Iran unveils upgraded Emad and Qadr ballistic missiles with electronic warfare in hidden tunnels.

Iran’s IRGC Aerospace Force aired footage on October 18 in Tehran that showcased upgraded Emad and Qadr medium-range ballistic missiles from an underground complex. The broadcast, including claims of new electronic warfare measures for Qadr, points to a refinement of Iran’s survivable launch chain and sustained pressure on regional air and missile defenses.

Iran’s state television carried a rare look inside an IRGC “missile city” on October 18, with commanders presenting an upgraded Emad and a Qadr fitted with counter-EW measures intended to protect the launch chain and complicate hostile fire control. The segment emphasized operational missiles mounted on TELs and readied for quick moves between covered galleries and pre-surveyed firing points, a message aimed at domestic audiences and foreign militaries watching Iran’s post-conflict reset. While the broadcast offered limited technical detail, it singled out Qadr’s anti-jamming package and described Emad as modernized and in service.
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According to the broadcast, Emad is upgraded and operational, while Qadr receives electronic warfare equipment intended to disrupt detection and fire-control on the opposing side (Picture source: Mehr Agency)

According to the broadcast, Emad is upgraded and operational, while Qadr receives electronic warfare equipment intended to disrupt detection and fire-control on the opposing side. The underground setting highlights a material-infrastructure pairing: on one hand, modernized missiles; on the other, a tougher launch chain through buried shelters and protected firing procedures. For practitioners, the combination determines acceptable attrition, reset speed, and, ultimately, the credibility of conventional deterrence.

Technically, Emad remains a liquid-fueled MRBM derived from the Shahab-3, with a single-stage architecture and a separable maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). Open sources converge on a diameter of about 1.25 m, a length of roughly 16 to 16.5 m, a launch mass in the 17 to 19 ton range, a typical payload near 750 kg, and a range around 1,700 km. The MaRV, guided by an INS with claimed satellite aids, enables terminal corrections and improves accuracy compared with Shahab-3. Qadr (often transliterated Ghadr), another liquid-fueled derivative of the Shahab-3 family, is optimized for faster setup through airframe lightening and guidance improvements. It retains similar dimensions (diameter about 1.25 m, length about 16 m), carries about 750 kg, and is generally reported with a range between 1,800 and 2,000 km. The element highlighted in the air is the addition of electronic countermeasures around the launch chain, meant to jam or deceive warning sensors and reduce electromagnetic signature before firing.

These features translate directly into employment. Deployed on transporter-erector-launchers and sheltered in underground complexes, Emad and Qadr can leave galleries, move to pre-surveyed firing points, complete a short setup, then return to cover before counterstrikes. Dispersed TELs on multiple routes, the use of decoys, and ECM near launch sites increase the interdiction burden for the attacker. Mixed salvos that combine flight profiles and missile families aim to stress layered defenses and hasten interceptor expenditure. At the operational level, the stated ranges cover the Levant and the entire Gulf from inside Iranian territory, with particular pressure on air bases, ports, and logistics hubs.

The subterranean dimension also serves a deterrent grammar: deep tunnels, armored doors, aligned canisters, and protected circulation convey redundancy of firing cells and the capacity to withdraw. The message is twofold: even if strikes neutralize one sector, other cells remain; even if TELs are caught in the open, the rear area is protected and the production chain retains capacity. In this framework, the countermeasures associated with Qadr are not cosmetic but a survival multiplier at the point of launch, where the trajectory of the first missile in a salvo is decided.

The sequence supports the view of incremental maturation of Iran’s MRBM segment rather than abrupt leaps. For Israel, it sustains vigilance regarding Iranian strategic depth and the need to keep interceptor stockpiles high. For the United States, it complicates active and passive protection of sites in the CENTCOM area and adjacent sea lines, increasing ISR demands and compressing reaction times. For Europe, it aligns with the erosion of earlier arms control arrangements and confirms growing autonomy in Iran’s ballistic enterprise. The October 18 announcement does not by itself change the regional balance, yet it feeds a deterrence competition with shorter warning timelines and rising costs for multi-layered defenses.