North Korea Tests KN-25 Long-Range Guided Rockets in Maritime Strike Scenario.

North Korea test-fired an upgraded super-large guided rocket system on January 27, overseen by Kim Jong Un, with state media claiming a 358.5 km strike against a sea target. The launch underscores Pyongyang’s focus on precision long-range fires designed to survive jamming and complicate U.S.-ROK-Japan missile defense planning.

On January 28, 2026, North Korea’s state media disclosed a new step in Pyongyang’s long-range fires modernization: the Missile General Bureau oversaw a January 27 test-fire of an upgraded large-caliber multiple rocket launcher system, with Kim Jong Un observing on site. KCNA said four rockets struck a sea target at 358.5 km, presenting the event as both a technical verification shot and a practical demonstration of what the regime calls “strategic deterrence.” Kim described the launcher as adapted for “special attack” missions and pointed to an “autonomous precision guidance flight system” intended to keep the weapon effective even under external interference.
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North Korea test-fired an upgraded super-large guided rocket system under Kim Jong Un, striking a sea target at about 358 km and showcasing hardened precision guidance meant to survive jamming, reinforce deterrence, and complicate U.S.-ROK-Japan defense planning with high-volume long-range fires (Picture source: KCNA).

Seoul and Tokyo described the launches as ballistic missiles, triggering the familiar diplomatic cycle of condemnation tied to UN Security Council restrictions. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the projectiles were launched from near Pyongyang around 3:50 p.m. local time and flew about 350 km, while Japan assessed a peak altitude around 80 km, consistent with a quasi-ballistic flight profile rather than classic unguided rocket artillery.

While Pyongyang did not name the weapon, the data points disclosed and observed strongly suggest the test involved the KN-25 “super-large” guided rocket family. KCNA reported a four-round firing and a strike distance of 358.5 km, which falls squarely within the KN-25’s demonstrated 350-380 km class performance and matches the four-tube launcher configuration commonly associated with KN-25 units. Regional tracking also characterized the flight as quasi-ballistic, with an apogee far higher than conventional unguided rocket artillery, a profile repeatedly linked to KN-25 launches and one reason allied militaries often categorize it as a short-range ballistic missile. KCNA’s emphasis on autonomous precision guidance and resistance to external interference further aligns with KN-25’s guided, long-range design logic rather than traditional area-saturation MLRS.

The most important clue in KCNA’s account is not the distance but the guidance claim: a self-steered, precision-guided flight system able to “neglect” outside intervention, as highlighted in Kim’s remarks. In operational terms, that reads like an attempt to harden the weapon’s navigation and terminal control against electronic warfare, spoofing, and jamming, the very conditions that define modern high-end conflict. Analytical studies of the KN-25’s design have previously highlighted features consistent with controlled flight and attitude management rather than pure spin-stabilized area fire, including unusual fin arrangements and forward control surfaces, arguing that guidance is central to the system’s concept because extended range otherwise dilutes lethality without accuracy.

A guided 600 mm class rocket with 350-380 km reach reshapes the geometry of the Korean theater. From multiple firing positions north of the DMZ, it can threaten deep rear-area nodes that enable allied air and maritime operations, including airfields, logistics hubs, command posts, and port infrastructure. The maritime target referenced by KCNA is also revealing. Hitting a sea target does not prove a true anti-ship capability against a maneuvering vessel, but it does demonstrate an ability to program and execute an over-water strike, relevant for deterring reinforcement flows, threatening naval facilities, and complicating littoral maneuver in the confined waters around the peninsula.

The system’s real operational value is its salvo logic. A road-mobile launcher that can ripple-fire multiple large guided rounds is not just a single-shot “message.” It is a scalable strike package that can be dispersed, shoot, and relocate, while presenting defenders with an uncomfortable mix: quantities more like rocket artillery, trajectories more like missiles, and accuracy approaching precision fires. That blend is designed to stress kill chains and air and missile defenses through volume, ambiguity, and timing, a rationale analysts have long associated with North Korea’s guided rocket development.

So why conduct this exercise now, and who is it meant to impress? Externally, the audience is the U.S.-ROK-Japan triangle, particularly planners betting on rapid detection and preemption. The timing also intersects with allied policy debates. The launches occurred as Washington and Seoul were discussing alliance posture and the U.S. role in combined defense, giving Pyongyang a chance to remind decision-makers that long-range fires remain its fastest escalatory lever. Internally, the test supports Kim’s narrative of continuous modernization ahead of a major party meeting. Recent reporting has tied the testing rhythm to preparations for a Workers’ Party congress and the regime’s effort to project momentum after stalled diplomacy. KCNA itself pointed to a forthcoming party congress unveiling “next-stage” plans to reinforce the nuclear deterrent, linking rocket artillery modernization to nuclear signaling even without stating a payload.

North Korea’s heavy investment in missiles and guided rockets follows a cold cost-exchange logic. Precision strike systems are cheaper and faster to scale than modern air forces, survive better under sanctions than complex aerospace ecosystems, and compensate for conventional inferiority by threatening high-value targets at risk-relevant ranges. They also offer coercive flexibility: rocket artillery can be portrayed as “defensive” or “tactical,” even when it delivers strategic effects by holding capitals, bases, and sea lines at risk. Finally, there is a shadow market angle. Growing interest in North Korea’s short-range systems after recent overseas transfers suggests that any demonstrator emphasizing guidance resilience and mobility doubles as a signal to partners watching battlefield lessons closely.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.