Taiwan speeds domestic drone production to fix supply chain risk tied to China.

Taiwan is fast-tracking military and dual-use drone production while weaning itself off Chinese components, a focus underscored at a Center for a New American Security panel this week. The urgency reflects intelligence and Pentagon assessments that Beijing wants the PLA ready for a cross-strait campaign by 2027, which raises the stakes for scalable, local drone capacity.

Taipei is moving from pilots to production on uncrewed systems, and it is doing so at speed. At a CNAS discussion on drones and deterrence, experts described a whole-of-government push to expand output, stand up new military drone units, and replace China-sourced electronics with domestic or allied alternatives, all within a narrowing timeline. Recent reporting and official statements point to new army drone formations, sea drones for the navy, and industry deals that pair local manufacturers with Western software to scale first-person-view and loitering munition designs.
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Taiwan’s defense industrial base, led by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), presents a new generation of indigenous platforms, including the Albatross II, a MALE UAV for surveillance and strike (Picture source: WikiCommons)

Taiwan’s defense industrial base, led by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), presents a new generation of indigenous platforms, including the Albatross II, a MALE UAV for surveillance and strike. Shown at the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition 2025, the system combines a modular EO/IR suite, redundant data links for beyond-line-of-sight operations, and a wing design providing more than 16 hours of endurance. The airframe uses a rear-propeller layout powered by a multi-fuel engine of about 100 hp, yielding an operating radius of roughly 250 kilometers suited to maritime interdiction and over-water ISR. These technical choices aim to sustain persistent effects without overloading logistics.

In the near term, Taipei sets a production target of 180,000 drones per year by 2028, compared with a baseline of about 10,000 units in 2024. Hong-Lun Tiunn of the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology notes that the priority is to build a non-dependent supply chain able to provide repair and resupply under wartime conditions. Experience from Ukraine weighs heavily. Rapid attrition and field improvisation impose short cycles. Hence an industrial strategy combining mass production of expendable quadcopters for tactical units with the development of higher-end armed UAVs integrated into multilayered defense.

Uncrewed systems sit at the center of the asymmetric deterrence posture. By altitude layers, loitering munitions and micro-UAVs feed the maritime and air operational picture, while MALE vectors such as the Albatross II or Cardinal variants extend maritime surveillance to 200 nautical miles under EMCON. These platforms support counter-landing operations, target amphibious flotillas and logistics nodes with guided munitions, or act as forward sensors for naval strike groups. Networking through secure line-of-sight and satellite links maintains interoperability with U.S.-origin systems and JADC2 architectures, sustaining the COP under jamming pressure.

Strategically, Taiwan’s drone expansion echoes the U.S. Replicator initiative, designed to address China’s numerical advantage through rapid deployment of distributed effectors. Although the trajectory under the new administration in Washington remains unclear, Tiunn confirms that Taipei’s procurement reforms and accelerated timelines draw directly on distributed-production logic. The objective is “quantity with quality,” meaning scale without undermining reliability, in a fight expected to unfold under heavy electronic warfare and supply-chain strain.

The implications extend beyond the Taiwan Strait. China’s focus on uncrewed systems and precision-strike networks reshapes regional balances and pushes allies to diversify sensor-to-shooter loops. Taiwan’s quest for self-sufficiency, combined with deeper co-production with U.S. and Japanese partners, can serve as a template for resilient defense ecosystems. In an Indo-Pacific offset competition, the island’s drone strategy seeks not parity but survival through industrial autonomy, deterrence through persistence, and endurance in a conflict that could turn on the pace of adaptation once the first salvos are fired.