Breaking News
U.S. Aims a Massive Fleet of Low-Cost Attack Drones to Reshape Future Warfare Dynamics.
The U.S. War Department announced an effort to field hundreds of thousands of low-cost attack drones, a move framed as central to President Trump’s drone dominance agenda. The initiative comes amid heightened friction with Venezuela and signals a shift toward high-tempo operations built around expendable unmanned systems.
On December 2, 2025, the U.S. War Department formally signaled its ambition to field hundreds of thousands of inexpensive, expendable attack drones, framing the move as a cornerstone of President Donald J. Trump’s “drone dominance” agenda. Announced at a moment of acute tension with Venezuela and a major U.S. naval deployment in the Caribbean, this industrial push is intended not only to transform American force structure, but also to underwrite a new way of waging limited, high-tempo operations against state and non-state adversaries. For Washington, mass-produced small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) promise to reconcile budgetary constraints with expanding operational commitments.
U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. launches a small drone during training in Queensland, Australia, July 2025, reflecting the War Department’s drone dominance push (Picture Source: U.S. Department of War)
The War Department’s latest request for information (RFI) asks U.S. industry to demonstrate the capacity to deliver approximately 300,000 small, one-way-attack unmanned aerial systems over a two-year period, beginning in early 2026, under a framework known as the Drone Dominance program. These systems, broadly comparable to short-range loitering munitions, are conceived as compact, lethal platforms designed for precision strikes, saturation attacks and support to artillery and maritime interdiction missions. Building on the “Unleashing American Drone Dominance” executive order signed in June and the subsequent “Unleashing U.S. Military Drone Dominance” memorandum issued by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in July, the program combines regulatory easing, fast-track approvals of American-made platforms, and a deliberate effort to shift decision-making authority from central bureaucracy down to operational commanders. The core idea is to secure a predictable, multi-year demand signal so that private capital can scale production lines and supply chains, transforming a nascent small-drone sector into a mature industrial base capable of sustained output for both training and combat operations.
In essence, the effort aims to transform small, armed drones into a standardized, low-cost ammunition-like capability rather than a niche asset. The request for information outlines four consecutive gauntlet phases beginning in February 2026, during which a competitive group of vendors will ramp up production while steadily reducing unit costs. The initial phase envisions twelve suppliers delivering a total of 30,000 attack drones at about $5,000 per system, for a War Department outlay of roughly $150 million. By the final phase, the department expects to narrow the field to five vendors and raise orders to approximately 150,000 units, targeting a price near $2,300 per drone. In battlefield terms, this approach would allow combat units to treat these drones as consumables, enabling frequent, high-tempo sorties in support of ground and maritime operations. Simultaneously, Hegseth has indicated that this hardware surge will be paired with corresponding updates to doctrine and training, with force-on-force drone-warfare exercises becoming routine from 2026 onward to institutionalize mass drone employment at the lowest tactical levels.
From a budgetary standpoint, the Drone Dominance initiative is anchored in a two-year, one-billion-dollar envelope drawn from what the administration itself brands the “Big Beautiful Bill,” earmarked to finance the production of roughly 340,000 sUAS for combat units. This implies an average program cost of just under 3,000 dollars per system, a deliberate break with three decades of U.S. practice that favored small quantities of highly sophisticated platforms over mass procurement of cheaper systems. Secretary Hegseth has explicitly argued that the United States can no longer afford to intercept low-cost drones with missiles priced in the millions, nor rely exclusively on exquisite aircraft and munitions in an era defined by attrition warfare and saturation attacks. The budget design therefore aims to compress unit prices through economies of scale while preserving headroom for the integration of improved sensors, navigation and warheads over time, without undermining the expendable character of the systems. At the same time, such a billion-dollar commitment, effectively acting as an industrial policy tool in favor of the domestic drone supply chain, inevitably interacts with other procurement priorities in air defence, precision munitions and manned platforms inside the broader U.S. defense budget.
Strategically, the initiative reflects lessons drawn from recent conflicts, particularly Ukraine, where cheap, disposable drones, often improvised from commercial components, have shifted the balance in artillery duels, reconnaissance and precision strikes at short and medium ranges. For Washington, ensuring that U.S. forces can fight and train with comparable, domestically produced systems is seen as essential to maintaining credibility against peer competitors and non-state actors alike. The administration’s narrative frames Drone Dominance as a “technological leapfrog,” enabling U.S. units to field swarms of American-made drones rather than relying on foreign supply chains or being outpaced by adversaries that have embraced low-cost unmanned platforms. The emphasis on integrating small drones into every relevant training scenario, combined with a stated “fight tonight” philosophy, suggests that these systems are viewed not as niche tools for special operations, but as basic equipment for infantry, maritime security forces and joint task forces.
This industrial and doctrinal shift is unfolding against the backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating U.S.–Venezuelan standoff. By late 2025, Washington has assembled its largest deployment to Latin America in decades, with around 11 warships and some 15,000 personnel in the southern Caribbean under Operation Southern Spear, officially aimed at narcotrafficking. More than twenty strikes on suspected drug boats have left over eighty dead and triggered an increasingly tense debate in Congress over the limits of presidential war powers, as lawmakers push for a formal vote before any escalation to strikes on Venezuelan territory. Caracas has responded with large-scale military exercises, reinforcement of coastal units and drones, and highly politicised measures such as revoking the flight rights of several international airlines after U.S. aviation authorities warned of heightened military risks in Venezuelan airspace. In this environment, a program designed to deliver hundreds of thousands of low-cost attack drones has direct implications for crisis management in the Caribbean: small, one-way-attack sUAS are well suited to dispersed maritime interdiction, close-in coastal strikes and highly discriminating engagements against small craft, and their relatively low cost and minimal logistical footprint lower the threshold for repeated kinetic action. At the same time, the wider and more routine their use becomes in congested and contested air and maritime spaces off Venezuela, the greater the risk of reciprocal unmanned engagements, misidentification incidents and unintended escalation, especially as Venezuelan forces and aligned non-state actors seek to expand their own drone capabilities.
Beyond the immediate U.S.–Venezuelan standoff, the Drone Dominance program is likely to accelerate a broader arms-diffusion dynamic. By investing in an industrial base capable of generating large volumes of inexpensive attack drones, Washington not only equips its own forces but also creates a scalable supply source for allies and partners confronted with similar challenges, from gray-zone maritime coercion to cross-border criminal networks. At the same time, the visibility of this effort will incentivize rival suppliers, most notably Russia, Iran and China, to deepen their own drone cooperation with states such as Venezuela, which already positions itself as part of a wider anti-U.S. camp. In such an environment, the availability of cheap unmanned strike platforms risks becoming a key indicator of alignment, further entangling regional crises with global technological competition and complicating any effort at arms-control or confidence-building measures.
The War Department’s choice to place mass-produced attack drones at the core of future U.S. force design represents a significant structural shift, signalling a move back toward volume as a deliberate complement to high-end platforms. Framed by a dedicated billion-dollar budget line yet conceived as a longer-term evolution of doctrine and industrial capacity, the Drone Dominance program is poised to influence how Washington approaches crisis management from Eastern Europe to the Caribbean, including the current tensions with Venezuela. If the initiative achieves its objectives, reducing costs, expanding the number of available systems and integrating unmanned capabilities across the force, it will provide U.S. decision-makers with a wider set of military options at lower marginal expense. At the same time, it will place additional pressure on existing legal frameworks, alliance dynamics and mechanisms for escalation control in environments where political stakes are high and operational margins are narrow. How this new mass of unmanned capabilities is employed, in the Venezuelan context and in other theaters, will ultimately determine whether drone dominance contributes to deterrence and stability or adds further complexity to an already contested strategic landscape.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.