Chinese FB-10A Short-range Air Defense Missile System for Chad Possibly Diverted to Sudan RSF.

Chadian outlet TchadOne reports a batch of Chinese-made FB-10A SHORAD units officially ordered by Chad’s Air Force ended up with Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. If confirmed, the diversion would breach the Sudan arms embargo and strengthen RSF low-altitude air defenses against drones and aircraft.

TchadOne said on Oct. 5, 2025, that internal correspondence and testimonies indicate a Chad Air Force order of Chinese FB-10A short-range air-defense systems was diverted to Sudan’s RSF. The FB-10A, an evolution of the FB-10 first shown at China’s 2016 Zhuhai Airshow and displayed as a scale model at Egypt’s EDEX 2021, is a compact SHORAD mounted on a Dongfeng Mengshi 6x6 with an engagement envelope of roughly 10 km and altitudes from ~15 to 5,000 meters. This matters because a successful diversion would violate UN embargo rules and could shift the air balance in Sudan by improving RSF defenses against drones, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft.
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The FB-10A is a Chinese short-range air defense system on a 6x6 Dongfeng Mengshi chassis with two pods of four ready-to-fire missiles, an engagement range of around 10 km and altitudes from 15 to 5,000 m, using mixed guidance with an imaging infrared seeker to intercept drones, helicopters, and low-flying aircraft. (Picture source: Weibo Channel @飞行的维克)

The launcher sits on a light 6x6 Mengshi chassis with a small armored cab at the front and a flatbed at the rear. Two pods of four tubes provide eight ready-to-fire missiles. The sensors are integrated without adding unnecessary bulk. A small 3D radar is paired with a 360-degree electro-optical package, allowing crews to search, cue, and fire while limiting exposure to detection. This is relevant in Sudan and the Sahel, where roads are poor, convoys are lightly protected, and units need to fire and redeploy before a response arrives.

The FB-10A missile is presented as a cost-effective counterpart to the Hongqi-10 family. Guidance is mixed: command updates in the initial phase, then an imaging infrared seeker for terminal homing. Chinese sources often compare its behavior to HQ-10, citing dual-mode concepts and high agility against small, fast targets, and even suggesting interception of supersonic anti-ship missiles. That claim requires caution for land warfare use, but the design intent is clear. The round addresses drones with low radar cross-section, aircraft flying at terrain-following altitude, and attack helicopters. Eight ready rounds do not provide continuous coverage, yet for a limited window along a road, near a forward depot, or around a mobile command post, the system raises the operational cost for opposing air assets.

An FB-10A battery can receive tracks from a surveillance radar or a command post and then pass rapid cues to launchers that remain silent until engagement. With crews trained for immediate displacement, the result is an air-defense ambush that is hard to target. Even a small number of vehicles can force helicopters to climb, divert drones, and alter low-altitude ingress profiles for attack aircraft. This affects planning through added escorts, greater use of decoys and expendables, more time allocated to suppression, and occasionally a scrubbed mission when risk outweighs expected gains.

That is the effect if such systems are indeed on the RSF side. Since April 2023, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF have contested cities, airfields, and supply routes, with front lines shifting. Aviation has remained one of the few mobile levers for the SAF to compensate for gaps on the ground. Any modern SHORAD across the line produces an outsized impact even with low expenditure. It shapes behavior. It also has vulnerabilities. Poor camouflage, lingering near known sites, or leaving emissions on can expose a launcher to loitering munitions, artillery, or a well-planned SEAD strike.

If the presence of an FB-10A within the RSF is confirmed, the primary impact is practical. A credible mobile SHORAD forces drones to reroute, pushes helicopters to adopt higher approach profiles, and disrupts low-altitude attack trajectories. Crews must account for short firing windows, air-defense ambushes, and rapid post-engagement movement. In a theater like Sudan, even a few vehicles can complicate the coverage of a logistics axis, the protection of a forward depot, or control of a crossing point. The consequences appear as longer mission times, additional jamming and decoy resources, and revised plans to limit exposure.