US Strategic Command warns Iran now holds Middle East’s largest ballistic missile arsenal.

The 2025 Congressional Posture Statement from the United States Strategic Command noted that, alongside its nuclear advances, Iran has built the Middle East’s largest and most diverse arsenal of conventional ballistic missiles. In 2022, U.S. Central Command's General Kenneth McKenzie already noted that Iran possesses an arsenal of over 3,000 ballistic missiles—surpassing any other regional power. These missiles, of various ranges and types, give Tehran a formidable capability to strike targets throughout the region. Iran demonstrated this reach starkly in 2024, when it employed ballistic missiles in attacks against Israel. The growing size and sophistication of Iran’s missile force have elevated concerns for the U.S., as Tehran’s missiles, combined with its nuclear potential, pose a complex deterrence challenge.
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In an operation code-named “True Promise,” Iran launched roughly 180 ballistic missiles at Israeli targets—the first direct Iranian missile attack on Israel in history. (Picture source: IRNA)

Over the past decades, Iran’s missile program has transformed from a small inventory of 1980s-era Scud missiles into a broad array of indigenously produced systems. U.S. Central Command assessments in 2022 stated that Iran had “over 3,000” ballistic missiles ready, reflecting years of steady expansion. Tehran has significantly improved the precision and accuracy of its missiles over the last ten years, enhancing their effectiveness against specific targets. Many of Iran’s newer missiles are built with guidance systems that give them a circular error probable (CEP) measured in tens of meters—a vast improvement over the unguided Scuds of the past. Iran has also increasingly embraced solid-fuel technology for its missiles, moving away from older liquid-fueled designs.

Solid-propellant missiles like the Fateh-110 family can be launched on short notice and from mobile launchers, making them harder to detect and pre-empt. Notably, Iranian officials have publicly maintained a self-imposed range limit of about 2,000 km on their ballistic missiles since 2015, ostensibly to signal that Europe is out of range. In practice, Iran’s arsenal already includes missiles at that range, and some models (such as the Khorramshahr) could potentially fly further if outfitted with lighter payloads. In parallel, Tehran has designed many of its missiles to be nuclear-capable—meaning they can carry the payload and withstand the reentry conditions needed for a nuclear warhead. Indeed, even United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which implemented the JCPOA, “called upon” Iran not to develop missiles designed to carry nuclear weapons. Iran, however, never accepted that constraint as binding and has persisted in advancing a wide array of missiles that inherently could deliver a nuclear warhead.

Iran’s missile ambitions were born out of necessity during the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq War, when it acquired Scud-B missiles from foreign sources to retaliate against Iraqi cities. After the war, Iran sought self-sufficiency in missile production, receiving crucial technical assistance from countries like North Korea and China. North Korea provided Iran with the basis for its early medium-range missiles—for example, Iran’s Shahab-3 missile was developed from the North Korean Nodong MRBM technology. By the late 1990s, Tehran was test-firing the Shahab-3, and it officially entered service in the early 2000s with an approximate range of 1,000–1,300 km. Iran established domestic missile production lines under organizations such as the Aerospace Industries Organization and the IRGC’s Aerospace Force.

Over time, Iranian engineers incorporated foreign designs and components into indigenous systems. Chinese entities were accused of aiding Iran’s solid-fuel program in the 2000s, contributing to the development of the Fateh-110 short-range ballistic missile. Iran’s missile industry grew increasingly sophisticated despite international sanctions, producing successive generations of missiles with greater range and accuracy. By 2010, Tehran had unveiled solid-fueled missiles (like the two-stage Sejjil with ~2,000 km range) and improved variants of liquid-fueled missiles (like the Ghadr and Emad, which are upgrades of the Shahab-3 with better guidance). This evolution has given Iran a multilayered missile force encompassing short-range battlefield rockets up to medium-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching any point in the Middle East.

Iran’s arsenal today includes an array of missile types, each with specific roles and ranges. The Shahab-3 is Iran’s first medium-range ballistic missile, derived from the Nodong. It has an estimated range of 1,000–2,000 km and a payload of around 750 kg. Deployed since 2003, the Shahab-3 (and its improved variants Ghadr and Emad) can target all of the Levant and Gulf region from deep inside Iran. The Fateh-110 is a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) introduced in the 2000s. It is solid-fueled, roughly 8.9 m long, and typically carries a 500 kg warhead to about 200–300 km. Later versions (such as Fateh-313 and Fateh-e Mobin) reportedly extend the range to 300–500 km. The Fateh family is known for its high precision, with guidance systems that can reduce CEP to under 50 meters. Iran has exported variants (or the underlying technology) to proxy forces in the region.

The Zolfaghar (Zulfiqar) is a medium-range derivative of the Fateh series, unveiled in 2016. It has a reported range of ~700 km while carrying a 500 kg warhead. The Zolfaghar was used in Iran’s strikes on ISIS in Syria and has been provided to proxy militias. A longer-range variant named Dezful extends this class to about 1,000 km. The Khorramshahr (Kheibar) is a large liquid-fueled missile based on a North Korean design (BM-25 Musudan). The latest version, dubbed Kheibar (Khorramshahr-4), was unveiled in 2023 with a 2,000 km range and a massive 1,500 kg warhead. By using a very heavy warhead, Iran keeps its range at 2,000 km, but analysts assess the Khorramshahr could reach much further with a lighter payload. This missile uses storable hypergolic fuel and is designed to reduce launch time, making it more “tactical” despite its long reach. Among Iran’s newest systems, the Kheibar-Shekan (2022) is a solid-fuel MRBM with a 1,450 km range, and the Fattah (2023) is advertised as a “hypersonic” medium-range missile capable of high-speed maneuvers.

Iran has not hesitated to use its missiles in regional conflicts, both directly and via proxies. One of the most notable direct uses came on January 8, 2020, when Iran launched over a dozen ballistic missiles (Qiam-1 and Fateh-313 variants) at U.S. bases in Iraq in retaliation for the killing of General Qassem Soleimani. That barrage, which struck Ayn al-Asad airbase and Erbil, caused significant damage and traumatic brain injuries to U.S. personnel despite no fatalities—showcasing the destructive potential of Iran’s precision SRBMs. Iranian forces have also fired missiles at ISIS positions in Syria; for instance, in 2017, the IRGC launched Zolfaghar SRBMs roughly 700 km into eastern Syria to target ISIS militants as revenge for terror attacks in Tehran. Iran’s missile strikes have also targeted Kurdish dissident groups in Iraq; in September 2018 and again in 2022, Iranian missiles hit bases of Kurdish opposition parties, causing casualties.

Perhaps the most brazen display came in October 2024, amid soaring Israel–Iran tensions, when Iran’s IRGC carried out a large-scale missile attack against Israel itself. In an operation code-named “True Promise,” Iran launched roughly 180 ballistic missiles at Israeli targets—the first direct Iranian missile attack on Israel in history. Israeli defenses intercepted the bulk of the missiles and damage was limited, but the sheer scale of the salvo demonstrated Iran’s willingness to use its long-range arsenal offensively. The attack underscored both the capabilities and limitations of Iran’s missiles: while numerous, they were largely neutralized by Israel’s multi-layered anti-missile systems, raising questions in Tehran about the need for an even stronger deterrent.

Beyond Iran’s own use, Tehran has aggressively supplied its allies and proxies with rocket and missile technology, extending its reach through asymmetric means. The Houthi rebels in Yemen, for example, have received Iranian-designed missiles (such as the Burkan series, believed to be modified Scud-derived Qiam missiles), which they have used to strike Saudi Arabian cities and oil facilities. Between 2016 and 2021, the Houthis fired dozens of Iranian-assisted missiles at Saudi Arabia and even as far as Abu Dhabi in the UAE. In one high-profile incident, a Houthi-launched ballistic missile targeted Riyadh’s international airport in 2017—an attack U.N. experts determined had Iranian origin. Iran has also armed Lebanese Hezbollah with increasingly advanced rockets and some guided missiles (likely smaller, solid-fuel types) that threaten northern Israel. According to U.S. defense intelligence, Iran in recent years transferred ballistic missiles to Shi’ite militia groups in Iraq and Syria, positioning them closer to forward targets.

Most concerning to global security, Iran has started cooperating with major powers under sanctions: it has sent large quantities of missiles to Russia. Since 2022, Tehran has reportedly transferred hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles to Moscow for use against Ukraine, complementing the armed drones it already provided. This unprecedented move—a Middle Eastern power supplying ballistic missiles to a superpower—highlights the reach of Iran’s missile production. The transfers to Russia may include Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar missiles, which could supplement Russia’s own stocks for strikes in Ukraine. Such proliferation not only violates U.N. arms embargoes (which partly lapsed in 2023) but also blurs the lines between regional and global security threats.

With the U.N. missile restrictions from Resolution 2231 having expired in October 2023, Iran now faces fewer formal international constraints on developing and testing its ballistic missiles. There are signs Tehran will continue refining its range and accuracy—for instance, by pursuing maneuverable reentry vehicles and even space-launch-derived technologies to push toward longer ranges. The fact that many of Iran’s missiles are inherently dual-use for nuclear delivery intensifies international scrutiny. The United States and regional partners are investing heavily in missile defense systems (Patriot, THAAD, Iron Dome, and others) to mitigate the Iranian missile threat. Still, as seen in recent conflicts, no defense is foolproof, and the sheer volume of Iran’s missile arsenal could overwhelm protective layers in a large-scale war.

Iran’s conventional missile might thus serves as a key pillar of its deterrence strategy—a means to inflict serious damage on adversaries and U.S. bases in the Middle East if Iran itself were attacked. The 2025 USSTRATCOM posture statement underscores that Iran’s missiles, combined with its expanding drone forces and proxy network, “undermine regional stability” and pose a persistent threat to U.S. forces and allies. Going forward, diplomatic efforts may shift toward addressing this arsenal, either through renewed negotiations or, failing that, containment and defensive measures. Iran, for its part, portrays its missile program as non-negotiable, emphasizing self-defense. As long as tensions with the West and Israel remain high, Tehran is likely to further invest in missile capabilities—ensuring that its rockets will continue to cast a long shadow over the Middle East’s security landscape.