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Ukrainian FPV Strike on Russian Osa AKM Short-Range Air Defense Reveals Frontline Coverage Gaps.
A new video from Ukraine’s 413th Regiment Raid shows an FPV drone striking a Russian Osa AKM air defense vehicle on the frontline. The incident underscores how low-cost drones continue to bypass older Soviet designed systems that once formed the backbone of Russia’s short-range protection.
On 27 November 2025, a new combat video circulated online showing Ukraine’s 413th Regiment “Raid” of the Unmanned Systems Forces using an FPV drone to hit a Russian 9K33 Osa-AKM short-range air defense system. The footage, published on the unit’s social media and relayed by the Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi, shows the drone approaching slowly before striking the radar array of the vehicle-mounted launcher. This episode is not an isolated incident but another indicator of how relatively inexpensive FPV platforms are systematically eroding the protection once provided by Soviet-era air defenses. For Ukraine and its partners, the strike is relevant as it highlights both the tactical flexibility of unmanned systems and the persistent vulnerabilities in Russia’s much-publicized layered air defense concept.
Ukrainian FPV operators released new footage showing their drone destroying a Russian Osa AKM short-range air defense system, a hit that points to ongoing gaps in Russia’s frontline protection (Picture Source: Vitaly Kuzmin / Ukraine’s 413th Regiment)
The system targeted in the video, the 9K33 Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko in NATO terminology), is a self-propelled, short-range surface-to-air missile system designed in the Soviet Union to protect maneuver units and rear areas from low-altitude aircraft, helicopters and cruise-missile-type threats. Mounted on a 6x6 amphibious chassis, the Osa-AKM carries six ready-to-fire 9M33-series missiles in canister launchers and combines both target-acquisition and fire-control radar on a single vehicle. Its engagement envelope typically extends from around 1.5 to 10 km in range and 25 m to roughly 5 km in altitude, with the ability to guide two missiles simultaneously against a single aerial target. In theory, such a system should provide a robust shield against low-flying threats. In practice, the emergence of compact FPV drones with very small radar signatures and extremely low flight profiles has created a target set for which Osa-AKM was never originally optimised.
Operationally, the 9K33 Osa series has been in service since the early 1970s and continues to be used by Russia and several other countries, including Ukraine. During the ongoing full-scale war, Ukrainian forces have recorded numerous instances of Osa systems being destroyed by drones and precision strikes, including FPV drone attacks and strikes guided by reconnaissance UAVs in areas such as Kherson. According to official Ukrainian reports, the 413th “Raid” Regiment has previously been credited with eliminating Russian Osa units using UAVs. The latest video reinforces a consistent trend: Soviet-era short-range air defense systems, originally designed to counter high-speed aircraft, are increasingly vulnerable to swarms of inexpensive, manually piloted FPV drones that take advantage of terrain masking, slow approach speeds, and minimal radar signatures. Each successful strike not only eliminates a launcher from active use but also compels its withdrawal for repairs, leading to temporary gaps in local air defense coverage.
From a tactical perspective, the combination of FPV drones and units such as the “Raid” Regiment delivers several advantages over traditional artillery or missile strikes against short-range air defense assets. Operators can slowly steer the drone through dead ground, tree lines and built-up areas, approaching from angles or altitudes where the Osa-AKM’s radar is degraded by clutter or remains switched off to reduce the risk of detection by Ukrainian electronic intelligence. Even when the air defense crew keeps the radar active, the drone’s small radar cross-section and relatively low speed make it harder to detect and track within the engagement envelope for which the system’s algorithms were designed. Once in visual range, the operator can deliberately aim at the most sensitive components, radar antennas, tracking sensors or missile canisters, maximising the probability that the system will be disabled or destroyed with a single, inexpensive munition. This cost-exchange ratio is highly asymmetrical: a low-cost FPV platform neutralising a vehicle-mounted missile system represents a favourable trade for Ukraine, while the resulting hole in coverage allows heavier assets, from larger drones to guided artillery or missile systems, to strike command posts or ammunition depots that were previously protected.
The vulnerability of Soviet-era air defense systems to modern drone tactics is increasingly evident, as these systems were originally designed for high-speed aircraft and struggle to detect and engage small, low-signature drones. Despite Russia’s doctrinal emphasis on a multilayered air defense network integrating long-, medium-, and short-range systems with electronic warfare and counter-UAV measures, many of these systems remain tactically ineffective against swarms of inexpensive FPV and reconnaissance drones due to limited radar sensitivity, slow reaction times, and insufficient short-range counter-drone capabilities. This gap between doctrine and operational reality results in frequent successful drone strikes that degrade local air defense coverage, underscoring the urgent need for new sensing technologies, faster decision-making processes, and layered protection specifically tailored to counter mass drone threats. Legacy air defenses without integrated anti-drone defenses face increasing exposure and reduced survivability on the modern battlefield.
This latest Osa-AKM loss may appear marginal compared with the scale of the conflict, yet it encapsulates a decisive shift in the offense–defense balance: low-cost FPV drones operated by specialised Ukrainian units are consistently opening corridors through which heavier strike systems can reach high-value rear targets, while Russian countermeasures against such threats remain either insufficient or poorly deployed. As more evidence accumulates of Soviet-designed systems being disabled by improvised unmanned platforms, the Ukrainian “Raid” strike stands as another concrete example that air defense without effective counter-FPV and counter-UAS layers is no longer capable of guaranteeing protection on a modern, drone-saturated battlefield.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.