China secretly trains hundreds of Russian soldiers to gain critical knowledge from Ukraine war.

A classified decree seen by Reuters and issued by Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov in August 2025 authorized a covert bilateral program that sent approximately 200 Russian servicemen to specialized People's Liberation Army facilities across China for advanced tactical training. The highly structured initiative represents an operational transition beyond symbolic joint exercises, establishing a direct knowledge-transfer mechanism between Moscow and Beijing. Through this framework, the Russian military secures access to modern Chinese simulators and specialized technical instruction, while the Chinese armed forces gain critical data and practical insights derived from large-scale combat operations in Ukraine.

The reciprocal training arrangement utilized six distinct People's Liberation Army locations to instruct Russian personnel from junior sergeant to lieutenant colonel in first-person-view drones, electronic warfare, and radiological, biological, and chemical defense. Internal military assessments validated the high technical caliber of the Chinese instruction while explicitly noting that the exchange balanced the institutional depth of China against the active battlefield experience of returning Russian forces.

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Since 2019, Sino-Russian military relations have evolved from a relationship centred on political signalling to regular combined exercises, industrial cooperation, dual-use technology transfers, and reciprocal operational knowledge exchange. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

On July 1, 2026, Reuters revealed that senior Russian and Chinese military officials approved and organized a covert 2025 training programme in China for about 200 Russian servicemen, effectively making Chinese military training schools part of how Russia prepares and equips its forces during the war. The initiative was authorized at the Russian Ministry of Defence level by Andrei Belousov and involved named senior officers from both militaries, including Colonel General Rustam Muradov, deputy commander-in-chief of Russia's land forces, Major General Li Jinsun, head of the PLA Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defence, Major General Vitaly Gerasimov, Major General Rustam Khusainov and Senior Colonel Sun Dayun.

Russian soldiers were trained at facilities of the Chinese Army (PLA) in Beijing, Nanjing, Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, Bengbu and Yibin, with instruction covering FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs, electronic warfare, counter-drone systems, 82 mm mortar fire coordinated by UAVs, engineering tasks and radiological, biological and chemical defence. Some trainees later returned to Russian units active in Ukraine, including formations using drone systems in occupied Crimea and Zaporizhzhia. Since February 2022, Beijing's position on the war in Ukraine has rested on a controlled ambiguity that preserved diplomatic room while keeping Russia as a strategic partner.

China said it respected Ukraine's sovereignty, but also argued that Russian security concerns over NATO enlargement had to be addressed, which gave Beijing a framework for avoiding direct condemnation of Moscow. It rejected Western sanctions, sustained trade with Russia and kept the "no limits" partnership active through repeated political and military contacts. This posture allowed China to present itself as neutral and available for peace diplomacy while its economic and industrial links effectively helped reduce the pressure created by Western restrictions on Russia. By 2024-2026, the European and American view of China had shifted from a state sitting outside the war to a state whose companies, military institutions and dual-use supply chains were materially supporting Russia's ability to continue fighting. 

The 2025 programme went beyond the earlier pattern of joint drills, naval exercises, air patrols and senior-level consultations. On July 2, 2025, Russia and China established a reciprocal training arrangement under which Russian personnel would train in China and Chinese personnel would receive instruction in Russia. The Russian contingent included ranks from junior sergeant to lieutenant colonel, meaning the courses mixed tactical-level personnel with officers able to absorb lessons into wider training structures. The use of several PLA locations, Beijing, Nanjing, Shijiazhuang, Zhengzhou, Bengbu and Yibin, indicates that the effort drew on specialized institutions rather than a single ceremonial exchange. This structure has a real operational significance for the two countries, because it reflects a deliberate transfer of concrete battlefield capabilities, rather than serving solely as a political gesture between partner militaries. 

For instance, the drone and counter-drone components matched some of the most decisive tactical trends in Ukraine. Russian trainees received instruction on FPV drones, reconnaissance UAVs, simulator-based pilot training and multimedia mission planning, all of which are relevant to short-range strike, target detection and battlefield surveillance. In Shijiazhuang, about 50 Russian personnel trained to combine 82 mm mortars with UAV target acquisition and fire correction, a method used to shorten the kill chain between spotting a target and adjusting fire. Russia actually fields four 82 mm mortar systems: the 2B14 Podnos, with a range of about 4,000 meters; the newer 2B24, which extends range to roughly 6,000 meters and can be mounted on vehicles; the 2B9 Vasilek, an automatic gun-mortar capable of high rates of fire; and the 2B25 Gall, a specialized silent mortar used by special forces that minimizes sound, flash, and smoke. 

Counter-drone training, for its part, included electronic warfare rifles, net-launch interception systems and drone-based defensive methods against small unmanned aircraft. These subjects reflect the daily reality of the front, where small drones shape movement, logistics, artillery survivability, infantry exposure and vehicle losses. Engineering and RBC defence added a second layer of relevance to the Ukrainian battlefield. In Nanjing, Russian personnel trained in mine construction, breaching, demining, unexploded ordnance disposal and improvised explosive device neutralization, all central tasks in a war dominated by mine belts, trench networks, damaged infrastructure and contested routes. In Beijing, a three-week course covered chemical reconnaissance, radiation reconnaissance, contamination monitoring and collective protection, using specialist PLA radiological, biological and chemical defence facilities.

The presence of Major General Li Jinsun in this field is significant because it tied the programme to a dedicated institution of the Chinese Army rather than a generic training centre. These courses were not about basic soldiering; they addressed specialist functions needed to preserve the Russian Army's mobility, protect units, manage contaminated environments and keep operations running under complex battlefield conditions. The limited size of the Russian group does not make the programme marginal. About 200 personnel is small compared with the total number of Russian troops committed to Ukraine, but the composition of the group gave it a multiplier effect. Many participants were instructors or personnel positioned to pass lessons into Russian schools, units and pre-deployment training cycles.

Once trainees returned to Russia or to occupied Ukrainian territory, knowledge from these Chinese courses could be redistributed through Russia's own military education system. This is why the programme is better understood as a training-transfer mechanism than as a manpower reinforcement measure. The practical value lies in the spread of methods on drone use, counter-drone defence, fire correction, engineering procedures and specialist protection tasks. The training also fits into a wider pattern of Chinese inputs supporting Russian military capability. Multiple Chinese companies have been linked since the start of the war to drone components, electronics, machine tools, industrial equipment, special chemical products and other dual-use goods used by Russia's defence industry.

Chinese assistance has also been associated with drone development, flight simulators and technical support for Russian UAV programmes. Like with Iran, allegations concerning satellite intelligence broaden the concern from industrial supply to military-enabling services. For Russia, all these categories matter because the attrition war in Ukraine depends not only on weapons already in service, but also on components, tools, chemicals, software, simulators and production equipment that allow a military to replace losses and adapt tactics. In that context, the PLA training programme becomes one element of a larger support structure spanning education, technology and industrial capacity. Russian evaluations of the courses also pointed to a relationship based on different strengths.

The Chinese Army offered modern facilities, simulators, standardized instruction and strong theoretical preparation by instructors in specialist disciplines. In exchange, Russia brought more than four years of continuous combat experience in Ukraine, including experience with FPV drones, artillery correction, electronic warfare, fortified lines, attrition tactics, and adaptation under Western sanctions. The main Chinese limitation was the PLA's lack of recent large-scale combat experience, since China has not fought a major war in decades. The exchange therefore joined Chinese institutional depth with Russian wartime experience.

This gives both sides an incentive to continue the process: Russia receives training infrastructure and technical methods, while China gains access to lessons from Europe's largest war since 1945. The political cost for Beijing has increased as the cooperation has become more concrete. The European Union confirmed that Russian military training had taken place in China and examined possible responses while adding Chinese entities to sanctions packages linked to Russia's defence sector. NATO described China as a "decisive enabler" of Russia's war effort, tying Chinese industrial support to Moscow's ability to keep fighting despite sanctions.

The United States already sanctioned Chinese entities connected to components, technologies and equipment used in Russian defence production, while Ukraine sanctioned Chinese companies and accused Beijing of supplying materials, industrial inputs and military-related technologies to Russia. Between 2022 and 2026, Sino-Russian defence cooperation moved through successive layers: political alignment, sanctions-resistant trade, dual-use exports, defence-industrial support, drone-related cooperation, reciprocal military education and wartime knowledge exchange. China continued to call itself neutral, but the practical relationship with Russia continues to become more institutionalized, more technical, and more directly connected to the military requirements of the war in Ukraine.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.

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