Breaking News
France Ready to Build FCAS Next-Generation Fighter Alone as Talks with Partners Stall.
Dassault Aviation CEO Éric Trappier said France can develop the Future Combat Air System’s crewed fighter on its own if negotiations with Germany and Spain fail, a stance echoed in later briefings. The dispute centers on program governance for a “system of systems” built around a stealth New Generation Fighter with drones and a combat cloud, with 2040 still the target to replace aging fleets.
On September 23, 2025, Eric Trappier, CEO of Dassault Aviation, stated that France could develop the future European fighter independently if FCAS negotiations fail. Politico reported on September 25 that a senior French official confirmed this national option, which is open to a European ecosystem of subcontractors. Beyond the standoff, the core issue is the architecture: a “system of systems” built around a stealthy New Generation Fighter, supported by combat drones and linked by a combat cloud. The objectives are information superiority, sensor fusion, interoperability, and resilience against modern air defenses. Key technical choices include target mass, propulsion, and integration of weapons such as Meteor, MICA NG, and stand-off strike capabilities. The 2040 milestone remains the reference to prevent current fleets from aging out.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link
Next generation European airpower concept NGF with unmanned effectors for multi-domain missions (Picture source: WikiCommons)
FCAS, launched in 2017 by France and Germany and later joined by Spain, aims to replace Rafale and Eurofighter around 2040 with a system of systems centered on the New Generation Fighter, assisted by combat drones known as “remote carriers,” and connected by a secure combat cloud for real-time data sharing. The target architecture combines multispectral low observability, sensor fusion, open mission systems, and joint-force interoperability, with an expected weapons set built around Meteor, MICA NG, and stand-off strike options. Dassault claims design authority for the manned fighter, Airbus leads other pillars on behalf of German and Spanish partners, and propulsion relies on Safran, MTU Aero Engines, and ITP Aero. Current debates concern governance, industrial workshare, the 2040 deadline, and technical choices such as target mass and engine sizing, since these parameters shape cost, schedule, and missions, including the contribution to France’s airborne nuclear component.
Regarding the airframe and architecture, the technical aims are defined. The NGF is conceived as a low-observability platform with signature management across multiple bands, numerous but fused sensors, and an open mission system to accelerate insertion of sensors, software, and effectors. Target mass illustrates the trade-offs ahead. Paris favors an aircraft around 15 tonnes to preserve carrier operations for future naval aviation, while Berlin looks toward an 18-tonne air-superiority profile. A heavier design usually implies more fuel and payload but also a more powerful engine, which can extend development. The propulsion partnership brings together Safran with MTU and ITP, which sets an industrial base, but exact sizing will depend on mission choices and schedule constraints.
Sensors and network-centric warfare sit at the heart of the requirement. The NGF will not act alone. It must pilot or coordinate remote carriers of different sizes, some dedicated to sensor extension, others to jamming, and others to carrying weapons. The combat cloud secures links and data distribution in order to shorten the sensor-to-shooter chain. In a patrol, the manned fighter can remain offset, preserve its signature, delegate designation to a drone, and fire by relay. If the network degrades, the crew must retain autonomous options through onboard sensors and weapons of the latest generation. Integration of active-radar BVR missiles, parallel use of a modern imaging infrared seeker for short-range shots, and employment of glide or cruise munitions align with European doctrine that favors cautious penetration supported by distributed effects.
At the tactical and operational level, the benefits are twofold. First, survivability in contested airspace, because role distribution between NGF and remote carriers exerts pressure on the adversary while limiting the fighter’s exposure. Second, the pace of effects, which depends on cycle time between detection, target confirmation, and weapon release. A robust network saves critical minutes. One simple example captures the ambition: the NGF detects, a drone closes in, a second drone jams a radar, a third carries the missiles, the shot is taken from the edge of the adversary’s envelope, then the package withdraws while maintaining a continuous picture. This is credible only if the software architecture and links enable joint interoperability and resilience to electronic attack, an area where European forces expect to be tested.
Focus now centers on architecture and industrial execution. Priority is the NGF pillar with clear design authority to avoid long validation loops, while allocating other pillars transparently among partners. The 2040 schedule remains essential, including because the aircraft must perform critical missions such as the airborne leg of deterrence. Choices on target mass and propulsion determine payload, endurance, carrier recovery, and schedule, while integrating a “system of systems” (remote carriers, combat cloud, sensor fusion) requires early, fixed interfaces to ensure interoperability and cybersecurity. Without timely decisions and tighter governance, the risk is cost and schedule drift and technological fragmentation that would dilute the expected capability gains.