Analysis: Are US sanctions redefining the global arms trade by sidelining Russia ?.

On August 15, 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defense accused the United States of deliberately obstructing its defense exports in Asia-Pacific, a region where Washington seeks to expand its influence to counterbalance China. Speaking at the Moscow Conference on International Security, Igor Kostyukov, chief of the Main Intelligence Department (RuMoD), alleged that Washington is blackmailing regional governments with the threat of sanctions to derail contracts involving the S-400 air defense system for India, Su-35 fighter aircraft and Mi-17 helicopters for Indonesia, Mi-171 helicopters for the Philippines, and future cooperation projects with Vietnam. His statements, relayed by the Interfax agency, come against the backdrop of a collapse in Russian arms sales since the outbreak of the Ukraine war.
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Indian Air Force Rafale fighter jet, symbol of New Delhi’s growing diversification away from Russian arms as US pressure and sanctions reshape defense markets in Asia (Picture source: Dylan Agbagni).

The example most frequently cited remains India, which acquired five regiments of the S-400 system despite U.S. opposition. Washington had initially exempted New Delhi from sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), but in recent months political pressure has resurfaced. President Donald Trump imposed a 25% tariff on Indian goods, while publicly criticizing New Delhi for buying Russian energy and arms. Russia has assured India that the two remaining S-400 squadrons will be delivered by 2027, with the system already deployed under the name “Sudarshan Chakra” playing a central role in India’s air defense posture. New Delhi, however, remains cautious about further acquisitions, notably regarding the Su-57 stealth fighter, which would risk worsening tensions with Washington.

Indonesia illustrates the combined effect of U.S. sanctions policy and economic constraints. A $1.14 billion contract for 11 Su-35s, announced in 2018, was never implemented, officially due to budgetary difficulties exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, but also under pressure from CAATSA. Jakarta has since diversified toward the U.S. F-15EX and the French Rafale, although Russian proposals, including joint production of Mi-17 helicopters, remain technically “on the table.” The Philippines likewise canceled in 2022 a contract signed the previous year for 16 Mi-171 helicopters, citing the risk of U.S. sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine. Manila is now considering American Boeing CH-47 Chinooks to cover its needs, as tensions with China in the South China Sea intensify.

Indonesia’s decision to procure the Turkish KAAN fighter jet further illustrates this realignment. After years of hesitation over the Su-35 deal with Moscow, Jakarta has now committed to acquiring 48 fifth-generation KAAN aircraft in cooperation with Türkiye, with deliveries expected to begin in 2028. The program includes technology transfer and local industrial participation, underscoring Indonesia’s choice to diversify away from Russian equipment amid fears of U.S. sanctions and uncertainty over Russian production capacity. This shift not only highlights the diminishing role of Moscow in Southeast Asian defense markets but also reflects how new suppliers, from Western partners to emerging producers like Türkiye, are filling the gap created by Russia’s decline.

Vietnam, a historical client of Russian industry, also finds itself in the crosshairs. Its air force is equipped with Soviet- and Russian-origin fighters, from Su-22s and MiG-21s to Su-30MK2s and Yak-130 trainers. Negotiations for new aircraft were slowed after Washington threatened sanctions, and Hanoi is now exploring the acquisition of U.S. F-16s. A decision in this direction would mark a major strategic realignment, signaling the gradual erosion of Moscow’s defense partnership with Vietnam, once a key pillar of its Asian exports.

The precedents go beyond Asia. In 2019, the Trump administration sanctioned Türkiye and expelled it from the F-35 program following its purchase of the S-400 system, a clear warning to all potential Russian clients. Egypt, too, had to renounce its plan to acquire Su-35s, despite initial deliveries, under pressure from its U.S. ally and principal military supplier.

For Moscow, these setbacks come on top of structural difficulties. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russian arms exports fell by 53% between the periods 2014-2018 and 2019-2023. The collapse has accelerated since 2021, when deliveries totaled $14.6 billion; by 2024, that figure had fallen below $1 billion, a 92% decrease in just three years. The causes are multiple: sanctions imposed on Russia’s defense-industrial base, logistical and production disruptions caused by the war in Ukraine, and the reluctance of many states to risk secondary sanctions from Washington.

For the United States, this pressure serves a dual purpose: to weaken the Russian economy and to expand its own arms market. As clients abandon Russian contracts, Washington offers alternatives, often backed by financing or training packages, reinforcing its position in Asia-Pacific. RAND had already noted in 2021 that the threat of CAATSA created a “chilling effect” on negotiations involving Russian equipment, with several countries preferring to avoid risk rather than challenge Washington’s sanctions regime.

Faced with the decline of its traditional markets, Moscow is turning to Africa, such as Algeria with the Su-57, and Latin America to maintain its export revenues, but here too U.S. pressure is felt, and local demand remains limited. If a contract is concluded, it would not be for new gen jets, vehicles or missiles, but for the previous generations. Russia’s efforts to promote joint production programs, such as with the Su-57 or helicopters, have so far met with little success outside of established partnerships like India.

The Russian accusations thus reveal both the effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic and economic tools and the fragility of Moscow’s position in the international arms market. While Washington presents its policy as a response to Russian aggression and a way to reduce dependency on Moscow, Russia sees it as a deliberate campaign of sabotage. The outcome is clear in numbers: Russian exports are at their lowest levels in decades, while U.S. and European defense industries are expanding their market share in Asia-Pacific and beyond. The competition, framed by sanctions and geopolitical alignments, now defines a central axis of the global defense economy.

Looking ahead, the next two to three years will likely lock in a structural shift away from Russian equipment across much of Asia, with sanctions pressure and Russian industrial limits reinforcing each other. Even if isolated contracts survive, uncertainty around delivery schedules, spare parts, and technology upgrades will continue to weigh on Moscow’s credibility as a supplier. India is expected to complete ongoing S-400 deliveries but will likely accelerate diversification toward U.S., European, and indigenous systems to limit exposure, gradually reshaping its defense relationship with Russia into one centered more on maintenance of legacy systems than on new-generation procurements.

In Southeast Asia, the trend already favors Western suppliers. Jakarta’s pivot toward the F-15EX and Rafale, Manila’s shift from Mi-171s to Chinooks, and Hanoi’s possible move toward F-16s illustrate a broader recalibration. Should Vietnam proceed with such a purchase, it would mark the end of Moscow’s privileged position in the region and further consolidate U.S. influence. In this evolving landscape, the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is hardening around U.S. and allied defense ecosystems, with France and other European suppliers also consolidating market share. Russia, meanwhile, will struggle to offset the loss of its largest Asian clients through sales in Africa and Latin America, where demand is fragmented and financing limited.

Absent a significant reversal of U.S. sanctions policy or a rapid recovery of Russia’s industrial capacity, the long-term trajectory appears set: fewer Russian platforms in Asian fleets, growing U.S. dominance in regional defense markets, and an arms procurement environment where the perceived risks of buying Russian equipment are factored in from the outset.