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Faced with Russian and Chinese Hypersonic Missiles US Accelerates Interceptor and Satellite Sensor Programs.
The latest report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), published on April 10, 2025, outlines the growing strategic priority of the United States to counter the emerging hypersonic weapons threat posed by China and Russia. While American offensive hypersonic missile programs are progressing cautiously, detection and interception have become central elements of national defense planning, supported by new technological initiatives and international cooperation frameworks.
The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), led by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), aims to intercept hypersonic weapons during their atmospheric glide phase—when they are traveling at extreme speed after separation from their booster (Picture source: Northrop Grumman )
Russian and Chinese hypersonic capabilities are now viewed by the U.S. Department of Defense as a strategic shift. Russia has officially deployed several systems, including the Avangard, a maneuvering glide vehicle launched atop an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, and the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile. These weapons, designed to evade current missile defense systems, are reportedly already in operational service. China, for its part, has conducted repeated tests of the DF-ZF glide vehicle and is actively developing scramjet-powered cruise missiles such as the Lingyun-1 prototype. Beijing is also significantly investing in the integration of these systems into its anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies, especially in the Indo-Pacific region.
The core concern for the United States lies in the speed, maneuverability, and trajectory unpredictability of these weapons. Unlike conventional ballistic missiles, hypersonic systems follow non-ballistic paths and are able to strike mobile or hardened targets with little warning, limiting decision-making time and response options. Moreover, while U.S. systems are intended for conventional precision strikes, Russia and China maintain the option to equip their hypersonic systems with nuclear warheads, raising the risk of escalation and strategic ambiguity.
The CRS report underlines that due to their velocity and flight profile, hypersonic missiles challenge current early-warning and interception architectures. Ground-based radars cannot detect them until the final phase of flight, offering only a narrow time window for response. Existing space-based sensors in geostationary orbit are also inadequate, as hypersonic missiles exhibit lower infrared signatures than ballistic missiles.
In response, the U.S. Department of Defense has adopted a dual-track approach: developing a new interceptor designed for the glide phase of hypersonic flight and deploying a dedicated low-earth orbit sensor constellation for early tracking and targeting support.
The Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), led by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), aims to intercept hypersonic weapons during their atmospheric glide phase—when they are traveling at extreme speed after separation from their booster. Originally scheduled for deployment around 2035, GPI’s timeline has been expedited through the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act, mandating an initial operational capability by late 2029. In May 2024, the United States formalized a cooperative development agreement with Japan. Under this arrangement, Japan is responsible for propulsion components, while the United States oversees the interceptor's overall architecture.
In parallel, the MDA is developing the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) program. These low-orbit satellites are intended to detect hypersonic threats earlier, track their trajectories continuously, and provide real-time targeting data to systems such as GPI. This effort was reinforced by the presidential executive order titled The Iron Dome for America, issued on January 27, 2025, directing the Department of Defense to accelerate the deployment of HBTSS and outline a new national missile defense framework that addresses ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missile threats.
The MDA’s FY2025 budget request reflects these objectives, with $182.3 million allocated to hypersonic defense programs and $76 million specifically for HBTSS. However, the CRS notes ongoing uncertainty surrounding the technical feasibility of broad-area hypersonic interception. While existing point-defense systems such as THAAD may be adapted for hypersonic scenarios, scaling these for nationwide coverage would likely be cost-prohibitive.
Meanwhile, DARPA is pursuing the Glide Breaker initiative, aimed at developing key components for a lightweight and precise interceptor capable of neutralizing hypersonic threats at long range. The FY2025 budget allocates $38 million to this effort.
Together, these programs reflect a shift toward technological resilience and a more comprehensive deterrence posture. As of today, the United States does not field any operational system capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles in flight. The CRS emphasizes that both Russian and Chinese hypersonic weapons are considered significant threats to strategic stability, particularly as some may carry nuclear payloads. Consequently, missile defense is increasingly seen not only as a military challenge, but also as a political issue with potential implications for future arms control frameworks.