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US Plans to Expand Columbia Submarine Fleet in Response to China and Russia Nuclear Threats.
On April 17, 2025, during a speech at the annual Defense Programs conference organized by McAleese and Associates, General Anthony Cotton, Commander of the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM), publicly raised the possibility that the U.S. Navy could exceed its initial objective of building 12 Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). This suggestion reflects a growing strategic concern, as the global nuclear threat landscape evolves with Russia's accelerated arsenal modernization, China's ongoing expansion of strategic capabilities, and continued uncertainty surrounding Iran's nuclear ambitions. In this context, the Columbia class, designed to ensure the continuity of the U.S. undersea nuclear deterrent well beyond 2080, could see its fleet expanded beyond current projections.
An artist rendering of the future Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (Picture source: US DoD)
The current program calls for the construction of 12 Columbia-class submarines to progressively replace the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs starting in 2028. Construction of the first vessel, USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826), began in 2020, with commissioning expected in 2031. Subsequent units are to be delivered at a pace of approximately one per year through the early 2040s. The numerical reduction from 14 Ohio-class to 12 Columbia-class submarines is mainly due to the introduction of a life-of-the-ship nuclear reactor, eliminating the need for mid-life refueling. This feature significantly increases operational availability, allowing for extended deterrent patrols without lengthy maintenance. The enhanced endurance and availability per unit thus justify a smaller fleet while maintaining—or even improving—overall strategic effectiveness.
The Columbia class represents the new generation of U.S. SSBNs, designed to assume the strategic role of the Ohio class within the nuclear triad. Each submarine will be equipped with 16 launch tubes for Trident II D5LE ballistic missiles, with a transition to the D5LE2 planned starting with the ninth vessel. The overall design incorporates technologies from Virginia-class attack submarines, including the Large Aperture Bow (LAB) sonar, a pump-jet propulsor to reduce acoustic signature, and turbo-electric propulsion—a first for the U.S. strategic fleet. This system converts nuclear-generated thermal energy into electricity to power the propulsion motor, enhancing stealth and long-term maintainability.
The program is led by General Dynamics Electric Boat as the prime contractor, in partnership with Newport News Shipbuilding, which contributes approximately 22% of the design and construction. The total program cost is estimated at over $132 billion, with an average projected unit cost of around $9 billion (FY2021 dollars). To contain costs, components from previous classes—such as sonar systems and modular structures—have been reused. Additionally, the Columbia class shares a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) with the Royal Navy’s future Dreadnought-class SSBNs, developed since 2008 to strengthen transatlantic industrial cooperation. This compartment is designed to accommodate Trident II missiles in modular "quad-pack" configurations, improving interoperability and streamlining joint development.
As construction of the first units is underway and new vessels continue to be named—the second will be the USS Wisconsin—the evolving global security environment is prompting military leaders to reassess the adequacy of a 12-submarine fleet. Russia has modernized its strategic and tactical nuclear forces, including the deployment of dual-capable delivery systems. Meanwhile, China plans to double its nuclear warhead stockpile within the next five years and has begun building new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos across its territory, significantly expanding its delivery systems. This vertical proliferation raises serious concerns in Washington, which seeks to maintain a credible deterrence posture in an increasingly multipolar environment.
Compounding these concerns is the potential emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. Such a scenario would intensify the need for a reliable, deployable, and survivable nuclear deterrent capable of operating across multiple theaters. At the core of the U.S. nuclear triad is the guarantee of a credible second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear attack—a mission primarily entrusted to SSBNs operating discreetly in the oceans. These platforms must remain undetectable and ready to respond at any moment, ensuring a continuous and credible deterrent posture.
An artist rendering of the future Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines (Picture source: General Dynamics)
However, the potential expansion of the Columbia program is not unanimously supported within the U.S. defense establishment, and several voices highlight the budgetary and strategic challenges of such an ambition. Although General Cotton raised the potential need to exceed the 12-unit plan due to growing threats, his statement—made near the end of his career, may reflect a personal view rather than a firmly established institutional directive. Additionally, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, while committed to nuclear force modernization, is seeking to reduce the Pentagon's overall budget by $50 billion annually. This goal makes it difficult to reconcile the addition of more Columbia submarines with the parallel financial demands of other major programs such as the B-21 Raider bomber, the F-46 Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, and the Virginia-class attack submarines. This prioritization introduces uncertainty regarding the political and industrial feasibility of expanding the Columbia fleet.
These concerns are further reinforced by operational and logistical difficulties already affecting the Columbia program. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Columbia represents the largest and most complex submarine acquisition in Navy history. Construction delays have already been reported, with the USS Columbia's delivery schedule slipping by approximately 16 months. Initially, the Navy hoped to begin delivering one submarine per year starting in 2026, but this goal has been postponed. The GAO also criticized the program for failing to conduct a comprehensive schedule risk analysis, especially given the accelerated timeline compared to the Ohio class, which required 88 months to deliver.
The complexity of the industrial arrangement between Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding adds to the program's fragility. Each shipyard is responsible for building major sections of the submarines—Newport News handles the bow and stern, while Electric Boat oversees final assembly. A delay at either site can cause ripple effects throughout the production timeline. These vulnerabilities are exacerbated by skilled labor shortages and supply chain issues, which have slowed production as workers wait for essential components.
Technologically, the Columbia class is expected to offer greater stealth and endurance than the Ohio class, with a 42-year operational lifespan and no mid-life refueling. It will carry 16 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles and Mk 48 heavyweight torpedoes, supported by advanced sonar and fire control systems. However, these advancements risk being compromised if delays persist.
In summary, the prospect of expanding the Columbia-class fleet beyond the originally planned 12 units reflects a broader reassessment of U.S. strategic needs in light of evolving global nuclear dynamics. Featuring advanced technologies and increased operational availability, this new generation of SSBNs is poised to become a central pillar of America's deterrent posture throughout the second half of the 21st century. However, significant industrial, financial, and organizational challenges continue to raise doubts about the feasibility of increasing production. As nuclear rivalries become more complex and widespread, the adequacy and reliability of the U.S. undersea strategic deterrent remain at the core of national security planning.