U.S. Troops in Estonia Disable Unidentified Drone Over NATO Outpost Near Russian Border.

Two unidentified drones were detected near Estonia’s Reedo Barracks, home to U.S. Army units, prompting allied troops to disable one using an anti-drone rifle. The incident underscores NATO’s growing emphasis on counter-drone defense near the Russian border.

The Estonian Public Broadcasting ERR disclosed on October 28, 2025, that two unidentified drones were detected at 4:30 p.m. on October 17 in the immediate vicinity of the Estonian Defense Forces’ Reedo Barracks in South Estonia, a base where U.S. troops are stationed. The U.S. troops used an anti-drone rifle to bring one aircraft down. EDF Headquarters spokesperson Liis Vaksmann said the Defense Forces, working with the Police and Border Guard Board, searched for the wreckage but did not find it and declined to provide further security details.
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Reedo Barracks, South Estonia, where NATO forces used an anti-drone rifle to disable an unidentified UAV detected near the base, located just 30 kilometers from the Russian border (Picture source: Social media/ U.S. Army).

Reedo Barracks hosts the U.S. Army’s 5th Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, an armored reconnaissance unit whose sensors and communications packages are highly sensitive in peacetime and decisive in a crisis. The site’s location near Võru puts it close to Russia, measured variously as less than 30 kilometers straight and roughly 35 kilometers by road to the Luhamaa border crossing. These distances explain why even a small quadcopter near the fence triggers a rapid allied response.

There is no public description of the drones themselves, no photographs and no confirmed origin. What is disclosed is the method of neutralization: a handheld anti-drone rifle. These are electronic-attack devices that project energy into the control and navigation links typically used by small unmanned aircraft, including 2.4 and 5.8 GHz command and video bands and satellite navigation signals. When jammed, most commercial-class drones either descend, hover aimlessly or attempt to return to a pre-programmed home point, outcomes that can make debris recovery uncertain in wooded terrain. Manufacturer data for widely fielded systems such as the U.S.-made Dronebuster and the Lithuanian EDM4S describe exactly these effects, though Estonian officials have not identified the specific model used at Reedo.

The absence of wreckage is therefore not the telltale of a cover-up but a predictable consequence of non-kinetic neutralization. Jamming a drone at standoff distance might induce an automated return flight in a direction that is unknown to the responding unit or cause a soft landing in thick forest beyond a base perimeter. ERR’s report that a combined EDF and police search found nothing lines up with how these systems work against small, commercially derived airframes.

This incident matters for three reasons that go well beyond local nuisance. First, it occurred over a base that stages U.S. forces within quick reach of Russia. Reedo opened as part of Estonia’s push to reinforce the south and can accommodate about 1,000 allied and Estonian personnel, giving NATO a ready platform for rapid reinforcement and pre-planned dispersal. In the current geopolitical context, that makes it a high-value target for probing, mapping and information operations.

Second, the response shows that counter-UAS is now a routine part of base defense down to the squad or platoon level. U.S. units training at Camp Reedo this year have exercised with handheld jammers, underscoring that allied forces no longer reserve drone defense for radars and missiles but field it at the point of need. That aligns with the quick, proportional use of a jammer rather than a kinetic interceptor on October 17.

Third, the event fits a wider pattern of hybrid pressure around the Baltic region, where airspace incidents and gray-zone activities have raised alert levels for months. In May, Estonia reported a Russian fighter violating its airspace during NATO drills, a reminder that the threshold between nuisance and provocation can shift quickly and that decision speed matters. Reedo’s proximity to the border and its U.S. footprint put it on the front line of that friction.

Estonia is not treating this as a one-off. Beyond military measures, Tallinn is building a state-led drone-defense architecture along the eastern frontier. The Police and Border Guard Board has outlined a 20 million euro “drone wall” that will cover the entire border with Russia and be completed by 2027, integrating sensors and defeat mechanisms to counter smuggling and more malign uses. The layered posture from handheld jammers at bases like Reedo up through national networks is the right answer to a low-cost, high-frequency threat.

The bottom line is that forward U.S. sites in the Baltics are important, deliberately discreet and increasingly scrutinized. A mystery drone over a staging area for American cavalry is a test of NATO’s base-defense playbook and a signal that probing will continue. ERR’s decision to confirm the incident while withholding technical specifics strikes a balance between public assurance and operational security, and it telegraphs a clear message to would-be operators near allied installations in Estonia. The next time a drone crosses the wire, allied forces have both the authority and the tools to act.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.