US Sends Anti-Drone Defenses to Denmark for European Council Summit After Drone incursions.

Denmark will receive U.S. anti-drone capabilities to help secure the European Council summit in Copenhagen after a wave of unidentified drone incursions disrupted air traffic. The deployment aims to protect leaders and airspace, limit airport closures, and deter hybrid threats during a high-profile gathering.

According to the Danish Ministry of Defence on 30 September 2025, the United States will provide Denmark with anti-drone capabilities to secure the European Council summit in Copenhagen. The announcement follows several incursions by unidentified drones that disrupted air traffic and led to temporary airport closures, while overflights were also reported near sensitive sites.
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A U.S. Air Force Security Forces defender uses a Dronebuster counter small unmanned aerial system device during C-UAS training in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility on April 11, 2024. (Picture source: US DoD )

Danish authorities describe these events as part of a hybrid threat intended to probe defenses, create uncertainty, and affect the conduct of the summit. Police and armed forces have increased surveillance of official routes and critical perimeters, while civilian drone flights are banned over the capital until 3 October to avoid confusion between authorized platforms and intrusive devices. The alert level for energy infrastructure has been raised to Orange, the second-highest tier of the national scale, to harden protection for terminals, compressor stations, substations, and critical access points.

No public announcement has specified the exact equipment sent by Washington. Public communications refer only to the delivery of counter-UAS capabilities tailored to site protection and area coverage during the summit. This lack of detail is common for temporary deployments linked to high-visibility events, and the configuration can vary with urban terrain, electromagnetic congestion, and rules for use in densely populated areas.

In practice, the likely architecture is modular and combines several complementary components. The first relates to multi-sensor detection with radars optimized for slow, small targets, radio-frequency sensors that identify and geolocate control links, and electro-optical and infrared means for visual confirmation and tracking. The second concerns electronic neutralization, notably targeted jamming of control links or satellite positioning to force loss of control or landing. The third, more restricted in urban environments, involves directed-energy or low-collateral kinetic intercepts, reserved for cases where electronic neutralization is insufficient.

Several systems available to the United States or partners illustrate this range. The MyDefence Wingman and Pitbull pair, already ordered in volume by the US Army, combines portable RF detection and jamming for close-in protection of deployed units and access points. Vehicle-mounted solutions such as Northrop Grumman’s M-ACE integrate radar, RF sensors, imaging, and a turreted intercept option to cover wider perimeters around sensitive sites and VIP routes. Directed-energy systems such as Epirus Leonidas or the THOR demonstrator, based on high-power microwaves, target groups of drones; their use is conditioned by public safety and deconfliction constraints in urban areas.

Newer solutions such as Honeywell’s SAMURAI, reflect the trend toward handling coordinated swarm attacks through sensor fusion and faster decision algorithms. For an international event, these capabilities are typically combined with strict management of very-low-altitude airspace and real-time coordination between police, military units, and air traffic control to avoid interference with authorized platforms and maintain continuity of operations.

These measures align with an established approach for European summits and state visits. The model relies on a layered, allied-interoperable anti-drone bubble that prioritizes early detection, non-kinetic neutralization when feasible, and intercept options as a last resort. In Denmark’s case, the absence of model-level detail does not prevent characterizing the general approach, which aims to reduce operational risk without adding excessive constraints in an urban setting already burdened by security requirements.