Could a secret North Korean military base near China hide the nuclear missiles that threaten the United States?.

On August 20, 2025, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), through its Beyond Parallel project, published a detailed report confirming the existence of the Sinpung-dong Missile Operating Base in North Pyongan Province. This was the first open-source confirmation of the base, which is located approximately 27 kilometers from the Chinese border, 146 kilometers north-northwest of Pyongyang, and 340 kilometers northwest of Seoul.
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According to the CSIS, the base likely hosts a brigade-sized unit composed of three missile-firing battalions equipped with six to nine intercontinental ballistic missiles, believed to be nuclear-capable Hwasong-15 or Hwasong-18 missiles. (Picture source: KCNA)

The report describes the base as an undeclared installation, noting that it has never been part of any denuclearization negotiations between the United States and North Korea. Satellite imagery dating back to 2003 shows that the facility has been maintained and continuously developed, with construction beginning around 2004 and operational capability achieved by 2014. Analysts concluded that ongoing improvements since 2014 are consistent with North Korea’s development of intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, basing requirements, and organizational changes.

The Sinpung-dong base is situated in a narrow mountain valley in Taegwan County, on the southern slopes of Pugo Mountain. The area covers approximately 22 square kilometers and contains one main valley of 4.8 kilometers in length, with four smaller branch valleys. The site was once used for agriculture and logging, as confirmed by satellite images from the 1980s and 1990s. Since the mid-2000s, specialized construction troops from the Korean People’s Army’s Military Construction Bureau are believed to have developed the facility. Today, its functions include entrance checkpoints, headquarters and administration areas, barracks, warehouses, hardened missile checkout shelters, agricultural support areas, and a large underground facility. Villages such as Wonpung-dong, Yoha-ri, Yodae-dong, and Won-ni remain nearby and provide some local agricultural and logging support to the installation.

According to CSIS, the base likely hosts a brigade-sized unit composed of three missile-firing battalions equipped with six to nine intercontinental ballistic missiles. These are believed to be nuclear-capable Hwasong-15 or Hwasong-18 missiles, or possibly another undisclosed ICBM, mounted on transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) or mobile-erector-launchers (MELs). The report also mentions support vehicles, logistical elements, and housing for personnel. Operational assessments suggest that in a crisis, launchers and missiles would exit the base, connect with special warhead storage and transport units, and conduct launch operations from dispersed, pre-surveyed sites. Analysts also noted the presence of two large earth-bermed support structures within the base, built between 2013 and 2014, possibly intended as emergency launch facilities, unfinished warehouses, or attempts at coffin-style launch sites similar to Cold War-era U.S. or Iranian designs. Their alignment and size indicate suitability for Hwasong-15 or Hwasong-18 ICBM launchers, but they have remained unchanged since construction.

The infrastructure of the Sinpung-dong base is extensive. At least two hardened drive-through missile checkout facilities were built between 2011 and 2014, each measuring approximately 35 by 17 meters and reinforced with soil and vegetation to obscure them from detection. These facilities are designed for missile arming, fueling, systems checkout, and maintenance. Vegetation growth now makes them difficult to detect in satellite imagery except during winter. The underground facility, built between 2006 and 2014, has two entrances located 258 meters apart, although the internal network is likely much longer and includes side galleries. To adapt to terrain and seasonal flooding, the entrances were built 20 to 40 meters above streams, with terraced ramps and tunnels to allow water passage. Both entrances are approximately 5.5 meters wide and large enough to accommodate missile launchers and support vehicles. Unlike other bases, they lack prominent protective berms. Satellite imagery from 2014 to 2025 shows little structural change, though vegetation makes identification increasingly challenging.

The base’s internal organization follows patterns seen at other missile facilities. The headquarters and administration area at Wonha-ri was constructed between 2004 and 2007, consisting of eight large buildings, including barracks, a cultural education hall added in 2018, motor vehicle storage, and circular gardens around a parade ground and memorial plaza. Housing for approximately 86 senior officers and their families was added between 2014 and 2017. Branch Valley Number One hosts three 40 to 55-meter-long Type 500 bunkers, usually used for armored or mechanized units, suggesting a battalion-sized support force possibly predating the missile complex. Branch Valley Number Two contains mainly agricultural activities, except for one 24 by 7 meter earth-bermed structure built in 2013–2014. Branch Valley Number Three includes two barracks areas, a 60-meter multi-roof support building added in 2019, remnants of a 31-by-9-meter building that existed until 2019, and another earth-bermed support structure of 27 by 7 meters. Branch Valley Number Four hosts the hardened missile checkout facilities and one of the underground facility entrances.

Security and support infrastructure at the base are also notable. At least seven remote compounds with small cultivated fields surround the facility, likely serving additional security functions. While no fixed anti-aircraft artillery positions are visible within 10 kilometers, the area falls within North Korea’s national air defense network. Four air defense artillery batteries and one SA-2 (S-75 Dvina) surface-to-air missile site are within 14 kilometers, and the unit based at Sinpung-dong is expected to include organic air defense assets such as light AAA and man-portable surface-to-air missiles like SA-7, SA-14, and SA-16. The nearest airbase is Panghyon, 43 kilometers southwest, operating older MiG-17 and MiG-19 aircraft. Analysts emphasize that this limited fixed defense posture suggests reliance on dispersal, concealment, and mobile defenses to protect the site from preemptive or wartime strikes.

The Sinpung-dong Missile Operating Base is one of North Korea’s estimated 15 to 20 undeclared ballistic missile-related installations, including maintenance, storage, and warhead facilities. Together with other bases in the strategic missile belt, such as Hoejung-ni, Sangnam-ni, Yongjo-ri, and Yongnim, Sinpung-dong forms a core element of North Korea’s nuclear deterrence posture. Its location near the Chinese border may also provide additional protection from potential preemptive strikes, raising the stakes for both Washington and Beijing. Media reports that previously referred to missile bases at Changsong-gun, Paegun-dong, Sakju-gun, or Taegwan-gun likely described the same facility under different names. The findings reinforce that North Korea’s ballistic missile infrastructure is larger, more dispersed, and more survivable than previously assumed, presenting a complex challenge to monitoring and arms control efforts.

The confirmation of the Sinpung-dong base by CSIS adds to a broader understanding of North Korea’s strategic missile force, which is estimated to operate between 15 and 20 undeclared sites supporting the Korean People’s Army Strategic Force of roughly 10,000 personnel. The report highlights that open-source information, defectors’ testimonies, and satellite imagery remain essential tools in identifying such facilities. Analysts caution that although some of the findings could eventually prove incomplete, the base demonstrates North Korea’s long-term planning for nuclear deterrence and the persistence of its missile development programs. The study concludes that Sinpung-dong, with its brigade-level ICBM force, hardened facilities, and location within the strategic belt, represents a key node in North Korea’s capacity to threaten East Asia and the continental United States, while remaining outside the scope of past negotiation frameworks.