EXCLUSIVE REPORT: China May Strike Taiwan's Outlying Islands to Challenge US Resolve.

According to information published by the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on May 11, 2025, Beijing may opt for a limited military operation targeting Taiwan’s outlying islands, specifically the Kinmen and Matsu archipelagos, to test the boundaries of U.S. deterrence and gradually erode Taipei’s effective control over its frontier territories. The DIA’s 2025 Worldwide Threat Assessment identifies these islands as the most vulnerable to a Chinese coercive strategy, which may include naval maneuvers, economic pressure, information warfare, and so-called gray-zone operations.
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Since January 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command has conducted repeated encirclement exercises involving the 72nd Group Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN), and airborne forces (Picture source: China Military)

The Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu islands are strategic forward positions held by Taiwan, located less than 10 kilometers from China’s Fujian coast. For example, the strait separating the town of Shuitou on Kinmen’s main island from the Chinese city of Xiamen is only six kilometers wide. Once heavily fortified during the Cold War, these islands have been progressively demilitarized since the 1990s and partially opened to Chinese tourism. Despite this, they still house underground military infrastructure, including granite tunnels, high-frequency observation posts, and coastal defense batteries repositioned since the 2010s.

The Kinmen Defense Command, a formation under Taiwan’s Army Command Headquarters based in Taipei, currently maintains a garrison of around 3,000 troops. Their capabilities in heavy weaponry remain limited. Deployed assets include short-range air defense systems such as the Sky Sword I (Tien Chien 1), 120 mm mortars, towed 155 mm M114 howitzers, and CM-21 armored personnel carriers. Heavier artillery platforms like the modernized M109A6 Paladin are stationed only on Taiwan’s main island. However, recent efforts have been made to enhance coastal surveillance through the deployment of AN/TPS-117 mobile 3D radars and passive sensors along Kinmen’s shoreline.

Since 2023, Taiwan has accelerated its island fortification program including the restoration of concrete bunkers, the installation of laser-guided anti-tank systems, and the distribution of light-class ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) drones. In April 2025, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed the transfer of 12 Cardinal II tactical drones to Matsu, aimed at monitoring Chinese naval movements in the strait.

The threat outlined by the DIA is not limited to a conventional amphibious invasion. The report also explores hybrid scenarios such as limited naval incursions, the landing of undeclared “maritime security forces,” cyberattacks against port infrastructure, or even cuts to undersea cables connecting the islands to Taiwan’s mainland internet network. These actions could precede a de facto occupation without a formal declaration of war.

China, on its side, has significantly increased its military activity around the Taiwan Strait. Since January 2024, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theater Command has conducted repeated encirclement exercises involving the 72nd Group Army, the PLA Navy (PLAN), and airborne forces. In May 2025, two carrier groups operated simultaneously east and west of Taiwan, including the Shandong aircraft carrier and Type 055 destroyers. The air bases at Longtian and Zhangzhou have hosted squadrons of J-16 fighters and WZ-7 Soaring Dragon combat drones capable of extended intelligence missions near the outlying islands.

The DIA report notes that Beijing may delay a full-scale assault as long as it considers unification with Taiwan to be negotiable, its red lines remain unchallenged, and the cost of military action outweighs potential benefits. However, Beijing’s focus on Taiwan’s offshore territories fits within a broader strategy of territorial increment commonly described as “salami slicing” aimed at modifying the status quo without triggering open conflict.

The vulnerability of Kinmen and Matsu reflects a broader strategic dilemma for Taiwan. Faced with rising military and psychological pressure, Taipei is strengthening its defensive posture without heavily remilitarizing these territories, so as not to escalate tensions. The current equilibrium relies on a delicate balance between China’s ambitions, Taiwan’s resilience, and the United States’ ambiguous deterrence posture, whose response to limited aggression remains intentionally undefined.