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Exclusive Analysis: Zapad 2025 Drill Reveals Russo-Belarusian Moves and Threats on NATO’s Eastern Flank.


From September 12 to September 16, 2025, Russia and Belarus carried out the joint military exercise known as Zapad 2025. The drills, conducted across Belarusian territory and parts of western Russia, come at a time of heightened tensions in Europe, with the war in Ukraine ongoing and NATO forces reinforcing their eastern borders. Far from being a routine training event, Zapad has historically served as both a test of military readiness and a signal to adversaries. This year’s edition is no exception, raising questions about Moscow’s strategic ambitions and Minsk’s deepening alignment with Russian defense planning.
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Zapad 2025 represents a turning point in emphasis. Unlike Zapad 2021, which relied on sheer numbers to demonstrate power, this year’s drills placed advanced strike systems such as Zircon, Kinzhal, Onyx, Iskander, and Oreshnik at the forefront, alongside integrated drone and electronic warfare capabilities (Picture source: Russian MoD)


Zapad, meaning “West” in Russian, is one of the four major recurring strategic exercises conducted by the Russian armed forces, alongside Vostok, Tsentr, and Kavkaz. First held in the late Soviet era, it was revived after the Cold War to reassert Russia’s influence and reassure allies such as Belarus. Over the past two decades, Zapad has grown in complexity and geopolitical weight. Zapad 1999 demonstrated nuclear strike simulations at a time when Russia was concerned about NATO’s role in the Balkans. Later iterations, particularly Zapad 2009, 2013, and 2017, integrated larger troop deployments, advanced air defense systems, and electronic warfare. Zapad 2021 stood out as the most extensive version to date, involving close to 200,000 personnel and wide-ranging scenarios that, in retrospect, foreshadowed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

There has been a notable gap between Zapad 2021 and this year’s exercise, with no equivalent large-scale drill held in 2023 or 2024. That four-year interval marks the longest pause in recent history, explained partly by Russia’s focus on the war in Ukraine and the heavy strain on its armed forces. The return of Zapad in 2025 is significant not just because of the gap, but because it is the first iteration conducted while Russia is engaged in a protracted high-intensity conflict. This dual context makes it both a rehearsal for future contingencies and a demonstration of endurance despite wartime pressures.

According to official Belarusian statements, around 13,000 troops participated in Zapad 2025, a figure consistent with Minsk’s efforts to remain within OSCE Vienna Document notification thresholds but widely regarded by Western observers as understated once dispersed deployments are considered. Beyond troop numbers, the exercise showcased a wide array of capabilities, including air force sorties over Belarus and the Barents Sea, armored maneuvers near the Barysaw training ground, and the integration of advanced unmanned systems and electronic warfare assets. Particular attention was drawn to the deployment of nuclear-capable systems: the Oreshnik missile system, expected to be delivered to Belarus before the end of the year, and the Iskander short-range ballistic missile system, already stationed in the country since 2022. Together, these assets highlight the enduring nuclear dimension of Zapad scenarios and underscore Belarus’s role in reinforcing Russia’s nuclear-capable posture and the credibility of rapid escalation strategies.

Alongside Iskander, Zapad 2025 highlighted several other high-profile weapon systems. The exercise included the test launch of the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile from the frigate Admiral Golovko in the Arctic, a move that NATO closely monitored given the missile’s high speed and maneuverability. In parallel, Russian coastal defense forces tested the Bastion missile system, firing Onyx anti-ship missiles against simulated naval targets, demonstrating the ability to deny NATO access to key maritime approaches. Strategic bomber operations also featured prominently, with Tu-160 aircraft conducting combat training missions over the neutral waters of the Barents Sea, escorted by MiG-31 interceptors for air cover. In addition, MiG-31 aircraft armed with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles were deployed, reinforcing the integration of advanced strike capabilities into Zapad’s operational scenarios.

Air operations extended further with Su-34 fighter-bombers performing precision strike missions and long-range anti-submarine aircraft from the Northern Fleet patrolling Arctic waters. On the ground, armored and mechanized units carried out combined-arms maneuvers, supported by artillery fire, though official figures on tank and vehicle deployments were not disclosed. Logistical components included the sustained use of Il-76 transport aircraft to ferry troops and equipment into Belarus in the run-up to the exercise. Complementing these traditional assets, reconnaissance and strike drones as well as sophisticated electronic warfare systems were employed to test Russia’s capacity to degrade adversary communications and navigation networks.

The technological emphasis of Zapad 2025 reflects a qualitative shift in Russian and Belarusian military priorities. Rather than relying solely on massed formations, the drills integrated drone swarms, AI-supported command platforms, advanced jamming systems, and high-speed strike weapons. This combination is designed to complicate NATO’s defense planning by blending conventional, nuclear, and hybrid threats. The nuclear preparedness simulations reported during the exercise further reinforced the perception that Moscow and Minsk are deliberately elevating the level of risk in their signaling toward the West.

Strategically, Zapad 2025 illustrates several key dynamics. First, it reaffirms the military integration of Belarus into Russia’s planning, with Minsk not only hosting but also directly engaging in scenarios involving nuclear-capable assets. Second, it demonstrates that despite the strain of ongoing operations in Ukraine, Russia remains able to field and test advanced systems across multiple domains. Finally, the exercise highlights the scenarios Russian planners deem most relevant: rapid escalation along NATO’s eastern flank, hybrid warfare blending cyber and drone tactics, and credible demonstrations of nuclear strike readiness.

The most likely directions of concern are the Baltic States and the Suwałki Gap, the narrow corridor linking Poland and Lithuania that separates Belarus from Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave. A limited incursion or hybrid campaign in this zone would allow Moscow to test NATO’s cohesion without immediately triggering a full-scale confrontation. Another possibility is the sustained use of Belarusian territory as a launch platform for missile and drone operations against Ukraine, further stretching Kyiv’s defenses. Both scenarios align with the overarching theme of Zapad exercises: preparing for escalation under the guise of defensive operations.

Zapad 2025 represents a turning point in emphasis. Unlike Zapad 2021, which relied on sheer numbers to demonstrate power, this year’s drills placed advanced strike systems such as Zircon, Kinzhal, Onyx, Iskander, and Oreshnik at the forefront, alongside integrated drone and electronic warfare capabilities. For NATO, this is a reminder that the threat no longer comes only from large-scale conventional invasion but from the combination of nuclear-capable assets, hybrid tactics, and rapid escalation strategies. The exercise shows that Russia and Belarus are preparing for prolonged confrontation, keeping pressure on both Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank, while leaving open the possibility of sudden, ambiguous actions designed to test Western resolve.

Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group

Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.


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