Focus | Strategic Command warns that the US may lose strategic superiority against China without urgent nuclear triad modernization.

Speaking at the McAleese Defense Programs Conference in Washington on March 18, 2025, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom), Air Force Gen. Anthony J. Cotton, sounded the alarm on the need to rapidly modernize America’s nuclear triad, warning that an unprecedented global security environment, where multiple nuclear-armed states (such as China and Russia) are currently expanding their capabilities, leaves no time to waste. He noted that following the Cold War, the United States reaped a “peace dividend” by scaling back its military industrial base and delaying nuclear modernization, assuming great-power rivalry was a thing of the past, an assumption that he now views as no longer applicable.
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A nuclear triad is a strategic military concept involving land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear bombs or cruise missiles. (Picture source: Army Recognition)

A nuclear triad is a strategic military concept involving three complementary platforms for delivering nuclear weapons: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear bombs or cruise missiles. The purpose of this structure is to enhance a state's nuclear deterrence by ensuring a second-strike capability—that is, the ability to retaliate even if one leg of the triad is destroyed in a first-strike attack. Each leg of the triad offers distinct advantages: ICBMs provide rapid response and high accuracy, SLBMs offer survivability and stealth due to submarine mobility, and bombers offer flexibility and signaling potential since they can be deployed and recalled. Maintaining a triad diversifies nuclear delivery options and reduces the risk that a single technological breakthrough or military action could neutralize a country's entire nuclear force.

Cotton described the current threat environment as historically unprecedented, "unlike any in U.S. history". He said China is rapidly developing advanced nuclear delivery platforms and expanding its naval and missile capabilities using dual-use civilian shipyards. He cited public assessments that Chinese President Xi Jinping has instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to seize Taiwan by 2027, a timeline that U.S. officials believe is influencing China’s force posture. Cotton also said that Russia has upgraded the majority of its nuclear arsenal and continues to employ nuclear rhetoric during its military operations in Ukraine. North Korea, according to Cotton, is continuing its nuclear weapons and missile development in violation of international resolutions, while Iran is expanding its uranium enrichment activities. He stated that these actors have not adopted what the United States considers responsible nuclear behavior and that some are collaborating with regional partners in ways that, in his view, challenge global stability. He concluded that the renewed presence of peer-level nuclear competition has increased the strategic demands placed on Stratcom.

The US Department of Defense has expressed concern about China's nuclear trajectory, which it views as occurring in parallel with limited military-to-military communication between the two countries. In a 2024 report, the Pentagon estimated that China’s operational nuclear warhead stockpile has likely surpassed 600 and that the country is on course to field a fully modern nuclear triad. Beijing is deploying new land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), constructing additional ballistic missile submarines, and developing a new strategic stealth bomber. The report also indicates that China seeks to enhance its capacity to conduct large-scale retaliatory strikes. Analysts believe China may adopt a launch-on-warning posture by the end of the decade, replacing its earlier minimum-deterrence strategy. Additionally, the Pentagon confirmed that China has tested a hypersonic glide vehicle on the DF-27 ballistic missile, and that the system may have already been integrated into operational units within the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Cotton has expressed concern that China’s civil-military industrial integration, particularly the use of dual-use infrastructure, is contributing to faster output of weapons platforms. Communication between the U.S. and Chinese armed forces was minimal for much of 2023, with Beijing agreeing to reopen selected defense channels only after a summit between Presidents Xi and Biden in late 2023. U.S. officials have argued that maintaining open military lines of communication is necessary to reduce the risk of miscalculation.

The United States currently operates a land-based ICBM force composed of LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles deployed in hardened silos across multiple states, which provide a rapid-response nuclear strike capability. (Picture source: US DoD)

In this context, Cotton and other U.S. defense officials have called for the recapitalization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The nuclear triad consists of three components: land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and long-range strategic bombers. All three are currently undergoing modernization following decades of service. Cotton noted that previous delays in replacement programs have resulted in multiple systems now requiring concurrent upgrades. He stated, “There is no margin left and no time left” to further delay modernization and expressed regret that earlier replacement efforts were not staggered over time. Current modernization programs include the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM, which will replace the Minuteman III; the Columbia-class submarine, which will replace the Ohio-class SSBN; and the B-21 Raider, a stealth bomber intended to update the air leg of the triad. Cotton cautioned that delaying any one of these programs could affect the overall credibility of the nuclear deterrent. He also identified the need to upgrade the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system, describing it as central to maintaining command integrity during any contingency and requiring improvements to withstand cyber threats.

Cotton has described nuclear modernization as relatively cost-effective in comparison to the potential consequences of deterrence failure. According to the Department of Defense, the entire nuclear enterprise comprises approximately 4% of the total defense budget. Cotton argues that this level of expenditure is proportionate to the strategic role these systems play. In a previous address, he said that the cost of modernization is less than the risks of system obsolescence. In March 2025, he urged lawmakers to ensure continued, uninterrupted funding for modernization and to support a sustainable defense-industrial base. Congress, as of late 2024, enacted a defense policy bill that fully funded the administration’s nuclear modernization plans and allocated additional funds to expedite specific programs. This included a $200 million increase in R&D for the Sentinel ICBM and authorization for Columbia-class submarine construction at requested levels, along with temporary increases in budget ceilings to maintain production schedules. The legislation also directed the Department of Defense to evaluate whether the existing nuclear force structure remains adequate in light of adversary developments and to outline steps for implementing the recommendations of a recent strategic posture commission. Congress additionally allocated funds to explore the reintroduction of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, which had previously been canceled.

The United States currently operates a land-based ICBM force composed of LGM-30G Minuteman III missiles deployed in hardened silos across multiple states. These systems provide a rapid-response nuclear strike capability. Their geographic dispersion requires any potential adversary to account for hundreds of launch sites, increasing the complexity of a potential preemptive attack. Originally fielded in the 1970s with a projected 10-year service life, the Minuteman III has been maintained through successive life-extension efforts. However, according to Stratcom, sustaining the system has become increasingly difficult due to its age and the need for obsolete parts. The Air Force is currently developing the LGM-35A Sentinel as a replacement, along with new infrastructure including silos, command facilities, and communications systems. Cotton, who previously led Air Force Global Strike Command, described the Sentinel program as a “mega project,” and current cost estimates reflect its large scale. Despite rising costs and some schedule risks, the Department of Defense maintains that the Sentinel is a necessary replacement. Stratcom officials have stated that further delay could reduce the credibility of the deterrent as the Minuteman III system ages. The current goal is to field the new missile system by the late 2020s, prior to the point at which Minuteman III may no longer be sustainable.

The sea-based component of the U.S. nuclear triad, the most survivable part of the nuclear force, consists of 14 Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with Trident II D5 missiles. (Picture source: US DoD)

The sea-based component of the U.S. nuclear triad consists of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with Trident II D5 missiles. These submarines conduct continuous patrols, operating undetected in international waters. According to the Department of Defense, this makes the sea leg the most survivable part of the nuclear force, with the ability to retaliate in the event of a surprise nuclear strike. The Navy currently operates 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, which entered service in the 1980s and are approaching the end of their operational lifespan. To avoid a gap in undersea deterrence, the Navy has prioritized the Columbia-class SSBN program. This program involves constructing 12 new submarines, starting with the USS District of Columbia, which is expected to begin patrols in the early 2030s. These submarines will initially carry the Trident II D5LE missile but will incorporate new reactor technology, acoustic quieting features, and upgraded electronic systems designed to remain in service through at least 2080. The Navy and Congress have both taken steps to mitigate schedule risk, including additional funding and expanded support for shipyards. Cotton has indicated that, depending on future threat assessments, the Navy may require more than the currently planned 12 Columbia-class SSBNs. For now, the focus remains on maintaining schedule discipline and transitioning to the new class on a one-for-one basis as Ohio-class submarines retire.

The air-based leg of the nuclear triad includes long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Unlike ICBMs or SLBMs, bombers can be launched, recalled, or redirected mid-mission, allowing national leadership more flexibility. The current fleet consists of B-52H Stratofortress and B-2 Spirit aircraft, both capable of delivering nuclear and conventional weapons. The Air Force plans to keep the B-52 in service through the 2050s, upgrading it with new engines, radar systems, and digital avionics. The B-52 is also expected to be the launch platform for the AGM-181 Long-Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile, which is in development to replace the aging ALCM. In parallel, the Air Force is introducing the B-21 Raider, a next-generation stealth bomber designed to penetrate contested airspace. First revealed in 2022, the B-21 will carry both nuclear and conventional payloads. While current plans call for at least 100 aircraft, Cotton has recommended acquiring up to 145 B-21s to meet projected deterrence requirements. He has also emphasized the need to coordinate the B-52’s upgrades with the LRSO program to ensure the platform can field the new missile on schedule. The air leg’s modernization includes not only new aircraft and weapons but also changes to training, operational tactics, and integration with other systems. By the 2030s, the U.S. bomber force is expected to consist of a two-type fleet of B-21s and updated B-52s, designed to provide both standoff and penetrative nuclear delivery options.

Cotton has said that the purpose of nuclear modernization is to maintain credible deterrence, not to prepare for warfighting. He has stated that while non-nuclear capabilities—such as hypersonic missiles, space assets, and cyber tools—contribute to deterrence, the nuclear triad remains the central element in deterring existential threats. U.S. officials have argued that a modern and credible nuclear deterrent strengthens alliance commitments and contributes to broader strategic stability. Cotton and others have stated that failing to modernize Cold War-era systems in time would risk undermining confidence in the U.S. deterrent posture. “If we don’t get it right, we won’t have an opportunity to come back and do it later,” he said in reference to the timeline for replacing legacy systems. He concluded that the United States is currently at a “crossroads of strategic competition,” and that investment in nuclear modernization is viewed by defense planners as a necessary response to global threat developments. U.S. policy continues to emphasize maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent in light of evolving international dynamics.

The US Air Force plans to keep the B-52 Stratofortress, one of its two long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, in service through the 2050s, upgrading it with new engines, radar systems, and digital avionics. (Picture source: US DoD)