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Türkiye Unveils ASELSAN DRONEDEF Counter Drone System with Laser Jamming and 25 mm Airburst Fire.
Türkiye’s ASELSAN unveiled DRONEDEF at Eurosatory 2026 in Paris as a counter-drone layer within its Steel Dome air defense architecture, targeting one of the most urgent threats in modern land warfare. The system is designed to detect, disrupt, and destroy small unmanned aircraft that are increasingly cheap, numerous, hard to find, and capable of shaping tactical outcomes.
ASELSAN said on 16 June 2026 that DRONEDEF was presented alongside radar, electronic warfare, precision-strike, and autonomous systems that point to a wider push toward layered, networked defense. Its combination of sensors, electronic attack, directed energy, electromagnetic effects, and gun-based interception gives ground forces a flexible response against drone swarms and low-cost aerial threats.
Related topic: How Havelsan solves multi-domain data overload with AI-powered command architecture at Eurosatory 2026.
DRONEDEF should be read less as a single weapon and more as an engagement architecture for the lower tier of air defense. Its main elements are İHTAR for detection, classification, and soft-kill jamming; GÖKBERK for laser defeat; KORKUT 100/25 SB for 25 mm hard-kill interception; and EJDERHA for high-power electromagnetic attack against drone electronics. A live demonstration in Ankara on 6 June 2026 reportedly used wirelessly controlled drones, fiber-optic-controlled drones, and swarm-type approaches, with the system assigning different threats to İHTAR, EJDERHA, and GÖKBERK through a central command-and-control center. The reported detection range for DRONEDEF in that demonstration was 10 km, which gives operators time to classify the threat before selecting an effector rather than firing immediately at every low-altitude track.
The KORKUT 100/25 SB is the most important armament in DRONEDEF for targets that cannot be defeated reliably by radio-frequency jamming. The weapon uses a 25 mm automatic cannon firing ASELSAN’s ATOM 25 programmable airburst ammunition, with reported figures of about 600 rounds per minute, a muzzle velocity of roughly 1,100 m/s, 200 ready rounds, an effective anti-UAV range around 1,000–1,200 meters, and a secondary 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun for local defense. The turret includes radar and electro-optical sensors, automatic tracking, day and thermal cameras, and a laser rangefinder, while the gun elevation range has been reported from -20° to +70°. The military value of the ATOM 25 round is that it does not need a direct hit on a quadcopter or fixed-wing mini-UAV; it is programmed to burst near the target and create a fragment pattern against propellers, control surfaces, optics, wiring, batteries, or flight-control components.
This 25 mm layer fills a gap between small arms and missile-based air defense. Small arms have limited probability of kill against maneuvering drones, especially at night or in crosswinds, while short-range missiles are often too expensive for a target that may cost a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. A cannon firing airburst ammunition changes the cost equation, but it does not eliminate constraints: range is short, ammunition is finite, and safe firing arcs matter in urban terrain, near fuel storage, or around friendly troops. That is why DRONEDEF’s pairing of KORKUT with electronic and laser effectors is operationally relevant; commanders can reserve gun ammunition for drones that are autonomous, fiber-optic guided, jam-resistant, or already inside the defended perimeter.
GÖKBERK adds a different kind of hard-kill capability. ASELSAN’s published description of GÖKBERK 100/5 states that the system uses a 5 kW single-mode laser source developed by TÜBİTAK BİLGEM, EO/IR sensors, a stabilized gimbal, radar cueing, and an integrated jammer, with beam focusing up to 2,000 meters and practical drone neutralization at roughly 1 to 1.5 km. ASELSAN also states that the system can sustain laser firing for at least 10 minutes depending on configuration and mission conditions. In tactical terms, this makes GÖKBERK suitable for repeated engagements against small UAVs when weather, atmospheric obscurants, target material, and dwell time permit. It is less useful than a gun against fast fleeting targets in poor visibility, but it offers a low-cost shot, no ballistic debris, and better suitability for critical infrastructure, bases, energy sites, and headquarters where collateral effects are a planning factor.
İHTAR remains the first decision point in the chain. Public descriptions of İHTAR 100 identify a Ku-band pulsed-Doppler radar, track-while-scan operation, TV and thermal cameras, automatic video tracking, programmable jamming, directional and omnidirectional modes, and disruption of UAV communications, GPS, and swarm control links. That gives the defender a non-kinetic option against commercial and modified drones dependent on radio control, satellite navigation, or datalink video return. The limitation is equally important: fiber-optic FPV drones and pre-programmed autonomous aircraft reduce the value of jamming, making physical defeat by KORKUT, GÖKBERK, or electromagnetic damage by EJDERHA necessary. KALKAN II/M, displayed in the same Eurosatory package, supports the wider air picture with X-band 3D detection, Mode 5 IFF, and a reported range greater than 120 km, allowing DRONEDEF to sit inside a broader air-defense network rather than operate as an isolated guard system.
EJDERHA is relevant because it targets the electronics of mini and micro UAVs rather than the airframe. ASELSAN describes the EJDERHA/AD 200 as a high-power electromagnetic anti-UAV system intended to affect navigation, communications, and command/control systems, while later reporting on the EJDERHA 210 notes radar integration, enhanced electro-optics, improved engagement effectiveness, and serial production. Such systems are of interest against swarm raids because they may engage electronics faster than a gun can service individual targets, but they require careful electromagnetic safety planning around friendly radios, sensors, civilian infrastructure, and unmanned systems. KORAL AD, shown separately at Eurosatory, extends the same logic upward by detecting, deceiving, and jamming hostile radar systems, giving Steel Dome an electronic warfare layer against aircraft radars and supporting the wider suppression or denial of enemy air operations.
For European and NATO-aligned customers, the practical question is integration rather than display value. The Daimler Truck memorandum could reduce adoption barriers by placing ASELSAN sensors and effectors on truck families already familiar to allied logistics organizations, while the VIC TEC agreement is relevant to Latvia’s requirement for layered counter-UAS coverage in a Baltic operating environment where fixed infrastructure, dispersal sites, and mobile units all face drone surveillance and strike risks. ASELSAN says it exports to more than 96 countries, has a direct presence in 25 countries, and employs more than 14,000 personnel, which gives it industrial scale, but export success will depend on interoperability, national communications security, ammunition supply, training burden, and rules for operating high-power electromagnetic and laser weapons in peacetime airspace.
The main conclusion is that DRONEDEF reflects where short-range air defense is moving: mixed sensors, mixed effectors, centralized fire control, and a cost-based response to drones. Its strongest feature is not any single weapon, but the ability to match a jammer, laser, cannon, or electromagnetic effector to a specific threat type. Its vulnerabilities are also clear: weather can degrade lasers, jamming will not solve fiber-optic or autonomous drones, cannon range is limited, and electromagnetic weapons introduce deconfliction problems. DRONEDEF is therefore best assessed as a tactical node in a layered air-defense network, not as a stand-alone answer to the drone problem.
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Written by Evan Lerouvillois, Defense Analyst.
Evan studied International Relations, and quickly specialized in defense and security. He is particularly interested in the influence of the defense sector on global geopolitics, and analyzes how technological innovations in defense, arms export contracts, and military strategies influence the international geopolitical scene.