Russia turns to Iran’s Shahed 107 drone for its war of attrition against Ukraine.

A newly recovered wreckage on Ukraine’s eastern front in mid-November 2025 confirms that Russia is now using Iran’s Shahed 107 loitering munition for deep logistics strikes. With claimed ranges out to 1,500 kilometers and jam-resistant satellite guidance, the system tightens pressure on Ukrainian rear areas and highlights growing Iran-Russia defense cooperation.

Images posted on Telegram in mid-November by military blogger Sergey Flash show the black airframe of a downed loitering munition laid out on a blue tarp, its rear piston engine still attached and surrounded by a distinctive four-element antenna ring. Visual comparison with footage released in Tehran when the system was unveiled in June 2025 leaves little doubt that this is Iran’s Shahed 107, a medium-range attack drone that analysts and Ukrainian officials have long suspected was being transferred to Russia and folded into its growing inventory of Shahed-type weapons for deep strikes against Ukraine.
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On the battlefield, the Shahed 107 adds an extra layer of threat between small FPV kamikaze drones and heavier systems such as cruise missiles or Shahed 136s (Picture source: Telegram Channel @Sergey Flash)

The Shahed 107 is a strike unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with a fixed wing, designed for medium-range penetration missions. Available data remain incomplete, but several parameters recur in Ukrainian and Western assessments: a high-explosive warhead of 8 to 9 kilograms, a cruising speed of around 120 kilometers per hour, a ceiling close to 3,000 meters, and, above all, a minimum range of several hundred kilometers, with some Iranian actors claiming up to 1,500 kilometers. In practice, even a more conservative envelope already gives Russian forces the ability to hit the full operational depth of Ukrainian territory from launch areas well behind the front line.

The guidance chain relies on a combination of inertial navigation and satellite positioning, with deliberate use of GPS and GLONASS signals. The term Controlled Reception Pattern Antenna (CRPA) refers here to the four-element antenna mounted at the base of the engine section. This device shapes the reception pattern and mitigates certain types of jamming, without providing complete protection against opposing electronic warfare assets. For Moscow, the main advantage lies in a guidance path that remains stable enough up to the target area, then in the drone’s relative autonomy in the terminal phase, even if data links are disrupted.

On the battlefield, the Shahed 107 adds an extra layer of threat between small FPV kamikaze drones and heavier systems such as cruise missiles or Shahed 136s. Its 8 to 9 kilogram warhead remains modest, but it is sufficient to destroy unarmoured vehicles, ammunition stocks, brigade-level command posts, or communications antennas. Its limited speed and medium altitude can reduce survivability against dense ground-based air defences, but these constraints are offset by a lower unit cost, the option of multiple launches, and the ability to operate from austere sites concealed in Russian rear areas or on occupied territory.

The tactical impact depends on how Moscow integrates this loitering munition with the rest of its strike toolkit. Single launches can target specific objectives identified by intelligence networks and reconnaissance drones, while salvos of Shahed 107s can be used to saturate early-warning radars, force surface-to-air systems to fire, and open corridors for heavier weapons. Ukrainian frontline units thus see their logistics hubs, assembly areas, and forward depots subjected to repeated attacks at distances of 100 to 300 kilometers from the line of contact. To limit losses, Kyiv’s command is forced to multiply movements, tighten emission discipline, emission control (EMCON), and disperse stocks more widely, at the cost of a more complex logistics effort.

In addition, the Shahed 107 drone found in Ukraine illustrates the support provided by Iran to Russia. The first examples used in Ukraine come from assemblies carried out in Iran, as indicated by markings observed by Ukrainian teams on some fragments. However, leaked documents and public statements regarding the Alabuga industrial zone suggest a gradual increase in local production, involving the transfer of designs, delivery of kits, and integration of Russian components into the chain. For Moscow, this approach reduces direct dependence on Iranian shipments while retaining a proven, low-cost loitering munition architecture.

By placing the Shahed 107 at the centre of its long-range strike strategy, Russia validates Iran’s approach of attrition and saturation using inexpensive delivery systems, which Tehran has been putting in place for many months, and offers Iran valuable feedback from a high-intensity conflict. Over time, this convergence is likely to encourage wider dissemination of similar loitering munitions to other partners of the Iran–Russia axis, whether armed groups or states. For NATO countries and their allies, the spread of such platforms requires adaptations in theatre air defence, improved interoperability of counter-drone systems, and a rethink of how to protect logistics depth, which has turned into a battlespace in its own right rather than a safe rear area.