China Deploys ZBD-04A Fighting Vehicles with HQ-17 Air Defense to Shield Mechanized Assault Units.

The People’s Liberation Army conducted a brigade-level combined-arms assault drill integrating ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicles with HQ-17 and PGZ-04A short-range air defense systems. The exercise highlights China’s push to keep mechanized battalions moving under drone, helicopter, and cruise missile threats, a capability closely watched by U.S. defense planners.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has staged a combined-arms assault drill that explicitly pairs armored maneuver with short-range air defense, sharpening the force’s ability to push mechanized battalions forward while denying enemy helicopters, drones, and cruise missiles the chance to break the attack. The training is tactically significant because it treats air defense not as a rear-area asset, but as a maneuver enabler that must move, sense, and shoot in step with the assault formation. In modern land warfare, the side that can keep armored vehicles moving under persistent aerial surveillance and precision attack gains the initiative, tempo, and survivability margin needed to exploit breakthroughs.
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A PLA brigade conducted a combined-arms assault drill integrating ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicles with HQ-17 and PGZ-04A air-defense systems under complex electromagnetic conditions. The exercise highlighted how mechanized forces advance under a mobile short-range air-defense shield to counter drones and low-flying threats in high-intensity combat (Picture source: China Military).

Footage circulated by Chinese military channels described a PLA brigade organizing its combined-arms battalions for coordinated offensive and air-defense training featuring ZBD-04A tracked infantry fighting vehicles, HQ-17 short-range surface-to-air missile systems, and PGZ-04A self-propelled air-defense gun systems. The equipment set is not incidental. It represents a deliberately layered, mobile shield intended to protect mechanized infantry while they close to direct-fire range, cross danger areas, and consolidate against counterattacks, all under an air threat that now includes small unmanned aircraft, loitering munitions, and helicopter-borne anti-armor weapons.

At the core of the offensive package, the ZBD-04A provides the mechanized infantry element with a balance of protection, mobility, and heavy firepower that is optimized for fighting alongside tanks. Open-source technical data describes a 24-ton class tracked vehicle carrying a three-man crew plus a seven-soldier infantry squad, with a stabilized 100 mm low-pressure gun paired with a coaxial 30 mm autocannon and machine gun, and a claimed frontal protection level intended to defeat 30 mm autocannon fire. In practice, this means a battalion of ZBD-04A can deliver suppressive fires, breach and clear defended positions with dismounted infantry, and rapidly shift between direct-fire engagements and rapid movement, while retaining enough armor to survive fragments and medium-caliber threats that dominate the forward edge of the battle area.

The ZBD-04A’s weapons layout also points to how the PLA expects mechanized infantry to fight in a high-intensity environment. The 100 mm system gives a dual role: high-explosive support against infantry and fieldworks, plus the ability to launch guided munitions in some configurations, while the 30 mm cannon provides high-rate engagement of exposed troops, light armor, and firing points. When paired with modern sights and stabilization, these attributes enable fight-on-the-move tactics that reduce exposure time, complicate enemy targeting, and compress decision cycles, especially when the battalion is executing short, violent thrusts supported by artillery and electronic warfare.

What makes the drill more revealing is the presence of HQ-17 and PGZ-04A operating as an escorting air-defense layer rather than a static umbrella. HQ-17 is widely assessed as a Tor-derived, all-weather short-range system designed to protect forward units from low-flying aircraft, cruise missiles, and other aerial threats. Open-source descriptions credit it with onboard surveillance and tracking radars, the ability to engage two targets simultaneously, and a missile carried in an eight-round loadout per launcher vehicle, with reported engagement ranges in the short-range category that vary by variant but broadly sit in the low tens of kilometers. In tactical terms, HQ-17 gives a mechanized battalion a mobile no-fly bubble that can be repositioned as the assault advances, forcing hostile aircraft and larger UAVs to operate higher, farther, or more cautiously.

The PGZ-04A, also known as the Type 95 family, adds the close-in layer that missiles alone cannot reliably provide, particularly against small drones and pop-up targets at very short range. Technical details describe a turret mounting four 25 mm cannons with a cyclic rate of roughly 600 to 800 rounds per minute per barrel and a ready ammunition load of around 1,000 rounds, complemented by four QW-2 infrared-guided short-range missiles and an S-band search radar reported around the 11 km class. This mix matters because gun systems can engage targets that are hard for radar-guided missiles to discriminate in clutter, while infrared missiles add a passive, fast-reaction option against helicopters or UAVs that attempt to mask behind terrain or electronic attack.

The combined presence of HQ-17 and PGZ-04A suggests the brigade was rehearsing a move-shoot-move rhythm in which air-defense assets leapfrog by bounds to keep coverage over the assault echelon. The tactical problem is familiar: if air defense lags, the assault becomes vulnerable at precisely the moment it is most exposed, during movement to contact, breach actions, or consolidation. If air defense moves too far forward without protection, it risks being destroyed by direct fire or artillery. Training that coordinates mechanized thrusts with air-defense positioning, radar discipline, and engagement authority is therefore about more than shooting down targets; it is about maintaining momentum under contested air conditions.

Beijing’s reasons for emphasizing coordinated armaments are both practical and strategic. On the practical side, the proliferation of drones and precision strikes has made maneuver formations increasingly detectable and targetable, pushing armies to re-learn how to survive under persistent aerial observation. On the strategic side, U.S. Army assessments of how the PLA fights in large-scale combat operations highlight that heavy combined-arms battalions built around ZBD-04A and tanks are expected to operate under an organic short-range air-defense umbrella that includes HQ-17 systems and radar-controlled anti-aircraft artillery such as the PGZ-95 family. The drill aligns with that doctrinal expectation: it is a visible rehearsal of how the PLA intends to keep armored spearheads viable when an adversary attempts to blunt an offensive with attack aviation, UAV swarms, and stand-off munitions.

The wider signal is that the PLA is continuing to prioritize brigade-level combined-arms competence where maneuver, protection, and air defense are integrated rather than deconflicted. This approach supports China’s broader modernization trajectory toward a more agile, joint-capable force designed to impose operational dilemmas on technologically advanced opponents. If drills like this become routine, they will indicate that China is investing heavily in the unglamorous but decisive skill set of keeping mechanized forces alive and moving under aerial threat, a prerequisite for any high-tempo campaign where the first side to lose freedom of maneuver is likely to lose the fight.