North Korea Formally Hands Over 50 KN-25 600mm Rocket Systems to Combat Units.

North Korea publicly handed over fifty 600 mm KN-25 super large multiple launch rocket systems to Korean People’s Army units ahead of the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The high-profile delivery highlights Pyongyang’s accelerating artillery modernization and reinforces the political messaging surrounding strategic weapons development.

On the eve of the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Pyongyang staged a formal transfer of fifty 600 mm super large multiple launch rocket systems, known in the West as the KN25, to frontline Korean People’s Army units, according to state media photographs showing rows of heavy wheeled launchers presented as a symbolic gift from defense industry workers. The event blended military procurement with political theater, underscoring the system’s role in North Korea’s broader force modernization campaign, where the KN-25 occupies a gray zone between traditional rocket artillery and short-range ballistic missile capabilities, offering extended range and precision compared with legacy tube artillery.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this link

The KN-25 is assessed to be a single-stage solid propellant missile with a reported diameter of 600 millimeters, or 0.6 meters, and an estimated length of approximately 8.6 meters(Picture source: KCNA)

Pyongyang consistently describes the KN-25 as a super-large multiple launch rocket system. The United States Forces Korea categorizes it instead as a short range ballistic missile, citing its size, range, and quasi-ballistic flight profile. First tested on August 25, 2019, the system has demonstrated a range of around 380 kilometers. During the initial test from North Korea’s east coast, two projectiles reportedly flew approximately 380 kilometers and reached a maximum altitude of about 97 kilometers before impacting in the Sea of Japan. Subsequent tests in September, October, and November 2019 showed ranges between 330 and 380 kilometers and varying apogees, confirming a trajectory that is higher and longer than conventional artillery rockets.

The KN-25 is assessed to be a single-stage solid propellant missile with a reported diameter of 600 millimeters, or 0.6 meters, and an estimated length of approximately 8.6 meters. Relative to its caliber, this makes it closer in scale to a short-range ballistic missile than to legacy multiple launch rocket systems. The missile appears equipped with four fixed rear fins and four forward control surfaces, indicating in flight, maneuverability and guided impact capability. While detailed data on circular error probable remain unavailable, North Korean references to an autonomous precision guidance flight system suggest the integration of inertial navigation potentially supported by satellite updates, as well as measures designed to resist electronic interference.

The system is deployed on a road mobile transporter erector launcher concept, typically featuring four launch tubes mounted on a heavy multi-axle wheeled chassis. This road mobility enhances survivability by enabling rapid displacement after firing. The interval data from 2019 tests, including salvo intervals as short as 30 seconds on November 28 and 20 seconds on March 2, 2020, illustrate an ability to conduct rapid successive launches. Such shoot-and-scoot tactics complicate counter-battery detection and preemptive targeting, particularly when launchers operate from dispersed, pre-surveyed positions.

The current launch is the second known ballistic missile event attributed to North Korea in 2026, following a January 4 firing in the same general direction. In recent years, Pyongyang increasingly-blends, technical experimentation with political choreography, using missile launches not only to refine capabilities but also to punctuate diplomatic calendars and domestic milestones. South Korean reporting notes that the January 4 launch occurred as President Lee Jae Myung was preparing to travel to Beijing for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, reinforcing a pattern in which North Korean tests are timed to remind regional actors that any broader Northeast Asian agenda remains constrained by the peninsula’s military dynamics.

While Seoul and Tokyo describe the January 28 weapons as ballistic missiles, North Korean state media frame the event as a test fire conducted by the Missile General Bureau to verify a new upgraded large caliber multiple rocket launcher system using new technology. In the North’s narrative, Kim Jong Un personally observes the test and emphasizes improvements in mobility, accuracy, and the system’s ability to withstand external interference, while linking the program to nuclear deterrence objectives. The state account claims that four rounds strike a sea target at a range of 358.5 kilometers, a distance consistent with publicly cited South Korean figures and with a KN-25 class weapon operating below its maximum envelope.

The KN-25 offers the Korean People’s Army a layered strike option between long-range tube artillery and traditional short-range ballistic missiles. Its 350 to 380 kilometer range permits engagement of air bases, logistics hubs, and command facilities across much of South Korea, depending on launch location. The combination of heavy payload mass and guided quasi- ballistic flight enables runway cratering, disruption of fuel storage sites, or targeting of hardened shelters. Salvo firing from multiple road mobile launchers can increase threat density during the opening phase of a crisis, stressing interceptor inventories associated with systems such as Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense. At the same time, the physical size of the missile and the limited number of tubes per launcher impose logistical demands for reload operations, which may constrain sustained high-tempo employment.

The delivery of fifty additional launchers in a single ceremony indicates industrial scaling rather than isolated production. It suggests that the KN-25 has moved from developmental trials to structured fielding within rocket or missile formations of the Korean People’s Army. Beyond the peninsula, the continued expansion of large-caliber guided rocket artillery complicates regional security calculations. By blurring the distinction between multiple launch rocket systems and short-range ballistic missiles, North Korea multiplies strike, vectors available in a contingency. For South Korea, Japan, and the United States, this evolving arsenal reinforces the need to adapt missile defense architectures, early warning networks, and counter strike planning to a threat environment in which political signaling and operational capability are increasingly intertwined.