Analysis: China parade raises questions over possible new hypersonic missile on WS2400 truck.

Beijing’s 2025 military parade offered a new glimpse into the evolution of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). Among the numerous armored vehicles, drones, and missile launchers on display, one image stood out, published by Zhao DaShuai on X: an 8x8 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL), marked HZ252, carrying two single solid-fuel ballistic missiles on an open cradle. The vehicle’s cab-forward design, reminiscent of Western heavy tactical trucks such as the Oshkosh HEMTT, closely matches the Wanshan WS2400 chassis family, a workhorse platform of the Chinese missile forces since the early 1990s.
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The 8x8 WS2400 launcher can transport and fire ballistic missiles with a 20-ton payload, here likely carrying a DF-11 short-range missile with up to 600 km range, though a DF-15 variant reaching 900 km is also possible (Picture source: Zhao DaShuai on X).

The WS2400 is an 8x8 special wheeled chassis manufactured by Wanshan Special Vehicle, part of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC). Developed as a derivative of the Soviet MAZ-543 but redesigned with domestic industry input, the WS2400 has a total length of approximately 11.4 meters, a curb weight of 22 tons, and a maximum payload capacity also in the 20–22 ton range. Its 517 kW Deutz diesel engine enables road speeds of up to 70 km/h with a range of about 650 km, giving missile units the ability to deploy rapidly across China’s vast road network. The 8x8 configuration, independent suspension, and wide tires allow for operations on semi-prepared terrain, though it remains primarily a road-mobile system.

This TEL is normally used to carry hypersonic missiles. We suspect the presence of the DF-11 (CSS-7) and DF-15 (CSS-6) short-range ballistic missiles. Both families have been central to the PLARF’s arsenal, providing conventional precision strike options in scenarios involving Taiwan, India, or other regional flashpoints. The WS2400’s open rear deck and hydraulic cradle system, visible in the 2025 parade photograph, align most closely with the DF-11/DF-11A launcher configuration, in which the missile is carried externally and elevated prior to ignition. By contrast, DF-15 systems are most often associated with the Taian TAS5450 8x8 TEL, which uses an enclosed bay with opening roof panels to house the missile vertically before launch.

Technically, the DF-11 is a single-stage, solid-fuel missile with a launch weight estimated at 6,200 kg, a diameter of 0.86 m, and a length of 7.5–8.5 m depending on variant. The DF-11A, the improved version introduced in the late 1990s, increased its range from the original 280 km to approximately 600 km by reducing payload mass and improving propellant efficiency. Guidance systems have also evolved: early inertial navigation was augmented with satellite updates (BeiDou/GLONASS), giving the DF-11A a reported circular error probable (CEP) of 50 meters or less, adequate for both conventional unitary warheads and submunition payloads. The missile can carry a 500–800 kg warhead, including high explosive, fragmentation, fuel-air explosive, or potentially nuclear options, though China is believed to reserve nuclear warheads for longer-range systems.

The DF-15 is a larger system, roughly 9.1–9.8 m long with a diameter of 1 m and a launch weight exceeding 6,200–6,800 kg. Range estimates vary between 600 and 900 km depending on the variant (DF-15A, DF-15B, DF-15C). Guidance has been upgraded over time, with later models incorporating terminal maneuvering fins, radar seekers, and satellite navigation to strike hardened or relocatable targets. The DF-15C variant is specifically designed for penetrating hardened underground bunkers, with a reinforced penetrating warhead. Its TEL, the Taian TAS5450, is an 8x8 truck chassis distinct from the WS2400, but in some instances the DF-15 has been adapted for carriage on Wanshan platforms, meaning its presence on the 2025 parade vehicle cannot be ruled out entirely.

The distinction between DF-11 and DF-15 matters operationally. The DF-11 is generally considered a tactical SRBM, designed to overwhelm enemy defenses in large salvos and saturate airbases, command centers, or logistics nodes within 300–600 km of Chinese territory. The DF-15, with its longer reach and more advanced guidance, is positioned as a theater missile capable of precision strikes deeper into adversary territory, extending beyond Taiwan to include U.S. bases in Okinawa or even northern Philippines. Both systems have been deployed in significant numbers, with U.S. Department of Defense estimates in the 2010s placing combined DF-11/DF-15 launchers in the hundreds, supported by large inventories of reload missiles.

Strategically, the presence of these systems in the 2025 parade reflects continuity as well as modernization. While newer missiles like the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle system and the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile have captured international headlines, the Rocket Force continues to emphasize the DF-11/DF-15 families as reliable, road-mobile assets that complicate adversary planning. Their mobility, ability to disperse, and survivability in China’s road and tunnel networks ensure that even legacy SRBMs retain deterrent and operational value.

From a technical perspective, the 2025 parade photograph underlines the adaptability of the WS2400 platform. Beyond ballistic missiles, Wanshan’s TELs form the basis for numerous PLA systems, including surface-to-air missile launchers such as the HQ-9 and specialized engineering vehicles. The WS-series, with variants from 6x6 up to 12x12, has become a backbone of China’s road-mobile strategic forces.

In summary, the vehicle seen during the 2025 parade is best identified as a Wanshan WS2400 8x8 TEL carrying a DF-11 or DF-11A short-range ballistic missile. While the DF-15 cannot be excluded given occasional cross-platform integration, the exposed cradle and proportions point more strongly to the DF-11 family. Together, these systems remain a key element of the PLA’s missile strike capability, bridging the gap between legacy tactical weapons and the newer hypersonic and long-range systems now entering service.