China to improve Iran's air defense capacity with new transfer of HQ-9B missile batteries.

According to Arab intelligence sources cited by Middle East Eye on July 7, 2025, Iran has received deliveries of Chinese-made HQ-9B long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries in the weeks following a de facto ceasefire with Israel on June 24, 2025. The acquisition reportedly occurred under a barter arrangement in which Tehran compensated Beijing with oil shipments, a method previously used to circumvent U.S. sanctions.
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The HQ-9B has not yet been used in active combat, but Chinese military exercises have simulated intercepts of stealth targets, high-speed projectiles, and electronic countermeasure scenarios, including those involving cruise missiles and low-observable aircraft. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

The quantity of systems received has not been publicly disclosed, and no official confirmation has been issued by the Chinese or Iranian governments. However, Arab officials stated that the United States has been informed of Iran’s post-conflict reconstruction efforts, including air defense reinforcement. The HQ-9B systems are intended to replace capabilities destroyed during Israel’s twelve-day campaign that targeted missile bases, radar installations, and command structures. Israel achieved temporary air superiority during this period, destroying ballistic missile launch platforms and eliminating multiple Iranian generals and scientists. Iran nonetheless continued missile launches toward Israeli targets, hitting areas in Tel Aviv and Haifa before the ceasefire took hold.

The HQ-9B is developed by China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) and represents a modernized version of earlier HQ-9 systems, integrating design features derived from the Russian S-300PMU1 along with domestic Chinese radar and electronics. The system uses a two-stage, solid-fuel missile with a reported maximum range of 260 kilometers and a ceiling of 27 kilometers. The missile follows an inertial navigation path during its initial phase, guided mid-course via datalink from a ground-based system, before transitioning to active radar homing in its terminal phase. The missile travels at speeds above Mach 4.2. One battery typically consists of a command post, HT-233 S-band phased array radar, acquisition radar, and six to eight transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). The radar system enables 360-degree surveillance and tracking of up to 100 targets, with the capability to engage between six and eight of them simultaneously, depending on the configuration. The HQ-9B has not yet been used in active combat, but Chinese military exercises have simulated intercepts of stealth targets, high-speed projectiles, and electronic countermeasure scenarios, including those involving cruise missiles and low-observable aircraft.

Iran’s current air defense network includes a combination of Russian, Chinese, and domestically developed systems. These include four batteries of the S-300PMU2 system, Bavar-373 systems with upgraded variants reportedly reaching 300 kilometers, and over 40 Khordad and Sayyad series batteries. Other long-range SAMs in service include the Arman, with a claimed range of 180 kilometers and Mach 5–6.5 speed, and the S-200 Ghareh with an extended range of up to 350 kilometers. Medium-range systems in Iranian service include the Raad series, the domestically upgraded 2K12 Kub, the AD-40, Mersad, and the improved Hawk. The air defense network also includes short-range systems such as the Herz-9, Kamin-2, Ya Zahra-3, and Azarakhsh, as well as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) such as the Misagh family and the Soheil launcher. Artillery-based air defense platforms like the ZSU-23-4 Shilka, ZSU-57-2, ZU-23-2, and radar-guided 100 mm and 35 mm autocannons also form part of Iran’s air defense architecture. Integration of the HQ-9B into this layered network adds additional engagement range and radar resilience, especially against threats posed by stealth aircraft and high-speed munitions.

The deliveries follow earlier transactions between Iran and China involving dual-use materials. U.S. intelligence sources and shipping data indicate that in February and March 2025, two Iranian ships arrived from China carrying over 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate, a precursor to ammonium perchlorate, which is used in solid-fuel ballistic missiles. The material was delivered to Iranian ports and estimated to be sufficient to fuel approximately 260 short-range missiles. A larger order involving thousands of tons of ammonium perchlorate is underway and expected to arrive in the coming months. Analysts estimate this shipment could enable production of up to 800 missiles. Some of the imported material may be forwarded to Iranian-aligned militias, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Shia groups in Iraq. These deliveries follow the destruction of a significant number of planetary mixers used in missile production by Israeli strikes in October 2024. Iran is currently repairing this equipment. In April 2025, a major explosion at Shahid Rajaee port, which handles most of Iran’s container trade, was attributed to the mishandling of hazardous material by the IRGC Quds Force. Reports indicate that some of the imported chemicals were lost during this incident.

China’s military cooperation with Iran remains structured to avoid direct confrontation with Western powers. During the conflict between Iran and Israel, China condemned Israeli and U.S. strikes via the United Nations and BRICS platforms. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called for a new international agreement on Iran, but no military assistance was offered. China also maintains an official denial of direct weapons sales to Iran and claims to enforce export control laws related to dual-use materials. Nevertheless, Chinese companies such as Lion Commodities Holdings, based in Hong Kong, have been linked to recent contracts with Iranian firms, including Pishgaman Tejarat Rafi Novin Co. The U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions in April and May 2025 on individuals and entities from China and Iran involved in procuring missile ingredients. These sanctions are part of ongoing efforts to limit the development of Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities. China remains Iran’s top oil customer, and much of this trade is conducted via independent refiners using so-called "dark fleet" tankers to mask the cargo’s origin and evade sanctions enforcement.

Military cooperation between the two countries has included repeated joint exercises such as the March 2025 “Maritime Security Belt” drill near Chabahar and the Strait of Hormuz. The exercise, which involved around fifteen vessels from Iran, China, and Russia, included live-fire drills, boarding operations, GPS jamming, and electronic warfare scenarios. These activities reflect increased interoperability, though their operational impact remains limited. Beijing and Tehran are also reportedly discussing a potential deal for J-10C multirole fighters. These aircraft, designated Vigorous Dragon, were highlighted at Airshow China 2024 and are powered by WS-10B engines, equipped with AESA radar, and designed for long-range engagement. The possible sale has raised concerns from Israel, which has formally requested that China halt the transfer. Iran views the J-10C as a way to address gaps in its air force capabilities, particularly following slow or incomplete delivery of Su-35 fighters from Russia. Discussions over the aircraft are ongoing, and no formal contract has been publicly acknowledged.

The HQ-9B is also in service with other countries, including Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Morocco. Egypt confirmed its use of the system in July 2025 when retired Major General Samir Farag stated in a television interview that the HQ-9B had been integrated into Egypt’s air defense network. Egyptian military transport flights involving Il-76MF aircraft between China and Pakistan were observed in July 2025, likely related to this deployment. The HQ-9B’s export variant, the FD-2000B, has been marketed as an alternative to U.S. Patriot and French SAMP/T systems, which are often subject to operational restrictions and export conditions. The estimated cost of one regiment of HQ-9B systems is approximately $1.5 billion. In the case of Egypt, issues with Western suppliers, such as the U.S. refusal to provide AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, France withholding long-range MICA missiles for Rafales, and Germany redirecting IRIS-T SLM batteries to Ukraine, contributed to the decision to procure the Chinese system. Egypt also reportedly explored the Indian Akash system, but talks did not advance due to bureaucratic complications.

The HQ-9B is designed for mobility and integration with other radar and surveillance platforms. In Egypt, the system is reportedly positioned to cover key strategic areas such as the Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea coastline. These deployments are configured to remain within the constraints of the Camp David Accords, which limit the presence of combat aircraft in Sinai. The mobile nature of the HQ-9B and its compatibility with systems like the MiG-29M have allowed it to be used within treaty-compliant frameworks. The same approach is likely to be employed in Iran, where the missile system will be integrated alongside Russian Buk-M2 and Tor-M2, German radar systems, and Iranian-developed sensors. This aligns with Iran’s broader strategy of maintaining a multi-vendor, layered defense network that reduces dependence on politically restricted suppliers. The HQ-9B's potential future integration with Chinese aircraft such as the J-10C and J-31, as well as its compatibility with networked air defense architectures, supports this objective, although no evidence currently confirms operational integration across platforms.

The deployment of HQ-9B systems in Iran, combined with missile fuel imports and potential aircraft deals, indicates a deliberate effort to enhance the country's air and missile defense capabilities following losses sustained during the Israel conflict. While the HQ-9B remains unproven in combat, its adoption by multiple countries, including recent confirmation from Egypt, and technical characteristics demonstrated in Chinese military exercises suggest increasing international confidence in its utility. For China, this expanding defense relationship reinforces its strategic presence in the Middle East, secures access to energy resources, and counters U.S. containment efforts. For Iran, the HQ-9B contributes to a restored defense posture, amid ongoing missile development and negotiations over its nuclear program, while relying on suppliers less likely to impose operational restrictions or withhold systems for political reasons. The transaction illustrates the growing defense coordination between the two countries without indicating the existence of a formal alliance or military pact.