U.S. strengthens Japan coastal defense posture with Typhon and NMESIS anti-ship systems training in Okinawa.

According to The Japan Times on 10 September 2025, the United States is bringing two land based missile systems to Japan for the Resolute Dragon exercise, with events taking place in Okinawa and other locations from 11 to 25 September. The deployments are framed as temporary and tied to joint drills with the Japan Ground Self Defense Force. That is the official line and it matters because it sets expectations with local authorities and with the public. Still, the signal is hard to miss. It is the first time these specific systems operate from Japanese soil in an exercise setting, and it happens as Tokyo moves ahead with its plan to field longer range counterstrike options of its own. Specialists have seen this trend gathering pace over the last two years. Now the hardware is showing up in the archipelago and crews are rehearsing with Japanese counterparts.
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NMESIS coastal defense is an unmanned JLTV launcher firing two Naval Strike Missiles with passive IIR seekers and sea skimming profiles, remote operated and quickly dispersed for low signature maritime interdiction from austere sites (Picture source: U.S Marine Corps).

The first system is the US Army’s Typhon, a containerized mid range capability built around a set of strike length launch cells mounted in a standard 40 foot ISO frame. The launcher rides on a heavy tractor and looks like cargo until it is set up to fire. Inside the frame sit four vertical launch tubes compatible with Tomahawk cruise missiles and the Standard Missile 6. That pairing is the point. Tomahawk gives deep land attack reach with modernized guidance and communications in the current Block V baseline, while the maritime strike variant adds a seeker to prosecute moving surface targets. SM-6 began life as an extended range air defense missile, but it has been adapted over time for anti surface roles and certain missile defense missions. From a single shore based box a battery commander can reach inland command nodes with a cruise missile or threaten a ship at speed using a multi mission round. It is a flexible tool, and its container form factor makes it easier to move under normal logistics covers.

The second system is the Marine Corps’ Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, better known as NMESIS. It couples the Naval Strike Missile with an unmanned launcher derived from the JLTV and branded ROGUE Fires. Each vehicle typically carries two canisterized missiles. The launcher can be remote operated and staged quickly on small landing strips, road laybys, ferry decks or other opportunistic ground. The Naval Strike Missile brings a low observable airframe, a sea skimming profile and a passive imaging infrared seeker that does not radiate. Operators value the way it rides the contours and remains quiet on the electromagnetic spectrum. For coastal defense or for a small expeditionary team set up on an island, this combination gives a way to hold warships at risk without dragging in a large radar detachment or a visible support tail. It is a different philosophy from the heavy coastal batteries of the past. Smaller signatures, less crew around the launcher, more movement.

Typhon deserves a closer look because it fills the gap that opened after the demise of the INF regime. The system uses proven naval launcher geometry in a land package. Standardization means the Army can tap into a missile ecosystem that the Navy already sustains, which has obvious benefits for inventory and upgrades. A Typhon unit brings its own power and control shelter and connects to joint fire control over standard digital networks. The crews can set up, shoot and displace in short cycles. The container footprint lets commanders distribute the launchers and complicate enemy targeting, since what looks like a stack of ordinary boxes at a port or a staging area might in fact be a live battery that will not stay put for long. None of that makes Typhon invulnerable, but it raises the cost for an opponent trying to preempt it with air or missile strikes.

NMESIS brings different strengths that complement Typhon rather than duplicate it. The launcher is small, the crew can step away from the firing point, and the vehicle can be hidden in scrub, under a pier approach, behind a berm on a rural road. The Naval Strike Missile’s seeker does not rely on the shooter painting the target. It matches what it sees to its onboard model, which helps in cluttered coastal waters. The missile’s path can hug the sea state and use landforms to mask approach. Reloads come in sealed canisters that ground teams can swap with a small crane. For a Marine Littoral Regiment or a Japanese coastal defense unit working in tight island terrain, that means more positions in play and fewer large signatures to track. It is not a silver bullet, it is another annoyance for any surface commander trying to run a strait or push into a contested bay.

Bringing both systems to Resolute Dragon is not just about showing the flag. Tactically it lets US and Japanese planners practice complementary roles against naval and land targets across a chain of islands. A NMESIS team sitting forward can shape a surface group’s movement and feed track data into the network. A Typhon element sitting deeper in the rear can take advantage of that picture to fire Tomahawk against fixed nodes or, if the rules and geometry allow, employ SM-6 in a surface strike role. The exercise environment forces both sides to test the kill chain under time pressure. Sensors, command posts and shooters have to talk cleanly across services and languages. The timing needs to work with air and maritime pieces that are also moving. In practice it requires repetitions with the actual launchers, the actual radios and the specific terrain where units might have to fight.

On the Japanese side, there is a clear policy line that puts this drill in context. Tokyo has committed to a counterstrike capability built around layered stand off weapons launched from ground, sea and air. Public plans include an upgraded Type 12 surface to ship missile with a much extended reach and the acquisition of hundreds of Tomahawks on an accelerated timeline. Japanese documents and statements since late 2022 are consistent on the logic. The country wants the ability to hold at risk the bases, ships and logistics nodes that would enable an attack on Japan or on its close partners. That does not change the constitutional debate that runs hot at home. It does shape procurement, training and alliance planning. Joint events like Resolute Dragon become the practical place where policy gets translated into crews, timetables and checklists.

Operationally the themes are the same ones that keep coming up in the Indo Pacific. Mobility, survivability and logistics. Typhon’s container layout means the system can move on standard flatbeds and blend into everyday traffic until it is time to erect the launcher. NMESIS rides on a smaller unmanned chassis and can set up in places where bigger systems would be obvious. Both rely on quick displacement after firing. Both work best when dispersed across many positions, supported by lean resupply and by networks that can survive electronic attack. For islands within easy range of hostile sensors and missiles, there is no alternative. If a launcher lingers, it risks being found. If crews bunch up, they risk being hit. So units practice shooting, moving and hiding again, with just enough sustainment to repeat the cycle.

The geopolitical picture around Okinawa and the broader first island chain explains why all this is happening now. China has protested each forward appearance of US land based launchers in the region and argues that such deployments destabilize the security environment. Washington and Tokyo see it differently. They argue that distributed, shore based fires make any cross strait or East China Sea operation much harder to execute. The presence of these systems also plugs Japan more tightly into allied kill chains that include Australian and Philippine pieces as well as US naval and air assets. Local politics in Okinawa remain sensitive and will continue to shape what is possible in terms of tempo and basing. At the national level, however, Japan’s trajectory since 2022 points toward more capability and more willingness to host allied training that would have been difficult a decade ago.

Typhon gives the US Army a shore based launcher that can fire both Tomahawk and SM-6 from a single four cell container, which allows land forces to contribute to maritime strike and to deep land attack from Japanese territory during a crisis. NMESIS gives Marine and potentially partner units a compact, low signature coastal interdiction tool built around a passive seeker and sea skimming flight. Japan’s own programs are moving in parallel and will eventually put similar long range effects in national hands. Put those trends together with a two week joint exercise across Okinawa and other prefectures, and the picture is of a region adjusting to a missile centric era. The exercise ends this month. The learning cycle does not. Crews will take what worked, fix what did not, and come back with the same systems a little sharper next time. That is how this slow, visible shift becomes the new normal.

Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group.

Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.