China further menaces US carrier strike groups in the Pacific with new DF-26D "Guam Killer" ballistic missile.

As reported by Jesus Roman on August 24, 2025, China has revealed the DF-26D, a new variant of the Dong Feng-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), during rehearsals for its September 3 military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Japan. The DF-26D adds to a missile family that has been operational since 2016 with the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) and is known for its ability to carry both nuclear and conventional warheads. The DF-26 is already widely referred to as the “Guam Killer” due to its estimated 5,000 km range that places Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Base Guam, and Camp Blaz within reach. The new DF-26D variant is reported to retain this range while adding greater precision and survivability, with implications for U.S. military facilities and carrier strike groups in the Western Pacific.
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The DF-26 is already widely referred to as the “Guam Killer” due to its estimated 5,000 km range that places the US' Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Base Guam, and Camp Blaz within reach of China's Rocket Force. (Picture source: Chinese social media/© 光影宇航局)

The DF-26, initially developed as a longer-range successor to the DF-21D, was conceived by China to extend its land-based strike capability beyond the First Island Chain. A defining feature of the system is its modular structure, allowing a single launcher team to swap warheads in the field, enabling the use of nuclear payloads, high-explosive unitary warheads, submunitions packages, or penetrator warheads against hardened targets without altering the missile booster. Using a 12x12 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) to allow rapid deployment and firing without reliance on fixed launch sites, the DF-26 was first publicly shown during the September 2015 Victory Day parade in Beijing and was assessed by the United States Department of Defense to have entered operational service with the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) by 2016. To refine its anti-ship role, testing took place in China’s Taklamakan Desert at a facility that includes full-scale mock-ups of U.S. carrier and destroyer classes mounted on rails to simulate ship movement, enhancing its terminal guidance for maritime targeting. Between 2019 and 2020, multiple brigades had been identified in locations ranging from Henan to Guangdong and Yunnan, with new facilities under construction to expand their deployment.

While public reporting consistently notes the DF-26’s significance within China’s strike arsenal, there is no confirmed information on the system’s unit cost, total program expenditure, or precise budgetary allocations, and open-source estimates of such figures are not available, leaving the economic scale of the program undefined despite the evident state resources required for its development and expansion. Open-source analyses provide only rough estimates of the DF-26 missile’s cost, since Beijing does not disclose official financial data on its missile programs. The unit price is generally cited as falling in the range of $15 to $20 million, with some assessments extending as high as $21 million per missile. The development of the entire DF-26 system has been estimated at around $1.1 billion, which accounts for research, production infrastructure, and deployment preparation across the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Furthermore, the modular structure of the missile has contributed to uncertainty over how many distinct DF-26 variants exist and what differentiates them. American defense sources use the designation CSS-18 for the DF-26, with the 2024 U.S. Department of Defense China Military Power Report distinguishing three versions as Mod 1, Mod 2, and Mod 3, which are believed to correspond to DF-26A, DF-26B, and DF-26C. The DF-26D now appears to represent a fourth variant, internally designated CSS-18 Mod 4.

Technical data for the DF-26 describes an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) approximately 15.8 meters long and 1.4 meters in diameter, launched from a 12x12 road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher. It can carry a warhead weighing between 1,200 and 1,800 kg and is reported to reach speeds up to Mach 18 in terminal flight. Its circular error probable (CEP) is assessed at around 100 meters, and it is designed for both land-attack and anti-ship roles. Chinese sources emphasize its ability to conduct precision conventional strikes against airbases, ports, and other high-value infrastructure, in addition to nuclear deterrence. The missile’s ability to target moving ships distinguishes it from earlier systems and reflects China’s investment in overcoming the challenge of maritime strike at long distances. To refine its anti-ship role, China maintains a missile test complex in the Taklamakan Desert equipped with full-scale mock-ups of U.S. carriers and destroyers, some mounted on rails to simulate movement for terminal guidance testing.

The DF-26D variant has been described by defense analysts and regional media as a potentially significant step forward in penetration and accuracy. Reports attribute to it the integration of active radar seekers, multi-spectral sensors, and advanced decoys, all designed to complicate interception by U.S. and allied defenses such as Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot. Other accounts suggest the missile could carry multiple reentry vehicles or hypersonic glide vehicles to further improve survivability and to increase the probability of reaching defended targets. China is already considered a global leader in hypersonic glide vehicle technology, and its application to the DF-26D would align with broader trends in Chinese missile development. While no official technical details have been released, the DF-26D is widely assessed to be intended to overcome new layered defense systems being deployed by the United States on Guam, which include THAAD, Patriot, Iron Dome batteries, and future Indirect Fire Protection Capability units.

The strategic context for the DF-26D’s appearance includes both Guam’s expanding role in U.S. defense planning and regional arms developments. Guam hosts U.S. Air Force B-52H bombers, major naval facilities, and the developing Marine Corps base Camp Blaz, making it central to operations in the South China Sea and near Taiwan. The DF-26D’s range means it can strike Guam as well as naval groups operating as far as the Second Island Chain. Regional developments parallel this Chinese move: North Korea’s Hwasong-16B, tested in March 2024, was the first intermediate-range missile confirmed to carry a hypersonic glide vehicle, while Russia’s Oreshnik IRBM, unveiled in November 2024, also carries such vehicles. Among these, however, the DF-26 remains the only system confirmed to combine anti-ship capability with ground attack in a dual-capable, road-mobile design.

The broader family context shows the DF-26 as a successor to the DF-21D, the world’s first operational anti-ship ballistic missile. The DF-26 extends this role to longer ranges and integrates with China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) framework alongside systems like the DF-100 cruise missile and air-launched CJ-series missiles. While there is no evidence that China deploys nuclear-armed anti-ship ballistic missiles, the dual-capable nature of the DF-26 means that adversaries may not be able to distinguish whether an incoming missile is nuclear or conventional, raising escalation risks in a crisis. Analysts have also speculated that the modular nature of the DF-26 leaves open possibilities for further variants, such as bunker-buster payloads similar to South Korea’s Hyunmoo-5, or specialized submunitions dispensers to maximize area effects against exposed aircraft on airfields. Even if these roles are not part of the DF-26D, the system’s design flexibility underscores its role as a multi-purpose strike asset for the PLARF.

The DF-26D’s introduction highlights how Beijing continues to refine its long-range missile forces in response to evolving U.S. and allied defenses in the Pacific. Its dual capability to threaten both bases and naval forces complicates operational planning for the United States and its partners. It reflects a consistent Chinese approach of deploying survivable, road-mobile missiles with multiple payload options to extend deterrence and conventional strike reach. By adding advanced guidance, decoys, and potentially multiple reentry vehicles or hypersonic glide vehicles, the DF-26D appears aimed at eroding U.S. confidence in its missile defenses at Guam and at sea. The appearance of this variant, therefore, fits into a longer trajectory of missile modernization, reinforcing the central role of the DF-26 family in China’s regional strategy and ensuring that American forward basing and naval assets face persistent, credible strike risks.