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Australia Tests HIMARS Rocket Launcher On Amphibious Assault Ship HMAS Canberra And Landing Craft
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The Australian Defence Force has embarked an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, on the amphibious assault ship HMAS Canberra and one of her landing craft in Sydney Harbour as part of a new series of sea trials. The move marks a practical step toward integrating long range rocket artillery with Australia’s amphibious force, tightening the link between sea based maneuver and land attack options in the Indo Pacific
On 2 December 2025, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) quietly marked a turning point in its long-range fires posture by embarking the M142 High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) aboard the amphibious assault ship HMAS Canberra and one of her landing craft in Sydney Harbour. Conducted as part of the system’s introduction into service, the activity went beyond a simple load trial and formed a key step in validating how rocket artillery can move with amphibious forces in contested littoral environments. In an Indo-Pacific context where dispersed fires and rapid manoeuvre between sea and shore are increasingly central to deterrence, the ability to move HIMARS by sea is strategically significant. The sea trials, designed to confirm the platform’s transportability and sustainment at sea, were carried out, as reported by the Australian Department of Defence.
Beyond the technical success of loading and moving the launcher, the Sydney Harbour activity signals that Australian HIMARS will not be confined to inland training areas or fixed garrisons (Picture source: Australian MoD)
HIMARS itself is now a core element of the Australian Army’s emerging long-range fires architecture. Mounted on a 6×6 wheeled chassis, the launcher can fire guided rockets out to tens of kilometres and, in future, longer-range precision strike missiles, while remaining mobile enough to reposition rapidly after firing. Australia has ordered 42 launchers under a Foreign Military Sales case with the United States, with initial systems already delivered and operated by 54th Siege Battery within the re-raised 10th Brigade, the Army’s long-range fires formation. The Sydney Harbour trials therefore represent the next phase in making this capability not only deployable by air, which has already been tested, but also fully integrated with the maritime component of the ADF.
During the activity in Sydney, a HIMARS launcher, together with its dedicated resupply vehicle and trailer, was embarked on HMAS Canberra, the Royal Australian Navy’s flagship landing helicopter dock, and then moved onto one of her LHD landing craft for further testing. The focus was to verify practical aspects of sea transportability: manoeuvring the launcher within the ship, securing it for sea states encountered in littoral operations, and demonstrating that the resupply elements could be embarked and moved as a complete long-range fires package. HMAS Canberra is designed to embark more than a thousand troops and their vehicles, and to project them ashore using landing craft and helicopters, giving the ADF the means to position HIMARS batteries close to key maritime chokepoints, coastal approaches and island objectives.
From a geostrategic perspective, the trial fits squarely within Australia’s shift towards a more littoral, archipelago-focused posture outlined in recent strategic reviews. The ability to transport HIMARS by Canberra-class ships, LHD landing craft and, in future, the new generation of Army landing craft under the LAND 8710 program, allows long-range fires to be dispersed across coastal regions and potentially onto strategically located islands in the broader Indo-Pacific arc. Instead of being tied to fixed bases or major ports, launchers can be embarked, moved at sea, offloaded to austere beaches, conduct fire missions in support of joint forces, and then be re-embarked or shifted to another location. This complicates an adversary’s targeting calculus and underpins concepts such as expeditionary basing, sea-denial along key sea lanes, and the defence of Australia’s northern approaches.
The trials underscore the drive towards a genuinely joint ADF, where land-based fires are integrated with naval platforms to generate effects from and across the littoral. Major Ben Hutchinson, commanding 54th Siege Battery, highlighted the importance of rehearsing such movements in seemingly benign conditions at Fleet Base East so that they can be executed under operational pressure. For Army gunners, this means understanding how to operate within the constrained spaces of a warship and its landing craft; for Navy crews, it means treating HIMARS and its support vehicles as a routine part of the amphibious load. In future operations, this combination could enable rapid deployment of rocket artillery to remote or lightly developed islands, where traditional port infrastructure is absent but the need for credible, long-range strike in support of allies and partners is acute.
Beyond the technical success of loading and moving the launcher, the Sydney Harbour activity signals that Australian HIMARS will not be confined to inland training areas or fixed garrisons. By proving that the system can embark on Canberra-class ships alongside its sustainment vehicles and operate as part of a broader amphibious task group, the ADF is laying the foundations for a flexible littoral strike capability tailored to the Indo-Pacific’s island geography. As the long-range fires brigade grows and new landing craft enter service, the ability to move HIMARS seamlessly between air, land and sea will be central to Australia’s efforts to deter coercion, reassure regional partners and respond quickly to crises across strategic islands and coastal zones in its near region.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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ALERT: China’s naval expansion and 100-ship surge increase military pressure on Taiwan and East Asian allies
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Reuters reports that China coordinated over 100 naval and coast guard vessels across the East and South China Seas on December 4, 2025. Analysts say the scale and timing show China’s growing ability to conduct synchronized maritime operations that limit response time for nearby militaries.
China executed its largest maritime surge in the East and South China Seas, according to a Reuters summary of intelligence reports released on December 4, 2025. Analysts said the operation involved over 100 naval and coast guard vessels moving in multiple sectors almost simultaneously, a pattern U.S. officials have watched for indications of advanced fleet coordination. While the intent was not specified, the activity was unusually cohesive and significant for regional monitoring agencies.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkChina’s third aircraft carrier, Fujian (Hull 18), during its commissioning ceremony, marked a major step in the PLAN’s carrier aviation modernization. (Picture source: China MoD)
China’s deployment of over 100 naval and coast guard vessels across East Asia coincides with a rapidly expanding fleet capable of projecting power at multiple flashpoints. The combination of massed maritime operations and major advances in carrier, amphibious, and submarine capabilities poses a growing strategic threat, particularly to Taiwan.
This surge occurs as the PLAN (China Navy) accelerates the development of its aircraft carrier fleet. In May 2024, the newest carrier, Fujian, began sea trials and continued extensive testing throughout 2024 and 2025. Its electromagnetic catapult system and arrester gear will allow China to launch heavier, longer-range aircraft, including next-generation fighters and electronic-warfare platforms. Once operational, expected in late 2025 or 2026, Fujian will significantly expand the PLAN’s strike and surveillance envelope around Taiwan.
Meanwhile, the PLAN’s first carrier, Liaoning, completed a year-long refit in 2024, and the second carrier, Shandong, continued large-scale training cycles. Together, both carriers conducted deployments in the South China Sea, the Philippine Sea, and around Taiwan, demonstrating increasingly sustained sortie rates. Their flight operations near the island highlight China’s improving ability to conduct multi-day air operations that simulate blockades, encirclement drills, or air-denial scenarios.
A fourth, larger Chinese carrier is reportedly under construction, suggesting that the PLAN seeks a multi-carrier force to sustain pressure on Taiwan from multiple maritime directions. Such a force is critical to any high-intensity contingency aimed at isolating or coercing the island.
China is expanding amphibious assault capabilities faster than any regional rival. It has rapidly fielded several Type-075 large-deck assault ships and is building the larger Type-076 class. Satellite imagery suggests the Type-076 may surpass U.S. LHDs in size and could feature electromagnetic catapults for launching fixed-wing drones. If confirmed, the vessel would be a hybrid amphibious-aviation platform optimized for fast island seizure, surveillance swarms, and suppression of coastal defenses—capabilities directly relevant to Taiwan’s security.
The PLAN is strengthening its surface escort forces, with carrier groups increasingly protected by Type-055 cruisers—large warships equipped for air defense and command roles—and Type-052D destroyers, multi-role ships focused on anti-air and anti-submarine warfare. These vessels, which have advanced sensors and long-range missile systems, enhance China’s ability to impose air and maritime exclusion zones around Taiwan or defend amphibious and carrier strike groups during a regional crisis.
Submarine modernization complicates Taiwan’s defense planning. The anticipated arrival of the Type-096 ballistic missile and Type-095 attack submarines, along with new variants equipped with vertical launch systems, increases China’s ability to threaten Taiwanese ports, naval bases, and sea lines of communication. Although reports of an unconfirmed submarine incident in Wuhan persist, ongoing construction signals China’s continued investment in its undersea fleet.
The threat to Taiwan becomes clear when combined with China’s recent 100-ship deployment. Massed formations near the Taiwan Strait can simulate blockade patterns, saturate approaches, and strain Taiwan’s readiness cycles. Large coast guard groupings give China gray-zone tools that force Taiwan to respond without clear escalation thresholds, gradually normalizing a coercive presence and complicating U.S. and allied support.
China’s expanded maritime power poses greater risks for the United States across key corridors needed to support Taiwan in crisis. Surveillance encounters, Chinese vessel shadowing, and mass maritime saturation could delay early U.S. presence in a conflict. Japan also faces greater difficulty defending the Ryukyu Islands and vital air routes essential for reinforcing Taiwan.
The Philippines is also under direct pressure, as Chinese formations operating in the Bashi Channel or the northern Luzon corridor could impede allied access routes to Taiwan while simultaneously increasing tensions in the South China Sea. China's 100-ship surge and rapid naval modernization mark a strategic shift: Beijing is moving beyond episodic force to a persistent, multi-theater maritime presence intended to pressure Taiwan, influence regional choices, and challenge U.S. contingency planning in East Asian waters.
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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Romania Secures Hisar-Class Corvette from Türkiye to Bolster Black Sea NATO Shield
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Romania has signed a government-to-government agreement with Türkiye for the Hisar-class light corvette Akhisar, a near-new Turkish combat ship valued at €223 million.The acquisition is intended to strengthen Romania’s naval capabilities in the Black Sea and enhance regional security cooperation.
On December 3, 2025, Romania formally signed an intergovernmental contract with Türkiye for the acquisition of the Hisar-class light corvette Akhisar, in a deal valued at €223 million excluding VAT. The contract, signed at the Ministry of National Defence in Bucharest between the Romanian General Directorate for Armaments and ASFAT, marks the first export of a Turkish-built combat ship to a NATO and European Union member state and the first new major surface combatant to join the Romanian Naval Forces in decades. Aimed at closing a critical capability gap in the Black Sea, the corvette is expected to enhance maritime security, protect key offshore infrastructure and improve Romania’s ability to operate alongside NATO partners in an increasingly contested regional environment.
Romania has purchased the Turkish-built Hisar-class light corvette Akhisar in a €223 million fast-track deal to modernize its aging Black Sea fleet and strengthen NATO’s defenses in the region (Picture Source: ASFAT)
During the ceremony, Minister Radu Miruță underlined that the arrival of a new ship in service is a “concrete step” that strengthens Romania’s defence posture at the Black Sea and directly concerns the safety of the country and the conditions under which Romanian sailors conduct their missions. The government-to-government agreement comes at the end of a decision-making process in which the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) approved, in March 2025, the multi-annual program to equip the Romanian Naval Forces with a new Hisar-class light corvette, enabling the MoND to initiate the necessary acquisition procedures. On 8 September, the joint defence committees of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies unanimously issued a favourable opinion on the purchase, clearing the political way for the contract signature announced on 3 December. The MoND specifies that the €223 million figure without VAT covers not only the ship itself, but also crew training and a logistic support package.
In Romanian service, the Akhisar light corvette will primarily showcase a mix of Turkish and Western defence products integrated on a compact multi-mission platform. The baseline Hisar-class configuration includes an MKE 76 mm naval gun derived from the OTO Melara 76/62, the Aselsan Gökdeniz 35 mm close-in weapon system using NATO-standard 35×228 mm ammunition, as well as 12.7 mm remote-controlled weapon stations and additional machine guns for close-range defence and response to asymmetric threats. The ship’s combat system is centred on the Havelsan ADVENT CMS, connected to a modern sensor suite combining a 3D surveillance radar, fire-control radars, electro-optical directors, sonar and electronic support measures. Romania may later choose to integrate additional NATO-standard or further Turkish-made systems on this platform, but no detailed configuration has been officially disclosed.
Financially and industrially, the contract is notable for both sides. Romania will pay €223 million, without VAT, for the platform itself, crew training and a logistics support package, with the total program cost estimated at around €265 million once national integration work and additional systems are included. The ship is to be transferred directly from the Turkish Navy’s order of battle, which allows delivery to Constanța in roughly six months after signature, a tempo far faster than Romania’s stalled domestic corvette program. This speed, however, comes at the price of limited workshare for Romanian shipyards, a sensitive issue in a country seeking to rebuild its naval industry. For Türkiye, the deal is a strategic export success: ASFAT, the state-owned company coordinating 27 military factories and 10 shipyards, secures its first sale of a Turkish-built warship to an EU and NATO navy, reinforcing its position as a serious competitor in the European naval market.
The acquisition aligns with strategic objectives in response to the increasingly volatile security environment in the Black Sea, intensified by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Romania’s fleet includes several platforms dating to the late Cold War era, and major modernization efforts, such as new corvettes and frigate upgrades, have encountered substantial delays. By acquiring the Akhisar as a turnkey vessel under an intergovernmental agreement, Bucharest secures a near-term enhancement of maritime presence, escort and surveillance capabilities in support of NATO’s eastern flank, including protection of offshore gas fields and vital sea lines of communication. The Hisar-class design, optimized for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), patrol, anti-surface operations, and limited anti-air roles, stands as a durable, high-availability asset capable of sustained operations in the northern and western Black Sea, delivering early warning and strengthening allied maritime situational awareness.
The transaction carries notable geopolitical resonance within NATO and the broader Euro-Atlantic industrial landscape. For Romania, selecting a Turkish-built corvette reflects a pragmatic emphasis on rapid capability delivery and interoperability, even when this means sourcing beyond traditional Western European shipyards. For Türkiye, exporting the Akhisar to a fellow NATO and EU member signals the maturity of its defence industry and its ability to supply complex surface combatants that meet Alliance standards. The deal broadens the Bucharest–Ankara partnership, complements cooperation in drones and land systems, and illustrates how defence industrial ties within NATO can evolve beyond classic supplier-customer relationships to foster new regional security linkages in the Black Sea.
With the signature of the Akhisar contract, Romania moves a step closer to fielding a coherent naval force structure that will eventually include locally built patrol vessels, European-program corvettes, upgraded frigates, submarines and a growing family of unmanned systems. The rapid arrival of this Hisar-class corvette, acquired under a program formally approved by CSAT and Parliament in 2025, will be an early test of Bucharest’s ability to translate political decisions and parliamentary approvals into concrete maritime capabilities, while offering Türkiye a high-visibility reference for future naval exports to allied nations. If timelines are respected and integration of Romanian-specific systems proceeds as planned, the Akhisar could soon become a symbol of both countries’ shared interest in a more robust, interconnected NATO posture in the Black Sea.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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Royal Australian Navy completes first trials of Edge 130 tri-copter drone aboard patrol boat
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On December 1, 2025, the Australian Ministry of Defence announced that the Royal Australian Navy had completed the first-of-class trials of the Edge 130 tricopter drone aboard the patrol boat HMAS Cape Pillar. The results point to a meaningful boost in coastal surveillance and small-warship capabilities as unmanned systems gain wider acceptance.
The Australian Ministry of Defence confirmed on December 1, 2025, that the Royal Australian Navy concluded its inaugural test campaign of the Edge 130 tricopter drone aboard the patrol boat HMAS Cape Pillar. Conducted in September across Darwin Harbour and nearby littoral waters, the flights were designed to validate safe deck operations and assess how a compact unmanned aircraft can extend the sensor reach of minor warships. Defence officials noted that the platform demonstrated stable performance throughout its evolution, offering crews a clearer understanding of how unmanned systems might fit into routine coastal patrols.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkRoyal Australian Navy sailors launch the Edge 130 tri-copter drone from the deck of HMAS Cape Pillar during operational trials in Darwin Harbour, showcasing the integration of uncrewed aerial systems into frontline patrol missions. (Picture source: Australia MoD)
Designed for lightweight, modular deployment, the Edge 130 drone weighs just 1.2 kilograms but offers advanced aerial surveillance and tactical flexibility. With beyond-visual-line-of-sight (BVLOS) capability, swappable lithium-ion batteries, and compatibility with a variety of sensors, the system is engineered for high-tempo maritime operations. The drone’s compact design enables rapid launch and recovery aboard small vessels, filling a critical intelligence and reconnaissance gap that has traditionally been underserved by manned aviation assets in coastal patrols.
The trials aboard HMAS Cape Pillar began with technical integration and remote-pilot training, followed by the operational development of onboard procedures and test flights alongside HMAS Coonawarra. Full operational assessment was conducted at sea under live conditions, simulating mission profiles across diverse coastal terrain, including mangroves, shallow inlets, and offshore surveillance zones. These are precisely the environments where uncrewed systems provide strategic advantage, reducing crew exposure and extending a vessel’s situational awareness far beyond visual and radar line of sight.
For naval forces, the integration of compact aerial drones like the Edge 130 represents a turning point in distributed maritime operations. On minor warships such as the Cape-class patrol boats, drones serve as force multipliers by extending the ship’s sensor range and enhancing maritime domain awareness without increasing crew workload or requiring aerial support from larger platforms. The ability to conduct persistent over-the-horizon reconnaissance enables commanders to detect, classify, and monitor contacts without diverting assets or exposing personnel.
The Edge 130's operational flexibility supports multiple mission profiles. In constabulary roles, drones can patrol remote coastlines for illegal fishing, smuggling, or unauthorised maritime activity, providing real-time video and thermal imaging in hard-to-access environments. In search-and-rescue missions, drones offer rapid deployment and overwatch, increasing the likelihood of detection in time-sensitive scenarios. In tactical operations, they provide critical overwatch, early warning, and terrain mapping support during interdiction efforts, particularly in shallow or confined waters unsuitable for larger platforms.
Throughout the trials, the Edge 130 demonstrated reliable stability during offshore flight, including successful sorties in varying wind conditions and challenging coastal terrain. The final phase included a multi-ship coordination test near Charles Point, during which the drone captured high-resolution aerial images of a formation comprising HMA Ships Cape Pillar, Albany, and Cape Woolamai. This showcased not only its imaging quality but also the ability to integrate into fleet-level operations as a flexible reconnaissance asset.
The success of the Edge 130 aboard Cape Pillar is part of a broader trend toward expanding the use of uncrewed systems across the Royal Australian Navy. With increasing maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Australia’s northern approaches, drone-equipped patrol vessels offer a cost-effective, scalable solution for surveillance across vast maritime zones. The system has already been operationalised in support of Joint Task Force 639, with drones deployed to monitor mangrove-dense areas for illegal fishing—an application that underscores the real-world value of these platforms for persistent maritime security enforcement.
As naval doctrine evolves to embrace distributed lethality and unmanned integration, platforms like the Edge 130 offer a practical, operationally proven solution to expand surveillance reach, reduce risk, and enhance the effectiveness of even the smallest naval units. With this first operational milestone now achieved, the Edge 130 is positioned to play a pivotal role in shaping the future of maritime patrol operations for Australia and allied navies facing similar coastal defence challenges.
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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EDEX 2025: ULAQ's 15 MPV drone signals a new step in Türkiye's autonomous naval warfare
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At EDEX 2025, the Turkish company ARES Shipyard presented the ULAQ 15 MPV unmanned surface vessel, following the program’s restructuring under ULAQ Global to coordinate production, integration, and export activities.
At EDEX 2025, the ULAQ 15 MPV was presented as one of the newest multi-purpose variants of Türkiye’s first armed unmanned surface vessel program, which now covers port security, intelligence and electronic warfare, mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-surface warfare. This presentation also comes at a time when the ULAQ brand, initially created through the joint work of ARES Shipyard and Meteksan Defence, has evolved into a standalone company known as ULAQ Global in July 2025, to serve both domestic and international customers.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkULAQ vessels have participated in the NATO Maritime Security Exercise in October 2023, where ULAQ ASuW and ULAQ PSV worked with a Turkish Navy Gabya-class frigate, Coast Guard interceptors, a Coast Guard RHIB, a Bayraktar TB2 UAV, and a special operations team. (Picture source: Army Recognition)
At the core of the ULAQ family is the ULAQ 15 anti-surface warfare (ASuW), the latest member of a family that includes the ULAQ PSV for port security, the ULAQ ISR and EW for reconnaissance and electronic warfare, the ULAQ 12 MCM for mine countermeasures, the ULAQ ASW for anti-submarine warfare, and the ULAQ 15 MPV as a multi-purpose vessel. The new ASuW version is based on a larger hull designed to accommodate four Çakir cruise missiles, water jet propulsion, and an aft mission space for missiles, towed sonars, torpedoes, and unmanned underwater vehicles. This structure follows earlier steps in which ULAQ was first equipped with Cirit and L UMTAS guided munitions, later expanded to anti-submarine variants and kamikaze configurations such as ULAQ KAMA. The EDEX 2025 display also connects these developments with the ongoing reorganization of the program under the newly created company ULAQ Global. This organization emerged from the partnership between ARES Shipyard and Meteksan Defence and aims to expand domestic and foreign deliveries, as well as manage the overall growth of the ULAQ program.
The Çakir cruise missile integration is the defining feature of the ULAQ 15 ASuW, moving the platform from the 8-kilometer range of UMTAS and Cirit missiles to a stand-off strike range exceeding 150 kilometers. The Çakir weighs up to 330 kg, has a diameter up to 275 mm, and carries a 70 kg high explosive semi-piercing blast fragmentation or thermobaric warhead. Its mid-course guidance uses inertial navigation, anti-jam GNSS, radar, and barometric altimeters, and terrain-referenced navigation, while its terminal guidance employs Imaging Infrared, RF seeker, or a hybrid IIR plus RF option. The missile can be launched from unmanned surface vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, including Akinci and Aksungur, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, land vehicles, trucks, helicopters, and naval ships. The missile can also be guided by a different unit after launch, enabling coordinated engagement between platforms. The first known test firing of Çakir occurred from the Bayraktar Akinci UCAV and confirmed the missile’s multi-platform architecture.
The ULAQ program began in 2018 as a joint initiative between ARES Shipyard and Meteksan Defence to develop Türkiye’s first armed unmanned surface vessel, with the first prototype unveiled in October 2020 and launched in early 2021. The initial ULAQ measures about 11 to 12 meters in length, carries up to 2,000 kg, and uses an advanced composite hull with the ability to operate in sea state 5 at speeds up to 35 knots with a 400-kilometer range. It employs encrypted communications, anti-jamming features, day and night sensors, a gyrostabiliser, X-band navigation radar, EO and IR tracking systems, depth sounder, VHF radio, and onboard firefighting systems. The vessel completed missile test firings of Cirit rockets during the May 2021 Denizkurdu exercise and later passed acceptance trials for the ASuW version. Control is provided from mobile ground stations, command centers, or naval platforms. The platform is intended for reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, surface warfare, asymmetric missions, escort tasks, and infrastructure security. Over time, it expanded into ASW variants carrying lightweight torpedoes and sonobuoys, mine countermeasures designs, firefighting versions, and humanitarian assistance modules.
Following the initial variant, ARES Shipyard completed production for Turkish Navy units under the ULAQ 12 ASuW and ULAQ 12 ASW programs, both based on a standard hull with different payloads. The ULAQ 12 ASuW uses Roketsan’s modular KMC launcher combined with a 12.7 mm remote weapon station and can fire UMTAS, L-UMTAS, Cirit, and L-UMTAS-GM guided munitions at ranges between 8 and 15 kilometers, depending on missile type. The ULAQ 12 ASW is equipped with sonar options and has provisions for torpedoes and ASW rockets. The KMC and KMC-U launchers feature 360-degree stabilized turrets, autonomous laser marking, day and night operation, EO and IR sensors, STANAG 3733 compliance, MIL STD 1760 and MIL STD 810 compatibility, and spare ammunition storage. These launchers can also be integrated onto other Turkish unmanned vessels, including MARLIN and SALVO. The ULAQ KAMA kamikaze boat was also introduced, with a 200 kg warhead, 20 knot speed, 200 nautical mile range, autonomous and semi-autonomous modes, and the ability to continue searching for targets if communication is lost.
ULAQ vessels have participated in maritime exercises such as the NATO Maritime Security Exercise in October 2023, where ULAQ ASuW and ULAQ PSV worked with a Turkish Navy Gabya class frigate, Coast Guard interceptors, a Coast Guard RHIB, a Bayraktar TB2 UAV, and a special operations team. They provided ISR, live video transmission, and support to interdiction operations, and demonstrated manned-unmanned teaming in a mixed operational environment. The Maritime Security Center of Excellence noted the operational completeness of the activities and the ability for manned and unmanned systems to operate without significant interference. Additional national developments include Türkiye’s order of ULAQ ASuW and ASW units in quantities described as being in the dozens, with unit prices characterized as a few million dollars depending on configuration. The program’s objective includes 90 percent localization of components such as propulsion, 12.7 mm remote weapon stations, torpedoes, L-UMTAS missiles, software, communication systems, sensors, and sonar. Statements indicate that the vessels are now equipped with a domestic propulsion system aimed at improving cruising performance.
Export activity has played a major role in shaping the ULAQ program, most notably with Qatar becoming the first international buyer through a QAR 21.3 million contract, about $5.85 million, for the ULAQ 11 PSV equipped with a 12.7 mm remote weapon station, radar, encrypted communication, and autonomous navigation software. The USV is intended for reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence, and facility protection and is expected to be delivered after testing and potential modifications. ULAQ PSV has also been offered to Vietnam with the KMC-U launcher, and exports under consideration include one to five anti-surface warfare vessels, port security vessels, and expendable vessels for another foreign customer. ULAQ’s organizational restructuring into ULAQ Global, announced at IDEF 2025, formalizes its status as an independent company seeking international expansion while remaining linked to its parent firms through financing and management. We can also mention that the broader Turkish unmanned surface vessel landscape includes ARES and Meteksan’s ULAQ, Dearsan’s SALVO, Yonca Onuk and Havelsan’s SANCAR, and Aselsan and Sefine’s ALBATROS and MIR.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Egypt presents USV-AIO-001 unmanned vessel with Eagle-2 weapon station at EDEX 2025
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Egypt unveiled the USV-AIO-001 with the Eagle 2 remote weapon station at EDEX 2025, marking a new step in its unmanned naval development.
At EDEX 2025, Egypt’s Arab International Optronics (AIO) introduced the USV-AIO-001, an unmanned surface vessel equipped with the Eagle-2 remote weapon station produced locally with the Spanish company Escribano, highlighting a 70 percent local content level in the displayed configuration. The USV-AIO-001 was presented as a new Egyptian unmanned naval asset combining a domestically integrated hull with a stabilized combat system for coastal missions, capable of surveillance and force protection with reduced crew exposure.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkBased on Escribano's Guardian, the Eagle-2 turret on the USV-AIO-001 is a lightweight, two-axis gyro-stabilized remote weapon station designed for naval craft and capable of functioning at sea state 3 in all climatic conditions. (Picture source: Army Recognition)
The Eagle-2 turret on the USV-AIO-001 is a lightweight, two-axis gyro-stabilized remote weapon station designed for naval craft and capable of functioning at sea state 3 in all climatic conditions. It supports 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm, and 12.7 mm as the standard naval caliber, and 14.5 mm, allowing different mission configurations depending on operational requirements. The system weighs 185 kg without weapon and ammunition, which enables installation on small boats and unmanned vessels. Its electro-optical suite includes an uncooled thermal camera with dual field of view and a day sight camera with 30x continuous optical zoom, supported by an eye-safe class I laser rangefinder with a 3.5 km maximum range. The software interface is described as seamless and easy to use for accurate control, and an embedded simulator supports training without live firing. The Eagle-2 is characterized as the naval version derived from the Eagle-1 turret.
Arab International Optronics is a joint venture formed in 1982 between Thales, holding 49 percent, and Egypt’s National Service Products Organisation, and has expanded from optronics to full weapon stations. Earlier, the company introduced the X29 RCWS for static defense roles, designed without stabilization and with an ammunition box on the left, a centrally mounted machine gun, and an optronic package beneath the weapon. It supports 12.7×99 mm M2HB or KPVT 14.5×114 mm weapons and uses a 640×480 uncooled microbolometer thermal sensor operating in the 8 to 12 micrometer band, with tank detection at 7.5 km and identification at 1.3 km. Its day camera uses a 1945×1225 CMOS detector with a 6 to 210 mm zoom lens, allowing tank detection up to 20 km at a narrow field and human recognition at 40 m. A 6 km laser rangefinder, automatic recording, video tracking, and a bullet counter are included, and the system weighs 160 kg without weapon or ammunition. The Egyptian Ministry of Defence received a Zero Batch in preparation for full production.
AIO also developed the Eagle-1 in cooperation with Escribano, based on the Guardian turret, forming the basis for the naval Eagle-2 displayed on the USV-AIO-001. Eagle-1 can mount 12.7 mm or KPVT weapons and optionally MG4, MG3, or a 40 mm Mk19, with smoke launchers and STANAG Level 2 protection available. It features a two-axis stabilization under 1 milliradian, with the ammunition box on the left and the sensor suite on the right, using thermal fields of view of 9.0 degrees by 6.75 degrees and 4 degrees by 3 degrees. Detection ranges include 6.9 km for vehicles and 4 km for humans, with identification at 3.2 km and 1.4 km respectively, and its day camera achieves up to 7.5 km vehicle detection. A laser rangefinder reaches 20 km, and the gunner station uses a 12 inch screen with an embedded simulator. AIO produces around 30 percent of its value and aims for 70 percent, with plans for 400 Eagle-1 units in two phases. Eagle-1 was seen on an Egyptian Sherpa, while Eagle-2 appeared on a mock up boat.
The USV-AIO-001 appears within an expanding Egyptian unmanned surface ecosystem that includes projects from public and private entities. The private firm Amstone previously produced the B5 HYDRA with Leonardo and a Cypriot partner, a high speed patrol USV with a payload of 600 kg, total weight of 1,500 kg, length of 2.1 m, and maximum speed of 85 knots. It can carry a 12.7 mm remote gun, launch a small drone for reconnaissance, and integrate Black Scorpion light torpedoes or serve as an explosive boat. The HORUS-USV survey craft, a fiberglass catamaran measuring 1.4 m by 1.3 m with a 0.35 m draft and 150 kg payload, also demonstrated hydrographic survey capability with differential GNSS, a 50 to 200 kHz echo sounder, dual thrusters, microcontrollers, sensors, and modular instrumentation, meeting IHO S 44 standards with ±0.15 m uncertainty at 4.08 m depth.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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China Converts Civilian Cargo Ship Into Maritime Directed-Energy Platform With LY-1 Laser Weapon
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China has mounted and tested the LY-1 high-energy laser on a civilian vessel, turning an ostensibly commercial ship into a potential anti-drone and close air-defence platform. This experiment illustrates how Beijing is integrating directed-energy weapons into its broader amphibious doctrine and blurring the line between civilian logistics assets and military combatants in any future regional crisis.
On November 30, 2025, images shared on Chinese social media showed the LY-1 high-energy laser weapon system bolted to the open deck of a civilian roll-on/roll-off cargo ship conducting sea trials. The photos reveal a large white passenger–cargo Ro-Ro vessel with helicopter landing markings on the forward deck, on which a camouflage-painted carrier vehicle has been positioned and secured with heavy chains. This system, until now associated with dedicated military platforms, is being tested on the same category of commercial Ro-Ro ships that China has for years integrated into amphibious and landing exercises as auxiliary transport. The pairing of a merchant hull and a sophisticated directed-energy weapon highlights how quickly the boundary between civilian logistics and naval combat power is narrowing in the Western Pacific. Concern over the vulnerability of slow, heavily loaded transports to drones and loitering munitions points to a future in which every cargo ramp and vehicle deck could double as a defensive node, signaling how China intends to harden the weakest links in any large‑scale landing force.
China has tested its LY-1 high-energy laser air-defence system on the deck of a civilian Ro-Ro cargo ship, highlighting a deepening fusion between the country’s merchant fleet and its amphibious combat capabilities (Picture Source: Chinese Social Media)
The LY-1 itself is a shipborne high-energy laser designed for close-range air and missile defence. First revealed publicly during the 2025 Victory Day parade in Beijing, the system was displayed on an 8×8 armoured vehicle with a prominent, large-aperture beam director surrounded by multiple electro-optical and infrared sensors for acquisition and tracking. Available open-source information describes LY-1 as a terminal air-defence layer intended to engage small, low-signature airborne threats (drones, loitering munitions, helicopters and potentially low-flying cruise missiles) at the speed of light. Some open-source assessments place the system’s power output in roughly the 180–250 kW class, with speculation that future variants could reach higher levels, and suggest engagement ranges against small unmanned systems extending to several kilometres or more under favourable conditions. These figures remain unconfirmed by Chinese authorities but are broadly consistent with LY-1’s role as the innermost tier of a layered naval air-defence network alongside HQ-10 and HQ-16 surface-to-air missiles. The weapon has already been observed on Type 071 amphibious transport docks such as Simingshan and Qilianshan, indicating that the People’s Liberation Army Navy is moving from technology demonstration toward series integration across its landing fleet. In this role, the laser offers the ability to conduct repeated engagements at a much lower cost per shot than missile interceptors or gun ammunition, provided sufficient shipboard power and cooling are available.
The latest image, circulated on Weibo and other Chinese social platforms rather than through official channels, is striking not only because of the turret but because of the platform beneath it and the way the system is installed. It shows the LY-1 mounted on a large camouflaged carrier vehicle, with the turret, bearing the “LY-1” marking and a conspicuous blue primary aperture, positioned toward the ship’s bow. The vehicle is parked on what appears to be a helicopter deck, identified by its circular landing markings, and is anchored to multiple deck lashing points using chains and tensioners, a standard maritime safety measure when heavy vehicles are transported on exposed decks. Several crew members in blue coveralls are visible along the railings, providing scale and underlining that the test is being conducted in routine sea conditions rather than in a controlled harbour environment. There is no visible additional shielding, dedicated sponson or structural reinforcement around the laser unit, suggesting that the system remains largely self-contained on its carrier vehicle and is being evaluated in a temporary but operationally realistic configuration. This combination of an unchanged civilian superstructure, standard safety procedures and an advanced weapon on deck illustrates how easily a merchant hull can transition from commercial transport to dual-use testbed, while exposing the laser to real-world factors such as vibration, ship motion, sea spray and humidity that strongly influence directed-energy performance.
Mounting the LY‑1 on a roll‑on/roll‑off (Ro‑Ro) vessel highlights a practical approach China may be testing to protect amphibious convoys against contemporary threats. In large landing operations, civilian Ro‑Ro ships laden with vehicles and personnel are especially vulnerable to low‑cost unmanned systems, everything from small quadcopters to one‑way attack drones and loitering munitions, that seek out high‑value hulls. A deck‑mounted laser effectively converts each transport into a short‑range counter‑UAS and counter‑munition node, capable of engaging multiple incoming threats without drawing on scarce missile inventories. Rather than depending solely on escort warships, this dispersal of defensive emitters across the convoy complicates enemy targeting and adds protective layers for otherwise exposed roll‑on/roll‑off and landing craft. The concept aligns with preparations frequently discussed in analyses of potential operations across the Taiwan Strait, where civilian tonnage is expected to augment amphibious lift and therefore would require organic defenses against the distributed drone and missile tactics seen in recent conflicts.
The test also sits squarely within a broader pattern of civil–military fusion at sea. For more than a decade, Chinese authorities have integrated commercial ferries and Ro-Ro ships into exercises involving beach landings, rapid loading and unloading of armoured vehicles, and long-range troop movements. Some of these vessels have reportedly undergone structural modifications to strengthen decks and ramps for heavy military loads. Using a civilian Ro-Ro as a platform for a high-energy laser is consistent with these earlier activities, but it pushes the logic further: the ship ceases to be merely a logistics enabler and becomes a potential combat platform, yet still sails under a civilian appearance in peacetime. This ambiguity raises questions under the laws of armed conflict, particularly the principle of distinction between civilian and military objects, and it complicates the decision-making of foreign commanders who must assess whether an apparently commercial vessel approaching a contested area is in fact equipped with high-end weaponry. At the same time, from Beijing’s perspective, such dual-use configurations increase flexibility in crisis, allow rapid surge mobilisation of the merchant fleet and create additional options for signalling and pressure short of open conflict.
On the technological and strategic fronts, the LY-1 Ro-Ro trials highlight how directed-energy systems are transitioning from experimental concepts to practical tools for maritime power projection. China already deploys other laser systems for land-based counter-drone missions, while multiple navies are evaluating high-energy lasers on destroyers and patrol vessels to address unmanned aerial vehicles and small craft. In this broader context, LY-1 is seen by many analysts not only as an effort to keep pace with developments like the U.S. Navy’s HELIOS, but also to shape emerging naval-laser concepts, advancing them from primary combatants to auxiliary platforms and, over time, potentially into wider segments of the merchant fleet. If these sea trials prove the system’s performance, regional navies may increasingly contend with the possibility that any Chinese Ro-Ro nearing a flashpoint could contribute to local air defense and sensor disruption, even in the absence of visible missile launchers on deck. Such a development narrows the traditional margin of safety for forces targeting logistics shipments and complicates planning for interdiction campaigns that rely on striking unprotected transports.
The appearance of LY-1 on a civilian Ro-Ro thus represents more than a novel test shot; it is an experiment in rewiring the architecture of amphibious power, embedding laser-based air defence directly into those transport platforms that are both indispensable and most exposed. By blending commercial hulls, directed-energy technology and a doctrine built around massed landing operations, China signals that future maritime crises in the Western Pacific could involve not only missiles and aircraft but also merchant vessels capable of silently burning incoming threats from the sky. For regional defence planners, the presence of such a system on a civilian hull is not simply a technological milestone, but a warning that convoy defence, civil shipping and escalation dynamics in any future crisis are now more tightly connected than ever.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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India to commission INS Aridhaman as third Arihant-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine
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India is preparing to commission INS Aridhaman after the submarine entered its final phase of harbour and sea trials, Navy officials said during the December 2 briefing.
INS Aridhaman, India’s third indigenously-built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, is set to be commissioned soon after entering the final stage of harbour and sea trials, as stated by Navy Chief Admiral Dinesh K. Tripathi during the pre-Navy Day press conference on December 2, 2025. The submarine will join the existing INS Arihant and INS Arighaat, giving the Indian Navy three operational Arihant-class SSBNs at sea for the first time and expanding the submarine component of the nuclear triad.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkFeaturing an enlarged hull compared to the INS Arihant, the INS Aridhaman will have an overall length of about 130 meters, with a beam of 11 meters and a draft of around 9.5 to 10 meters. (Picture source: X/News IADN)
This announcement follows the formal commissioning of INS Arighaat into the Strategic Forces Command in Visakhapatnam on August 29, 2024, after a long construction and trial period. Military assessments during early 2025 already indicated that INS Aridhaman, which has been on trials for close to three years, was planned for commissioning within the year. Built under the Advanced Technology Vessel project at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam, the INS Aridhaman, designated as S4 or SSBN 82, is the third Indian-made nuclear submarine and the second Arihant-class unit. The submarine was laid down around 2017 to 2018, launched quietly on November 21 or 23, 2021, and has been undergoing harbour acceptance and sea trials since 2022, with final weapon and reactor checks completed by mid-2025.
The INS Aridhaman's displacement is consistently given as about 6,000 tonnes on the surface and approximately 7,000 tonnes submerged, with a complement of roughly 95 to 100 crew members, including officers and sailors. The submarine is powered by an 83 MW CLWR-B1 compact light water pressurised reactor derived from the prototype naval reactor at Kalpakkam, driving a single shaft with a seven-blade propeller. Speed is stated at 12 to 15 knots when surfaced and about 24 knots when submerged, with an endurance and range limited primarily by food stocks, crew rotation, and scheduled maintenance rather than fuel. The hull could be made using specialised low-carbon steel and, in some descriptions, anechoic tiles for acoustic damping, and it incorporates bow, flank, and towed array sonar fits. Once commissioned, INS Aridhaman is expected to be homeported at Rambilli near Visakhapatnam under the Eastern Naval Command, operating under the Strategic Forces Command within India’s nuclear command structure.
The missile and combat system of INS Aridhaman reflects a larger payload than earlier Arihant-class units, with eight vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in the raised hull section compared to four on INS Arihant and INS Arighaat. This arrangement allows the submarine to carry up to 24 K-15 Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missiles, with a range of about 750 kilometers. Alternatively, the submarine can embark up to eight K-4 SLBMs, with ranges around 3,500 kilometers, and is widely expected to be compatible with future K-5 missiles, which are described as having a range between 5,000 and 6,000 kilometers. The K-15 can reach most targets in Pakistan from patrol areas close to the Indian coastline, while K-4 missiles offer coverage across the wider regional theatre, and K-5 is envisioned to provide longer reach into more distant strategic areas.
The INS Aridhaman also retains a set of six 533 mm torpedo tubes to launch heavyweight torpedoes such as the Varunastra, as well as certain cruise missiles or mines for self-protection and limited conventional strike roles. Its sensor fit includes the USHUS sonar, originally developed for Kilo-class submarines, and the Panchendriya unified sonar and tactical control system, which integrates passive, active, intercept, ranging, and underwater communication functions. These systems are complemented by submarine combat management systems intended to integrate navigation, fire control, and sonar information for submerged operations in the Indian Ocean Region.
Within India’s nuclear doctrine, which is based on credible minimum deterrence and a stated no-first-use policy, the Arihant-class is a family of four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines developed under the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) initiative, which has been valued at about ₹900 billion for the nuclear submarine effort and around ₹40 billion or about $470 million per submarine in earlier estimates. These submarines are described domestically as strategic strike nuclear submarines and, with the commissioning of INS Arihant in 2016, India became the first state outside the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to build and deploy an SSBN. The conceptual basis for a sea-based deterrent emerged after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, when the US carrier group Task Force 74 entered the Bay of Bengal, and a Soviet nuclear-armed submarine reportedly trailed it, highlighting for Indian leaders the strategic value of submarines able to carry nuclear weapons. Following the 1974 Smiling Buddha nuclear test, an internal feasibility study called Project 932 examined the potential for an indigenous nuclear propulsion system, and the nuclear submarine design effort later crystallised in the 1990s as the ATV.
Initially focused on nuclear-powered attack submarines, the project was reoriented toward ballistic missile submarines after India’s 1998 nuclear tests and the adoption of a no-first-use pledge, which emphasized a secure second strike capability. The prototype 83 MW light water reactor, designated S1, was installed at Kalpakkam, reached criticality in November 2003, and was declared operational in September 2006, providing the basis for the production reactors used in Arihant-class boats and a training facility for naval nuclear personnel. Industrial participation in the programme includes detailed engineering at Larsen and Toubro’s submarine design centre, control systems by Tata Power SED, and steam turbine packages from Walchandnagar Industries, with Hindustan Shipyard transferred to the Ministry of Defence in 2009 to support construction work.
The history of the Arihant-class reflects a gradual expansion of India’s SSBN fleet, with boats identified internally as S1 through S4*, followed by a planned S5-class. INS Arihant, designated S2 and SSBN 80, was laid down in 2004, launched on July 26, 2009, began sea and weapons trials in December 2014, completed a series of missile firings, including a K-4 test in March 2016, and was commissioned in August 2016 before completing its first deterrence patrol on November 5, 2018. INS Arighaat, designated S3 and SSBN 81, was laid down in 2009, launched on November 19, 2017, began sea trials in January 2018, completed trials around March 2021, and was formally commissioned on August 29, 2024, after upgrades and testing. INS Aridhaman, or S4, launched in November 2021, began sea trials in 2022, and has been assessed for commissioning at the end of 2025, while a fourth unit, codenamed S4*, with about 75 percent indigenous content and armed only with 3,500-kilometer-range K-4 missiles, was launched on October 16, 2024.
Earlier in the programme, internal discussions in 2007 led to a modification of the design to extend the hull by about 10 meters to accommodate four additional missile tubes on the larger variants S4 and S4*, ensuring a greater missile load without waiting for the follow-on S5 submarine. An additional S4* unit was sanctioned in 2012 to avoid production gaps before the new class, while planning has continued for three larger S5 SSBNs of around 13,500 tonnes displacement, carrying longer-range missiles beyond 5,000 kilometers. In parallel with SSBN construction, India has arranged for a further leased Russian Akula-class nuclear attack submarine, often called Chakra III, under a $3 billion, ten-year lease signed in 2019 and scheduled to deliver around 2028 with a displacement in the 12,770 to 13,800 tonne range. Project 77, a separate plan for six 10,000-tonne indigenous SSNs designed by the Navy’s Warship Design Bureau and built at Visakhapatnam, received Cabinet Committee on Security approval for two boats in October 2024, with design and construction timelines expected to span more than a decade.
As of December 2024, the Indian Navy operated more than 130 warships and 251 aircraft and helicopters, with goals of reaching 155 to 160 warships by 2030, between 175 and 200 by 2035, and up to 230 surface combatants and submarines by 2037. By September 22, 2025, there were 54 ships in various stages of construction, from early fabrication to sea trials, with around 10 of those planned to be commissioned within the same year, and contracts for these vessels were valued at about ₹99,500 crore (roughly $11.1 billion). The Defence Acquisition Council has accorded Acceptance of Necessity for 74 additional warships worth roughly ₹2.35 lakh crore ($26 billion), while the Ministry of Defence continues to clear further programmes, including a first batch of four 10,000-tonne next-generation destroyers and a future aircraft carrier. By October 31, 2025, the Navy had commissioned 10 warships and a submarine in that calendar year, with four more ships scheduled for delivery by December, corresponding to an induction rate of roughly one warship every 40 days.
In response to increased activity by the Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean Region, including submarines and surface deployments, India has invested in anti-submarine corvettes such as the Kamorta and Mahe classes, long-range P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Saryu-class patrol vessels, and unmanned aerial vehicles like the Heron-1. Plans also include strengthening island infrastructure at the Andaman and Nicobar chain and Lakshadweep to create a network of air bases and logistics nodes that support freedom of navigation and overflight across the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, while a Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap published in September 2025 outlines an ambition for at least 10 nuclear propelled surface ships, including the proposed aircraft carrier INS Vishal.
Future submarine plans under the “Future of the Indian Navy” framework include three more Kalvari-class or modified Type 214 submarines under consideration, six Project 75I AIP equipped submarines based on an enlarged Type 214 design, and twelve Project 76 submarines equipped with AIP and tube launched land attack cruise missiles, with feasibility studies beginning in July 2024 and design and construction projected over the next decade. Additional undersea plans include at least five 150 tonne midget submarines intended for MARCOS special operations as swimmer delivery vehicles, a ₹2,500 crore project (roughly $278 million) for twelve extra large unmanned underwater vehicles over 100 tonnes with roles in ISR, anti submarine warfare, anti surface warfare, and mine warfare, and the Jalkapi XLUUV currently under construction in Halol, Gujarat, after a plate cutting ceremony on June 10, 2025.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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U.S. Navy USS Gerald R. Ford in Virgin Islands Confirming Aircraft Carrier Presence Near Venezuela
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The USS Gerald R. Ford’s arrival in St. Thomas marks a visible shift in how the United States is positioning its most advanced carrier near emerging security pressures tied to Venezuela. Navy officials frame the stop as part of a wider homeland defense mission, reflecting growing concern about regional instability in the Caribbean.
On December 1, 2025, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) arrived in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, in a deployment that reflects shifting U.S. security priorities close to home amid the latest diplomatic and military tensions with Venezuela. The U.S. Navy frames the operation as contributing to the broader “defense of our Homeland,” suggesting that the carrier’s deployment carries significance beyond standard maritime security duties. The service notes that personnel within the carrier strike group have adapted to their U.S. Southern Command assignment by treating it as a primary focus and by supporting what is described as the wider effort to safeguard the Homeland. The current crisis with Caracas has elevated concerns about regional instability and the possibility of escalatory actions in the southern approaches. The arrival of the world’s largest aircraft carrier in a U.S. territory therefore, represents a recalibrated posture toward an increasingly unpredictable threat environment in the Caribbean, where regional instability now intersects with broader geopolitical friction.
The USS Gerald R. Ford's December 1, 2025, port visit to St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, marks a strategic deployment underscoring the U.S. commitment to regional stability and homeland defense amid rising tensions in the Caribbean (Picture Source: U.S. Navy)
The USS Gerald R. Ford is currently supporting Operation Southern Spear under U.S. Southern Command, a mission officially aimed at detecting, disrupting, and degrading transnational criminal networks. Yet the Navy’s own language makes clear that the deployment is equally tied to safeguarding the homeland. Rear Adm. Paul Lanzilotta’s reference to the strike group prioritizing “the defense of our Homeland” provides a direct indication that current conditions in the Caribbean are now assessed through a strategic defense lens as much as a law-enforcement one. The presence of the world’s largest aircraft carrier in the U.S. Virgin Islands therefore reflects a deliberate decision to enhance surveillance, deterrence, and response capacity in immediate proximity to U.S. territories.
The Ford’s capacity to execute defensive maneuvers materially strengthens its strategic posture. As the lead ship of its class, CVN-78 integrates advanced systems to counter air, surface, and subsurface threats, and it operates within a carrier strike group that includes guided‑missile destroyers equipped with Aegis air and missile defense, enabling coordinated evasive repositioning, layered interception, and continuous threat tracking. The carrier’s air wing can be launched rapidly to detect and neutralize emergent threats, while onboard electronic warfare suites, decoy systems, and high‑resolution sensors permit timely responses to hostile actions or surveillance attempts. Together, these defensive capabilities allow the carrier not only to project power but also to safeguard U.S. territories and maritime approaches against unforeseen challenges.
The carrier’s recent trajectory further underscores this shift. After departing Norfolk in June 2025, the Gerald R. Ford Carrier Strike Group conducted multi-domain operations in the Atlantic, participated in NATO Neptune Strike 25-2 and 25-3 vigilance activities, and operated above the Arctic Circle and across the Mediterranean alongside allied navies. Its subsequent westward transit through the Strait of Gibraltar into the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility and the Caribbean represents a notable reallocation of high-end naval power. A region traditionally covered by destroyers, Coast Guard cutters, and maritime patrol aircraft now hosts a Ford-class carrier whose capabilities provide unmatched situational awareness, layered air and missile defense, and rapid intervention potential across a wide range of scenarios.
Operation Southern Spear continues to focus on transnational criminal networks, yet the surrounding regional security landscape has become markedly more complex. The Caribbean now lies at the crossroads of organized crime, fragile governance, and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. Political instability in Haiti, protracted crises in Venezuela, and intelligence or military activities involving external powers contribute to a highly dynamic environment, where the potential for unforeseen or opportunistic hostile actions cannot be discounted by U.S. defense planners. The deployment of a Ford-class aircraft carrier, equipped for integrated air defense, advanced intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and sustained high-tempo air operations, enhances the United States’ capacity to detect, evaluate, and counter emerging threats along its southern maritime approaches with speed and precision.
From a geopolitical and geostrategic perspective, the Gerald R. Ford’s visit to the U.S. Virgin Islands signals Washington’s determination to maintain a secure perimeter in the Western Hemisphere. While the official Navy communication avoids political rhetoric, the operational reality is clear: positioning such a carrier in St. Thomas strengthens deterrence, reassures regional partners of continued U.S. engagement, and underscores that the Caribbean remains a critical component of U.S. homeland defense architecture. The deployment also supports broader U.S. objectives of preserving maritime domain awareness, upholding law and order across the Western Hemisphere, and preventing illicit or hostile activities from reaching U.S. shores.
The presence of the USS Gerald R. Ford in the U.S. Virgin Islands represents far more than a routine port call or a visible counternarcotics mission. It serves as a clear and deliberate signal from the U.S. Navy emphasizing homeland defense amid a period marked by converging challenges of illicit trafficking, regional instability, and foreign state interference. By deploying its most advanced aircraft carrier to Operation Southern Spear and positioning it alongside a U.S. territory in the Caribbean, the United States underscores its unwavering vigilance, formidable deterrence capabilities, and steadfast dedication to safeguarding the security of American citizens and territories within this strategically critical theater.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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British Navy’s Future Type 26 Frigates to Field MBDA STRATUS LO Cruise Missile for Advanced Strike
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The UK Government has confirmed that the Royal Navy’s new Type 26 City class frigates will embark MBDA’s STRATUS LO missile to meet the Future Offensive Surface Weapon requirement, following a written answer to Parliament by Defence Secretary Luke Pollard. This locks Britain into the tri-national STRATUS programme with France and Italy, shaping how the UK replaces Harpoon and Storm Shadow with a new generation of long-range, multi-role strike weapons.
On 1 December 2025, the UK Government formally confirmed that the Royal Navy’s future Type 26 frigates will embark the new STRATUS LO strike missile to meet the Future Offensive Surface Weapon (FoSUW) requirement, in a written answer to Parliament by Defence Secretary Luke Pollard. The decision anchors the United Kingdom in the trilateral STRATUS programme led by MBDA alongside France and Italy, aimed at replacing legacy Harpoon, Exocet and Storm Shadow/SCALP families with a new generation of long-range, multi-role missiles. In parallel, MBDA had unveiled the STRATUS family at DSEI 2025 in London, presenting updated designs for both the low-observable LO variant and the high-speed RS variant as the programme enters its development phase. This alignment between national procurement plans and industrial progress makes the Type 26 the central Royal Navy platform for adopting STRATUS.
Royal British Navy Type 26 City-class frigate HMS Glasgow, representing the class that has been selected by the UK Government as the principal surface combatant fleet to integrate MBDA’s STRATUS LO cruise missile under the Future Offensive Surface Weapon programme (Picture Source: Royal British Navy / BAE / Army Recognition Group)
The STRATUS family, formerly known as the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon (FC/ASW) or FMAN/FMC, is conceived as a dual-branch missile system sharing as many subsystems as possible to control costs and simplify integration. STRATUS LO (Low Observable) is the deep-strike and anti-ship arm of the programme: a subsonic cruise missile driven by a turbojet, with a highly refined airframe that minimises radar signature through blended shaping, compact lifting surfaces and extensive use of low-observability materials. Its design aims to deliver very long-range engagements, estimates typically range from beyond 500 km to potentially around 1,000 km, against both land infrastructure and high-value naval targets. The companion STRATUS RS (Rapid Strike) trades stealth shaping for speed, using a ramjet to achieve high supersonic performance and extreme manoeuvrability, optimised for suppression and destruction of enemy air defences. Both missiles are intended to be compatible with Mk41 vertical launch systems as well as a range of air platforms, reflecting MBDA’s intent to create a common family that can be deployed from frigates, destroyers and combat aircraft across the three partner nations.
The development trajectory of STRATUS reflects nearly a decade and a half of Franco-British cooperation on future long-range strike, to which Italy has now formally acceded. Initial conceptual work dates back to the Perseus concept unveiled in 2011, followed by the launch of the joint FC/ASW programme in 2017 under the Lancaster House defence treaties. Since then, MBDA has conducted extensive airframe optimisation, wind-tunnel testing of the ramjet propulsion for the RS variant, and iterative stealth refinements for the LO missile, resulting in the smaller wings and tail surfaces seen on the latest models. The rebranding to STRATUS at DSEI 2025 marked the programme’s transition into a full development phase, with several hundred engineers across the United Kingdom, France and Italy working on guidance, propulsion, warhead and seeker technologies, and early planning already underway for potential ground-launched derivatives that could complement future European land-based strike systems. While the UK Ministry of Defence initially suggested an in-service date around 2028, MBDA officials now regard the early 2030s as a more realistic timeframe for Royal Navy frontline deployment, with the first operational integration expected to coincide with the maturing of the Type 26 class.
For the Royal Navy, selecting the STRATUS LO missile for the Future Offensive Surface Underway Weapon (FoSUW) programme is directly aligned with the Type 26 frigate's design architecture. The eight Type 26 frigates, currently on order from BAE Systems, are each outfitted with 24 Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS) cells, complemented by dedicated Sea Ceptor missile silos and a sizeable mission bay. Choosing a missile family inherently compatible with the Mk 41 system allows London to avoid expensive custom modifications while enabling interoperability, as the same missile can be deployed across other NATO vessels equipped with Mk 41. Operationally, STRATUS LO will provide the Type 26 with a true long-range precision strike capability, enabling a single frigate, whether escorting a carrier or operating independently in regions like the North Atlantic, Mediterranean, or Indo-Pacific, to threaten enemy warships and critical land targets from stand-off distances well beyond the reach of most adversary anti-ship missiles. Meanwhile, the RS variant, initially allocated to air platforms such as Rafale and Typhoon, offers the prospect of a layered strike strategy: Type 26-launched LO missiles perform deep strikes, while the fast, air-launched RS missiles engage radar and air-defense nodes, complicating enemy defensive efforts. This integration of STRATUS LO with the Type 26's Mk 41 VLS infrastructure exemplifies a cost-effective, flexible, and powerful enhancement of Royal Navy capabilities, supporting advanced maritime and joint strike scenarios. The separation of VLS cells and Sea Ceptor silos also maximizes the defensive and offensive potential within the vessel’s combat system.
Tactically, STRATUS LO represents a significant change in how Royal Navy surface combatants will be able to fight. Stealth-optimised shaping, low-altitude sea-skimming profiles and sophisticated guidance should make the missile harder to detect and track than legacy subsonic weapons such as Harpoon or even the French MdCN, particularly in cluttered coastal environments. A deep-strike weapon in this class allows a Type 26 to engage fixed land targets, naval task groups or high-value logistics nodes from outside the envelope of most shore-based anti-ship systems and many combat aircraft, especially when combined with off-board targeting from maritime patrol aircraft, uncrewed systems or allied assets. The compatibility with Mk41 also means that STRATUS LO can be loaded alongside other effectors such as area-defence surface-to-air missiles or anti-submarine rockets, enabling commanders to tailor the load-out to theatre requirements without structural changes to the ship. When considered as a family, the pairing of stealthy LO and high-speed RS missiles offers a flexible toolkit for saturating enemy defences with mixed profiles, forcing defenders to deal simultaneously with low-observable, terrain-following threats and fast, manoeuvring weapons aimed at their sensor backbone.
Strategically, the integration of STRATUS LO on the Type 26 frigate underscores the United Kingdom’s commitment to preserving sovereign long-range strike capabilities while firmly embedding itself within a broader European industrial and operational alliance. By aligning missile requirements with France and Italy around a shared missile family, the UK enhances interoperability among European partners and generates economies of scale for a procurement likely to involve thousands of rounds across all users. Unlike the MdCN missile, which is a capable but more specialized naval cruise missile dependent on French Sylver A70 launchers, STRATUS is designed from inception as a versatile, multi-platform, multi-mission system with extensive export and integration potential via the Mk41 launch system. This collaborative approach positions the European partners strongly compared to other major powers fielding diverse families of long-range conventional missiles, such as the US with its LRASM and JASSM-ER, and China and Russia with their broad anti-ship and land-attack arsenals.
Within the wider European strategic framework, STRATUS also complements initiatives like the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) programme, which focuses on land-based launchers; future ELSA architectures may incorporate STRATUS-derived sensors, warheads, or guidance technologies even if the missile itself is chiefly optimized for naval and air deployments. This synergy reflects a coherent European strategy to maintain advanced, interoperable deep-strike capabilities capable of countering evolving threats in high-intensity contested environments.
By confirming STRATUS LO for the Type 26’s FoSUW fit, the UK Government has effectively designated its future anti-submarine warfare frigate class as the main surface carrier for Europe’s next-generation cruise and anti-ship missile. As the first ships of the class move towards entry into service at the end of this decade and STRATUS transitions from development to qualification and series production, the Royal Navy, together with its French and Italian counterparts, is laying the groundwork for a common long-range strike architecture that will shape European naval operations into the 2050s and beyond. The decision underlines that deep, precise and survivable conventional strike from the sea is now regarded as a core element of deterrence and power projection, and that equipping Type 26 with STRATUS LO is central to delivering that effect.
Written by Teoman S. Nicanci – Defense Analyst, Army Recognition Group
Teoman S. Nicanci holds degrees in Political Science, Comparative and International Politics, and International Relations and Diplomacy from leading Belgian universities, with research focused on Russian strategic behavior, defense technology, and modern warfare. He is a defense analyst at Army Recognition, specializing in the global defense industry, military armament, and emerging defense technologies.
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USS Tripoli Amphibious Assault Ship Enhances Indo‑Pacific Airpower With F‑35B Night Operations
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The USS Tripoli conducted night F-35B operations in the 7th Fleet area of operations on November 29, 2025, underscoring its new role as an aviation-centered platform in the Indo-Pacific. The flights signal a broader shift in how the Navy projects airpower forward, especially as Tripoli completes its move to a Japan-based posture.
On November 29, 2025, night flight operations from the USS Tripoli (LHA 7) in the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations highlighted how a forward-deployed amphibious assault ship can now act as a de facto small aircraft carrier in the Indo-Pacific, with F-35B fighters launching into the darkness from its deck. In a scene captured as Aviation Boatswain’s Mate 2nd Class Arnitt Jones signaled a Marine F-35B of VMFA-242 into position, the U.S. Navy demonstrated that these nocturnal sorties are no longer routine training events but part of a broader shift in how airpower is projected at sea. This development comes as Tripoli completes its transition to a Japan-based platform designed around aviation, without a well deck and optimized for fifth-generation aircraft, as reportedby the U.S. Navy and U.S. Pacific Fleet, with the images made public through DVIDS.
USS Tripoli (LHA 7) conducted night F‑35B operations in the 7th Fleet on November 29, 2025, underscoring its transition to a Japan‑based aviation‑focused platform and its emerging role as a small carrier in the Indo‑Pacific (Picture Source: DVIDS / USNI)
The defense product at the heart of these operations is the pairing of the F-35B Lightning II and the America-class amphibious assault ship Tripoli, configured to operate as a “lightning carrier”. The F-35B’s short takeoff and vertical landing design, sensor fusion and low-observable profile allow it to take off from Tripoli’s reinforced, heat-resistant flight deck in tight launch cycles, including at night, while maintaining a reduced radar signature and high survivability. Tripoli’s design removes the traditional well deck to free up volume for an enlarged hangar, expanded aviation maintenance spaces and greater fuel and ordnance stowage, turning the ship into an aviation-centric platform capable, in surge mode, of embarking around twenty F-35Bs for continuous flight operations. These night flights also illustrate the Navy and Marine Corps’ shift toward distributed maritime operations, a doctrinal evolution that aims to spread airpower across multiple hulls rather than relying solely on nuclear carriers. By placing fifth-generation aircraft on LHAs, the U.S. multiplies launch points, complicates adversary targeting and opens several simultaneous axes of airpower across the Indo-Pacific.
Commissioned in 2020 and tested with a full complement of F‑35Bs during its 2022 maiden deployment, USS Tripoli was among the first large-deck amphibious ships to validate the lightning carrier concept. Following successful trials, the ship was designated for forward deployment to Sasebo, Japan, in 2025, replacing USS America as the region’s primary big-deck amphibious platform. VMFA‑242, known as the “Bats,” transitioned to the F‑35B in 2020 and achieved full operational capability in 2022 after extensive training and participation in major exercises such as Red Flag and Resolute Dragon. The integration of night deck operations aboard Tripoli now marks the convergence of these two developments, a ship designed around aviation and a squadron capable of delivering sustained, all-weather combat power across austere decks throughout the Indo‑Pacific. Within this framework, lightning carrier operations serve as a direct response to China’s expanding anti‑ship ballistic missile threat, particularly the DF‑21D and DF‑26, by establishing mobile, difficult‑to‑detect strike platforms that strengthen the survivability and flexibility of U.S. naval airpower in contested A2/AD environments.
From a tactical perspective, the combination of Tripoli and F-35B changes the way the Navy–Marine Corps team can fight at sea. Night flight operations complicate an adversary’s ability to track sorties and predict deck cycles, while the F-35B’s sensors and networking allow it to act as both a strike platform and an airborne node feeding targeting data to other naval and joint systems. Operating from a relatively compact hull compared with a nuclear aircraft carrier, Tripoli can disperse high-value air assets across a wider maritime area, reducing the concentration of risk and enabling distributed maritime operations. The STOVL performance of the F-35B makes it possible to sustain higher sortie rates from the shorter deck, even in confined waters or under threat conditions where conventional carrier operations might be constrained, turning an amphibious ship into a flexible tool for close air support, maritime strike and air defense in contested littorals. Beyond its kinetic role, the F-35B enhances the U.S. military’s emerging “kill web” by collecting and transmitting targeting data in real time to Aegis-equipped destroyers, submarines, and land-based fires such as HIMARS or M270 units. A single F-35B sortie at night can therefore reshape a maritime engagement by providing immediate, fused situational awareness to joint forces operating across the theater.
Strategically, conducting night operations within the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility sends a clear signal amid intensifying competition in the Indo‑Pacific. Basing USS Tripoli in Japan and routinely integrating VMFA‑242’s F‑35Bs into complex night evolutions expands the number of decks from which fifth‑generation aircraft can operate near critical maritime chokepoints and contested waters, including the East and South China Seas. This posture strengthens deterrence by offering decision‑makers a larger, more mobile, and less vulnerable set of airpower options than reliance on a single carrier strike group. It also reassures allies such as Japan and other regional partners that U.S. forces are not only present but continuously enhancing their capability to conduct night operations from dispersed platforms in coordination with joint and coalition assets. In a crisis around Taiwan or along the first island chain, a forward‑deployed lightning carrier like Tripoli, launching F‑35Bs at night, would provide a rapid, survivable, and adaptable tool for escalation control and precision strike without immediately committing the full weight of a supercarrier.
Seen from the flight deck, the image of a sailor directing a stealth fighter under night lighting on a forward-deployed amphibious assault ship is more than a snapshot of routine activity; it encapsulates a wider transformation in U.S. naval and Marine Corps doctrine in the Indo-Pacific. Night flight operations by F-35Bs from USS Tripoli show that the lightning carrier concept has moved from experiment to operational reality, with direct consequences for how the United States plans to deter, maneuver and, if required, fight in the region’s contested seas and skies in the years ahead.
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US Navy accepts last Freedom-class USS Cleveland as LCS program ends
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The U.S. Navy accepted the delivery of the USS Cleveland (LCS 31) from Fincantieri Marinette Marine on November 26, 2025, completing both the delivery of Freedom-class and the construction of LCS ships.
On November 26, 2025, the U.S. Navy accepted the delivery of the last Freedom-class USS Cleveland (LCS 31) from Fincantieri Marinette Marine, marking the completion of the 16-ship Freedom-class line and the end of the active Littoral Combat Ship delivery program involving Navy personnel, industry partners, and program teams. This Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) will be commissioned in Cleveland, Ohio, in early 2026 before moving to Mayport, Florida.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkThe ship, which will support forward presence missions, maritime security, sea control duties, and deterrence operations, is the fourth vessel to bear the Cleveland name, continuing a lineage of cruisers and amphibious ships that served from 1903 to 2011. (Picture source: US Navy)
Statements from program leadership noted the conclusion of years of development and integration that brought the Freedom-class to its final unit, and highlighted the ship’s role within the broader Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) family. Cleveland is the last ship of the monohull Freedom design and joins the fleet after earlier deliveries such as Beloit, Nantucket, Marinette, Minneapolis Saint Paul, and Cooperstown. The Navy’s surface fleet planners have indicated that this delivery marks the transition from construction to sustainment for the Freedom-class. The Freedom-class program is now aligned with a smaller long-term fleet plan that retains ten ships for surface warfare roles. The commissioning has been postponed to spring 2026, although associated events in Cleveland remain structured by the USS Cleveland Legacy Foundation.
The delivery of Cleveland concludes the Freedom-class acquisition phase that began when the Navy authorized development of littoral combat ships (LCS) in the early 2000s as part of a program to create fast, modular, and mission-focused ships for operations near coastlines. The class was developed in parallel with the trimaran Independence-class, the last of which was commissioned in November 2025, and initial plans anticipated as many as 55 LCSs across both classes before adjustments reduced long-term objectives. Early Freedom hulls, including Freedom, Fort Worth, Detroit, Little Rock, Milwaukee, and Sioux City, experienced propulsion and combining gear issues that led to engine failures, early decommissioning proposals, and suspensions of delivery in 2021 until technical corrections were implemented.
The combining gear redesign, developed with Renk AG, has since been applied to multiple hulls, including St. Louis and Beloit, and incorporated into Cleveland’s final configuration. The class has also undergone structural and systems refinements, including corrosion resistance improvements, buoyancy adjustments, radar changes such as the transition to TRS-4D on later ships, and modifications to deck equipment. Deliveries in 2024 and 2025, including Beloit and Cleveland, have been shaped by these upgrades intended to allow unrestricted operations. The LCS program remains divided into surface warfare and mine countermeasure roles, with the Navy setting a long-term goal of ten Freedom-class and fifteen Independence-class ships.
The LCS 31 is the fourth U.S. Navy ship to carry the name Cleveland, following a lineage beginning with USS Cleveland (C 19), a Denver-class protected cruiser commissioned in 1903 and later redesignated CL 21 that served as flagship of the Atlantic Fleet and carried out convoy escort and troop transport operations during World War I before decommissioning in 1929. The second vessel, USS Cleveland (CL 55), was a Cleveland-class light cruiser commissioned in 1942 that participated in major Pacific theater operations at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa before its decommissioning in 1947. The third namesake, USS Cleveland (LPD 9), was an Austin-class amphibious transport dock commissioned in 1967 or 1976, depending on classification notes, serving for approximately three decades in global deployments and participating in operations including Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Iraqi Freedom before decommissioning in 2011.
The new LCS 31 continues this historical sequence by linking a modern small surface combatant to more than a century of ships bearing the same name. The ship’s crest includes four stars symbolizing the four ships, and its motto, “Forge a Legacy,” references the intention to maintain ties to Cleveland throughout the ship’s service life. The crest incorporates the Cleveland skyline, red lightning bolts for speed, wavy lines referencing Lake Erie and the Cuyahoga River, and symbols acknowledging local institutions such as museums, universities, and hospitals. Cleveland’s commissioning plan includes a long-term goal of returning the ship to the city as a museum after its 20 to 25-year service life.
The technical characteristics of Cleveland follow the established Freedom class configuration, using a steel semiplaning monohull and an aluminum superstructure measuring approximately 115 meters in length with a beam of about 17.5 to 17.7 meters and a draft between 3.9 and 4.3 meters, supporting a full load displacement of roughly 3,400 to 3,500 metric tons. Propulsion is based on a combined diesel and gas system using two Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines and two Colt Pielstick 16PA6B diesel engines that drive four Rolls-Royce waterjets, providing speeds above 74 km/h and a range of about 6,500 kilometers at 33 km/h with endurance approximated at 21 days. Electrical power comes from four Isotta Fraschini V1708 diesel generators rated at 800 kW each.
The ship features launch and recovery systems located at the stern and starboard side for boats and unmanned vehicles, a large mission bay with a three-axis crane, and a flight deck and hangar sized for MH-60R or MH-60S helicopters and MQ-8 B or MQ-8C Fire Scout unmanned helicopters. Sensors include the TRS 3D or TRS 4D radar, depending on hull sequence, the COMBATSS 21 combat management system, and the AN SQR 20 multi-function towed array for anti-submarine modules. Armament consists of a 57 mm Mk 110 gun, a Rolling Airframe Missile launcher, .50 caliber machine guns, and 30 mm Bushmaster cannons with planned integration of AGM-114L Hellfire missiles and optional laser systems. Crew structure includes a core complement of about 50 sailors and up to 75 with detachments, based on the blue and gold rotation model.
Operational experiences across the Freedom-class include the August 2025 self-sufficient engine repair conducted on USS St. Louis during counterdrug operations, which restored propulsion without contractor support after diagnostics and corrective actions by the ship’s engineering team. This event was linked to Navy efforts to pre-position high-demand spare parts on Freedom-class ships and expand crew training to reduce dependence on shore facilities. Squadron commanders have reported increased operational availability during recent deployments in the Second and Fourth Fleets, where Freedom-class ships have engaged in interdiction, maritime security, and partner exercises. Earlier maintenance challenges for the class included seawater intrusion in propulsion systems, metallic debris in filter assemblies, and oil starvation events in combining gears, all of which directed corrective redesigns and procedural updates.
Industrial initiatives such as compressed overhaul timelines for diesel engines and in situ machining for more complex failures remain part of the wider maintenance approach but are applied separately from shipboard tasks. Ships such as Beloit, delivered in 2024, entered post-shakedown availability periods lasting into 2026, demonstrating the extended transition from delivery to full operational certification. Cleveland will undergo similar post-delivery trials and crew qualification phases after commissioning. These processes are intended to stabilize long-term deployment cycles and reduce unplanned propulsion-related downtime across the remaining Freedom ships.
The USS Cleveland Legacy Foundation will manage all kinds of activities linked to the ship, such as community engagement, crew support, and commissioning activities, organized into phases that extend from contract signing to eventual museum conversion. Phase 1 includes milestone events such as steel cutting in 2020, keel laying in 2021, crest unveiling in 2024, leadership visits, and commissioning week planning. A preliminary schedule for commissioning week in Cleveland included an arrival flotilla, community events, sponsor tours, family activities, receptions, and the formal ceremony itself, although the date has been postponed to spring 2026.
Phase 2 focuses on supporting the ship and crew during the vessel’s service life, while Phase 3 concerns the eventual return of the ship to Cleveland after decommissioning. Crew composition for commissioning anticipates 12 officers, 10 chief petty officers, 49 additional enlisted personnel, and 18 junior enlisted sailors with an average age of 22. The commissioning site will require continuous security throughout event week, and support arrangements include crew meals, travel assistance for families, and ship space customization with Cleveland-related items.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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Argentina seeks a French-backed loan to acquire three Scorpène-class submarines
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Argentina’s plan to buy three French Scorpène submarines remains stalled because financing and loan guarantees from France remain unresolved.
In an interview with Infobae on November 27, 2025, Laurent Mourre, director of Sales for strategic countries at Naval Group, confirmed that Argentina’s negotiations for three Scorpène-class submarines remain stalled since a French-guaranteed financial loan has not yet been arranged, and no contract can be finalized until financing terms are agreed with lenders familiar with Argentina’s risk profile. The delay affects the Argentine government's desire to rebuild the country's submarine force, which has lacked operational units since the loss of ARA San Juan in 2017.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkArgentina's idea is to retain the Brazilian Riachuelo-class's general dimensions and hydrodynamic characteristics while incorporating lithium-ion batteries and systems from the Scorpène Evolved, for longer submerged endurance, faster charging, and simpler maintenance. (Picture source: Brazilian Navy)
President Javier Milei’s decision in November 2025 that his government would buy submarines from France prompted Argentina’s ambassador in Paris, Ian Sielecki, to urgently seek a meeting with Defense Minister Luis Petri because the subject was not initially on the political agenda. This choice followed a non-binding Letter of Intent signed in France in October 2024 by Defense Minister Luis Petri and Admiral Carlos Allievi to launch formal negotiations for three boats based on the Brazilian Riachuelo model. That Brazilian program, launched in 2008, covers four conventional Scorpène-class submarines and one nuclear-powered unit, and all four conventional boats have now been delivered, with the third, Tonelero, entering service and the fourth being launched from the Itaguaí naval shipyard.
Infobae notes that Scorpène prices in recent contracts are often above $700 million per unit, which matches estimates of about $2.3 billion for three boats when support and associated services are included. For its part, Argentina has already included a multi-year credit request of $2.31 billion under the heading “Submarine Capacity Recovery” in its proposed 2025 budget. Mourre declined to give a specific figure for the Argentine offer, arguing that before a contract and in a competitive environment, prices are confidential, and that the final value will depend heavily on the level of modification compared with a standard Scorpène, since custom engineering can lead to significant cost increases or remain limited.
He explained that the main obstacle at this stage is financial, since Argentina cannot pay the full amount immediately and must rely on external credit, while Naval Group itself does not provide sovereign loans. According to Mourre, export finance mechanisms are the usual mechanism in such cases, with banks providing loans that are often guaranteed by the French state, and conditions depending on interest rates, guarantees, and insurance. He emphasized that the French state can play a relevant role by backing financing, but that such guarantees are not automatic and come with conditions for both the buyer and the lenders. In practice, Naval Group tends to work with banks it already knows, ones that are familiar with the purchasing country and able to manage the associated risk, which would be an important factor for the initial down payment of roughly fifteen percent by Argentina, given its recent economic history and current focus on controlling public spending.
Therefore, any binding contract cannot be made until a state-backed loan from France is secured, which is a prerequisite for starting the submarine construction in French shipyards. Negotiators in Buenos Aires are seeking highly favorable payment terms, spread over six or seven years, which local media describe as unprecedented if they are obtained. Industrial options are another central axis of the discussion, since Naval Group has presented Argentina with alternatives that include building submarines locally or importing finished boats. Mourre highlighted that there is a large difference in cost depending on whether construction occurs in Argentina, Brazil, France or another location, and he identified this as a strategic choice that will shape the entire program. He stated that if Argentina wants to build submarines domestically, shipyards such as Tandanor would require major investments to reach the necessary infrastructure standards for submarine construction, repeating in some form the experience of Brazil, which created the Itaguaí Naval Complex and invested heavily in facilities, workforce training, and local supply chains to fabricate its Riachuelo class boats.
Establishing a similar framework in Argentina, involving Naval Group, the Navy, and other public entities, would require a multi-year program similar to PROSUB, with an estimated timeline of around ten years from launch to the delivery of a first submarine. The alternative is to have the submarines built entirely in France, as currently envisaged for three Scorpène Evolved units, and to focus Argentine participation on maintenance, training, and later mid-life overhauls. In this second case, Tandanor and other local actors would still regain technical competence by handling mid-life refits, while crews and technical personnel would train using simulators and integrated logistic support systems supplied by Naval Group. This approach reduces initial industrial ambition, shortens timelines, and lowers the upfront investment in shipyard modernization, but the current plan does not seem to include any Brazilian industrial participation.
The configuration envisaged for Argentina corresponds broadly to the Brazilian Riachuelo-class, a stretched derivative of the Scorpène adapted to long-range missions in the South Atlantic. Riachuelo-class submarines measure about 71.6 meters in length, with a beam of 6.2 meters and a draft of 5.8 meters, and their submerged displacement is approximately 1,870 tonnes. They use a diesel-electric propulsion unit to remain deployed for roughly 70 days during operations. Each unit carries four 533 mm torpedo tubes and can load up to 18 F21 heavyweight torpedoes or a mix of torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles, such as SM 39 Exocet or Harpoon, as well as mines in place of some torpedoes when needed.
For Argentina, the idea is to retain these general dimensions and hydrodynamic characteristics while incorporating lithium-ion batteries and systems from the Scorpène Evolved, for longer submerged endurance, faster charging, and simpler maintenance. Naval Group indicates that Scorpène Evolved submarines can achieve an underwater endurance exceeding 78 days, a range close to 8,000 nautical miles, and a yearly at sea availability of more than 240 days, figures that are used as reference for the performance targets of the future Argentine submarines. Naval Group complements this approach with the provision of training simulators intended to allow crews and support personnel to train from the earliest phases of the program and to rehearse missions and emergency procedures before full operational deployment.
At the same time, Argentina presents the submarine purchase as part of a wider effort to strengthen sea control in the South Atlantic, where foreign fishing fleets, illegal fishing, and the United Kingdom’s control around the Falkland or Malvinas area create recurring tensions, explaining why the plan is prioritized politically yet still awaits concrete financial closure. Argentina’s move occurred after the sinking of ARA San Juan in November 2017, an event that ended the operational career of the TR-1700 class, triggered the withdrawal of the country's submarine force from active duty, and led to the suspension and later cancellation of the modernization of ARA Santa Cruz. ARA Salta, a Type 209 boat, now serves only as a training platform that can sail on the surface but no longer provides full operational capability.
To preserve skills, Argentine crews have been sent to train on Peruvian Type 209 submarines, under an agreement intended to prevent the complete loss of expertise. Admiral Allievi has stated that recovering underwater capabilities is a priority and that technical, logistical, and financial studies were carried out, but Argentina's preference still needs to be translated into a detailed contract. In this context, Mourre stressed that the political decision for acquisitions of this scale must be taken at the highest level, and that an understanding between Javier Milei and Emmanuel Macron on strategic priorities and financing will be decisive for the fate of the program. Argentina’s negotiations with France also take shape in a global submarine market that has grown rapidly, as many states seek to expand or modernize their underwater fleets to protect exclusive economic zones, undersea cables, trade routes, and offshore resources.
The worldwide inventory of attack submarines, excluding ballistic missile submarines, is estimated at around 450 units, with four countries, North Korea, Russia, China, and the United States, holding more than half of that total. Between 2016 and 2023, shipyards delivered more than fifty conventional attack submarines worth roughly $25 billion and more than twenty nuclear-powered attack submarines worth about $30 billion, with China and the United States together accounting for a significant portion of these deliveries. In this environment, export-oriented shipbuilders such as Naval Group and TKMS face growing competition from Saab, Navantia, South Korean companies Hanwha and Hyundai, as well as Chinese and Japanese shipyards that increasingly target markets in Latin America, Asia, and Europe. The United States remains focused on nuclear-powered designs and is not a competitor in the conventional segment, which leaves European, Asian, and emerging industrial bases to compete for countries like Argentina.
Written by Jérôme Brahy
Jérôme Brahy is a defense analyst and documentalist at Army Recognition. He specializes in naval modernization, aviation, drones, armored vehicles, and artillery, with a focus on strategic developments in the United States, China, Ukraine, Russia, Türkiye, and Belgium. His analyses go beyond the facts, providing context, identifying key actors, and explaining why defense news matters on a global scale.
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U.S. Navy Receives Future Destroyer DDG 124 to Expand Arleigh Burke-Class Fleet Capabilities
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The U.S. Navy has taken delivery of the future USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr., a Flight IIA Technology Insertion destroyer built by Bath Iron Works. The ship enhances the service's surface warfare capacity and enters final preparations before entering operational duty.
The U.S. Navy confirmed it has accepted delivery of the future USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. (DDG 124), a new Arleigh Burke-class destroyer handed over by General Dynamics Bath Iron Works on November 17, 2025. Naval officials described the ship as a significant upgrade within the long-running class, noting that its Technology Insertion configuration brings improved sensors, combat systems, and power distribution architecture. With delivery complete, the vessel shifts into its final pre-commissioning stage, a period that includes crew training, systems certification, and baseline readiness checks before joining the operational fleet.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkThe future U.S. Navy USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. (DDG 124), a Flight IIA Technology Insertion Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, underway during acceptance trials prior to delivery to the U.S. Navy, showcasing its Aegis combat system radar arrays and advanced multi-mission configuration. (Picture source: U.S. Navy)
The USS Harvey C. Barnum Jr. (DDG 124) belongs to a specialized sub-variant of the Arleigh Burke-class known as Flight IIA Technology Insertion, bridging the gap between the original Flight IIA ships and the more recently introduced Flight III platforms. While maintaining the core combat architecture that defines the Arleigh Burke lineage, this iteration includes enhanced electrical power generation, upgraded air and missile defense systems, and a modernized combat systems suite to counter increasingly complex multi-domain threats.
Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers are the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet, with over 70 ships commissioned since the class first entered service in 1991. Built around the Aegis Combat System and the SPY-1D radar in early variants, the Flight IIA ships introduced critical structural and systems improvements over their predecessors, including a helicopter hangar to support MH-60R and MH-60S operations, an extended hull form, and expanded vertical launch capabilities.
The Flight IIA destroyers are optimized for full-spectrum warfare, combining advanced radar systems, sonar arrays, and electronic warfare capabilities with a high-density missile payload. Each ship is equipped with 96 Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells, capable of firing Standard Missiles (SM-2, SM-3, SM-6), Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, and ASROC anti-submarine weapons. In addition, the class integrates Mk 45 5-inch naval guns, Phalanx close-in weapon systems (CIWS), Harpoon anti-ship missiles (on select hulls), and torpedo launchers, giving it the flexibility to operate in high-intensity conflict or peacetime deterrence missions.
Flight IIA Technology Insertion destroyers, such as DDG 124, incorporate several hardware and software modifications to accommodate the combat systems architecture of Flight III ships. This includes upgraded computing infrastructure to host Aegis Baseline 9C, which enables integrated air and missile defense, including simultaneous ballistic missile defense and traditional air warfare functions. The propulsion system remains based on the reliable LM2500 gas turbines in a combined gas and gas (COGAG) configuration, delivering speeds over 30 knots with extended operational range.
The delivery of DDG 124 reinforces the U.S. Navy’s commitment to maintaining high-end naval forces capable of forward presence, sea control, and power projection. It also sustains the industrial base at a time when global maritime competition continues to escalate, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions. Seven additional destroyers are under construction at Bath Iron Works, including DDG 126 through DDG 138, reflecting a stable production line and long-term investment in surface combatants.
As an Arleigh Burke-classFlight IIA destroyer, DDG 124 will serve for decades as a multi-role combatant, capable of leading surface action groups, operating independently in contested zones, or integrating seamlessly within carrier strike groups. Its flexible mission profile and survivability make it a central element in the Navy's distributed maritime operations strategy, ensuring dominance across air, surface, subsurface, and strike domains.
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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Indian Navy receives its fourth Nilgiri-class stealth frigate to boost naval modernization
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The Indian Navy has taken delivery of Taragiri, its fourth Nilgiri-class stealth frigate, during a handover ceremony at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited in Mumbai. The milestone highlights India’s growing capacity to build advanced frontline warships to meet the security demands of the Indo-Pacific.
The Indian Ministry of Defence confirmed on November 29, 2025, that the Indian Navy has formally accepted its fourth Nilgiri-class stealth frigate, designated Yard 12653, marking another major step in the seven-ship Project 17A program. Officials familiar with the handover described the event at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited as a visible sign of how India’s naval industrial base is maturing, with the new frigate set to join a class known for improved stealth shaping, updated sensors, and expanded mission flexibility across the Indo-Pacific.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkOfficial handover ceremony of INS Taragiri, the fourth Nilgiri-class stealth frigate, to the Indian Navy at Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, Mumbai, on November 29, 2025. The event marks a major milestone in India’s Project 17A frigate program and showcases the nation’s growing self-reliance in advanced warship construction. (Picture source: India MoD)
The reincarnation of the original INS Taragiri, a Leander-class frigate that served from 1980 to 2013, the new Taragiri is a cutting-edge multi-mission warship engineered for surface, anti-air, and anti-submarine warfare. Built under the Indian Navy’s flagship P17A program, the ship embodies a generational shift in naval design, with a significantly reduced radar signature, high survivability standards, a network-centric architecture, and robust offensive capabilities.
Structurally optimized for stealth, the Taragiri incorporates an angular superstructure, flush-mounted sensors, and infrared suppression systems to reduce thermal and radar signatures. Below the waterline, a bulbous bow and low-noise propeller system enhance acoustic stealth and hydrodynamic efficiency, essential for submarine evasion and sonar stealth. The hull form is reinforced for high-speed performance and seakeeping, allowing the ship to maintain stability and combat effectiveness in rough sea states.
At the heart of Taragiri’s combat capability is an advanced integrated weapons suite. It is armed with the BrahMos supersonic surface-to-surface missile system capable of engaging enemy surface targets at ranges exceeding 290 kilometers with pinpoint accuracy. For air defense, the ship fields the MF-STAR (multi-function surveillance, track, and acquisition radar) paired with the vertical-launch MRSAM (Medium Range Surface-to-Air Missile) system, enabling the vessel to intercept aerial threats, including aircraft, drones, and sea-skimming missiles.
Its layered close-in defense system includes a 76mm Super Rapid Gun Mount (SRGM) for high-rate fire against air and surface targets, alongside twin 30mm automatic cannons and 12.7mm remote weapon stations for short-range threats. For anti-submarine operations, Taragiri is equipped with dual torpedo launchers, RBU-6000 rocket launchers, and a sophisticated hull-mounted sonar system, providing a potent undersea warfare punch and area denial capability in littoral and open-ocean environments.
The ship’s aviation facilities include a flight deck and hangar capable of operating an advanced naval helicopter such as the MH-60R or the indigenous HAL Dhruv. These airborne assets significantly enhance the ship’s surveillance reach, anti-submarine operations, and over-the-horizon targeting capability. Furthermore, the Integrated Platform Management System (IPMS) enables real-time diagnostics, automated power distribution, and damage-control management, enhancing survivability under combat conditions.
Driven by a Combined Diesel or Gas (CODOG) propulsion system, the Taragiri can sustain cruising speeds on diesel power and rapidly transition to high-speed sprint modes using gas turbines. This propulsion flexibility ensures efficient long-range patrols while allowing quick maneuvering during combat. The ship's endurance exceeds 5,500 nautical miles, allowing extended deployments across the Indian Ocean Region and beyond.
Mission-wise, Taragiri is configured to support a wide spectrum of operations, from high-intensity naval combat to peacetime maritime security missions such as anti-piracy, coastal surveillance, convoy escort, and humanitarian assistance or disaster relief. The ship is also expected to participate in multilateral naval exercises and strategic patrols, reinforcing India’s diplomatic presence and military cooperation across the Indo-Pacific theater.
The Taragiri is the fourth of seven P17A frigates, following INS Nilgiri, INS Himgiri, and INS Udaygiri. Its compressed build time of 81 months, down from 93 months for the lead ship, is credited to lessons learned from earlier vessels and more efficient integration practices. The remaining three ships, one at MDL and two at Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), are on track for delivery by August 2026.
With over 75 percent indigenous content, the delivery of Taragiri is a strong declaration of India's industrial maturity and defense capability. The ship’s entry into service will boost the Navy’s capacity to deter aggression, control key sea lanes, and project power into contested maritime zones, further solidifying India’s status as a regional security provider in the dynamic Indo-Pacific.
Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.
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U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford conducts Caribbean flight ops amid Venezuela tensions
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The USS Gerald R. Ford conducted flight operations in the Caribbean Sea, according to new Defense Department imagery from November 2025. The move signals a stronger U.S. push to disrupt illicit maritime activity across the Western Hemisphere.
Pictures released by the U.S. Department of War show the U.S. Navy USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier conducting flight operations in the Caribbean Sea, a pace U.S. officials describe as part of an expanded readiness posture under U.S. Southern Command. While the Pentagon did not detail the full scope of the mission, officials familiar with regional operations say the increased tempo reflects a broader effort to counter trafficking networks that operate through key shipping corridors. Ford’s presence, amid tensions with Venezuela, also serves as a visible reminder that Washington is leaning more heavily on naval aviation to reinforce stability in the southern approaches.
Follow Army Recognition on Google News at this linkAn F/A-18E Super Hornet touches down on the flight deck of the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the world’s largest and most advanced aircraft carrier, during operations on November 17, 2025. (Picture source: U.S. Department of War)
Flight operations refer to the full spectrum of launch and recovery exercises involving carrier-based aircraft, conducted continuously to validate combat readiness, precision coordination, and system performance under operational conditions. These exercises are critical not only for pilot proficiency and deck crew synchronization, but also for testing the carrier’s ability to generate sustained air sorties under real-world tempo. In this deployment, flight operations simulate strike, surveillance, interdiction, and air dominance scenarios tailored to the region’s unique threat environment. They allow the Navy to evaluate response speed, sortie capacity, and interoperability with joint and allied forces in the event of escalating maritime tensions or state-level conflict.
The U.S. Navy Ford’s Caribbean deployment directly supports a War Department-directed operation aimed at disrupting narcotics trafficking, enforcing maritime law, and ensuring regional stability—priorities outlined by the president. U.S. defense officials emphasize that the Gerald R. Ford’s presence is a deliberate show of force designed to deter malign actors and enable persistent surveillance of known smuggling routes used by transnational criminal organizations.
Battle rhythm on the Ford’s flight deck is captured in exclusive images showing synchronized F/A-18E/F Super Hornet launches and E-2D Advanced Hawkeye surveillance. Published by the Department of War on November 17, 2025, these images underscore heightened readiness and demonstrate intent to dominate the maritime domain through sustained joint operations.
The Ford Strike Group, featuring support from three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, marks an unprecedented U.S. carrier deployment in the Caribbean. This fully networked, multi-domain force enables rapid interdiction and layered maritime strike, responding agilely to emerging narcotics threats like go-fast boats and semi-submersibles moving cocaine and fentanyl toward the U.S. coast.
This deployment demonstrates a doctrinal shift: the U.S. Navy is leveraging high-value assets against emerging non-state maritime threats near U.S. shores. Traditionally used for global power projection, assets like the Ford are now responding to a recent surge in narcotics trafficking across the Eastern Caribbean Basin, including activity from Venezuelan and Colombian networks.
If conflict escalates with state-level adversaries such as Venezuela, the Ford delivers overwhelming airpower. Carrier Air Wing Eight, with 44 F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, five EA-18G Growlers for electronic warfare, four E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes for command and control, and MH-60R/S helicopters, provides versatile strike, surveillance, and response capabilities.
In strike scenarios, Ford’s assets conduct long-range attacks on adversary defenses, military infrastructure, or logistics hubs while maintaining defensive screens. Growlers degrade enemy sensors for follow-on strikes, and E-2Ds provide persistent airborne early warning to support coordinated air and surface operations.
With EMALS (Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System) and AAG (Advanced Arresting Gear), the Ford enables faster, more reliable flight cycles compared to legacy carriers. Its flight deck can support higher sortie generation rates, enabling the carrier to sustain combat air patrols, strike packages, and maritime surveillance flights simultaneously. This capability would allow the strike group to control the air and sea domain surrounding Venezuela for extended periods without reliance on land-based infrastructure.
In parallel with the operations, multinational maritime drills have been conducted with partner navies from Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Trinidad and Tobago. These exercises focus on maritime interdiction tactics, joint boarding operations, and synchronized air-sea responses to high-speed trafficking vessels. Such engagements are designed to strengthen collective readiness and increase regional burden-sharing in long-term counterdrug efforts.
U.S. Navy Ford’s aircraft carrier current deployment represents a strategic evolution in carrier operations, with the scale and sophistication of this mission underscoring aircraft carriers' role as multi-mission platforms for modern threats. While U.S. Navy officials have not confirmed how long the Ford Strike Group will remain in the region, analysts suggest the deployment could be extended if trafficking indicators persist or regional stability demands a continued deterrent presence.
As high-tempo flight operations persist, the U.S. Navy USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier redefines U.S. naval presence in the hemisphere. The carrier projects strategic reach, operational flexibility, and a firm message: maritime security continues as a central U.S. defense priority.
