Exclusive Analysis: Chinese Missiles Threaten U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Next Era of Naval Warfare.

The strategic balance in the Pacific Ocean is being reshaped not by the number of aircraft carriers or submarines but by a growing arsenal of long-range precision missiles developed by the People’s Republic of China. For the United States Navy, whose global dominance has traditionally relied on the unmatched power projection capability of its aircraft carrier strike groups (CSGs), China’s expanding missile force represents a critical and evolving threat that challenges long-standing assumptions about maritime supremacy.
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American carrier strike groups now face increasing threats from Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles like the DF-21D and DF-26. (Picture source: Editing Army Recognition Group)

At the heart of this threat is China's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, which aims to deter or delay U.S. military intervention in the Western Pacific, particularly in any Taiwan-related conflict scenario. Central to this posture are missile systems capable of targeting high-value naval assets from great distances. The DF-21D and DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), often dubbed “carrier killers,” form the backbone of this approach.

The DF-21D, with an estimated range of over 1,500 kilometers, is designed to strike moving maritime targets, a capability long considered elusive due to the complexities of real-time targeting over vast oceanic expanses. China claims to have solved this targeting challenge through a network of satellites, over-the-horizon radar systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) integrated into a multi-layered kill chain. Whether these capabilities are fully operational remains debated, but the Pentagon’s latest China Military Power Report acknowledges credible advancements in China’s reconnaissance-strike complex.

Meanwhile, the DF-26, with a range exceeding 4,000 kilometers, extends China’s reach deep into the Philippine Sea, allowing it to threaten U.S. carriers operating from what were once considered relatively safe standoff distances. Notably, the DF-26 can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads, further complicating escalation management and crisis stability.

Complementing these systems are land-attack and anti-ship variants of cruise missiles such as the YJ-18 and YJ-21, which can be launched from ships, submarines, and aircraft. The YJ-21, unveiled in 2022, is a hypersonic anti-ship missile reportedly capable of maneuvering at terminal speeds exceeding Mach 10, making interception by current shipboard missile defenses exceedingly difficult.

This layered and multi-domain missile threat has forced the U.S. Navy to reexamine its doctrine. Traditionally, carriers operated with a protective screen of destroyers, cruisers, and submarines, projecting power through their embarked air wings. But the range of Chinese missiles now exceeds the strike radius of carrier-based aircraft like the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, typically limited to around 700 kilometers without aerial refueling. While the introduction of the F-35C with its stealth characteristics and slightly extended range helps bridge some of this gap, the fundamental asymmetry remains: China can launch precision missiles from its coast, while U.S. carriers must sail thousands of kilometers and operate within striking range to be effective.

To mitigate this threat, the United States is accelerating the development and deployment of cutting-edge combat systems designed specifically to protect high-value naval assets from long-range missile attacks. At the forefront are advanced shipboard missile defense systems, such as the Aegis Combat System, now integrated with SM-6 missile interceptors. The SM-6, with its dual capability against both ballistic and cruise missiles, is designed to intercept threats in the terminal phase of their trajectory, providing a final layer of protection for carrier strike groups. New variants of the SM-6 extend engagement ranges and are capable of intercepting hypersonic glide vehicles under development.

Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missile launches from a U.S. Navy warship, forming part of the layered defense against Chinese anti-ship missile threats. (Picture source U.S. DoD)

The U.S. Navy is also fielding the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block 2 (ESSM Block 2), a medium-range interceptor with active radar homing, optimized for defeating supersonic sea-skimming missiles. Additionally, the close-in defense is being upgraded with systems like the SeaRAM and upgraded Phalanx CIWS (Close-In Weapon System), providing rapid-response firepower against threats that penetrate outer defenses.

Beyond kinetic defenses, the U.S. Navy is investing heavily in electronic warfare (EW) systems such as the AN/SLQ-32(V)7 under the Surface Electronic Warfare Improvement Program (SEWIP). These systems aim to jam or deceive incoming missile seekers, redirecting them away from U.S. vessels. Coupled with decoys like the Nulka active offboard decoy and newer corner reflector systems, these soft-kill measures offer critical protection when layered with hard-kill solutions.

A more transformative solution lies in the integration of directed-energy weapons. The U.S. Navy is currently testing the HELIOS (High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance) system aboard Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Designed to defeat drones, small boats, and potentially missiles, these lasers represent the next generation of shipborne defense. Though limited by atmospheric conditions and power constraints, they offer a virtually unlimited magazine depth, a crucial advantage in missile saturation scenarios.

In the air domain, carrier air wings are beginning to integrate new capabilities like the MQ-25 Stingray aerial refueling drone, which will extend the range of manned strike aircraft, allowing carriers to operate further from the threat envelope. Longer-term plans include the development of sixth-generation aircraft under the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, expected to incorporate stealth, advanced sensors, and the ability to control loyal wingman drones equipped for both surveillance and strike missions.

On the strategic level, the U.S. is also deploying survivable ground-based systems such as the U.S. Army’s Typhon Mid-Range Capability surface-to-surface missile system, which launches SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles from land, contributing to maritime defense from forward positions in the Pacific. Integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) concepts aim to unify these systems across services and domains for seamless multi-layered protection.

Nonetheless, China’s growing arsenal introduces a form of deterrence by punishment. The mere existence of accurate long-range missiles capable of destroying aircraft carriers before they can enter the battlespace forces U.S. planners to consider either accepting greater risk or rethinking the viability of carrier-based power projection in high-end conflict scenarios.

For allies such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, these developments raise critical questions about the future of regional security and the credibility of extended U.S. deterrence. The presence of U.S. carrier strike groups has long been symbolic of America’s commitment to defend the Indo-Pacific. If these assets are increasingly seen as vulnerable, U.S. regional influence may erode — not through kinetic defeat, but through the perception that the costs of intervention outweigh its strategic benefits.

China’s missile force has redefined the playing field in the Western Pacific. It has not rendered the U.S. Navy obsolete, but it has made traditional power projection significantly more dangerous and expensive. The future of naval warfare will be shaped not only by tonnage and fleet size but by resilience against long-range precision strikes. With investments in missile defense, directed energy, extended-range aviation, and electronic warfare, the U.S. is adapting — but the balance of power will increasingly hinge on who can outpace the other in the evolving contest between offense and defense.