Taiwan Unveils Red Falcon II Anti-Tank Rocket to Counter Chinese Armored Vehicle Threats.

Taiwan has publicly unveiled the Red Falcon II portable anti-armor rocket for the first time, signaling a major effort to strengthen frontline infantry defenses against growing Chinese armored threats and potential amphibious assault operations. Developed by the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), the new disposable weapon improves Taiwan’s ability to counter modern tanks with a lighter, longer-range, and more mobile system that enters a market traditionally dominated by the U.S. FGM-148 Javelin and Sweden’s Carl Gustaf M4 recoilless weapon system.

The Red Falcon II delivers greater armor penetration, extended firing range, and enhanced night combat capability, giving Taiwanese infantry a more effective tool for urban warfare, coastal defense, and rapid-response operations. Its debut reflects a broader shift toward highly mobile anti-armor warfare, in which portable precision weapons are becoming essential for deterrence, survivability, and distributed battlefield operations against larger mechanized forces.

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Taiwan’s new Red Falcon II portable anti-armor rocket combines a lightweight design, improved 50+ cm RHA penetration, 500 m range, and thermal night-fighting capability to counter Chinese armored threats during amphibious and urban combat operations. (Picture source: DEF Taiwan)

The unveiling comes as Taiwan accelerates efforts to modernize its asymmetric defense strategy against a potential amphibious assault by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). According to NCSIST, the Red Falcon II was specifically designed to counter next-generation armored vehicles and support coastal and urban defense operations where infantry anti-armor weapons play a decisive role in delaying mechanized advances and disrupting amphibious landing operations.

The Red Falcon II evolves directly from Taiwan’s earlier Red Falcon I disposable anti-tank rocket, known locally as the Kestrel series. Development work on the new variant reportedly began in 2024, with NCSIST launching full-system planning and verification studies to address shortcomings identified in the original weapon. In 2025, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan approved additional requirements focusing on reduced system weight, improved engagement of moving targets, and the ability to fire safely from enclosed spaces, a critical capability for urban combat and defensive operations inside buildings.

The outdoor-launch version of the weapon has already completed development and is entering research and development testing during the first half of this year. Following system verification, Taiwan’s military will conduct initial operational testing and evaluation before potential serial production. An indoor-launch variant, designed for confined-space firing, is expected to complete testing before the end of the year.

The most significant improvement concerns armor penetration capability. NCSIST confirmed that the Red Falcon II increases penetration against rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) from approximately 30 cm in the previous model to more than 50 cm. During live-fire trials, the warhead reportedly penetrated 62 cm of armor equivalent, while peak performance tests reached up to 67 cm. Such performance substantially enhances Taiwan’s ability to threaten modern Chinese armored fighting vehicles during amphibious landings or mechanized breakthrough operations.

The weapon’s effective combat range has increased from 400 m to 500 m while maintaining a total projectile weight of only 3.5 kg. Engineers achieved this by using aluminum alloy and composite materials in the projectile's structure, balancing improved lethality with infantry portability. Such weight reduction is operationally significant for Taiwan’s reserve and light infantry forces, which must operate in dense urban terrain, mountainous areas, and coastal defensive positions with limited logistical support.

NCSIST also introduced a substantial lightweighting program for the launcher itself. The launcher mass was reduced from 5.1 kg to 3.9 kg while reinforcing the internal launch tube structure to preserve safety margins and firing durability. The launcher’s overall length was simultaneously shortened from 119 cm to 116 cm by adopting a redesigned front-section flow guide inspired by the French APILAS anti-tank rocket system.

Another major advancement is the incorporation of a Predictive Line of Sight (PLOS) targeting concept. According to NCSIST engineer Huang Chih-ching, the system calculates target movement and adjusts the aiming point in advance, significantly increasing hit probability against moving armored vehicles. This feature improves effectiveness against maneuvering armored targets and partially narrows the capability gap between conventional disposable rockets and guided anti-tank missile systems.

The new launcher can also integrate detachable thermal imaging sights mounted on a tactical rail system, providing all-weather and night-fighting capability. This enhancement is particularly important for Taiwan’s defensive doctrine, which anticipates continuous operations during low-visibility conditions, including nighttime amphibious assault scenarios across the Taiwan Strait.

The thermal imaging module itself reflects Taiwan’s increasing domestic defense-electronics capability. Unlike traditional optical tube systems, the sight uses advanced digital chip technology, enabling an operational standby time of up to 8 hrs. The device includes external power bank charging capability, a digital data interface, 5x magnification, and a night observation range of up to 500 m. The thermal sight can also be detached from the launcher and mounted on other infantry equipment fitted with tactical rails, expanding its utility as a standalone battlefield observation system.

Although the Red Falcon II does not match the long-range fire-and-forget precision of the U.S. Javelin anti-tank guided missile, Taiwan appears to be targeting a different operational niche focused on lightweight, mass-deployable systems and lower production costs. Compared with the Javelin’s heavier guided-missile architecture and the Carl-Gustaf M4’s reusable multi-role recoilless-weapon design, the Taiwanese system emphasizes disposable operation, reduced combat load, and rapid distribution to reserve infantry, coastal defense units, and urban combat teams. While the Javelin remains superior in top-attack capability against heavily protected main battle tanks and the Carl-Gustaf M4 offers broader ammunition flexibility, the Red Falcon II provides Taiwan with a domestically produced anti-armor weapon optimized for large-scale territorial defense and sustained wartime consumption.

NCSIST additionally confirmed that future ammunition development is already underway. Beyond the anti-armor warhead, Taiwan plans to introduce high-explosive and bunker-buster variants tailored for different operational requirements across the armed forces. This modular approach mirrors the evolution of Western infantry support weapon systems, such as the Carl-Gustaf family, which achieved operational success through diverse ammunition options ranging from anti-armor to anti-structure and anti-personnel effects.

Strategically, the Red Falcon II demonstrates Taiwan’s determination to reduce its dependence on foreign anti-tank weapons while simultaneously building a domestic defense industrial base capable of supporting prolonged wartime consumption rates. In a conflict scenario involving large-scale amphibious landings, infantry anti-armor systems would likely be among the most heavily expended munitions. Indigenous production, therefore, provides Taiwan with greater sustainability and wartime resilience.

The emergence of the Red Falcon II also reflects a broader trend among Indo-Pacific militaries seeking lighter, cheaper, and more adaptable infantry anti-tank weapons optimized for urban warfare and coastal defense rather than traditional Cold War armored engagements. For the PLA, the growing sophistication of Taiwan’s infantry anti-armor inventory complicates operational planning for amphibious assault formations, particularly during vulnerable landing and breakout phases ashore, where large numbers of portable anti-armor rockets could saturate beachheads and mechanized assault corridors with mobile defensive fire.

Written by Alain Servaes – Chief Editor, Army Recognition Group
Alain Servaes is a former infantry non-commissioned officer and the founder of Army Recognition. With over 20 years in defense journalism, he provides expert analysis on military equipment, NATO operations, and the global defense industry.