acquiring under the Future Fighter Capability Project. Washington underlines that Canada “will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment” and that the proposed sale will not require additional US government or contractor personnel in country, pointing to a mature support and training framework between the two allies.
Strategically, the United States presents the proposed sale as a contribution to its broader foreign policy and national security objectives. The DSCA emphasizes that Canada is a key NATO ally, an important actor for political stability and economic development, and a regular contributor to military, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. For Ottawa, a large inventory of precision strike weapons is aligned with ongoing investments in NORAD modernization and air domain awareness, where Canada has committed tens of billions of dollars to upgrade sensors, command-and-control systems and air weapons capabilities to respond to evolving threats, including cruise missiles and long-range conventional strike systems. The ability to equip new fighters with a diverse set of munitions strengthens Canada’s credibility as a contributor to deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank, in expeditionary operations and in the increasingly contested Arctic. At the same time, DSCA explicitly states that the transaction “will not alter the basic military balance in the region,” signaling that it is viewed in Washington as a reinforcement of existing capabilities rather than a transformative escalation.
The package also sits at the intersection of industrial and political dynamics in US–Canada defense relations. Boeing and RTX Corporation, both headquartered in Arlington, Virginia, are identified as the principal contractors, confirming that US industry will remain a primary supplier of Canadian air-launched weapons even as Ottawa explores closer industrial links with European partners and considers diversification of its defense supply chain. DSCA indicates that no offset arrangements are currently known and that any industrial compensations will be the subject of separate negotiations between the companies and the Canadian government. The proposed sale follows a period of scrutiny over the costs and dependence associated with Canada’s F-35program, with an Auditor General report highlighting substantial cost growth and Prime Minister Mark Carney ordering, then ultimately sustaining, a review that still pointed to continued reliance on US-made aircraft for interoperability and lifecycle support. Against this backdrop, the weapons package underscores that, despite ongoing debates over diversification and European partnerships, the core of Canada’s air combat capability remains deeply integrated with US platforms, munitions and support ecosystems.
From Washington’s perspective, the notification stresses that the delivery of these weapons and associated services will not negatively affect US defense readiness and will not require a permanent increase of US personnel in Canada. For Ottawa, the case offers a way to synchronize munitions stocks with the planned introduction of new fighters, helping to ensure that aircraft entering service over the coming decade are immediately paired with modern, network-enabled air-ground weapons. It also reinforces Canada’s ability to make tangible contributions to North American aerospace defense and NATO operations, at a moment when allies expect greater burden sharing and when precision long-range strike has become central to deterrence and warfighting concepts.
The notification of this proposed sale signals that, if Congress gives its approval and negotiations lead to a final contract, Canada is preparing not only to renew its fighter fleet but to ensure those aircraft are equipped for sustained, high-intensity operations alongside US and NATO forces. Thousands of precision munitions, extensive support infrastructure and assured US industrial backing together point to a long-term choice: to anchor Canadian airpower in interoperable US systems at the very moment when NORAD modernization, F-35 introduction and great-power competition converge. Beyond the technical detail of GBU-39s, SDB-II and JDAM kits, the underlying message is that Canada intends to remain a front-line contributor to collective air and missile defense, and Washington is prepared to underwrite that role with some of its most in-demand strike weapons.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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EDEX 2025: Egypt Begins Certified Rafale Component Production in Local Aerospace Factories
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Egypt has confirmed that its industry is now manufacturing certified Rafale fighter components, a move showcased at EDEX 2025. The shift gives Cairo new leverage in regional defense production and expands Dassault’s supply chain into North Africa.
Egypt’s push to localize advanced aerospace manufacturing took a visible step forward at EDEX 2025, where the Arab Organization for Industrialization displayed Rafale wing sections marked as Egyptian-made. According to officials cited by the Egypt Independent, Egypt has now been formally approved by Dassault to produce select airframe components for the multirole fighter, adding Cairo to the French company’s global supply chain. The update reflects nearly a decade of deepening cooperation between the two countries since Egypt became the first foreign Rafale operator in 2015.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkAt EDEX 2025, the Arab Organization for Industrialization showcased newly manufactured Rafalewing components, marking Egypt’s first confirmed production of parts for the French multirole fighter under its expanding industrial partnership with Dassault Aviation (Picture source: Army Recognition Group).
Egypt is today one of the Rafale’s most important export customers. Cairo’s Rafale journey began with a 2015 contract for 24 aircraft, worth roughly 5.9 billion dollars, making Egypt the first foreign operator and giving the Egyptian Air Force eight single-seat EM and sixteen two-seat DM fighters. A second order for 30 additional F3R standard aircraft was signed in May 2021 in a deal estimated at 3.75 billion euros and largely financed through a long-term French-backed loan, raising the planned Egyptian fleet to 54 aircraft, the largest Rafale force outside France. With ongoing deliveries, more than forty Rafales are now believed to be operational in Egyptian service.
The Egyptian Rafale is a high-end F3R configuration built around the Thales RBE2 AESA radar, the SPECTRA electronic warfare and self-protection suite, and a sensor fusion architecture that gives pilots a unified tactical picture. The twin-engine M88 powerplant allows the aircraft to reach close to Mach 1.8 and operate at altitudes approaching 50,000 feet while carrying a significant weapons load across its 14 hardpoints. Egypt’s Rafales are qualified to employ MICA air-to-air missiles, the Meteor long-range air dominance missile, AASM Hammer precision guided bombs, the SCALP cruise missile, and the Exocet anti-ship missile. This mix gives the Egyptian Air Force a true omnirole fleet that can shift from air superiority to deep strike or maritime strike within a single mission cycle.
It is this level of capability that explains why the industrial story behind the aircraft matters. AOI has now been approved by Dassault as part of the company’s global supply chain, with the Helwan-based Aircraft and Engine factories manufacturing selected Rafale components, including elements of the wing structure and associated fairings, as well as parts for Falcon business jets. Egyptian officials have stated that AOI is producing high-precision parts to French quality standards and positioning itself as an export-ready supplier not only for Egypt’s own fleet but also for broader regional markets. At EDEX 2025, the Rafale wing sections on display at the AOI stand offered clear and tangible proof that these commitments have entered serial production.
For Egypt, this cooperation goes far beyond traditional offset. By fabricating wing components, engine parts, and potentially composite structures, AOI engineers are gaining access to Dassault’s design tolerances, digital manufacturing processes, and strict quality assurance regimes. This exposure accelerates the learning curve across Egypt’s aerospace sector, covering areas such as tooling, non-destructive testing, advanced coatings, and aerostructures assembly. Egyptian defense leaders have been explicit that these Rafale work packages are meant to anchor a broader aerospace ecosystem capable of supporting the country’s drone programs, MRO services, and future combat aircraft acquisitions.
Strategically, the relationship also deepens the long-standing Franco-Egyptian defense axis. Wing and engine components built in Cairo could ultimately fly not only on Egyptian Rafales but potentially on aircraft delivered to other customers, embedding Egypt into the life cycle of a major European fighter program. For the Egyptian Air Force, that should translate into more predictable spares availability and the possibility of evolving into a regional Rafale maintenance and upgrade hub. For Dassault, integrating AOI’s increasingly capable manufacturing base offers a way to remain cost-competitive while expanding its industrial footprint across Arab and African markets.
On the EDEX show floor, the grey Rafale wing sections sitting on AOI’s stand signal that Egypt is moving from being only a Rafale buyer to becoming a small but genuine Rafale builder, with all the strategic and industrial leverage that status brings.
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U.S. Marines AH-1Z Attack Helicopter Crews Sharpen Strike Skills Amid Rising Caribbean Demands
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Marine AH-1Z Viper crews from HMLA-267 conducted close air support drills during Steel Knight 25 at Camp Pendleton on 2 December 2025. The training carries added weight as U.S. forces monitor heightened tensions around Venezuela and prepare for a rapid crisis response in the Caribbean.
On 2 December 2025, AH-1Z Viper crews from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 (HMLA-267) at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton executed a close air support training mission during the Steel Knight 25 exercise, as shown in images published by DVIDS. The sortie rehearsed the rapid, precise use of fires in support of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force operating in contested terrain. With tensions between the United States and Venezuela running high and U.S. naval and Marine units already deployed in the Caribbean, this training links routine flight operations in California to potential real-world crisis-response missions off the Venezuelan coast.
U.S. Marine AH-1Z Viper crews at Camp Pendleton practiced fast, precise close air support during Steel Knight 25, a timely readiness push as U.S. forces track rising tensions around Venezuela (Picture Source: DVIDS)
On the ground at Camp Pendleton, the Steel Knight 25 close air support scenario is built to test the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing’s ability to deliver precise, time-sensitive strikes in support of maneuvering ground forces. Flying AH-1Z Vipers under Marine Aircraft Group 39, White and Bianco train to absorb last-minute target updates, work with forward air controllers and unmanned systems, and fire from positions that simulate small, dispersed expeditionary bases. The focus is on flying as they would in a distributed fight: aircraft cycling quickly through rearming and refueling points, command-and-control nodes shifting as the simulated front line moves, and aviation fires paced with infantry and artillery so the MAGTF can either press an attack or break contact. In recent iterations, Steel Knight has expanded to include long-range strikes, sea-denial missions and complex air-tasking sequences, turning southern California into a testing ground for the type of multi-domain operations that could unfold in both the Pacific and the Caribbean.
The AH-1Z Viper sits at the core of this approach. Evolving from the Cobra family but equipped with a four-bladed rotor, modern avionics and an integrated sensor and weapons suite, the Viper is tailored for ship-to-shore and littoral operations. It combines a nose-mounted 20 mm cannon with guided rockets and precision missiles such as the AGM-114 Hellfire and, in some configurations, the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, allowing crews to engage armored vehicles, small craft or fortified positions from stand-off distances. Operating from amphibious assault ships or forward expeditionary sites, AH-1Zs serve as armed reconnaissance platforms and escorts for MV-22B Ospreys and CH-53K heavy-lift helicopters, while also providing rapid close air support to Marines ashore. During Steel Knight, these helicopters are integrated into a wider kill web that can include fixed-wing aircraft, naval surface fires and ground-based sensors, refining tactics for tracking and engaging mobile maritime and land targets across wide areas. The work at Camp Pendleton is therefore less about isolated crew drills than about rehearsing how Vipers plug into Navy and joint command-and-control networks in environments where communications may be degraded or contested.
These tactical sequences unfold against the backdrop of the largest U.S. naval and Marine build-up in the Caribbean in decades. Since late summer 2025, Washington has moved warships and Marine units into the southern Caribbean under an operation framed as targeting “narcoterrorist” networks linked to Venezuela’s leadership. By late September, the deployment encompassed around ten major vessels, including an amphibious assault ship, amphibious transport docks, several guided-missile destroyers and a cruiser, supported by a fast-attack submarine and the special operations support ship MV Ocean Trader. Many of these platforms are capable of launching Tomahawk cruise missiles, giving U.S. commanders options to strike land targets deep inside Venezuelan territory if ordered. As the crisis has evolved, U.S. troop levels in the region have risen to roughly 15,000 personnel with the arrival of the carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and her escorts, a concentration of air and sea power not seen in the area since the 1989 intervention in Panama.
Caracas has responded to the regional build-up with its own exercises and statements on sovereignty, adding to an already tense security environment in the Caribbean. Against this backdrop, the deployment of amphibious ships and Marine aviation detachments, including AH-1Z units capable of delivering close air support from sea-based platforms, underlines the practical value of the drills conducted in California. Steel Knight 25 shows how crews trained at Camp Pendleton can be called upon to provide tailored fire support, armed overwatch and escort missions in a maritime contingency, with procedures already rehearsed in realistic conditions.
The image of HMLA-267’s Viper crews stepping out for a Steel Knight sortie reflects the unit’s clear focus on readiness. Each flight hones close air support, armed reconnaissance, and littoral strike techniques while evaluating how the AH-1Z’s sensors, weapons, and radios perform in a simulated contested environment. Through rapid turnarounds, ground-controller coordination, and integration into broader command-and-control networks, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing keeps its Viper pilots prepared to shift from training at Camp Pendleton to potential missions in the Caribbean, armed with well-established tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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South Korea Starts Domestic Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile Program for the KF-21 Fighter Jet
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South Korea has approved a 435.9 billion won program to develop a homegrown short-range air-to-air missile for the KF-21 Boramae. The effort aims to deepen strategic autonomy and strengthen the fighter's export value as regional demand for advanced aircraft grows.
On 2nd December 2025, South Korea’s arms procurement authorities confirmed the launch of a 435.9 billion won (about $296 million) program to develop indigenous short-range air-to-air guided missiles for the KF-21 Boramae fighter jets, as reported by Korea Times and announced by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA). This decision marks the first fully homegrown air-to-air missile development program for the KF-21 and fits into a broader strategy to secure strategic autonomy in critical airborne weapon systems. By targeting operational readiness of the new missile capability by 2032, Seoul is seeking both to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers and to strengthen the export appeal of the KF-21 package at a time when demand for advanced but affordable fighter solutions is rising in Asia and the Middle East.
South Korea has kicked off a domestic short-range air-to-air missile program for the KF-21 fighter jet, a move aimed at boosting the aircraft's autonomy and long-term export appeal (Picture Source: Korean Aerospace Industries)
The new missile will be developed under the leadership of the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), with major participation expected from LIG Nex1 and Hanwha Aerospace, the two flagship actors of South Korea’s missile and aerospace industrial base. Today, the KF-21 test fleet is using or preparing to integrate imported missiles such as the European IRIS-T for short-range engagements and Meteor for beyond-visual-range combat, with U.S. AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9X Sidewinder also considered for future integration. The new program does not replace these weapons in the short term; instead, it adds a domestic option that can be tailored to the KF-21’s sensors, data links and future stealth upgrades. In practice, this gives the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) a layered mix: combat-proven Western missiles for near-term readiness, complemented over time by a national missile family designed from the outset around KF-21-specific requirements and export flexibility.
From a capability standpoint, the future short-range missile is expected to be more than a simple infrared dogfight weapon. While detailed specifications have not yet been disclosed, ADD and its industrial partners already field complex seekers, data links and guidance algorithms on systems such as the air-launched Cheonryong cruise missile and the TAipers anti-tank missile. It is therefore reasonable to expect a highly agile missile with an imaging infrared seeker, high off-boresight engagement angles, and full compatibility with the KF-21’s AESA radar, electronic warfare suite and helmet-mounted sight. If these expectations are met, the new weapon would give the Boramae a sovereign counterpart to leading Western short-range missiles, while allowing South Korea to manage upgrades without foreign approval and to adapt the missile’s software or seekers to specific export customers. In the longer term, an indigenous short-range missile will also provide a building block for a full family of air-to-air weapons, complementing South Korea’s ongoing work on long-range air-to-air and advanced air-to-ground munitions for the KF-21.
The program must be read against a regional backdrop characterized by North Korea’s missile developments, intensifying great-power competition in Northeast Asia and growing scrutiny of export control regimes. DAPA has explicitly framed the missile initiative as essential to “strategic autonomy”, reducing exposure to shifting U.S. and European export policies that could constrain the availability, upgradeability or re-export of foreign-made missiles in crisis. By fielding a domestically engineered missile mated to a domestically led fighter program, Seoul gains much greater freedom to adapt rules of use, integration timelines and configuration baselines without external veto players. This autonomy carries geopolitical weight: it strengthens South Korea’s bargaining position within the U.S. alliance framework, offers partners in Southeast Asia and the Middle East a combat aircraft package less exposed to third-party licensing, and signals to regional competitors that Seoul is consolidating a vertically integrated air combat capability, from sensors to missiles.
The 435.9 billion won budget allocated for 2025–2032 represents a modest share of the broader KF‑21 program, whose development alone exceeds 8.8 trillion won. Averaging about 54 billion won ($37 million) annually, the missile effort is manageable within South Korea’s expanding defense budget and ADD’s R&D framework. For the industry, the impact is more direct: LIG Nex1 and Hanwha Aerospace secure long‑term contracts that sustain high‑skill jobs, advance seeker and propulsion technologies, and potentially generate export revenue if marketed with the KF‑21.
The choice to pursue a national short-range air-to-air missile for the KF-21 represents more than a simple upgrade to armaments. It strengthens the technological backbone of South Korea’s airpower and defense industry. By directing several hundred billion won into a program that combines ADD’s research and development capabilities with the manufacturing capacity of LIG Nex1, Hanwha Aerospace, and potentially KAI, Seoul is shaping the Boramae as more than an advanced fighter; it is developing a fully sovereign air combat ecosystem. For the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF), this enhances operational resilience in high-intensity scenarios. For export customers, it provides a more cohesive and less constrained weapons package. And for the broader region, it signals South Korea’s intention to remain a central, independent player in the evolving Indo-Pacific balance of airpower.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Australia in talks to donate retired Tiger ARH attack helicopters to Ukraine
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Australia is evaluating a potential transfer of its Tiger attack helicopters to Ukraine as part of a wider assistance package that also includes new sanctions on Russia.
As reported by ABC News on December 3, 2025, Australia is reviewing the potential transfer of its retiring Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) to Ukraine, as the Albanese government is finalizing a new assistance package valued at $95 million and additional sanctions on Russia. If successful, the decision would mark the first transfer of Western attack helicopters to Ukraine, and reshape both Australia’s aviation transition and Ukraine’s air defense and reconnaissance missions.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkThe Tiger ARH, based on the French Tiger HAP, can fire AGM-114 Hellfire II and Mistral missiles, as well as 70 mm rockets developed by Belgian manufacturer Thales FZ, and use a nose-mounted 30 mm cannon. (Picture source: Australian MoD)
Australia is considering transferring its retiring Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters (ARH) to Ukraine as part of a possible expansion of military assistance, while finalizing a new $95 million support package and introducing additional sanctions on Russia. The decision process is being handled separately from the funding package, but remains connected to broader efforts to increase Australia’s contribution to Ukraine at a time when the U.S. is pursuing peace initiatives in Moscow. The question of whether the Tigers should be sent to Ukraine has emerged as a central issue in Canberra as officials examine how the aircraft fit within a wider combination of military aid, financial commitments, and pressure on Russian revenue streams. The decision is also influenced by Ukraine’s formal request for the helicopters, by the public outrage following the scrapping of the MRH-90 Taipan fleet, and by Australia’s ongoing shift from the Tiger to the AH-64E Apache fleet. The timing of any potential transfer now depends on how quickly Australia decides to accelerate the Tiger withdrawal schedule and how Ukraine could receive them.
The current Australian package includes around $50 million earmarked for a NATO-managed program that acquires mostly U.S.-manufactured weapons for Ukraine, alongside funding for tactical air defense radars, munitions, combat engineering equipment, and updated contributions to a multinational drone capability initiative. This assistance represents the first major increase in physical assistance since October 2024, when Australia committed 49 M1A1 Abrams tanks, and it lifts total support since the start of the full-scale invasion to more than $1.7 billion, including about $1.5 billion in military aid. Previous deliveries have included armored vehicles, loitering munitions, rigid hull inflatable boats, RBS 70 man-portable air defense systems, and the forward deployment of an E-7A Wedgetail to Europe to assist regional air surveillance. Alongside the new funding, Australia has sanctioned 45 vessels associated with Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers used to evade existing restrictions, showing that the government intends to combine equipment transfers with economic measures. Within this framework, any Tiger transfer is expected to be treated as a discrete component rather than a symbolic side decision, reinforcing the broader mix of actions Australia is taking to support Ukraine across both financial and operational dimensions.
The Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) fleet, consisting of 22 attack helicopters that entered Australian service in 2004, is scheduled to be fully retired by 2028, although this date could be moved forward if authorities choose to release the Tigers for Ukraine earlier. The helicopters are being replaced by 29 AH-64E Apache aircraft that will enter service by 2029, with the first two having arrived at RAAF Base Townsville in October 2025 and the remaining deliveries planned in phased increments. The transition plan includes a three-stage drawdown that shifts pilots and maintenance personnel from Tiger units to Apache units to maintain training continuity and operational readiness. Infrastructure upgrades at Townsville and long-term sustainment and training contracts have already been established to support the AH-64E introduction. Australian officials have said that if operational planners recommend bringing Tiger retirement forward to facilitate a transfer to Ukraine, this recommendation will be seriously examined. This means that the helicopters’ future now depends not only on Australia’s domestic modernization schedule but also on whether the helicopters are judged suitable for integration into Ukraine’s evolving helicopter force.
The Tiger ARH was ordered in 2001 to replace the OH-58 Kiowa and UH-1 “Bushranger” gunship helicopters, with assembly work performed partly in Australia and operational use centered around the 1st Aviation Regiment at Robertson Barracks in Darwin. The ARH variant is based on the French Tiger HAP, and includes upgraded MTR390 engines, a Strix sight with laser designation capability for firing AGM-114 Hellfire II missiles, 70 mm rockets developed by Belgian manufacturer Thales FZ, and a nose-mounted 30 mm cannon as the primary gun system. The ARH can also carry short-range air-to-air missiles such as the Mistral for self-defense or for missions that require engagement of low-altitude aerial targets. During its service life, the Tiger ARH fleet has faced recurring issues, including cockpit fume incidents, supply chain delays linked to the distance from European maintenance centers, and higher-than-expected sustainment costs, which have contributed to lower readiness rates. These difficulties were part of the reasoning behind the decision not to pursue a long-term modernization path and instead to acquire the AH-64E Apache at an estimated cost of about $3.5 billion. The accumulated technical and logistical challenges now form an essential part of the evaluation of whether the Tigers can be effectively integrated into Ukrainian service and whether their maintenance requirements can be met at a sustainable level.
Measuring approximately 15.3 meters in length, with a 13-meter main rotor diameter and a height of about 3.8 meters, the Tiger ARH features a composite airframe designed to reduce structural weight while improving resistance to corrosion and battlefield wear, with a maximum takeoff weight of approximately 6,000 kilograms and a typical cruise speed near 230 kilometers per hour. Its twin MTR390 turboshaft engines provide a combined output of roughly 1,300 kilowatts (close to 2,570 shp), giving the helicopter a hover ceiling above 3,000 meters and enabling high agility at low altitude. The ARH is equipped with a digital avionics suite that integrates navigation, targeting, and communication through a multiplex data bus that manages onboard subsystems for flight and weapon employment. Its mast-mounted IFF antennas, laser warning receivers, radar warning receivers, and missile approach warning sensors form a defensive aids subsystem that automatically deploys countermeasures through an onboard dispenser. The ARH cockpit uses multifunction displays compatible with night vision systems and a helmet-mounted sight that allows pilots to cue weapons through head movement rather than manual instrument alignment. The aircraft’s 30 mm cannon is housed in a turret with a wide traverse arc to engage ground and aerial targets independently of flight direction, improving flexibility in confined spaces.
The Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter (ARH) fleet, consisting of 22 attack helicopters that entered Australian service in 2004, is scheduled to be fully retired by 2028, although this date could be moved forward if authorities choose to release the Tigers for Ukraine earlier. (Picture source: Australian MoD)
Domestic reactions to previous helicopter retirements influence how the Tiger decision is being approached, especially after the early withdrawal of the MRH 90 Taipan fleet following a fatal crash in July 2023 that killed four soldiers during a training activity. After the fleet was retired, the airframes were dismantled for spare parts and buried, despite Ukraine indicating interest in acquiring them if restoration were feasible. The disposal decision caused anger among members of Australia’s Ukrainian community and triggered a broader criticism in the country about the handling of surplus defense equipment. Defence authorities stated that the Taipans were not in the necessary condition to be returned to service without extensive remedial work, which they considered impractical. Ukraine’s ambassador to Australia later emphasized that Kyiv accepted the Taipan decision but remained interested in future capabilities, specifically referencing the Tigers as they approach the end of their service life. A Senate committee subsequently recommended that Australia establish a process to make retiring helicopters and other major systems available to Ukraine when appropriate. This earlier experience means the Tigers are now viewed as a test case for whether Australia intends to adopt a systematic approach to surplus platforms, rather than treating each retirement as an isolated matter.
Evaluations of the Tigers’ potential role in Ukraine acknowledge the helicopter’s record of reliability issues while also identifying areas where it could contribute if adequately supported. Observers frequently cite the maintenance demands, the requirement for a dedicated logistical system, and parallels with the German Tiger fleet, which has faced technical challenges and low availability that led to an early phase-out decision. At the same time, supporters note that Ukraine would be operating much closer to European support hubs, which could mitigate some of the constraints that affected the Australian fleet. The ARH configuration’s integration of Hellfire missiles, 70 mm rockets that can be equipped with laser guidance kits, a 30 mm cannon, and compatibility with short-range air-to-air missiles offers options that Ukraine could incorporate into its existing mission sets. Receiving the Tigers would introduce the first non-Soviet-designed attack helicopter into Ukraine’s inventory, providing additional tactical flexibility while also requiring investment in new training, simulators, and maintenance structures. Because the fleet consists of only 22 Tiger ARHs, Ukrainian and Australian decision-makers would need to determine whether the operational value offsets the resource demands associated with maintaining a relatively small number of complex airframes.
Potential missions under consideration emphasize counter-drone roles and flexible support tasks rather than deep strike operations against heavily defended positions. Ukraine has increasingly relied on helicopters to intercept Shahed-type loitering munitions and other low-flying drones at night and at very low altitude, taking advantage of the mobility and rapid reaction potential of helicopters. With guided rockets, air-to-air missiles, and a stabilized cannon linked to modern targeting systems, the Tiger ARH could reinforce Ukraine’s mobile air defense layer by engaging drones and various low-altitude threats while complementing fixed and vehicle-mounted air defense systems. These missions could also allow Ukraine to reassign its transport and utility helicopters to evacuation, logistics, and troop movement tasks in areas where attack helicopters are less essential. In addition to these roles, the Tiger could be used for armed reconnaissance, convoy escort, and fire support in sectors where ground-based air defenses are less dense, enabling it to contribute without being exposed to the heaviest threats. However, the vulnerability of all attack helicopters in environments with extensive short-range air defense systems and inexpensive armed drones remains a key operational factor, meaning that employment concepts would have to minimize exposure. These constraints shape realistic expectations about how much effect a limited number of Tigers could have across such a large and high-intensity battlespace.
The Tiger decision is also influenced by earlier discussions about providing fixed-wing aircraft to Ukraine, including the case of the Royal Australian Air Force’s retired F/A-18 Classic Hornets. After the Hornets were withdrawn in 2021, a commercial agreement transferred 41 airframes to RAVN Aerospace, and there were subsequent negotiations about supplying some of these fighters to Ukraine, contingent on United States approval due to intellectual property protections and end-user conditions. Ukrainian authorities focused on securing F-16 aircraft and publicly rejected claims that they had dismissed the Hornets as unsuitable, instead emphasizing the difficulty of sustaining multiple Western fighter types simultaneously. This experience shows that surplus aircraft transfers depend on alignment between operational requirements, industrial support capacity, and the conditions imposed by third-party stakeholders. In this environment, the Tigers would represent just one of several possible additions to Ukraine’s aviation inventory, and their integration would need to be balanced against other priorities that compete for training resources, technical personnel, and financial support. Australia must also ensure that any transfer fits its broader force development plans and regional commitments in the Indo-Pacific, creating a multi-layer decision process with strategic and operational implications for both countries.
The Albanese government is weighing all these factors as it considers whether to accelerate the Tigers’ retirement and make the aircraft available to Ukraine, with the choice involving strategic, operational, and domestic considerations. Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy has stated that Canberra approached Kyiv to request its level of interest and that gifting the helicopters is the leading option being reviewed. Defence Minister Richard Marles has indicated that a final decision will be made shortly within the wider assistance framework, pointing to a decision timeline that depends on coordination between departments. If Australia proceeds, the transfer would form a specific component of an assistance package that already includes financial contributions and sanctions, with the stated aim of improving Ukraine’s air defense and reconnaissance capability over the medium term. If the government decides not to send the Tigers, the aircraft may remain stored or be disposed of through other pathways, which would likely revive debate about how Australia handles retired equipment. The choice will be interpreted in relation to the Taipan case, the Senate recommendations on surplus platforms, and the practical question of whether the Tigers’ operational potential outweighs the challenges associated with their maintenance history. In each scenario, the decision will shape how Australia manages its own aviation transition while determining whether its outgoing helicopters will play a role in Ukraine’s defense.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Turkish Aerospace Targets Middle Eastern and African Markets With Full Portfolio at EDEX 2025
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Turkish Aerospace opened EDEX 2025 with a full lineup of fighters, trainers, helicopters, and unmanned systems as Türkiye leads the largest national pavilion at the show. The broad portfolio signals Ankara’s effort to expand defense exports and deepen ties with Middle Eastern and African air forces.
Turkish Aerospace Industries arrived in Cairo for EDEX 2025 with a message that regional airpower modernization is moving fast and that Ankara intends to be a long-term supplier. Company officials highlighted renewed cooperation with Egyptian aerospace entities, ongoing technology transfer discussions, and a growing export pipeline that now exceeds three billion dollars in international contracts over five years. The company’s presence at the largest national pavilion reflects a strategic push by Türkiye to position its next-generation aircraft and UAVs as competitive alternatives for countries seeking modern capabilities without long procurement timelines.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkTurkish Aerospace showcases its full airpower portfolio at EDEX 2025, highlighting the KAAN fifth-generation fighter, HÜRJET trainer, ANKA and ANKA III unmanned systems, T129 ATAK helicopter, and Şimşek target drone as the company strengthens its export presence across the Middle East and Africa (Picture source: Army Recognition Group).
For Egypt and regional air forces, Turkish Aerospace arrives in Cairo as a partner already familiar from earlier cooperation initiatives, including industrial-level discussions with Egyptian aerospace entities on joint production and technology transfer. That diplomatic warming has been paired with a broader surge in export activity. Company officials note that Turkish Aerospace has secured more than three billion dollars in international contracts over the past five years. ANKA UAVs have been delivered or ordered by several nations, AKSUNGUR drones are in service with two foreign customers, T129 ATAK helicopters have been exported to three countries, HÜRKUŞ trainers to two, and the Şimşek target drone has also entered overseas inventories. This momentum offers important context for the aircraft and systems being showcased in Cairo.
At the top of the company’s lineup stands KAAN, Türkiye’s indigenous fifth-generation fighter. The twin-engine aircraft carries a maximum takeoff weight of 34,750 kilograms and uses two 13,150 kgf-class engines to reach Mach 1.8 at 40,000 feet, with a service ceiling of 55,000 feet. Designed for low observability, KAAN integrates internal weapon bays, high-agility flight performance up to plus nine G, and an advanced avionics suite that fuses radar, electro-optical, and electronic support sensors. Large-area cockpit displays and a modern helmet-mounted sight complete a cockpit architecture intended to match Western fifth-generation designs. In 2025, Indonesia signed a landmark contract for 48 KAAN fighters, valued at roughly ten billion dollars, with final assembly arrangements and industrial cooperation built into the agreement. This milestone elevates KAAN’s export credibility and positions it as a serious candidate for future operators across the Middle East and Africa.
HÜRJET, the company’s advanced jet trainer and light combat aircraft, anchors the mid-tier of the portfolio. The single-engine, tandem-seat aircraft carries up to 7,500 pounds of payload, reaches Mach 1.4, and operates at altitudes up to 45,000 feet while sustaining plus eight G. It is designed for lead-in fighter training, aggressor missions, close air support, and border security operations. Its selection by Spain for a program involving up to 45 aircraft underscores the platform’s growing relevance among NATO air forces seeking replacements for aging trainer fleets. At EDEX 2025, HÜRJET is one of Turkish Aerospace’s signature exhibits, signaling its readiness to compete directly with European and Asian manufacturers for regional training and light combat requirements.
In unmanned aviation, the ANKA family remains the company’s most mature and widely deployed segment. The baseline ANKA medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV delivers up to 30 hours of endurance, a 30,000-foot ceiling, and a payload capacity exceeding 350 kilograms. It carries EO/IR sensors, SAR and GMTI radar, electronic support and attack payloads, and precision munitions including guided bombs, rockets, and anti-tank missiles. Encrypted datalinks, SATCOM connectivity beyond 2,500 kilometers, and fully autonomous takeoff and landing round out its mission flexibility. The newer ANKA III introduces a stealth-oriented flying-wing configuration with a 7,250-kilogram maximum takeoff weight, 1,600-kilogram total payload, and high subsonic dash speeds. Designed with multirole weapon options and AI-enabled teaming concepts, ANKA III is intended to operate alongside KAAN or legacy fighters in coordinated strike or air defense suppression roles.
For helicopter missions, the T129 ATAK remains Turkish Aerospace’s proven rotary-wing solution. Powered by twin CTS800-4A engines, the two-crew platform mounts a turreted 20 millimeter cannon with 500 rounds, carries up to 16 anti-tank missiles, laser-guided rockets, and air-to-air missiles, and demonstrates a maximum cruise speed of 281 kilometers per hour. With three hours of endurance and strong high-hot high-performance, the T129 has earned a reputation for reliability through operational use. Recent export deliveries to the Philippines and contracts with Nigeria highlight its relevance for counterinsurgency and border security missions common across Africa.
Rounding out the portfolio, the Şimşek high-speed target drone offers essential training and electronic warfare realism for air defense units. With a wingspan of 1.6 meters, a length of 2.3 meters, and a maximum weight of 70 kilograms, Şimşek reaches 0.63 Mach, climbs to 25,000 feet, and endures for roughly 50 minutes with an operating radius of 700 kilometers. Its payload suite ranges from radar and infrared signature modifiers to chaff, flares, scoring systems, and electronic warfare trainers. Autonomous mission profiles and in-flight reprogramming support complex swarm and threat-simulation scenarios that are increasingly important for modern air forces.
Together, these systems allow Turkish Aerospace to enter EDEX 2025 not as a single-platform exhibitor but as a full-spectrum airpower provider. The combination of stealth fighters, advanced trainers, unmanned strike aircraft, attack helicopters, and sophisticated training targets gives regional militaries a coherent architecture for force modernization at a time when demand for integrated airpower solutions is rising across the Middle East and Africa.
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Analysis: Could the Su-57E become India’s next fighter jet as Putin arrives in New Delhi?
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India is entering a fresh round of negotiations with Russia on the Su-57E fighter, new S-400 units, and possible S 500 cooperation during President Vladimir Putin’s visit to New Delhi on December 4, 2025.
As reported by Bloomberg on November 30, 2025, India and Russia are preparing for an unusually wide-ranging defence discussion during President Vladimir Putin’s two-day visit to New Delhi, according to senior Indian officials familiar with the agenda. Russia’s proposals reportedly include the potential co-production and acquisition of Su-57E fifth-generation fighter jets, additional S-400 units, and possible future cooperation on the S-500 air defence system, as part of an ongoing assessment of capability needs, technology access, and supply chain risks.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkA previous Russian proposal foresaw an initial delivery of about 20 to 30 Su-57Es to India within three to four years, followed by the local production of a further 70 to 100 units by the early 2030s.(Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
The visit includes the 22nd India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military and Military Technical Cooperation, co-chaired by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, and the 23rd annual summit between Putin and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The agenda covers the timely delivery of the remaining two S-400 systems from the original $5.4 billion contract for five units, India’s examination of further S-400 batteries, and an offer of the S-500 capable of intercepting ballistic targets at about 600 kilometres and airborne targets at about 400 kilometres, and wider cooperation in shipbuilding and jointly developed weapons such as new BrahMos variants. Moscow is also seeking to reinforce energy and trade ties after a period in which Russian crude exports to India are projected to fall to a three-year low, as New Delhi has explored greater purchases from the United States and the Middle East.
Both sides are studying a free trade agreement within the Eurasian Economic Union framework and mechanisms such as rupee-based trade and rupee loans from Russian banks like Sberbank, while Belousov’s visit programme includes a wreath laying at the National War Memorial in New Delhi. Indian officials describe the visit as an opportunity to review the full spectrum of defence and economic relations while managing the effects of U.S. sanctions and tariffs that have targeted both Russian entities and Indian exports. At the centre of the current discussions is a Russian proposal that combines an extensive Su-57E package with short-term reinforcement through Su-35M fighters, technology transfer, and high levels of industrial localisation in India. United Aircraft Corporation has previously offered India the co-production of the Su-57E at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)’s Nashik facility, where Su-30MKI aircraft are already assembled, with localisation projected to be between 40 and 60 percent across avionics, structural parts, engines, and mission systems.
The proposal foresees an initial delivery of about 20 to 30 Su-57Es within three to four years, followed by the local production of a further 70 to 100 units by the early 2030s, and the integration of Indian systems such as Astra air-to-air missiles, Rudram anti-radiation missiles, Gaurav guided bombs, and domestic AESA radars like the Virupaksha. In parallel, Russia has offered 36 to 40 Su-35M fighters for delivery within two to three years to address the Indian Air Force’s squadron strength, which stands at around 31 units compared to an authorized 42.5, stressing that the Su-35M shares 70 to 80 percent systems commonality with the Su-30MKI. Both the Su-35M and Su-57E use the AL-41F1S engine rated at about 142 kilonewtons of thrust, and Russia has proposed that India could later gain access to the newer Izdeliye 177S engine with serrated nozzles and an expected life of 6,000 hours, which has been displayed but not yet flight tested. Moscow has also revived a two-seat Su-57 concept aimed at export markets, intended for roles involving control of S-70 Okhotnik unmanned combat aircraft, electronic warfare, and airborne command and control missions, which aligns with Indian interest in manned-unmanned teaming.
These offers are also linked to a broader proposal to use Su-57-derived engines and systems in a future “Super 30” modernisation of the Su-30MKI fleet, leveraging HAL’s experience building more than 900 AL-31FP engines and existing industrial infrastructure in India. The Su-57E itself is a fifth-generation multirole aircraft developed under the PAK-FA programme to perform air superiority, ground attack, and maritime strike missions in all weather conditions with reduced radar and infrared signatures. The Su-57E has a maximum takeoff weight of 34,000 to 35,500 kg, an internal fuel load of about 11,100 kg, and an internal and external weapons capacity of up to 7,500 kg distributed among internal bays and 12 external hardpoints. The aircraft is credited with a top speed of around 2,600 km/h at altitude, a practical ceiling of about 20,000 m, an unrefuelled range of roughly 2,800 km that can be extended to 5,200 km with one aerial refuelling and 7,800 km with two, and an endurance close to 10 hours with a load factor tolerance of 11g.
The Su-57E is credited with a top speed of around 2,600 km/h, a practical ceiling of about 20,000 m, an unrefuelled range of roughly 2,800 km that can be extended to 5,200 km with one aerial refuelling and 7,800 km with two, and an endurance close to 10 hours. (Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
The avionics suite includes the N036 Belka radar system, combining an X-band AESA array in the nose, side-facing arrays, and L-band radar elements in the wing roots, with roughly 1,526 transmit/receive modules made using Russian gallium arsenide technology. Weapon options include R-77M active radar-guided and R-74M2 infrared guided air-to-air missiles, Kh-38 and Kh-58USHKE air-to-surface missiles, Kh-35UE and Kh-69 anti-ship and land attack missiles, and guided bombs such as KAB-250, KAB-500, and UPAB-1500B-E, supplemented by a 30 mm internal cannon derived from the GSh-30-1. At the same time, the program has experienced structural and production issues, with observers at Zhuhai Airshow China 2024 and other events noting misaligned fuselage panels, extensive use of external fasteners of differing types around weapons bays, and concerns that radar cross section estimates in the range of 0.1 to 0.5 square metres would lag behind the lowest signature levels claimed by other fifth-generation designs.
The production of the Su-57 has also been constrained by dependence on Western electronics and high precision machine tools obtained through dual use channels, with around ten aircraft delivered in 2022, eleven in 2023, a small number in 2024, and losses that include a prototype and at least one production aircraft in crashes, as well as damage from a Ukrainian drone strike on Su-57s parked at Akhtubinsk flight test centre. Indian deliberations about the Su-57E take place against the background of a fleet structure in which Russian jets remain predominant, alongside the gradual expansion of Western and indigenous aircraft. The Indian Air Force operates more than 260 Su-30MKI multirole fighters and about 60 MiG-29s, together with 28 Rafale and 44 Mirage 2000 aircraft from France and 37 HAL Tejas light fighters, and has historically drawn over 60 percent of its major platforms from Russia.
India already fields several S-400 systems from the five-unit contract signed in 2018, locally designated Sudarshan Chakra and used in Operation Sindoor during a four-day confrontation with Pakistan, with three systems delivered and two more planned for 2026 and 2027. At the same time, India previously halted its participation in the joint Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft project in 2018 after internal evaluations identified multiple shortcomings in the Su-57’s stealth performance, sensor fusion, and engines, while pointing out that the Indian specific variant existed only on paper and that cost and schedule projections were unsatisfactory. Separately, India has declined earlier offers related to the S-500, while the S-400 contract is still being fulfilled, and while sanctions linked to the Ukraine war have slowed deliveries. More recently, Indian Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh has stated that defence cooperation with Russia is long-standing and ongoing, but will coexist with increased acquisitions from the United States and Europe as India reduces over-reliance on a single supplier.
Concerns also persist about sustainment and supply chain issues, as past assessments indicated that up to 40 percent of the Su-30MKI fleet could be grounded at times due to spares shortages, and there is awareness that some Su-57 subsystems may incorporate foreign or Chinese origin components that could be difficult to support in a crisis. Parallel to Russia’s proposals, the United States has put forward the F-35A Lightning II as an alternative fifth-generation solution, while maintaining strict limits on technology access and local integration. The F-35 is a single-engine stealth aircraft available in three variants for air force, short takeoff and vertical landing, and carrier operations, combining the AN/APG-81 AESA radar with a distributed aperture system, sensor fusion, and network-centric capabilities intended to link aircraft, ships, ground units, and air defence systems. It has a combat radius of roughly 1,200 km, can carry about 8,000 kg of ordnance, and places an emphasis on low observability and electronic warfare features, although top speed and agility are lower than those of twin-engine jets such as the Su-57.
These offers are also linked to a broader proposal to use Su-57-derived engines and systems in a future “Super 30” modernisation of the Su-30MKI fleet, leveraging HAL’s experience building more than 900 AL-31FP engines and existing industrial infrastructure in India. (Picture source: Yaplakal/Gurzho)
U.S. policy keeps the F-35’s core software and source code under American control, even for close partners, limiting access to what is needed for routine maintenance and preventing users from freely integrating national weapons or modifying mission systems without the prime contractor’s involvement. Unit prices in the range of $110 million for the F-35A and higher life-cycle costs have been key factors for India, especially in the context of domestic budget priorities and the need to fund indigenous programmes. Recent trade friction has added another layer, as U.S. tariffs on Indian goods have been increased up to 50 percent in some cases, including a 25 percent hike imposed on August 1, 2025, after India’s continued import of Russian crude, and New Delhi has considered options to rebalance trade through increased imports of U.S. gas, gold, and communications equipment while reserving the right to challenge tariffs at the World Trade Organization at a chosen time. Although India has not formally closed the door to the F-35, the combination of cost, software restrictions, lack of local manufacturing, and the political context of tariffs and sanctions has narrowed the space for a near-term agreement on this aircraft.
Within India, these two external offers intersect with the trajectory of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program and with a wider policy of technological self-reliance under Aatmanirbhar Bharat. The Cabinet Committee on Security approved the AMCA in May 2025, and the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) has issued an expression of interest and a request for information to select both public sector and private partners within an expected three to six-month window, moving away from a development model centred on HAL alone. The AMCA is planned as a twin-engine multirole stealth aircraft capable of deep strike, air superiority, and electronic warfare missions, with an eventual family that includes manned and unmanned variants, and a development and induction timeline of around ten years from contract award to operational service. Defence Secretary Singh has described foreign fifth-generation procurement as a possible interim measure while the AMCA matures, stating that discussions with several partners, including Russia, are underway but remain at an early stage and will only be revealed when they reach milestones such as an Acceptance of Necessity, a request for proposals, or a signed contract.
Former commanders and commentators in India are divided, with some seeing the Su-57E offer with source code access and local integration of Indian munitions as an opportunity to strengthen national capabilities and bridge the gap until AMCA enters service, and others warning that greater dependence on Russian platforms exposed to sanctions and supply constraints could undermine long term autonomy and complicate relations with partners such as the United States and France. There is also awareness that Pakistan is expected to induct Chinese fifth-generation jets, and that China continues to expand its own J-20 and J-35 fleet, reinforcing the need for India to maintain credible airpower in the short and medium term while investing in indigenous solutions for the longer term. For now, Russia remains India’s largest supplier of military hardware, even as New Delhi has diversified towards Western systems, reduced the proportional share of Russian equipment in new orders in the four years up to 2024, and has become a major buyer of Russian seaborne oil despite sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine.
At the same time, however, Indian crude imports from Russia are projected to decline as sanctions tighten, as Indian refiners adjust their portfolios, and as U.S. pressure has included both tariffs and concerns about further large-scale defence deals with Moscow, such as the S-500 and Su-57E. Russia is therefore combining offers of advanced fighters, long-range air defence systems, and co-production arrangements with efforts to deepen energy, banking, and trade links, while seeking to maintain its profile in South Asia at a time when Western restrictions and Ukrainian strikes have exposed vulnerabilities in its defence industrial base. For India, choices on Su-57E, Su-35M, S-500, and F-35 are interwoven with the need to restore the Indian Air Force's squadron strength, protect airspace against regional competitors, support industrial programmes like AMCA and BrahMos, and avoid excessive exposure to any single foreign supplier or sanctions regime. The outcome of the current cycle of negotiations will indicate whether New Delhi opts for a high degree of technological access through Russian offers, maintains a more cautious posture while relying on existing fleets and incremental upgrades, or keeps multiple pathways open while giving priority to domestic development, but in all scenarios the relationship with Russia will remain an important variable alongside expanding defence and economic ties with the United States, Europe, and other partners.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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EDEX 2025: Chinese Bolas GAM 102LR Unveiled in New Twin Tube Launcher for Long Range Strikes
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The Bolas GAM 102LR missile appeared at EDEX 2025 in Cairo with a new twin-tube pedestal launcher, highlighting a shift toward vehicle-ready precision strike roles. The upgraded design signals a push by Chinese and Turkish partners to challenge Western long-range anti-armor systems.
A newly configured version of the Bolas GAM 102LR surfaced at the Egypt Defence Expo in Cairo. The twin tube launcher, photographed by Army Recognition at the Poly Defence stand, reflects how the fifth-generation missile line is moving from a shoulder-fired weapon to a network-connected platform that can support long-range anti-armor and multi-mission engagements.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkTwin tube Bolas GAM 102LR launcher shown at EDEX 2025, featuring a fifth-generation long-range ATGM with fire and forget and man in the loop guidance, dual band IR and TV seeker, top attack capability, and a range advertised between 6 and 10 km, designed for both dismounted teams and vehicle integration (Picture source: Army Recognition Group).
The GAM 102LR sits at the heavy end of the GAM 10X missile family that Poly Defence first unveiled in 2016 and has steadily expanded with lighter GAM 100 variants. In its current export form, marketed in partnership with Mediterranean Defence Technology, the missile is described as a multi-purpose, ultra-long range, fifth-generation weapon for both dismounted infantry and combat vehicles. It combines fire and forget and man-in-the-loop modes, uses a dual-band uncooled infrared and TV seeker, and is supported by a wireless data link that allows guidance updates and retargeting in flight.
Technical data released by Med Defence Tech indicate an engagement envelope extending beyond 10 km, while earlier Chinese reporting spoke of a 6 km reach, suggesting incremental growth or range bands depending on platform and profile. Open sources also credit the missile with a tandem HEAT warhead able to defeat more than 1,000 mm of rolled homogeneous armor after explosive reactive armor, putting it squarely in the class of modern heavy anti-tank weapons. The soft launch two-stage propulsion permits firing from confined urban positions and enables a steep top attack trajectory against main battle tank roofs.
The EDEX system, photographed by Army Recognition, uses a robust tripod on a three-legged base with a powered cradle carrying two missile canisters and an electro-optic head above the tubes. This configuration allows rapid salvo firing against two separate targets, or a quick follow-up shot if the first missile fails, while remaining light enough for crew deployment around static firing points, forward operating bases, or defensive strongpoints. A separate command and launch unit with integrated day TV, thermal imager, and laser rangefinder provides target acquisition out to the missile’s maximum range and acts as the interface for man-in-the-loop control.
The system is designed to support both classic line-of-sight engagements and beyond-line-of-sight shots cued by third-party sensors. In a desert or steppe environment, a platoon of GAM 102LR launchers on light armored 4x4 vehicles could build an extended anti-armor screen in depth, engaging columns well before they reach friendly positions. In urban or mountain terrain, dismounted teams could exploit the confined space firing capability to ambush armor from upper stories or reverse slopes, using top attack mode to bypass frontal protection. Network connectivity allows several launchers to cooperate, sharing targets and running coordinated strikes against key vehicles or hardened firing points.
From an industrial perspective, the system is attractive for countries seeking a modern anti-tank capability without dependence on Western suppliers. Both the Chinese origin of the missile and the Turkish-based marketing of the GAM 102LR open doors for co-production, local assembly of launchers and vehicle integration packages, particularly in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, where EDEX visitors are looking for cost-competitive alternatives.
In capability terms, the Bolas GAM 102LR competes with systems such as the US Javelin, the Israeli Spike LR2, and the Turkish OMTAS. Javelin and HJ 12 type missiles offer man-portable fire and forget top attack profiles, but are generally limited to around 4 km. Spike LR2 extends reach to about 5.5 km, while OMTAS again tops out near 4 km. By contrast, the GAM 102LR’s advertised 6 to 10 km envelope and networked man-in-the-loop guidance give it a genuine standoff advantage, at the cost of a heavier launcher and greater dependence on external sensors. For armies prepared to invest in reconnaissance and command networks, the twin-tube Bolas launcher seen at EDEX 2025 offers a path toward long-range, high-precision anti-armor fires that can be tailored to local industrial and political constraints.
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AC-130J Gunship with Hellfire Missiles in Puerto Rico Signals U.S. Readiness Near Venezuela
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A Reuters photo from Ceiba, Puerto Rico, shows a U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier II operating near an AC-130 gunship, signaling a mixed strike and special-operations presence close to Venezuela. Together with previous images of an AC-130J Ghostrider with Hellfires, the deployment indicates a sustained, heavily armed U.S. footprint in the southern Caribbean.
On 1 December 2025, a photograph from the former Roosevelt Roads naval base in Ceiba, Puerto Rico, shows a U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier II taxiing for takeoff while a U.S. Air Force AC-130 gunship sits parked nearby, taken by Ricardo Arduengo of Reuters.Circulating widely on social media, this new visual evidence confirms that the reactivated base is now hosting both Marine strike aircraft and a special-operations gunship in the same operating environment, just a short flight from Venezuela. As reported by Army Recognition Group on 11 October 2025, an AC-130J Ghostrider had already been documented in Puerto Rico carrying wing-mounted AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, an unusual configuration for the Caribbean theater. The October sighting and the 1 December image now form a coherent picture: a sustained, heavily armed U.S. air presence positioned on U.S. territory but within rapid reach of Venezuelan airspace and maritime approaches.
A Hellfire armed AC-130J Ghostrider gunship operating alongside Marine AV-8B Harrier II jets from the reactivated Roosevelt Roads base in Puerto Rico highlights a sustained, forward-positioned U.S. airpower presence within rapid reach of Venezuelan airspace and nearby sea lanes (Picture Source: U.S. Air Force/Lockheed Martin/RicardoArduengo)
The AC-130J is the latest variant in the long-running U.S. gunship lineage, built on the C-130Jairframe and equipped with the Precision Strike Package that combines advanced mission consoles, electro-optical and infrared sensors, and secure datalinks with side-firing weapons. According to official U.S. Air Force data, the Ghostrider is designed for close air support, air interdiction and armed reconnaissance, providing persistent direct fire at low to medium altitude. Its standard armament includes a 30 mm GAU-23/A cannon and a 105 mm howitzer mounted on the left side of the fuselage, supplemented by precision-guided munitions carried on underwing pylons and inside common launch tubes. In addition to glide bombs such as the GBU-39 and GBU-69 and light missiles like the AGM-176 Griffin, the platform is certified to employ AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, giving the crew a line-of-sight, low-yield option against moving or time-sensitive targets.
The Hellfire loadout makes the Puerto Rico deployments particularly notable. Open-source imagery shows an AC-130J Ghostrider on the ramp at Roosevelt Roads equipped with wing-mounted AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, a configuration more commonly seen on helicopters or unmanned platforms in counter-insurgency theaters. Coupled with the Ghostrider’s multi-sensor suite, this setup enables the crew to threaten small surface targets such as fast-attack craft, smuggling boats, radar sites, or coastal strongpoints while maintaining standoff from traditional gun-employment patterns. In the crowded sea lanes around Venezuela and the eastern Caribbean, the combination provides a capable platform for surveillance, target identification, and, if authorized, precise interdiction with low collateral risk.
The choice of Roosevelt Roads as a hub amplifies the geostrategic message. Closed in 2004 and long considered a symbol of the U.S. drawdown in the Caribbean, the base has been progressively revitalized, with a Reuters visual investigation documenting new construction work, repaved taxiways and an increasing flow of military aircraft in late 2025. The reporting characterizes the site as a potential staging ground for sustained operations to support contingencies in or around Venezuela while remaining on U.S. soil. Satellite imagery and press photos published over recent weeks show fighter jets, refueling and transport aircraft, and now an AC-130 gunship operating from the former naval station, reinforcing the perception that Washington is re-establishing a layered air and logistics presence in the northeastern Caribbean.
From an operational perspective, the December 1 image highlights how the AC-130J is being integrated into a broader joint posture. The AV-8B Harrier II taxiing past the parked gunship belongs to a Marine air component embarked on the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima, with aircraft from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (VMM-263) and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit utilizing Roosevelt Roads as a shore base between sorties. Harriers (and, in other sequences from the deployment, F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing jets) provide high-speed strike capability, while the Ghostrider offers a slower, sensor-rich presence that can remain on station for extended periods. In a crisis, this combination would enable the United States to maintain persistent surveillance, direct Marine or naval fires, and, if necessary, employ Hellfire and other precision munitions directly from the gunship against smaller or less-defended targets at sea or along the coast.
Regionally, the pattern extends beyond Puerto Rico. Additional reporting has highlighted AC-130J activity from other locations in Central America, including operations from El Salvador disclosed in satellite imagery and press coverage in mid-November 2025, part of a broader U.S. effort to combine counter-narcotics missions with contingency planning related to Venezuela. In this context, a Hellfire-equipped Ghostrider at Roosevelt Roads, operating alongside Marine aviation and other U.S. assets, is less a standalone deployment than a visible node in a wider network of platforms and bases stretching across the Caribbean and Central American arc. For neighboring states, this posture may be reassuring in terms of maritime security and interdiction of illicit trafficking, but it also signals that any sudden deterioration in the Venezuelan crisis would find U.S. forces already positioned with surveillance and precision-strike options close at hand.
The presence of a Hellfire-armed AC-130J in Puerto Rico, now documented both in October and in the new 1 December Reuters image, therefore marks more than a technical curiosity in the gunship’s loadout. It anchors a posture in which U.S. special operations and Marine air power can monitor, deter and, if required by political decision, conduct limited, targeted actions in and around Venezuela without additional warning deployments. The key point is not whether a missile is eventually fired from the launcher under the Ghostrider’s wing, but the fact that such a capability is already in place, integrated with other assets and operating from a strategic base in the northeastern Caribbean that had long been dormant.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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China tests a new Loong M9 attack drone modeled on Iran's Shahed-136
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China is testing another loitering munition that closely matches the design and mission profile of Iran’s Shahed-136 drone,the Loong M9.
As reported by OSINTWarfare on December 2, 2025, China is testing the Loong M9, a new loitering munition that resembles the Iranian Shahed-136 in both shape and mission profile. Intended for deep strike missions, extended reconnaissance flights, and all the types of attacks that have previously been associated with the Shahed, the Loong M9 now joins a growing list of Chinese drones modeled on the Iranian UAV, such as the ASN-301, DFX-50, DFX-100, Feilong-300D, PD2900, or the Sunflower-200.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkThe Loong M9 possesses a wingspan of 2.5 m, a length of 3.5 m, an empty weight of 62.5 kg, and a maximum takeoff weight of 200 kg, for a maximum endurance comprised between eight and nine hours. (Picture source: Loong)
The M9 is presented by the Chinese company Loong as a heavy, long-endurance, oil-powered, delta-wing UAV designed for reconnaissance, strike, tactical assault, and aerial target practice roles. Using a rocket-assisted catapult launch system, the M9's airframe is constructed through carbon fiber integrated molding to maintain structural strength while keeping overall mass low, and the design incorporates mild rain resistance to support operations in varied environments. The internal payload bay can accommodate up to 50 kg of payload in a customizable internal bay, including warheads, while the propulsion system draws on a 108-liter fuel tank that permits a maximum range of 1,620 km, suitable for long-duration or deep-strike flights. Additionally, the M9 integrates a dual visible light seeker tracking for target engagement, combined with a sensor-based guidance to support different operational profiles.
The Loong M9 possesses a wingspan of 2.5 m, a length of 3.5 m, an empty weight of 62.5 kg, and a maximum takeoff weight of 200 kg, which places it within the heavy loitering munition class. Its stall speed is 40 m/s, with a cruise speed of 53 m/s and a maximum speed of 62 m/s, supported by a climb rate of 5 m/s, pitch and roll angle limits of 15° and 28°, and a minimum turning radius of 450 m. The M9 is designed to withstand Level 7 winds (roughly 50 to 61 km/h) and operate between minus 25°C and 60°C, with an IP54 protection rating for environmental resilience. The engine is a 550 cc EFI unit with a starter generator capable of 1,000 W at 28 V, using a 33-inch propeller, while the fuel consumption is stated as between 10 and 12 liters per hour. According to Loong, the maximum endurance for this drone reaches eight to nine hours, while its maximum altitude is said to reach 4,500 m.
The Loong M9 integrates a guidance and communication suite emphasizing resistance to interference and the ability to operate during electronic warfare, with capabilities such as no-GPS return, GPS-free hovering, precision landing support, and an anti-jamming data link that uses broadband frequency hopping along with a multi-array, multi-band satellite positioning system. The reconnaissance variant of the M9 carries a wide-angle telephoto infrared camera with three primes and an AI-assisted night operation mode called AI Super Night Scene, supported by what is described by Loong as a long endurance smart battery, as well as additional smart flight functions that include features described as “shouting and throwing,” possibly indicating that the M9 can broadcast audio or release lightweight payloads. For strike missions, the drone uses a dual visible-light seeker tracking and a fixed-coordinate position strike mode, while terminal guidance supports attack angles between 15° and 70°. The rocket booster provides a total impulse thrust of 20 kN at 20°C with a burn duration of 2.0±0.2 seconds, for a weight not exceeding 23 kg excluding the bracket.
The company, Loong UAV, places the Loong M9 within a larger portfolio that includes reconnaissance drones, attack drones, FPV suicide drones, ground control systems, navigation devices, airburst equipment, bomb release mechanisms, data links, gimbals, and signal detection and simulation hardware. The product list includes Loong 8T for gun-sighted reconnaissance, Loong 3, Loong 4P, Loong 5, Loong 5H, Loong 7, and Loong 15 combat attack drones, as well as the Loong M2 series of FPV suicide drones, as well as Loong M5 5000 and Loong M10 suicide drones. This range indicates that the manufacturer supports multiple weight classes and mission profiles, reflecting a trend in which Chinese companies, such as AVIC, are building modular drone families to serve both domestic and export markets, ranging from small FPV drones to unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). The Loong M9 is also directly comparable to the Shahed-136 drone, which has gained a significant reputation due to its large-scale use by Russia in Ukraine, where hundreds of drones have been launched in concentrated attacks on infrastructure and energy networks, taking advantage of their low cost, long range, and small radar signature.
The Shahed-136 emerged from Iran’s long-term effort to develop a wide range of drones as a response to technologically superior adversaries, benefiting from Iran’s gradual accumulation of experience in earlier creations like the Shahed-131. Developed by Shahed Aviation Industries, it first appeared in conflicts involving Houthi forces in Yemen before Iranian forces used it directly, and later became widely known when Russia employed it against Ukraine. Early skepticism about Iran’s drone programs diminished once the Shahed-136 demonstrated both a reliable long-range performance and a significant operational impact, despite sanctions and limited industrial resources. The drone’s design relies on a delta wing airframe with a rear-mounted pusher propeller, a small gasoline engine derived from a German model, and a warhead of roughly 40 to 50 kg within a total mass of about 200 kg. Its range, estimated between 2,000 and 2,500 km, and cruise speed around 185 to 200 km/h allow deep strikes against infrastructure or air defense sites while using simple GPS and inertial navigation instead of sophisticated or costly sensors. This approach favors mass production, expendability, and asymmetric employment at scale, which has proven effective in recent conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East.
The Shahed-136 is widely emulated because it reshapes cost-effective warfare by offering a long-range precision attack capability at a low unit price, achieved with commercially available components and straightforward manufacturing processes. Its affordability allows for a deployment in large numbers, enabling saturation attacks that force defending units to expend expensive interceptors, creating an unfavorable economic exchange for the defender. The swarm tactic enabled by its low cost has repeatedly pressured Ukraine’s air defenses, demonstrating how a large volume of inexpensive drones can offset an opponent’s technological advantage. The design’s simplicity and reliability reduce training requirements and maintenance demands, while GPS waypoint guidance provides adequate accuracy without resorting to advanced or expensive systems. Some newer variants reportedly use an anti-radiation behavior by homing on radio emissions, indicating that the basic airframe can be adapted into multiple mission variants with limited changes. These characteristics allow states with modest or constrained industrial capacity to produce a weapon that is accessible, scalable, and capable of sustaining prolonged operations.
From an operational point of view, the Shaed-136 is further emulated because it democratizes long-range strike capabilities, making them available to actors that traditionally lacked cruise missiles or long-range air forces, and because it alters the offense-defense balance by enabling deep strikes against strategic targets using inexpensive and expendable platforms instead of missiles or fighter jets. Armed forces increasingly perceive the need to field similar systems both to conduct long-range attacks and to train against them, since the Shahed-136 has shown that relatively simple weapons can impose high attrition on defenders over time. Defense industries across the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, and other regions are now being engaged in a competitive effort to develop similar drones, indicating that the Shahed-136 has become, ironically, a benchmark. In prolonged conflicts such as the one in Ukraine, a large stockpile of Shahed-inspired drones can gradually degrade even technologically advanced militaries, which reinforces the strategic appeal of this type of drone. Although many Shahed drones are intercepted, their value lies in the cumulative effect of repeated swarm attacks and the economic strain they impose.
Now, a wide range of countries have replicated or adapted its aerodynamic layout, mission concept, or production philosophy, leading to a broad proliferation across multiple regions. Russia employs the Geran-2, effectively a renamed Shahed-136, while also mass-producing these systems at the Alabuga facility at a rapidly increasing scale. The United States has produced replicas such as the MQM-172 Arrowhead and the LUCAS, while additional prototypes have appeared across the globe. In the ex-USSR, Ukraine fields the Batyar and Gupalo-N, Belarus deploys the Nomad, while Poland has created the PLargonia as both a target and a potential strike drone. In East Asia, Chinese manufacturers have produced drones such as the DFX-50, DFX-100, and the Sunflower-200, while North Korea has displayed a large system resembling the Shahed in shape and mission. In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia developed the X-1500, Turkey produced the Azab in multiple sizes, Israel used the Delta-RS2, Egypt displayed the Jabbar-150, and India has also initiated programs for long-range loitering munitions in the 150 kg class.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Brazil and Polish defense industry Sign Agreement to produce KC-390 Military Transport Aircraft in Poland
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Brazilian Company Embraer announced in Warsaw on December 2, 2025, that it signed five new MoUs with Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and several PGZ subsidiaries to advance long-term cooperation on the KC-390 Millennium and related aerospace projects. The agreements position Poland to strengthen its transport aviation capabilities while expanding industrial ties with Brazil’s defense sector.
Brazilian Company Embraer confirmed that it has entered into five strategic Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with Poland’s state-owned defense group PGZ and key subsidiaries, marking a significant step toward deeper industrial and program-level collaboration on the KC-390 Millennium transport aircraft. Company officials described the documents as a framework for joint work on maintenance, production support, and broader aerospace technologies, noting that the agreements align with Poland’s ongoing modernization push and its interest in expanding domestic aviation capacity. While specific work shares were not disclosed, executives on both sides indicated that the MoUs set the stage for long-term cooperation that could support future procurement or sustainment decisions.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkEmbraer KC-390 Millennium is a next-generation multi-mission military transport aircraft capable of carrying 26 tons of cargo, performing aerial refueling, medical evacuation, and operating from unprepared runways. Designed for high reliability and versatility, it supports a wide range of tactical and strategic missions for modern armed forces. (Picture source: Wikimedia)
The KC-390 Millennium is a next-generation, medium-lift military transport aircraft developed by Brazilian Company Embraer to perform a wide range of missions under the most demanding conditions. With a maximum payload capacity of 26 tons, the aircraft can carry troops, armored vehicles, pallets, and conduct aerial refueling both as a tanker and receiver. It cruises at speeds up to 470 knots and operates from semi-prepared or unpaved runways, including dirt, gravel, and packed earth. Designed with modern fly-by-wire systems, NATO-standard avionics, and rapid reconfiguration capabilities, the KC-390 is tailored for tactical and strategic airlift, MEDEVAC, humanitarian missions, and search-and-rescue operations. Its modular architecture and high mission-readiness rate position it as a serious contender to replace older C-130 Hercules aircraft in several allied air forces.
In recent years, the KC-390 has gained traction among NATO members in Europe. Portugal became the first European customer, with its first aircraft delivered in 2023 and full operational capability expected by 2026. Hungary followed with its own order, receiving its initial KC-390 in 2024 and integrating it into a rapidly modernizing airlift fleet. The aircraft is also in service with the Brazilian Air Force and continues to be evaluated by several European nations, including the Netherlands, Austria, and the Czech Republic. The Polish partnership represents not only a potential pathway for KC-390 procurement but also a broader effort to build a regional support base in Central and Eastern Europe, enhancing the aircraft’s logistical appeal and serviceability for future European customers.
This landmark partnership aligns Embraer with some of Poland’s most capable and specialized defense companies. Wojskowe Zakłady Lotnicze Nr 1 (WZL-1), based in Łódź, will support the production of composite and metallic parts, certification processes, and technology transfer. WZL-2, located in Bydgoszcz, brings decades of MRO expertise and is positioned to become a regional sustainment hub for the KC-390. WSK “PZL-Kalisz” will contribute precision manufacturing, mechanical systems expertise, and heat-treatment services, while WBCKT, a technology integrator within the WB Group, will explore joint development of ground support equipment and potential command-and-control applications linked to Embraer’s aircraft systems.
The MoUs extend beyond tactical aircraft production and maintenance. Embraer and PGZ will jointly explore future cooperation in supply chain integration, engineering development, and advanced aerospace testing. The agreement outlines a roadmap for Polish companies to take on a greater share of manufacturing workshare, develop new capabilities, and ultimately contribute to Embraer’s European and global operations.
Speaking at the ceremony, PGZ Vice President Jan Grabowski described the deal as a strategic breakthrough for Poland’s defense industrial base: “Thanks to the agreements signed with Embraer, the PGZ Group gains a partner who is one of the largest aviation companies in the world. This confirms our readiness to establish long-term cooperation, boosting the technological depth of our defense industry.”
On Embraer’s side, Bosco Da Costa Junior, President and CEO of Embraer Defense & Security, highlighted the European dimension of the deal. “These agreements lay a solid foundation for a long-term partnership that will effectively place Poland at the center of the industrial ecosystem we are creating in Europe,” he said. He also noted that the collaboration goes beyond the KC-390, pointing to opportunities in C4ISR integration and dual-use aerospace technologies.
During the event, Embraer also showcased the KC-390 Millennium and its operational track record, which includes a mission readiness rate of 93 percent and mission completion rates above 99 percent. The aircraft’s speed, payload capacity, and multi-role versatility make it a compelling solution for modern NATO airlift needs. In addition, the company highlighted the counter-UAS capabilities of its A-29 Super Tucano, a platform increasingly seen as relevant in asymmetric warfare scenarios across Eastern Europe.
While Poland has not yet formally committed to acquiring the KC-390, defense sources in Warsaw suggest that a potential procurement is under serious evaluation by the Ministry of National Defense. With the new industrial cooperation framework in place, such a purchase would not only enhance Poland’s airlift capabilities but also ensure significant domestic industrial participation in its operation and support.
For Embraer, the agreements represent a major step forward in securing a long-term industrial foothold in Europe. Poland marks a turning point in its transformation from a defense hardware importer to a regional aerospace co-producer. As both countries deepen their defense ties, the KC-390 is poised to become more than an aircraft—it may be the launchpad for a new phase of transatlantic defense collaboration.
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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Bahrain to keep its F-16 fighter fleet operational with new U.S. $445 million deal
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The United States approved a $445 million Foreign Military Sale to Bahrain on December 1, 2025, for F-16 sustainment components, technical services, and associated support activities, to maintain the operational readiness of the Royal Bahraini Air Force’s F-16s.
On December 1, 2025, the U.S. approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to Bahrain valued at $445 million, involving F-16 sustainment and a wide set of associated components and services that expand an earlier $47 million sustainment case that contained no major defense equipment and remained below the congressional notification threshold. The current notification states that Bahrain seeks aircraft components, missile containers, radar receiver parts, guidance and control section spares, weapons system support, ground handling equipment, and instruments and laboratory equipment to maintain the Royal Bahraini Air Force’s F-16 operational readiness.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkIn the late 1980s, Bahrain evaluated multiple fighter jets, including the F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado, Mirage 2000, and Russian ones, before selecting the F-16 Block 40, becoming the fifteenth F-16 customer and the first in the Gulf region. (Picture source: US Air Force)
This new package also covers activities already established under the first sustainment case, including major and minor modifications, Computer Program Identification Numbers, aircraft maintenance support equipment, launcher spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support, together with software deliveries, publications, studies, surveys, transportation support, engineering services, technical services, and logistics services. The U.S. indicates that Bahrain will not face difficulties absorbing these items because they align with its existing F-16 operations, and the sale is expected to maintain Bahrain’s ability to meet current and future threats through a credible force able to participate in regional operations with the U.S. and other partner nations. General Electric Aerospace and Lockheed Martin Aeronautics are identified as the principal contractors for the sustainment effort. The overall structure of this package keeps focus on the continuity of operations and the long-term readiness of the Bahraini F-16 fleet as part of a multi-decade modernization path.
This new sustainment effort follows Bahrain’s expansion and updating of its F-16 inventory, including a May 2019 authorization for up to $750 million in weapons intended to support F-16 Block 70 and F-16V aircraft, as well as upgraded legacy aircraft within the Royal Bahraini Air Force. That weapons approval covered AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM, AGM-88B HARM, AIM-9X, and Harpoon AGM-84 Block II missiles, as well as AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon, and GBU-39 SDB-1 all up rounds. Two major approvals issued on September 8, 2017, also built the structural basis for Bahrain’s current modernization program, with one case authorizing $2.785 billion for nineteen new F-16V aircraft and associated equipment, and another FMS authorizing $1.082 billion to upgrade twenty existing F-16C/D Block 40 aircraft to the F-16V configuration. Both cases stated that these aircraft would strengthen Bahrain’s homeland defense and deterrence capacity, improve interoperability with the United States and regional allies, and preserve long-term fleet capability without altering regional military balances.
Bahrain’s F-16 program began in the late 1980s when the Bahrain Amiri Air Force evaluated multiple fighter types, including the F-15, F-16, F-18, Tornado, Mirage 2000, and Russian options, before selecting the F-16 Block 40 based on maintainability, reliability, and upgrade potential, becoming the fifteenth F-16 customer and the first in the Gulf region. Under Peace Crown I, Bahrain signed an 1987 agreement for eight F-16C and four F-16D aircraft, with the first aircraft handed over in March 1989 and the first four delivered to Bahrain in May 1990. These aircraft entered operational service during the Gulf War, flying defensive missions beginning on January 25, 1991, and offensive missions on January 26, while the conflict ended on February 28.
After the war, Bahrain evaluated a U.S. Navy proposal to exchange 18 retired F-16N aggressor aircraft for its F-5E/F fleet, but rejected the idea due to high airframe hours, the absence of an internal cannon, and concerns about supporting non-standard aircraft. Bahrain also considered surplus U.S. Air Force F-16A/B aircraft and embargoed Pakistani F-16s, but declined these options due to cost and compatibility issues. Peace Crown II followed in 1998 with a $303 million order for ten additional F-16C Block 40 aircraft delivered between 1999 and 2000 in the same configuration as the original batch. During the 1990s, Bahrain integrated AN/AAQ-14 LANTIRN targeting pods for GBU-10 and GBU-12 bombs, used AGM-65B and AGM-65G Maverick missiles, and in 1999 received the approval to purchase AIM-120B AMRAAM missiles for long-range air intercept missions to replace AIM-7.
The F-16 Block 40 configuration, introduced in 1989, features LANTIRN navigation and targeting pods, APG-68V(5) radar, digital flight controls, GPS navigation, ALE-47 decoy launchers, automatic terrain following, a holographic head-up display, and strengthened structures enabling 9G maneuvering at 28,500 pounds and a maximum takeoff weight of 42,300 pounds. The aircraft used the F110-GE-100 or F100-PW-220 engine, depending on variant, and incorporated longer landing gear, bulged gear doors, larger wheels and brakes, and relocated landing lights to accommodate the LANTIRN pods. Precision weapons capability included GBU-10, GBU-12, GBU-15, and GBU-24, with later upgrades such as Sure Strike adding night vision goggle compatibility and improved data modems for rapid coordinate transfer from forward air controllers. Gold Strike later expanded this system with two-way imagery transfer to and from cockpit displays.
On the other hand, the F-16 Block 70 configuration, referred to as the F-16V or F-16 Viper, includes F110-GE-129 or F100-PW-229 engines around 29,000 pounds of thrust, structural life extended to 12,000 hours, conformal fuel tanks, advanced weapons integration, a modern cockpit with a 6 by 8 inch center pedestal display, improved mission computers, Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance capability, an infrared search and track system, and the AN/APG-83 AESA radar with extended detection range, multi target tracking above twenty targets, all weather synthetic aperture radar mapping, interleaved air to air and air to surface modes, and improved reliability relative to mechanically scanned radars. Production of Block 70 upgrade kits began in 2019 for global users, including Taiwan, Greece, South Korea, Turkey, Morocco, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Jordan, with more than 450 upgrade kits and 153 new build aircraft ordered by late 2023.
Bahrain also became the first customer for the newly built Block 70 aircraft in 2017 under a $3.8 billion agreement for 16 aircraft, followed by a June 2018 $1.124 billion fixed price contract for their production, with early delivery targets set for 2021 and later adjusted to 2024 because of pandemic delays. The first Bahraini Block 70 aircraft was completed in Greenville, South Carolina, in early 2023, conducted initial flight testing, and was held under U.S. Air Force supervision before overseas transfer. Five aircraft had been produced by March 2024, with eleven more in production and testing, and three aircraft departed Greenville in March 2024 on a ferry flight to Bahrain. Ferry delivery procedures follow standard Foreign Military Sales practice in which the aircraft carry U.S. Air Force markings until arrival in the receiving country, and U.S. Air Force pilots conduct the ferry flights in groups of four aircraft whenever possible. Bahrain currently operates about twenty older F-16 Block 40 aircraft and five F-16 Block 70 aircraft, with further deliveries planned as production continues. Lockheed Martin projects annual deliveries of nineteen to twenty-one Block 70 aircraft and maintains a backlog of around 127 to 133 aircraft for six countries, with potential demand for about 300 more aircraft.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Expodefensa 2025: First Colombian-made Dragom drone debuted for intelligence and precision strike
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Colombia presented its domestically built Dragom reconnaissance and attack drone at Expodefensa 2025 in Bogota, marking the system’s first major defense industry showing. The debut signals a push for greater national autonomy in air defense technology and a potential new regional foothold in unmanned systems.
During Expodefensa 2025 in Bogota, held from 1 to 3 December under the patronage of the Colombian Ministry of National Defense, the state-owned Colombian Aeronautical Industry Corporation (CIAC) is showcasing the Dragom, a guided reconnaissance and attack drone designed and manufactured entirely in Colombia. Officially unveiled in July 2025 at the F-AIR aeronautical fair and presented in detail by the Ministry of Defense, Dragom is the first military unmanned aircraft developed in the country specifically for national security and defense missions. Its presence at Expodefensa places this new tactical system at the center of Latin America’s debates on technological sovereignty, cost control and adaptation to complex operational environments such as jungle, mountainous and border areas. For Colombia, it is a concrete signal that the country intends to rely on its own industrial base to respond to evolving threats and to position itself as a supplier of unmanned solutions to the wider region.
Colombia used the Expodefensa 2025 stage in Bogota to spotlight its Dragom guided reconnaissance and attack drone, underscoring a broader national push to build autonomous defense technology through its state-owned manufacturer CIAC (Picture Source: Army Recognition Group)
Developed by CIAC as the “Dron de Reconocimiento y Ataque Guiado para Operaciones Militares”, Dragom is a tactical multirotor platform conceived from the outset as a dual-role system for surveillance and precision engagement. The aircraft is a four-rotor UAV with a maximum take-off weight of around 12 kg and a payload capacity of 7.5 kg, offering an endurance of 94 minutes with the standard camera. Its effective control radius is between 9 and 20 km, depending on terrain and atmospheric conditions, in line with CIAC’s stated performance figures. Dragom operates in manual, semi-automatic or fully autonomous modes, enabling operators to program complex routes, execute missions automatically and rely on autonomous take-off and landing functions. Navigation relies on dual-band satellite positioning compatible with BeiDou, Galileo, GLONASS, GPS and QZSS, complemented by four IMUs ensuring redundant attitude and position data. A dual-encrypted communication channel secures the data link, while the 16-channel remote control with integrated touchscreen, designed to remain readable in direct sunlight, provides intuitive access to all mission functions, including RTK and NTRIP positioning modes for improved accuracy.
On the payload side, Dragom integrates a dual high-definition electro-optical and infrared camera for day and night operations, delivering real-time tactical imagery to commanders for reconnaissance, surveillance, target identification and battle damage assessment. The platform can also carry and release munitions mounted in the lower fuselage, using gravity-drop launchers dimensioned for mortar bombs and other explosive loads produced by the Colombian state-owned company Indumil. CIAC highlights the flexibility of the architecture: depending on the mission, operators may opt for a configuration prioritizing sensors and communications, a mixed load combining observation and attack, or a purely kinetic profile with heavier munitions. Still within the 12 kg take-off limit, the drone can also be adapted for light logistical support, transporting small quantities of supplies or critical components to forward positions where access is constrained by terrain or threat.
For Colombian forces, Dragom is designed as a response to operational realities that range from dense urban environments to remote jungle and mountainous areas, often dominated by irregular armed groups and criminal organizations. The Ministry of Defense explicitly links the system to the need to improve command and control, surveillance, monitoring and the protection of critical infrastructure such as oil pipelines, bridges and electrical transmission towers, while providing tactical support and resupply to units deployed in difficult terrain. The ability to combine persistent airborne surveillance with the option of guided engagement from a compact, easily deployable platform opens up new possibilities for border patrol, coastal monitoring, support to special forces and protection of key sites against sabotage, illegal mining or narcotrafficking activities. At unit level, Dragom offers an intermediate capability between small commercial quadcopters used for immediate situational awareness and larger fixed-wing UAVs dedicated to high-end ISR missions, providing organic intelligence and, when required, the means to neutralize point targets with tailored munitions.
Industrial and budgetary considerations are at the heart of the program. CIAC and the Ministry of Defense underline that Dragom is the result of a 100% Colombian engineering effort, from airframe design to electronics integration and software, relying on national human capital and suppliers. According to CIAC’s management, the drone has been developed to be significantly less expensive to design and produce than foreign multirotor platforms with comparable payload and endurance, with internal estimates pointing to a reduction on the order of one third in acquisition costs. This approach fits into a broader strategy in which CIAC, historically known for aircraft maintenance and the T-90 Calima trainer, has expanded its UAV portfolio with systems such as the Quimbaya and Coelum, and participates in international programs like the SIRTAP medium-altitude ISR drone with Airbus Defence and Space. Dragom thus capitalizes on experience accumulated over nearly a decade in unmanned systems to deliver a product that can be produced and supported domestically, while creating an industrial reference point for future export discussions with regional partners.
Beyond the tactical and industrial dimensions, Dragom carries significant strategic and geopolitical weight. Colombia is confronted with the proliferation of improvised and commercially derived drones in the hands of insurgent and criminal groups, a phenomenon increasingly analyzed as a challenge to state authority in several regions. By fielding a national guided reconnaissance and attack drone, Bogotá not only seeks to close the capability gap with non-state actors, but also to integrate unmanned systems into a coherent doctrine of territorial control, border security and protection of strategic resources. Demonstrating Dragom at Expodefensa 2025, a major Latin American forum for security and defense technologies, positions Colombia as a provider of indigenous UAV solutions tailored to the region’s specific environments, at a time when many countries are looking for alternatives to traditional suppliers and for systems that can be adapted to their own topography and threat landscape. As drone warfare expands from large-scale conflicts to internal security and transnational crime, the Dragom program illustrates how a middle-power country can use its defense industry as a lever to reinforce technological autonomy and to shape the regional conversation on responsible and effective use of unmanned systems.
By bringing Dragom to the forefront at Expodefensa 2025, Colombia is sending a clear signal: the country intends to confront its security challenges with tools designed on its own terms, by its own engineers, and optimized for its own terrain rather than imported as a generic solution. If the planned acquisitions by the Army, Navy and Air Force materialize after the additional trials and upgrades requested by the services, Dragom is likely to become one of the emblematic systems of Colombia’s modernization effort and a reference point for other Latin American forces looking for compact yet versatile drones. In a regional market where unmanned platforms are increasingly central to both deterrence and day-to-day security operations, the Colombian-built Dragom stands as a concrete example of how national industry, when supported by consistent political will, can transform specific operational needs into a sovereign capability with export potential.
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EDEX 2025: Egypt Unveils Jabbar-150 Drone as a Homegrown Alternative to the Iranian Shahed
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Egypt has introduced the Jabbar-150, a domestically built one-way attack drone, at EDEX 2025 in Cairo. The system signals a push toward an independent, scalable long-range strike capability that reduces reliance on imported cruise missiles.
On December 1, 2025, during EDEX 2025 in Cairo, Egypt has unveiled a new one-way attack drone, Jabbar-150, developed by the private firm Amstone. The system appears as part of a broader family of Jabbar loitering munitions and smaller strike drones now being promoted to Egyptian and foreign delegations. Its public debut signals Cairo’s intention to build an indigenous deep strike toolkit instead of relying solely on imported cruise missiles and legacy ballistic systems. In practical terms, the new drone pushes Egypt into the growing club of states that treat expendable long-range munitions as central to their future strike doctrine.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkThe Jabbar-150 is a long-range, one-way attack drone with a roughly one thousand kilometer reach, a medium explosive warhead, and simple GPS-based guidance. Designed for mass launch from truck-mounted ramps, it gives Egypt a low-cost deep strike option for hitting fixed infrastructure and airfield targets (Picture source: Army Recognition Group).
Jabbar-150 is presented as a single-use, long-range loitering munition built around a slender fuselage, cropped delta wings, and a rear-mounted piston engine driving a pusher propeller. The overall layout closely recalls Iran’s Shahed 136, a resemblance that is difficult to miss when viewing the drone on the exhibition stand. Visual analysis suggests a vehicle in roughly the same class, with a fuselage of about 3 to 3.5 meters, a wingspan near 2.5 meters, and an all-up mass of around 200 kilograms. The nose is clearly sized for a medium-high explosive or fragmentation warhead, while the central section is reserved for fuel, supporting a claimed range on the order of 1,000 kilometers against fixed infrastructure, air bases, or shipping.
Guidance is a combination of inertial navigation and satellite signals using GPS or broader GNSS, following preprogrammed routes to designated aim points. This deliberately simple architecture avoids expensive electro-optical seekers and advanced data links, but it keeps unit cost low and eases mass production. Jabbar 150 is intended to fly one way, strike a predetermined target area, and be cheap enough to launch in large salvos without stressing procurement budgets. Although Tornex has not yet shown a complete launcher, the airframe and mission profile point strongly to rail or ramp launch, likely with a small solid rocket booster for initial acceleration and a truck-mounted, container-style launcher for tactical mobility.
Company officials and Egyptian commentary emphasize that Jabbar-150 is built around commercially available components wherever possible. That likely includes a metal and composite structure, a small automotive or motorcycle-derived engine, and off-the-shelf avionics modules adapted for military use. The philosophy mirrors trends seen in Ukraine and across the Middle East, where relatively crude but plentiful one-way attack drones have proven their value by exhausting air defense systems and forcing adversaries to trade expensive interceptors against cheap airframes. If Egypt can replicate that cost balance, Jabbar-150 will offer commanders a flexible tool for shaping the early hours of any high-intensity campaign.
The new drone is designed to sit between Egypt’s ballistic missile inventory and its growing roster of MALE UAVs, including platforms such as EJune 30 SW, Ahmous, and 6th October. Batteries of truck-mounted launchers could fire staggered waves of Jabbar-150s at low altitude, exploiting radar gaps before converging on critical nodes like radars, fuel depots, or command centers. Even modest accuracy would be offset by the volume of fire and the ability to coordinate with reusable UAVs that provide reconnaissance and battle damage assessment. In such a scheme, high-end cruise missiles and manned aircraft follow behind, striking hardened or time-sensitive targets once defenses are saturated.
Jabbar-150 reflects a deliberate effort to pull private industry into Egypt’s unmanned ecosystem alongside state-linked entities such as the Arab Organization for Industrialization. By showcasing a named family of loitering munitions, the company is signaling export aspirations as well as domestic ambition, offering partners a locally branded alternative to Iranian, Chinese, or Western systems.
