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Analysis: How Venezuela’s Plan To Arm 4.5 Million Militia Raises Risk of Regional Clash With US Forces.
On August 18, 2025, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro announced the mobilization of more than 4.5 million militia members in response to what he described as new threats from the United States, as reported by France 24. The decision follows Washington’s deployment of guided-missile destroyers to the southern Caribbean and the doubling of the US bounty on Maduro’s arrest to $50 million, as reported by Army Recognition Group. Venezuela has pledged to arm its militias with rifles and missiles, in a move that raises the stakes of a potential regional confrontation. The announcement highlights the fragile balance between deterrence, domestic control, and international pressure.
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For air defense, Venezuela operates S-300VM (Antey-2500) long-range surface-to-air missile systems, delivered around 2013 and considered among the most advanced strategic assets in the region (Picture source: Wikimedia)
Venezuela’s militias, formally established under Hugo Chávez, have long been presented as a popular defense force intended to supplement the regular armed forces. While official figures claim their number at nearly five million, experts suggest the real figure is lower. Arming such a force with rifles and missiles raises questions about Venezuela’s available stockpiles. Venezuela has historically relied on Russian-made small arms, including AK-103 rifles, which are produced locally under license at the CAVIM factory. These weapons could serve as the backbone of militia armament.
Maduro’s reference to “missiles” likely encompasses a range of systems that Venezuela has acquired over the past decades. On the one hand, this includes man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) such as the Russian Igla-S, designed to engage low-flying aircraft and helicopters. On the other, it also refers to short-range anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) delivered by Moscow, such as the Kornet and Metis-M, which significantly enhance the Venezuelan military’s capacity to counter armored vehicles in the event of a confrontation. Both categories of weapons have the potential to complicate U.S. or allied air operations near Venezuelan territory, particularly in scenarios involving close air support or low-altitude reconnaissance flights.
In addition to its Russian-supplied arsenal, Venezuela maintains the Swedish-made RBS 70 short-range air defense system, originally purchased from Saab in the early 1980s. Still operational within the Venezuelan Army and Air Defense Command, the RBS 70 provides a laser-guided, ground-based complement to shoulder-fired MANPADS, offering greater accuracy and resilience against electronic countermeasures. This layered mix of portable and short-range air defense assets, when combined with anti-armor capabilities, contributes to a defensive posture aimed at deterring external intervention and reinforcing the government’s narrative of military self-reliance.
Further, The Venezuelan Armed Forces maintain a conventional force structure centered on Russian and Chinese-origin platforms. Their inventory includes Su-30MK2 fighter aircraft, acquired from Russia in the mid-2000s, which provide multirole capability and a combat radius sufficient to patrol the Caribbean approaches. For air defense, Venezuela operates S-300VM (Antey-2500) long-range surface-to-air missile systems, delivered around 2013 and considered among the most advanced strategic assets in the region. On the maritime front, the Venezuelan Navy is believed to deploy Chinese C-802A anti-ship cruise missiles from its patrol vessels, adding a coastal strike dimension, although some reported imagery of these systems has been disputed. More recently, in April 2024, Caracas confirmed the acquisition of Iranian CM-90 anti-ship missiles, further reinforcing its ability to threaten naval forces approaching its littoral zones. Air defense coverage is supplemented by shorter-range assets such as the Buk-M2E medium-range system, Pechora-2M upgrades, and Igla-S man-portable air defense systems, offering Venezuela a layered defensive posture.
Taken together, these assets give Venezuela the means to impose significant costs on foreign naval and aerial units operating near its coasts and airspace, while also retaining credible conventional firepower on land. However, sustaining large-scale or prolonged operations against the U.S. Navy or other advanced adversaries remains beyond its reach, given the persistent gaps in logistics, training, and long-range power projection.
The activation of millions of militias, while symbolically significant, underscores Maduro’s strategy of deterrence through mass mobilization. If fully armed, these units could provide asymmetric defense against incursions on land, creating a scenario where US or allied intervention would risk becoming costly and prolonged. At sea, Venezuela’s best hope to counterbalance American destroyers lies with its limited but potent anti-ship missile arsenal, while in the air, S-300VM batteries represent a defensive shield against precision strikes. The question remains whether Venezuela possesses sufficient operational readiness and maintenance to keep these systems effective under high pressure.
Geopolitically, Maduro’s announcement deepens the polarization in Latin America. Mexico has already rejected U.S. allegations linking Venezuela to drug cartels, while regional allies such as Cuba and Nicaragua remain aligned with Caracas. This dynamic reflects the framing once advanced by Washington under former National Security Advisor John Bolton, who labeled Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as the “Troika of Tyranny,” underscoring U.S. efforts to isolate these governments diplomatically and economically. Outside the region, Russia has been Venezuela’s principal military supplier, providing aircraft, air defense systems, and armored vehicles. China has extended financial and limited defense support, while Iran has supplied fuel and technological expertise, often circumventing sanctions. If a conflict were to erupt with the United States, these partners would likely provide political backing and possibly covert military assistance, though none are expected to commit direct forces.
For Washington, deploying three guided-missile destroyers in the Caribbean is both a show of force and a means of pressure through counter-narcotics operations. The operation, coordinated by US Southern Command, will reportedly include the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, a guided missile cruiser, several Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and Boeing P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. Supporting rotary-wing assets such as US Marine Corps UH-1Y Venom helicopters are also expected to provide close air support and mobility from amphibious platforms. Yet this posture also risks reinforcing Maduro’s narrative of external aggression, allowing him to consolidate internal support. Strategically, the militarization of Venezuela’s civilian population blurs the line between state defense and irregular warfare, complicating any potential US intervention and raising the prospect of a protracted conflict with regional destabilizing effects.
Maduro’s decision to mobilize millions of militia fighters and arm them with rifles and missiles represents more than a domestic show of strength; it is a calculated move designed to deter US pressure and reinforce his political legitimacy. By highlighting Venezuela’s capacity to defend its territory with asymmetric means, Caracas seeks to elevate the cost of any external intervention. Yet the imbalance of power with the United States remains stark, and any escalation would inevitably draw in global actors such as Russia, China and Iran, further internationalizing the crisis. At a moment when warships already patrol the Caribbean and militias prepare for mobilization, the standoff risks transforming into a confrontation with consequences reaching far beyond Venezuela’s borders.