U.S. Army uses plywood tank decoys in Hawaii to sharpen Indo-Pacific combat readiness.

The U.S. Army is using plywood tank decoys mounted on Humvees and pickup trucks during Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center rotation 26-01 in Hawaii, a multi-domain exercise that ran in early to mid-November 2025. The improvised “opposing force tank simulation set” is meant to harden 25th Infantry Division units for Indo Pacific scenarios where distinguishing real armored threats from decoys and logistics vehicles could decide the opening hours of a crisis.

Photographs released in Hawaii on 25 November 2025 show an unusual sight in U.S. Army training: plywood tank silhouettes bolted onto Humvees and civilian pickups rolling through jungle valleys and coastal roads. The images come from Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center rotation 26-01, a large joint and multinational exercise that U.S. Army Pacific uses to rehearse combat in the islands, straits and cluttered approaches that define the Pacific theater. Instead of shipping heavy tracked armor across the ocean, planners have fielded a low cost “opposing force tank simulation set” that mimics mechanized threats at scale while staying easy to move and repair. The concept fits a broader JPMRC trend, stressing realistic terrain, multi domain effects and cognitive pressure on units more than hardware parity with a peer adversary.
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An opposing force tank simulation set occupies a battle position during Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center Rotation 26-01 at Kahuku Training Area, Hawaii, on Nov. 11, 2025. (Picture source: US DoD)

United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) uses the Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) as an advanced training center tailored to the geographical realities of the Pacific theater. Rotation 26-01 focuses in particular on the 3rd Mobile Brigade (3MBDE), the 25th Infantry Division Artillery (DIVARTY), and the 125th Division Signal Battalion, assessed in a demanding joint and multinational setting. The tank decoys, introduced as an “opposing force tank simulation set,” create the illusion of armored elements maneuvering in compartmented terrain. Planners disperse these silhouettes in training villages, narrow corridors, or elevated positions, forcing units to combine reconnaissance, visual identification, and fire coordination. The aim is to prevent any vehicle perceived as logistical from automatically being regarded as non-threatening by training soldiers to check, confirm, and engage according to procedure.

The opposing force tank simulation set is based on plywood structures mounted on High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) or civilian pickup trucks. A HMMWV, able to carry between one and two tons and to exceed 100 km/h on roads, allows these mock tanks to be repositioned rapidly to vary scenarios. Civilian pickups add another level of realism by reproducing the mobility and improvised silhouettes observed on recent battlefields. The U.S. Army stresses the low cost of these systems, which are easy to maintain and repair compared with tracked platforms, whose deployment to Hawaii would require sealift, support teams, and much higher budgets.

During JPMRC rotations, the opposing force combines these mobile decoys with real vehicles, drones, and sensors to reproduce the behavior of a contemporary adversary. A plywood armored silhouette positioned hull-down and supported by a small unmanned aerial system orbiting overhead pushes units to adjust their tactical patterns. Reconnaissance teams and infantry sections learn to treat any armored-looking shape as a potential threat until it is clearly identified. Fire support officers refine target acquisition by cross-checking visual observations with data from higher-echelon sensors, while commanders practice rapid decision-making when a formation resembling a mechanized thrust appears on a flank. The intended cognitive effect remains central even if no live ammunition is fired.

At the tactical and operational level, these wooden tanks primarily serve to accustom U.S. units to facing a mechanized or motorized adversary able to conceal itself, disperse, and reappear along unexpected axes. In the Hawaiian jungle and constrained coastal terrain, limitations on mobility, visibility, and target identification mirror the conditions U.S. forces expect in contested archipelagos of the western Pacific. These simulated versions, easy to multiply and redeploy, push brigades to maintain coherent combined-arms schemes, linking ground maneuver, air support, ISR drones, and long-range fires to counter a mechanized push seeking to saturate a given axis. Signal units also find direct value in this framework: they can test network robustness and continuity of digital flows in a degraded electromagnetic environment, a plausible scenario in a confrontation with a regional competitor equipped with advanced jamming capabilities. The result is a demanding training environment where rapid reaction, sensor-to-shooter integration, and the ability to retain the initiative matter more than simple material superiority.

The use of plywood decoys also addresses a strategic requirement specific to the Indo Pacific theater, which is to prepare U.S. forces for an adversary investing heavily in anti-access capabilities and saturation strategies. Replica armored vehicles make it possible to simulate a mass of tactical assets that the United States could face in a regional coercion scenario, whether through mechanized forces projected onto a held coastline or motorized groupings in dense urban areas. By training to identify, categorize and engage these threats in constrained terrain, U.S. brigades develop habits needed to counter an adversary able to combine concealment, dispersion, mobility, and decoys. This approach also encourages tactical innovation, as each unit develops more refined methods for distinguishing a real armored grouping from a fictitious formation intended to absorb fires and sensors.

The Indo-Pacific remains characterized by enduring strategic competition, structured around the rise of the People’s Republic of China, tensions around Taiwan, frictions in the South China Sea, and the gradual militarization of several archipelagos. The United States considers that any high-intensity conflict in this region would involve operations on islands, in sensor-saturated environments, with opposing forces able to conduct limited mechanized actions to seize key points. By integrating simulated armored vehicles into a multi-domain rotation in Hawaii, USARPAC prepares its brigades for combat in which decision speed, the ability to absorb surprise, and the capacity to distinguish a real threat from a false signature could determine the outcome of the first hours of a crisis.