U.S. Army Picks Nine Bases for Janus Microreactors to Secure Mission Power in High-Tempo Ops.

The U.S. Army has moved its Janus microreactor program into full execution by naming nine candidate bases and requesting proposals through the Defense Innovation Unit. The effort aims to give major installations resilient nuclear power as digital warfighting systems push energy demand beyond what aging civilian grids can provide.

The U.S. Army announced on November 18, 2025, that the service has moved its Janus Program into a concrete execution phase by naming nine candidate installations for microreactor power plants and launching an industry call through the Defense Innovation Unit. Behind that bureaucratic step lies a blunt operational problem: aging grids, fragile fuel logistics, and surging demand from digital warfighting systems that can no longer depend on commercial power alone. Janus is designed to turn nuclear energy into a deliberate instrument of mission assurance.
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The U.S. Army's Janus Program advances toward prototype deployment, aiming to field next-generation microreactor power plants that provide resilient, grid-independent energy for critical missions and future high-demand systems across key installations (Picture source: Army Recognition Edit).

The Army’s own problem statement is stark: installations rely on vulnerable civilian grids and long liquid-fuel supply chains to power command posts, depots, simulators, airfields, and data centers. Frequent grid disruptions and limited backup capacity threaten command and control, communications, and logistics functions, undercutting readiness and training tempo. Advanced sensors, AI-enabled C2, and future directed-energy systems are pushing power demand sharply upward, while adversaries gain more tools to disrupt civilian infrastructure. Janus answers that vulnerability by treating resilient energy as a warfighting requirement, not a utility issue.

At its core, Janus aims to field a suite of Microreactor Power Plants that can deliver from kilowatt-level output up to roughly 20 MWe and about 60 MWth, with continuous power provision over a 30-year lifecycle by refueling or replacing modules as needed. The reactors will be commercially owned and operated but regulated by the Army under its authority derived from section 91b of the Atomic Energy Act and implemented through Army Regulation 50-7, giving the service a bespoke, defense-focused regulatory regime. Prototypes are expected to follow a first-of-a-kind and second-of-a-kind sequence, with lessons from the initial units feeding rapidly into more mature designs and eventually into serial production.

Janus microreactors are scoped to use nuclear fuel enriched to 20% or less, the high-assay low-enriched band that is legal for defense purposes yet significantly below weapons-grade material. Vendor designs must emphasize passive safety, ensuring that key safety functions are preserved without active intervention and that radiation at the site boundary remains within federal limits even in abnormal conditions. They are also expected to withstand seismic events, flooding, and other natural hazards, while integrating with base power infrastructure and providing both grid-connected and black-start capability. In practical terms, a 20 MWe unit could shoulder a large share of an installation’s critical loads: surveillance and fire-control radars, hardened data centers, hospital complexes, and climate control for ammunition or missile stocks.

The program’s acquisition and prototyping strategy is as important as the technology itself. In partnership with DIU, the Army is using the Commercial Solutions Opening and Other Transaction Authority framework, modeled in part on NASA’s COTS approach, to move quickly from paper to hardware and to force industry to share risk through private capital contributions rather than relying solely on government funds. The Janus Area of Interest encourages vendors to propose full life-cycle concepts, from design and licensing through decommissioning and waste removal, and to articulate a credible path from FOAK to SOAK to true nth-of-a-kind production. That structure is meant to compress learning cycles, mature a domestic nuclear supply chain, and avoid bespoke, one-off reactors that cannot be replicated at scale.

The initial nine candidate installations show how the Army thinks about operational payoff: Fort Benning, Fort Bragg, Fort Campbell, Fort Drum, Fort Hood, Fort Wainwright, Holston Army Ammunition Plant, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and Redstone Arsenal. At Holston, a microreactor could underpin continuous energetics production and safety-critical chemical processes. At Fort Wainwright, it could supply both electricity and heat in a harsh Arctic environment where fuel convoys are costly and vulnerable. At power-projection hubs like Joint Base Lewis-McChord, nuclear-backed energy could keep railheads, airfields, and deployment IT infrastructure operating even if regional grids are compromised by cyberattack or physical sabotage.

Army leaders are explicit that Janus is about more than keeping garrison lights on. Senior officials frame the program as “about warfighting power,” tying microreactors directly to training, deployment, and combat credibility. Official concept language points to “non-permanent operations” that could eventually benefit from similar technologies, a clear nod to future forward logistics hubs, island-based missile defense clusters in the Indo-Pacific, or persistent ISR and radar sites on NATO’s eastern flank where grid power is limited or adversary pressure is constant. Lessons from earlier Pentagon microreactor initiatives, including transportable reactor concepts, are deliberately carried into Janus to ensure that fixed-installation designs inform future expeditionary energy options.

The Army Reactor Program and its updated AR 50-7 framework are being retooled to cover a new generation of installation and expeditionary power reactors, with modern, performance-based dose and safety criteria aligned to international standards. Operating under its own regulator, rather than the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, allows the Army to tailor requirements to defense missions while still meeting or exceeding civilian safety benchmarks, shortening licensing timelines without relaxing standards.

Janus also functions as an industrial policy: by demanding qualified nuclear-grade supply chains, credible fuel-enrichment and fabrication plans, and financed decommissioning and waste strategies, the program forces vendors to help rebuild sovereign U.S. nuclear manufacturing capacity with spillover potential into commercial grids and allied defense markets. For NATO partners worried about energy coercion and Indo-Pacific allies planning hardened, grid-independent facilities, a proven Army microreactor model could quickly become an exportable template.

If Janus succeeds, the payoff is straightforward but strategically significant. Indeed, brigade combat teams will train on installations that no longer lose critical systems to local blackouts or fuel shortages, munitions lines will not sit idle for lack of diesel, and power-hungry capabilities like integrated air and missile defense, AI-enabled C2, and future directed-energy weapons will have a dedicated, hardened energy spine. The risks are real, from community acceptance and physical security to the discipline required to operate reactors over decades, but the direction is set: the Army is treating energy as a contested domain.