U.S. Special Forces seize Chinese cargo tied to Iran missile program.

U.S. special forces boarded a vessel in the Indian Ocean and seized Chinese dual-use components linked to Iran's missile program, according to U.S. officials cited by the Wall Street Journal.

On December 12, 2025, the Wall Street Journal announced that U.S. special forces boarded a ship in the Indian Ocean last month and seized military-related items assessed as moving from China to Iran. U.S. officials described the action as a maritime interdiction aimed at slowing Iran’s attempts to rebuild parts of its missile arsenal after a 12-day conflict in June 2025. The boarding took place several hundred miles off Sri Lanka, the cargo was removed, and the vessel was allowed to continue, while the ship’s name and ownership were not disclosed.
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The seized material was described as dual-use components potentially useful for Iran’s missile program, and U.S. officials tied the timing to intensified Iranian efforts to rebuild its ballistic missile arsenal before another confrontation with Israel. (Picture source: US Navy)

Speaking on the condition of anonymity to the WSJ, U.S. officials said a U.S. special operations team carried out the boarding with support from conventional forces, after U.S. authorities tracked the shipment in advance. The seized material was described as components potentially useful for Iran’s conventional weapons, and U.S. officials characterized the items as dual-use components with both civilian and military applications. One official said the shipment was destroyed after seizure, and officials said intelligence indicated the cargo was destined for Iranian companies that specialize in procuring components for Iran’s missile program, linking the interdiction directly to supply chains rather than to a single finished weapon system.

In the same account, the interdiction was framed as notable because it was the first time in recent years that U.S. military forces had intercepted cargo with Chinese origins en route to Iran. U.S. officials tied the timing to intensified Iranian efforts to rebuild their ballistic missile arsenal amid fears of another confrontation with Israel, and to the broader damage they said was inflicted on Iran’s nuclear and missile facilities during the June war involving Israel and the United States. They also said negotiations with the United States over Iran’s disputed nuclear program had not resumed after being interrupted by the conflict, and the WSJ noted that spokespeople for Iran and China’s foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

U.S. officials also placed the operation inside a wider maritime enforcement picture that covers both military-related shipments and sanctioned energy flows connected to Iran. They said the boarding happened weeks before the United States seized a sanctioned oil tanker off Venezuela that had been used to transport oil from Venezuela to Iran, and according to Reuters, the U.S. is planning to intercept additional vessels carrying Venezuelan oil after that seizure. That tanker action was described as the first time since 2019 that an oil cargo or tanker from Venezuela under U.S. sanctions was intercepted, and the overall approach was portrayed as more aggressive maritime action than U.S. officials said had been typical in recent years. U.S. officials also said the interdiction came as the United Nations reimposed an international ban on Iran's arms trade in late September.

Earlier known seizures include a January 2024 U.S. Central Command operation near the coast of Somalia that confiscated Iranian-made ballistic missile and cruise missile components assessed as destined for Yemen’s Houthi militants. U.S. seizures of Iranian oil shipments happened in 2020 and 2023, with U.S. authorities saying the proceeds benefited the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while Chinese sales of products suspected of supporting Iran’s missile program have faced increasing scrutiny in the United States. That scrutiny was described as including pressure in November, when two Democratic lawmakers urged U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and CIA Director John Ratcliffe to investigate a large shipment of chemicals from China to Iran that was characterized as potentially useful for missile propellants, reinforcing the focus on chemical inputs and components rather than complete weapons.

China-Iran defense ties are long-running, beginning with China’s recognition of the post-1979 Iranian regime. China then supplied missiles and arms during the 1980s despite a U.S. embargo, with Iran importing planes, artillery, and tanks, including J-6 fighters, T-59 and T-69 tanks, and HY-2 “Silkworm” anti-ship missiles, while some reports note China covertly provided some weaponry through North Korea. During the 1980s “Tanker War”, Iran reportedly fired Silkworm missiles at U.S. ships as well as Kuwaiti targets, and U.S. pressure included an October 1987 Reagan administration freeze on high-technology transfers to China aimed at deterring missile sales to Iran, while Chinese arms transfers to Iran were said to peak in 1987 at $539 million, followed by a March 1988 Chinese pledge to the United States about Silkworm sales that did not cover other cruise missiles and conventional weapons.

After a U.N.-brokered ceasefire in August 1988, the second phase described a decline in transfers, but was followed by a 1990s spike to $318 million as Iran sought to rebuild its military forces, with major acquisitions reportedly including dozens of fighter jets, hundreds of missiles and related technology, and naval vessels, alongside a trend of Iran using Chinese equipment and technology to advance domestic arms production, notably missile manufacturing based on Chinese models. Reports cite an April 1983 high-level Iranian delegation visit to Beijing tied to a reported $1.3 billion deal for J-6 fighters, T-59 tanks, artillery, and light arms, followed by a reported March 1985 $1.6 billion deal including F-6 fighters, T-59 tanks, anti-tank guns, and rocket launchers, plus subsequent acquisitions such as up to 200 M-7 short-range ballistic missiles with an around 150-kilometer range, 72 F-7 fighter planes, 10 Houdong missile boats later used by the IRGC Navy as capital ships armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, and anti-ship missile purchases ranging from C-801 to C-701 and factory production of the Nasr-1 based on China’s C-704.

From the late 1990s into the 2010s and 2020s, constraints from international measures and continued technology pathways led to a shift toward exercises, dual-use components, and economic interdependence. However, we can mention the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737 in 2006 directing states to prevent transfers of materials used in nuclear or ballistic missile programs, Resolution 1747 in 2007 constraining arms-related procurement from Iran and urging vigilance in supplying items to Iran, and Resolution 1929 in 2010 requiring states to prevent supply of most major conventional arms and calling for inspections of suspect vessels; after Resolution 2231 endorsed the 2015 nuclear deal, major Chinese arms transfers to Iran virtually ceased, yet Tehran and Beijing signed a 2015 deal enabling Iran to use China’s BeiDou 2 navigation satellite system, and a 25-year strategic agreement signed in 2021 envisioning cooperation in training, research, defense industries, and potential coproduction. Flows continued, such as Chinese parts in drones, chemical precursors like sodium perchlorate linked to solid propellant supply chains, leading to April 2025 U.S. Treasury sanctions on Iranian and Chinese entities tied to such transfers.

Written by Jérôme Brahy

Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.