Russia secures Port Sudan naval base while Sudanese generals seek air defense shield.

Sudan’s military rulers have revived an offer to give Russia a 25-year naval base on the Red Sea, likely at Port Sudan, in exchange for discounted air defense systems and other weapons to fight the Rapid Support Forces. The move would hand Moscow its first permanent naval foothold in Africa and tighten a three-way contest with the United States and China over control of critical shipping lanes that link the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean.

Sudan’s army leadership has put a detailed base offer back on the table for Moscow, promising long-term access to the Red Sea in return for urgently needed firepower in its civil war with the Rapid Support Forces. According to Sudanese officials cited by the Wall Street Journal and confirmed by subsequent reporting, the draft deal would run for 25 years and allow Russia to deploy up to 300 personnel and berth four warships, including nuclear-powered vessels, in Port Sudan or another nearby facility, while securing priority access to Sudanese mining concessions. In exchange, Khartoum is seeking advanced Russian air defense systems and guided munitions delivered at preferential prices, a package that could quickly harden its urban strongholds and shift the tactical balance along key routes linking the capital to the Red Sea.
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Talks reportedly focus on the potential delivery of S-300PMU2 Favorit air defense systems, whose 64N6E2 radar can detect targets at more than 300 kilometers, as well as the S-350 Vityaz, designed to engage aircraft and missiles within an envelope of roughly 120 kilometers using 9M96E2 interceptors. (Picture source: Vitaly V. Kuzmin)

According to Sudanese officials quoted in the press, the proposal would allow Russia to station around three hundred personnel and to berth four warships at the same time, including nuclear-powered units. Access to a deep water port such as Port Sudan would give the Russian Navy a durable foothold to ease its current logistic constraints, which remain substantial in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Nuclear-powered vessels, able to cover long distances without refueling, could operate in the Red Sea and then move toward the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean without relying on politically uncertain ports of call.

Sudanese officials also describe a military quid pro quo centered on systems that could rapidly affect the tactical balance. Talks reportedly focus on the potential delivery of S-300PMU2 Favorit air defense systems, whose 64N6E2 radar can detect targets at more than 300 kilometers, as well as the S-350 Vityaz, designed to engage aircraft and missiles within an envelope of roughly 120 kilometers using 9M96E2 interceptors. Intermediate layers discussed include the Buk-M2E system, employed against aircraft, drones, and cruise missiles out to about 45 to 50 kilometers, and short range point defense solutions such as the Pantsir-S1, which is particularly adapted to intercepting armed drones and loitering munitions that have become central to the Sudanese front.

The authorities in Khartoum are also seeking regular access to Russian guided munitions, including some variants of KAB laser or satellite-guided bombs, as well as 122 and 220 millimeter rockets fitted with trajectory correction kits. Since 2022, Russia has been promoting exports of tactical and MALE unmanned systems, and platforms such as the Orion-E or, in a more limited way, the Orlan-10E, often delivered with a complete intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance package, are part of the discussions. In return for granting a permanent foothold on the Red Sea, the Sudanese junta expects a package that would reconstitute a multi layered air defense architecture. The combined use of S-300PMU2 systems for high altitude engagement, Buk-M2E for the medium layer and Pantsir-S1 for low altitude coverage would complicate Rapid Support Forces air operations, including those relying on foreign-supplied drones and improvised strike platforms, and would strengthen the protection of Khartoum and Port Sudan.

The talks also cover mining concessions reserved for Russian companies, following patterns already seen in Central Africa or the Sahel with entities linked to Russian security networks. Sudan, the third largest gold producer on the continent, has long attracted structures that combine resource extraction with security services. A naval base on the Red Sea would reinforce the coherence of a logistical corridor allowing personnel, equipment, and strategic commodities to move by sea. For the Sudanese army, such an exchange is expected to help rebalance the correlation of forces against the Rapid Support Forces, which control large parts of Darfur and threaten road links toward the east of the country. The prospect of Russian military support, even if confined to technical assistance and selective deliveries, is already a factor in the calculations of both camps, while Western capitals remain cautious about committing further assets to this theater.

For Moscow, the stakes go far beyond Sudan’s internal conflict. Russia has for years sought a foothold that would allow its fleet to operate beyond its Black Sea and Baltic bases, which are constrained by geography, straits and political tensions. The maintained presence at Tartus in Syria gives access to the Mediterranean but does not guarantee a continuous logistic chain toward the Indian Ocean. A facility on the Red Sea would bring near permanent access to this strategic route while allowing extended deployments toward the Horn of Africa and East Africa, where Western navies remain very active. The capacity to host ships armed with Kalibr cruise missiles, some variants of which can reach more than 1,500 kilometers, would extend the area of Russian military effect over the Arabian Peninsula, the approaches to the Suez Canal and the northern part of the Indian Ocean.

Tactical implications also concern the Sudanese battlefield itself. The arrival of modern air defense systems such as S-300PMU2, Buk-M2E, and Pantsir-S1 would improve the protection of urban centers held by the army, notably Khartoum and Port Sudan, against drones and rockets supplied to rebel forces by external networks. The combination of long range surface to air missiles, electronically scanned array radars, and interconnected command posts would give Khartoum a more coherent air defense bubble than the heterogeneous equipment currently available, while enabling more offensive operations under a stronger protective framework. Ground units, logistics hubs, and critical infrastructure could be less exposed to air and missile attacks, which would affect the mobility and tempo of Rapid Support Forces operations.

At the geopolitical level, a Russian base on the Red Sea would exert lasting pressure on the regional security architecture. Washington would face a sharper strategic contest already underway with Beijing, while Riyadh, Cairo, and Ankara would have to adjust their own red lines in the face of another actor able to influence energy routes and military traffic. A durable Russian military footprint would set a precedent in East Africa and could encourage other asymmetric arrangements between weakened states and external powers. Each new militarized port on this sensitive axis becomes an indicator of an evolving strategic landscape and of the vulnerability of global trade to local crises and external rivalry.