Google Earth Reveals Six Nuclear Submarines at Chinese Base Exposing Scale of Naval Expansion.

The satellite imagery made available on Google Earth shows an unusual concentration of nuclear-powered submarines moored along the piers. At least six submarines can be identified, including two of the Type 091 class and two of the more modern Type 093A, all conventionally armed. Also visible is an unidentified submarine, as well as the sole remaining Type 092 ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), which, although no longer in active service, remains docked at the site. A seventh submarine appears in drydock, likely undergoing dismantling, as regular maintenance typically takes place at other locations.

The ability to access this level of information through commercial satellite imagery highlights the increasing role of open-source intelligence but, more importantly, underscores a strategic shift: China is rapidly building a diversified and capable undersea force intended to strengthen its nuclear deterrence posture, extend its projection capabilities, and challenge major naval powers in the Pacific.

Since the early 2010s, the PLAN has undergone a deep transformation of its submarine fleet. Over a dozen nuclear-powered submarines have been built in just over a decade, including Type 093 and 093A attack submarines and six Type 094 SSBNs, designed to carry intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the JL-2 and the newer JL-3. Each Jin-class submarine (Type 094) can carry up to twelve nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, marking China’s first credible sea-based deterrent. A next-generation SSBN, the Type 096, is currently under development and is expected to enter service within the next decade, equipped with longer-range missiles that would significantly expand the strategic autonomy of China’s navy.

Simultaneously, China has been expanding its fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines with offensive capabilities. Between 2022 and 2023, four Type 093B submarines—an upgraded variant designed to launch cruise missiles—were reportedly launched, with up to three expected to be operational by the end of 2025. This dual-track approach, combining strategic deterrence and conventional long-range strike capabilities, reflects a more assertive naval doctrine aimed at controlling maritime spaces and projecting power beyond China’s immediate coastline.

The South China Sea remains at the core of this strategy. China has multiplied its military infrastructure, patrols, and displays of force in the region. Deploying nuclear-powered submarines there, amid tensions with neighboring countries, provides Beijing with a second-strike capability in case of conflict and reinforces its position in territorial disputes. However, Chinese ambitions now extend beyond the region.

A recent naval circumnavigation of Australia by a Chinese task force, reportedly including a nuclear-powered submarine, marked a new milestone in the PLAN’s shift toward blue-water operations. Such missions, unprecedented in geographic scope, reflect Beijing’s intent to test the long-range deployment capacities of its navy and assert influence in areas historically dominated by the United States.

In response, the U.S. maintains a reinforced naval presence in the region, including the permanent deployment of several nuclear-powered submarines in Guam, while intensifying cooperation with allies. Initiatives such as the AUKUS agreement, which involves the transfer of nuclear propulsion technology to Australia, illustrate the strategic depth of this competition. The growing U.S.-China rivalry is increasingly taking shape beneath the ocean’s surface in a contest that blends advanced technology with long-term strategic positioning.

Despite these developments, China faces operational challenges. Reports suggest the loss of a next-generation attack submarine, which allegedly sank at a shipyard in mid-2024. Although unconfirmed, the incident highlights the complexities of transitioning to a fully modern nuclear-powered fleet, both technically and logistically.

A broader comparison with the submarine forces of the United States and Russia offers further perspective on the current status and limitations of the Chinese undersea deterrent. The United States operates 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each capable of carrying up to 20 Trident II D5 SLBMs under treaty constraints. Each missile can be fitted with up to 8 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), giving the U.S. fleet a theoretical capacity of over 1,900 warheads at sea, along with extensive global patrol routes and exceptional stealth capabilities. These submarines form the backbone of the U.S. nuclear triad’s survivable leg and benefit from decades of operational maturity.

Russia maintains approximately 10 to 11 SSBNs, primarily of the Delta IV and Borei-A classes. The Borei-A submarines can each launch 16 Bulava SLBMs, with multiple warheads per missile, providing Russia with a total of over 700 sea-based warheads. These submarines typically operate in the Arctic Ocean under protective coverage, following a bastion strategy. Borei-A submarines are known for their reduced acoustic signature and are expected to carry new strategic weapons such as the Poseidon underwater nuclear drone, increasing their strategic flexibility.

By comparison, China’s current SSBN fleet includes six Type 094 Jin-class submarines, each armed with 12 JL-2 or JL-3 missiles, generally believed to carry single warheads. This puts the total number of sea-based Chinese warheads around 72, a figure significantly lower than that of its two peers. Moreover, Chinese SSBN patrols are thought to remain limited in range, usually confined to coastal zones such as the South China Sea, where protective coverage is easier to maintain but where strategic reach is more constrained.

Acoustic performance remains another differentiator. Open-source assessments suggest that the Type 094 remains noisier than Cold War-era Soviet submarines, making detection by adversary forces more likely. In contrast, U.S. and Russian SSBNs operate at significantly lower acoustic signatures. China’s future Type 096 class aims to reduce this gap, potentially incorporating pump-jet propulsion and other silencing technologies inspired by Russian designs. Reports indicate that the Type 096 may carry 16 to 24 SLBMs with longer ranges and multiple warheads, marking a major leap in capability.

In the SSN domain, the U.S. Navy currently operates around 50 nuclear-powered attack submarines, including the Virginia, Seawolf, and Los Angeles classes, known for their stealth, endurance, and flexibility. These submarines can perform a range of missions, including ISR, anti-submarine warfare, and land-attack operations. Russia’s estimated 25 SSNs, including the newer Yasen-M class, are increasingly focused on multi-mission capabilities and include vertical launch systems for cruise missiles.

China’s fleet of SSNs, particularly the Type 093 and 093B, has grown rapidly in recent years, with estimates suggesting that seven to eight Type 093B units may have been launched since 2021. These submarines have introduced vertical launch systems for the first time in the Chinese navy. However, their operational experience and stealth levels still lag behind U.S. and Russian equivalents. Additionally, China’s SSNs are generally limited to regional operations, with limited evidence of extended deployments in blue-water environments.

The appearance of the Qingdao base on Google Earth should not be seen as an isolated exposure but rather as a sign of a deeper structural evolution. Support facilities are expanding, notably on Hainan Island, while industrial production continues to be scaled up at key shipyards. China’s objective is to field a coherent and increasingly sophisticated naval force capable of deterrence, projection, and control across a growing maritime perimeter.

The unintentional visibility of this base illustrates the broader transparency introduced by modern satellite technologies, but more importantly, it reflects a strategic shift underway. In the increasingly contested Indo-Pacific, undersea capabilities are becoming a central component of regional power dynamics. China aims to position itself as a global naval actor through continued investment and doctrinal evolution. The images from Qingdao, now accessible to the world from space, quietly signal this growing ambition beneath the surface.