Iran Presents CM-300LA Land-Attack Container Launcher Firing Three Cruise Missiles in Minutes.

Iran showcased the CM-300LA land-attack cruise missile at Serbia’s PARTNER 2025, mounted in a three-cell launcher on a civilian-style 6×6 truck.The subsonic, low-altitude system with 300 km range is designed to set up, fire, and relocate within minutes, complicating detection and counter-fire.

At the PARTNER 2025 defense exhibition in Belgrade, Serbia, Iran presents the CM-300LA, a compact land-attack cruise missile integrated into a rectangular three-round canister on a 6×6 chassis that outwardly resembles a civilian truck. The launcher includes onboard power, a multifunction control console, and auto-leveling to enable rapid “shoot-and-scoot.” The missile is subsonic with a low-altitude profile, including sea-skimming, and an advertised range of around 300 km. The packaging matters because it’s meant to blend in, set up within minutes, launch, and withdraw before counter-battery fire or armed ISR can respond.
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Mock-up of the Iranian CM-300LA Land Attack Cruise Missile Weapon System at Partner 2025 in Serbia (Picture source: Army Recognition)

The container holds three missiles and the complete firing module. Elevation angles run from roughly 10 to 30 degrees, which is enough for coastal shots or inland trajectories without pushing the mount into complex engineering. Auto leveling is stated to take less than five minutes. The launcher rides on a 22,000 kg 6x6 truck that reportedly cruises at 50 to 60 km/h. In plain terms, it can move at the pace of heavy highway traffic. Three rounds per vehicle is a modest load, but it keeps weight and axle stress in check and makes the container dimensions plausible among ordinary freight. Nothing fancy is visible from the outside beyond stabilizers and the rectangular box itself.

Guidance and navigation are described as a digital autopilot with onboard sensors and an inertial navigation core. An optical seeker is offered as an option for terminal refinement. That combination is familiar across many cruise missiles in this range class. It allows an autonomous midcourse and a last-mile adjustment without constant external updates. The absence of detailed references to satellite corrections in the official wording suggests autonomy is the default, which suits a concept that values independence from large fire control chains. The missile’s low altitude flight profile, including sea skimming, reduces exposure to radar by staying in clutter and below many sensors’ optimal look angles. Subsonic speed is a trade that gives more time in flight but enables tighter route shaping around terrain and urban features.

A sealed box hides tooling, cable runs, and the missile’s shape, which complicates visual identification from aerial surveillance or casual ground observation. In traffic, a white cab pulling a drab container blends with the thousands of trucks that move every day. Units can stage under awnings, near tunnel mouths, or inside industrial yards without extensive site preparation. The ability to roll to an unprepared spot, stabilize, fire, and leave in a short window speaks to a survivability model in which the launcher avoids detection rather than tries to ride out an attack. With three missiles per vehicle, a unit can ripple fire to stress local defenses, or stagger launches to test routes and timing.

Operationally, the 300 km envelope allows shots at fuel storage, command nodes, periphery airfields, or critical infrastructure from positions that remain inside national territory. The firing unit does not need heavy external sensors nearby, which trims the radiofrequency footprint and the number of vehicles that must be co located. A small team can handle the sequence with fewer moving parts that give them away. Low altitude routing, particularly along coastlines or through built-up areas, can complicate intercept timelines. Even so, a subsonic cruise missile faces modern point defenses if warned in time, so the system leans on concealment and timing more than speed.

Iran’s defense posture puts a premium on assets that can survive pre launch strikes and still deliver measured effects across the near abroad. A truck that looks like a truck helps. It can be dispersed in depth, stored in ordinary facilities, and activated briefly when an opening appears. This is consistent with a doctrine that favors attrition over parity in the air and allows distributed salvos from many small launch points rather than a few fixed sites. In a crisis involving Israel or coalition airpower, the decisive question is whether enough launchers remain unlocated long enough to shoot again.

Regionally, the introduction of another containerized, road mobile cruise missile adds to an already dense strike ecosystem. Iran has built networks of hardened sites, underground galleries, and covered logistics flows that support small, autonomous units. A system that can hide within ordinary freight patterns fits naturally into that architecture. It also adds a layer of uncertainty for planners trying to neutralize threats preemptively. If a launcher can be parked under a canopy in an industrial park, the intelligence task of finding it on a timeline shrinks the options and drives up the cost of surveillance. That is the quiet utility of this kind of armament. It does not rely on elaborate external support, it does not advertise itself, and it erodes an opponent’s confidence that all the right targets have been found before the first salvo.